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FOREWORD
When the Zagreb office of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the In-
stitute of Public Finance publicly presented the third volume of publi-
cations within their joint project “EU monitoring” in spring 2005 in 
Zagreb they could hardly assume or foresee the dynamics that would 
emerge shortly afterwards.
Eve of March 17, 2005, the date originally scheduled for the of-
ficial commencement of the negotiations between the EU and Croatia, 
the EU declared a postponement of the opening of the negotiations due 
to the lack of cooperation of Croatia with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. No new date was set and Croatia 
found itself in a critical situation regarding its own ambitions to join 
the EU as soon as possible. The Croatian government, however, de-
spite the difficulties in tracing and capturing General Gotovina and at 
the same time of resisting the protests of his supporters in Croatia pro-
ved its absolute willingness to get the negotiations started. On October 
3, 2005, the EU officially opened the negotiations with Croatia. Since 
then, the screening process has been in full swing, most of the chapters 
have been opened, some are already closed and Croatia’s overall per-
formance is seen to be remarkably positive, if not impressive.
This publication, the fourth volume entitled Croatian Accession 
to the European Union: the challenges of participation is being publi-
shed and presented at a time when Croatia faces the real challenges of 
transforming its society according to EU standards. During the second 
half of 2006 it became increasingly apparent that there were two pre-
conditions for ensuring the success of the highly ambitious project of 
the political elite. On the one hand, the political classes need to indu-
ce a high level of grassroots participation in the accession process. On 
the other, they have to communicate very transparently the message 
that, regardless of the requirements for EU membership, the reforms 
and transformations of society are in themselves beneficial for the co-
untry. This includes the willingness to tackle fields and sectors of soci-
ety where lack of transparency, shortage of implementation capacities, 
a highly politicised administration, poor management skills and corru-
ption are still present. 
Therefore, apart from the regular official reports on the progress 
of the negotiations by the government and international organisations, 
we deem it extremely important to continue to present a critical view 
by independent domestic experts. Two other major issues are also ad-
xiv
dressed by the publication. One highlights the importance of regional 
cooperation and Croatia’s future role as a bridging nation in the transfer 
of know-how to other countries in South Eastern Europe. The other is 
the need to overcome social exclusion on a large scale by involving all 
the stakeholders in the planning and implementation of crucial steps in 
the reforms. 
A closer look further north clearly shows that Croatia finds it-
self in the rather comfortable position of being able to learn valuable 
lessons from new EU members like Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic or Poland to name but a few. In the second half of 
2006, most of these countries are finding themselves in considerable 
difficulties which can be described as “post-accession-crisis” (Attila 
Agh). To be in a position to avoid mistakes by exchanging experts and 
information with the “group of 10” that joined the EU in 2004 is a huge 
advantage for Croatia and should be exploited on a much greater scale 
in the months to come.
Through this fourth volume within our joint project “Monitoring 
the Process of Croatia’s Accession to the European Union” we hope to 
provide a useful contribution to the public debate in Croatia and within 
the countries of the EU.
Finally, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all those 
who contributed to this project, in particular Dr. Katarina Ott, director 
of the Institute of Public Finance and editor of the book, for her contri-
butions and the excellent cooperation with her Institute, and Prof. Dr. 
Nenad Zakošek from the Faculty of Political Sciences for his valuable 
advice and assistance in editing the contributions.
Zagreb, September 2006
Mirko Hempel
Director
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Office Croatia and Slovenia
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CROATIAN ACCESSION TO THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: THE CHALLENGES 
OF PARTICIPATION
Katarina Ott*
Institute of Public Finance
Zagreb
ABSTRACT
This chapter summarizes the findings of the project of monitor-
ing Croatian accession to the European Union. It draws particular at-
tention to the challenges entailed in participation in the accession pro-
cess and in relations with European countries, irrespective of Croatia’s 
membership status. It tries to answer questions about: the place of Cro-
atia in Europe; the problems of its economy; the nature of its political 
elite and the views of its citizens, and institutions’ capacities to adapt 
to requirements of modern and open societies. Among the findings one 
could highlight: First, irrespective of the membership status, there are 
possibilities for Croatia to participate and even to try to act as lead-
er in some fields (e.g. Adriatic Sea protection) and Croatian experts 
could participate in and contribute to the discussions of EU-relevant 
topics (e.g. European citizenship or communicating Europe). Second, 
high and stable distrust in the EU, rising unwillingness to join the EU 
and views concerning the EU that are more based on impressions than 
on utilitarian considerations might lead to a Croatian “no” to the EU in 
the final moment of decision. However, if the benefits of reforms are 
reaped even without joining the EU, this does not have to be a disas-
ter for the country, although it could be a serious setback for the politi-
cal elite. Third, adaptation of the capabilities of Croatian institutions is 
despite many improvements still the weakest spot. The progress of re-
2forms has been limited and characterized by partiality, lack of strategies 
and still under strong political influences. The key words missing in al-
most all investigated fields are implementation, enforcement and action 
plans. As the end of negotiations will more depend on the implementa-
tion than on the mere adoption of EU requirements, Croatia should turn 
to an “as soon as ready” instead of an “as soon as possible” policy. 
Key words:
European Union, Croatia, accession, reforms, administrative capacity, 
legal enforcement
INTRODUCTION
This chapter summarises the findings of the project of monitor-
ing Croatian accession to the EU. It draws particular emphasis to the 
challenges entailed in participation in the EU accession process and in 
relations with European countries, irrespective of Croatia’s member-
ship status. It identifies the ideas of the project, gives a brief chronol-
ogy of the relationship between the EU and Croatia, presents changes 
in Croatia in last couple of years, details the challenges of participation 
and ends with some conclusions and recommendations.
The idea of the 2006 project was to try to answer questions for 
Croatia similar to those that citizens of France asked themselves before 
the EU constitution referendum: about the place of the country in Eu-
rope, particularly vis-à-vis the EU and vis-à-vis the West Balkan; about 
the problems of the economy, particularly in its efforts to create more 
jobs, and about the nature of the political elite. To these three questions 
we added one about the capabilities of Croatian institutions to adapt to 
the requirements of modern and open societies. 
Several or almost all the chapters try to answer the question 
about the place of Croatia in Europe, comparing its data, policies and 
institutions with those of EU members, other candidates and West Bal-
kan countries. The results are diverse from high rankings in measure-
ments of perceptions of wellbeing and happiness to huge differences 
in state aid as a share of GDP. Probably the most obvious problem en-
countered in almost all the investigated fields is the lack of reliable sta-
tistical data. This indicates the necessity of developing a system of col-
lecting and monitoring qualitative and quantitative indicators to en-
able reliable comparisons with other countries. Comparing the Croa-
3tian speed of entry into the EU and the experiences of new members 
one could conclude that capacity to meet the tight timetable and to draft 
qualitative reform could lead to poor quality of legislation, insufficient 
policy analysis, government overload and counterproductive results. 
However, the chapter on the needs for regional cooperation in protect-
ing the Adriatic Sea shows how Croatia could also act as a leader in 
proposing joint actions for several EU member and non-member coun-
tries. The chapter on European citizenship and the chapter about com-
municating Europe in which authors from Croatia, not yet the member 
of the EU, approach topics relevant for the development of EU con-
cepts and practices show that Croatian authors could also contribute to 
EU discussions. 
The problems of the economy are dealt with in a chapter on the 
Lisbon Strategy, state aid reform and health care policy and reform. 
Topics posing problems for the most developed countries are even 
more pronounced in Croatia. Goals are difficult to achieve, but could 
be used as benchmarks and for learning from the best performers. The 
main economic problems lie in the slow reforms and privatization pro-
cesses with high involvement of the state in the economy, inadequate 
education, administrative and managerial capabilities. Problems can be 
easily observed in high foreign and public debt, slow results in increas-
ing employment and poor results in decreasing public expenditures.
Instead of dealing with the nature of the political elite, which is 
partly dealt with in the chapter on lobbying and interest groups and that 
on negotiation experience, authors were more oriented to the attitudes 
of the ordinary citizen. One can find them in chapters on quality of life, 
life satisfaction and happiness; euroscepticism, and the determinants of 
the support of citizens for the EU. The results show a rather high and 
stable distrust of the EU, rising unwillingness to join the EU, views to-
ward the EU that are formed more on the basis of impressions than of 
utilitarian considerations, and dissatisfaction with the standard of living 
and social conditions. The political elite should be aware of the attitudes 
of population to avoid unpleasant surprises at the moment of the final 
decision on joining the EU. If the benefits of reforms can be reaped 
even without joining the EU, a Croatian “no” for the EU does not have 
to be a disaster for the country, but it could be a serious setback for the 
political elite. The findings of the authors, particularly concerning the 
dissatisfaction with the standard of living and with social conditions, 
are also connected with economic problems. Implementation of struc-
tural reforms aimed at increasing the competitiveness of the economy, 
4restructuring of social services and improving governance will be nec-
essary to create the conditions for utilitarian assessments. 
The capabilities of institutions to adapt to the requirements of 
modern and open societies – probably dealt with in almost all chapters 
– are, despite many developments in good directions, still the weakest 
spot. Almost all authors engaged in this project emphasize the limited 
progress of reforms, which continue to be made only partially, without 
strategies and under strong political influences. Normative versus real 
conformity with EU requirements, poor implementation and enforce-
ment, lack of action plans or implementation instruments with clear 
obligations, deadlines and reporting systems, poor administrative and 
managerial capacities, poor leadership qualities, high politicization… 
One can hardly stop enumerating the problems. As it is obvious that 
the end of negotiations will depend more on the implementation than 
on mere adoption of EU requirements, as was the case in the last en-
largement, one of the authors simply concluded that Croatia should try 
to turn to an “as soon as ready” instead of an “as soon as possible” 
policy. 
Box 1 Brief overview of European Union Monitoring Project
It all started in 2002 at the initiative and with the ﬁnancial
support of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung ofﬁce in Zagreb. The ﬁrst book
(Ott, 2003) dealt with economic and legal challenges. Major pro-
blems found were related to education, public administration, nor-
mative vs. real conformity with the EU, building of efﬁcient institu-
tions and a society that respects laws and individual rights. 
Awareness of such problems led to the second book (Ott, 
2004) dealing with institutional challenges. We stressed that dea-
ling with institutions was not only fashionable, but also important 
for both the economy and the society, as institutions could inﬂuence
development, growth and democratization. We said that adjustments 
were often just normative, bureaucracy was ﬂourishing and laws
were often poorly harmonized and deﬁcient. The key issues with or
without the accession would be: better and faster application of ru-
les and institutions; quality and depoliticisation of the public admi-
nistration, particularly the judiciary and institutions for deregulation 
and liberalization of markets. 
As we believed that we were nearing the negotiations, our 
third book (Ott, 2005) dealt with the challenges of negotiations. We 
stressed that Croatia’s future could depend on overall preparedness 
and credibility not only regarding the sole person missing as it see-
5med then; developments in Bulgaria and/or Romania; EU attitudes 
towards Turkey and fatigue of the EU with the last enlargement. 
We suggested that accession should be used as the process of tran-
sformation of the country. We said that a kind of real integration of 
Croatia in the European space already existed even without the for-
mal accession and that it should be further deepened through the 
building of institutions and harmonization with modern, democra-
tic societies. We also warned that despite the declarative dedicati-
on of Croatian government to join the EU as soon as possible, and 
despite the encouraging signals from the EU, hesitations in structu-
ral and institutional reforms could hamper not only the success of 
negotiations and delay the accession, but also hamper the transfor-
mation of the country into a modern, efﬁcient and democratic sta-
te. Unfortunately, some of the views proved to be correct before we 
even managed to publish the book, when the EU postponed the start 
of negotiations. 
Before planning this fourth book (Ott, 2006) we somehow 
started hoping that the future EU could probably go more in the di-
rection of a looser, less federalist and more decentralized club than 
an ever-tighter Union. We also started hoping that the current mem-
bers would opt for a stronger subsidiarity principle. Member coun-
tries would in that case be able to take different approaches tow-
ards the issues that would not substantially harm the principles of 
the free ﬂow of services, goods, labour and capital. If this were so,
such an EU could seem more appealing to a small country like Cro-
atia, which could certainly beneﬁt from participating in a common
market, but could hardly substantially participate in governing the 
Union. 
CHRONOLOGY OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN CROATIA AND EUROPEAN UNION
Due to the war Croatia experienced in the early 1990s and its po-
litical, institutional and economic consequences in the following years, 
country lagged behind other Central and Eastern European (CEE) coun-
tries in its relationship with the EU. The Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA) was signed in 2001, Croatia applied for EU mem-
bership in 2003 and after numerous ups and downs in the relationship, 
mostly caused by the clumsy cooperation with the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), accession negotiations 
6and the screening stage of the accession negotiations started in Octo-
ber 2005. Less than a year after that, Croatian negotiators were busy 
and quite advanced with chapters on science and research and on ed-
ucation and culture, which were opened and provisionally closed. All 
other chapters also went through various stages of multilateral and bi-
lateral screening to fulfilling the requirements for opening the chapters 
according to the report from the Commission. The most difficult ones 
were chapters on regional policy and coordination of structural instru-
ments, judiciary and fundamental rights, foreign security and defence 
policy and finally finance and budgetary provisions that did not even 
start the first explanatory stage of the screening. 
It is true that some chapters are more complicated than others. 
It is also true that Croatia’s intentions are to close the chapters faster 
than any of the previous candidates. This intention is fuelled first by the 
high expectations of the population and second by the logical conclu-
sion that country could learn from the experiences of the previous can-
didates. However, as things in Croatia are changing rather slowly, we 
could remind ourselves of the conclusions of the Progress Report of 
the European Commission (2005). After praising the positive achieve-
ment of Croatia in the previous period, Commission stated that “fiscal 
consolidation needs to be further strengthened and effectively backed 
by structural measures, in particular in the area of subsidies and social 
transfers… there are complex rules and deficiencies in public adminis-
tration and courts as well as slow market entry and exit procedures. The 
enforcement of property and creditor rights continues to be undermined 
by an inefficient judiciary. State interventions in the economy remain 
significant and little progress has been made with respect to the restruc-
turing of large state-owned enterprises in particular in the shipbuild-
ing, steel and energy sector. The strengthening of financial discipline of 
state-owned enterprises remains a particular policy challenge… Croa-
tia needs to address the identified weaknesses and problems with deter-
mination”. 
These statements could be seen as guidelines for the majority 
of the authors engaged in this project, leading them to approaches they 
deemed particularly important and interesting. 
7CHANGES IN CROATIA IN  
THE LAST COUPLE OF YEARSi
Economic sustainability
The briefest facts about the developments in the Croatian econ-
omy could be summarized in following way:
•  Economic growth is favourable (a 3.8% rise of GDP in 2004, 4.3% 
in 2005 and 6.0% in 2006/Q1) with predictions of 4.4% for 2006 and 
4.5% for 2007.
•  Inflation is accelerating from 2.1% in 2004 to 3.6% in 2006/Jan-Jul. 
and is expected to stay at similar levels in 2006 and 2007.
•  The current account deficit is growing (4.9% GDP in 2004, 6.3% in 
2005 and 6.5% in 2006/Q1) with unfavourable predictions (around 
6% in 2006 and 2007).
•  Foreign debt is increasing (80.2% GDP in 2004, 82.5% in 2005 and 
87.9% in 2006/Q1) although it is expected to decrease to 81.5% in 
2006.
•  Total public debt is slightly increasing (46.4% GDP in 2004, 47.4% 
in 2005 and 47.8% in 2006/Q1) although expected to decrease to 
around 44% in 2006 and 2007.
•  General government budget deficit is showing better results (4.6% 
GDP in 2004, 3.4% in 2005 and 2.9% in 2006/Q1) although expected 
to be around 3.5% in 2006 and 2007.
•  Tax burden (41.4% in 2004) is slightly but constantly decreasing and 
coming closer to EU averages, although the structure of taxation sub-
stantially differs (indirect taxes are over 50% of total tax revenues in 
Croatia vs. less than 40% in the EU-25 average).
•  Employment growth continues (around 1% per year), and the unem-
ployment rate fell to under 13%. 
We could say that macroeconomic trends are generally favour-
able: above average GDP growth, rising employment, decreasing gen-
eral government budget deficit, moderate growth of salaries, and slight 
appreciation of domestic currency. However, inflation, although not 
alarming, is accelerating. Current account deficit and foreign and pub-
lic debt are growing, ranking Croatia among highly indebted countries. 
Policymakers should have in mind that countries like Croatia should 
aim for much lower public debt targets than those envisaged by the 
Maastricht criteria (20-40% instead of 60% GDP). 
8Thanks to the decreased budget deficit fiscal policy could be 
evaluated positively. However, one could still be puzzled about the 
pension debt payments bookkeeping and cautious because the positive 
signs are resulting from revenue increase without any serious results 
on the expenditure side of the budget. Slow dynamics, poor results and 
scandals in privatization process are certainly not contributing to the 
improvement of the fiscal position of the country. 
Despite the still high levels of unemployment and despite the 
realistic expectations that the EU will ask for a transition period for 
workers from Croatia, the government could start thinking in advance 
and aiming for a liberalisation of the labour market. Free movement 
of workers benefits countries that have liberalized that market. It has 
helped to remedy labour market deficiencies, open new jobs, decrease 
unemployment and increase economic growth. Only two percent of the 
EU active population lives and works in other member states and the 
movement of workers is still slow. That is the reason why an addition-
al number of old member states lately further liberalised their labour 
markets. The Croatian government approved 2,600 foreign workers in 
2004 and only 1,037 in 2006 although the needs for foreign workers are 
substantially higher. The realistic number of them already working in 
Croatia could be over 10,000. They are mostly working in shipbuild-
ing, construction and tourism and come from Bulgaria, Romania, Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, Slovakia and Ukraine. Liberalisation of the la-
bour market could help to bring down the unofficial economy, corrup-
tion and criminal activities, give incentives to better quality growth of 
the economy, and remedy the mismatch of labour supply and demand 
at the same time as enabling more humane conditions for the increasing 
number of illegal foreign workers. 
Administrative capacities
Changes in the public administration in the last couple of years 
show limited progress in the application of reforms that continue to be 
made partially, without strategies and under strong political influences. 
While the European Commission in 2004 said that initial steps should 
be taken, in 2005 it required complete enforcement of reform mea-
sures. Although no results in administrative capacities building can be 
seen in the short run, changes of laws about government administration 
and changes in the number and scope of ministries and various offices 
and agencies would tend to suggest that they were not driven by ratio-
9nalizations, the incentives being found rather in combining the avail-
able manpower resources in the most effective and politically reward-
ing ways. The way in which the public administration is formed, the 
transparency of its work and respect for access to information are cru-
cial, particularly in the fight against corruption. However, we are still 
in want of definitions of bodies of the public administration, of a list of 
government officials and of the information that has to be accessible 
to the public. Strategy of the reform is still in preparation, which could 
go some way to explaining the partiality of reforms. The adopted Stra-
tegic Framework for 2006-13 (Vlada RH, 2006) defines some of the 
goals necessary for public administration reform and various new in-
centives are proposed, but it is difficult to expect the necessary politi-
cal will for their implementation in the second part of the government 
term in office. 
As a case study for administrative capacity building one could 
go deeper into the energy sector. The reform of that sector has not been 
efficient. Delays in enforcement and the necessity of further harmoni-
sation with EU requirements are stated as formal reasons for passing 
new laws. Croatia accepted the obligations of the energy sector acquis 
and the parts related to market competition, state aid, environment pro-
tection and regional cooperation in that sector, but enforcement is still 
a challenge. Some improvements are visible, but among the numerous 
further requirements of the Commission in that field, one should again 
emphasize overall improvement of administrative capacity for enforce-
ment of laws. New laws formally represent a step forward, but enforce-
ment is still problematic because of the insufficient preparations, weak 
administrative structure, legal insecurity and strong lobbying. Deficien-
cies are visible in the unreliability of data, which shows up the weak-
nesses of the controlling ministry; in lack of funding for newly estab-
lished administrative structures, which endangers their independence; 
and in frequent changes of laws raising expectations of further lobby-
generated modifications. 
The capability of Croatia to use EU regional policies funds 
shows similar weaknesses. Regional policy is segmented, regulated by 
various laws, without a strategy for regional development. Numerous 
proposals of laws and strategies exist, some important steps have been 
taken, but real documents for enforcement are lacking. All levels of 
government in Croatia should be aware that the EU can finance our 
projects but only if we also engage our funds and plan them in advance. 
That will be impossible without the enforcement of strategies, laws and 
regulations. 
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The situation in justice, welfare and civil society 
The relationship of Croatia and the EU is developing, and nor-
mative harmonization is in full gear. However, normative analyses of 
the preparedness of a country can not give a complete picture. Harmon-
isation should be looked upon together with basic requirements of rule 
of law like the division of power, democracy, political pluralism and 
independence of courts. Despite numerous achievements in satisfying 
EU legal requirements, problems still remain redefinition of SAA in the 
constitutional and legal system, including the possibility of direct ap-
plication of its provisions by Croatian courts; poor definition of the le-
gal standing of bodies like the Stability and Association Council, and 
particularly the poor definition and legal standing of decisions made by 
these bodies. The possibility of changing the constitution in connection 
with EU membership is still not on the agenda. Substantial changes in 
legal culture are needed because the constitutional court and the par-
liament still follow the authoritarian concept of unitary authority. This 
means that we need an interpretative change of course towards the val-
ues of pluralistic democracy. 
There have been few fundamental changes in social policy al-
though a number of important initiatives, projects and studies appear 
likely to have a longer-term impact. The preparation of the Joint Inclu-
sion Memorandum has increased the visibility and role of the EU in so-
cial policy in Croatia. The process has involved stakeholder dialogue 
but has drawn attention to the weakness of such a dialogue and has so 
far not facilitated inter-ministry or inter-agency cooperation as much 
as might have been hoped. It has also shown the urgent need for the 
development of comparable statistical bases. The EU has introduced a 
benchmark before the relevant chapter on employment and social poli-
cy can be formally opened for negotiations. Once again it indicates the 
need for an action plan to address the strengthening of administrative 
capacity. Besides the EU, important players in the social policy field in 
Croatia still are the World Bank and UNDP. That points to the necessi-
ty of a stronger role for relevant domestic players in development of the 
knowledge base and in setting social policy options. 
Civil society complains that although some strategies (e.g. re-
lated to development of civil society or communication with and infor-
mation of the public about the EU) do exist, enforcement is question-
able, government is yet not ready for the dialogue, a national forum on 
accession functions is mostly on paper and inclusion of civil society 
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organizations representatives in negotiations is quite weak. The tight 
time-framework for negotiations explains the hesitations or unwilling-
ness of government to include more civil society representatives, but 
the poor capacity of civil society organizations could also be a reason. 
Civil society faces a particular problem as Croatia is the only country 
with which the EU did not form a joint consultative committee to co-
operate with the European Economic and Social Committee. The Croa-
tian SAA simply lacks such a provision, which points again to our own 
incompetent approach in negotiations, for all other European Agree-
ments do contain such provisions. Whatever the reason for poor partic-
ipation of civil society in EU related activities, civil society should not 
expect the government to do its job, but should if capable, engage on 
its own and claim the information, the communication and participa-
tion possibilities. 
THE CHALLENGES OF PARTICIPATION
The following part of the chapter will try to summarize the most 
important findings of the 2006 project on monitoring the Croatian ac-
cession to the EU. 
Negotiations, communication and lobbying
Missing the 2004 enlargement process, Croatia is today in a po-
sition to learn the lessons of that accession: not only how to negotiate 
but also how to implement necessary reforms in the best possible way. 
Success in these endeavours will depend on communication of negotia-
tions and involvement of stakeholders, not only because these concepts 
are trendy, but because they are important for obtaining better results. 
The chapters in this group re-examine the issues still questionable even 
within the EU: communication of the EU as still a developing category, 
lobbying as a controversial concept, rather undeveloped in Croatia and 
EU citizenship as one of the least elaborated and concrete EU terms. 
We could ask ourselves: Who are the citizens to whom the EU is com-
municated? Do they exist? Are they the citizens of the EU or the citi-
zens of member states? Who is joining, communicating and lobbying? 
Tomislav Maršić writes about the conflicts of integration speed, 
democratic control and stakeholder participation in negotiations, look-
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ing for trade-offs among these contradictory goals. The Croatian nego-
tiations are streamlined in order to be completed in record time. They 
concentrate one-dimensionally on executive expertise, reinforcing 
problems in domestic representation and legitimisation and failing to 
accommodate to new strategic developments like enlargement fatigue 
in the EU and eurofatigue in Croatia. Strategic changes in the domestic 
negotiation set up should be made in order to ensure better representa-
tion by the parliament and a less pressured approach to accession. 
In contrast to the last enlargement the end of negotiations will 
depend more on the implementation and less on mere adoption of the 
EU requirements. Croatia will have to work more thoroughly and the 
EU will have wider leeway in rating the progress. Accession negotia-
tions are asymmetric because of the overwhelming negotiating pow-
er of the EU, but also because of the weaknesses of candidate coun-
tries, and that is the fact a candidate should have in mind all the time. 
The foreseen timetable might depend on a tacit preference for ignoring 
the widespread euroscepticism within the country and the enlargement 
fatigue within the EU. Public concerns should be taken very seriously, 
considering the option of an accession treaty being rejected by the pop-
ulation. Yet the government seems to be pushing through negotiations 
as fast as possible. The lessons of the rejection of the EU Constitution 
should illustrate the danger of political elites ignoring adequate elector-
ate representation and failing to generate the legitimacy necessary to 
engage in large scale reforms. 
Focus on quick accession at any cost rests on the presumption 
that a slower tempo would endanger the transition process. On the con-
trary, small states lacking the capacity to meet the tight timetable and 
to draft qualitative reforms could especially risk poor quality of legis-
lation and insufficient policy analysis, government overload and coun-
terproductive results. The persisting need for speed collides with the 
goals of fostering democracy. The low degree of responsibility vested 
in parliamentary representatives in the negotiations will lead to temp-
tations to abuse negotiation issues by politicisation instead of problem-
focused discussion. The author therefore recommends turning from an 
“as soon as possible” to an “as soon as ready” policy. The present situa-
tion seems to overstrain both the citizens of Croatia and the EU. 
It is not EU membership itself, but intense reforms enabled by 
the window of opportunity that should be used as a self-disciplining in-
strument. Shortening this period means less time available for design-
ing, sequencing and implementing reforms in a socially bearable way. 
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It is also necessary to turn away from a top-down to a more bottom-up 
approach, as legitimacy requires substantive rather than symbolic con-
trol of citizens over political processes and their contents. EU issues 
should be looked upon as domestic issues, since the decisions made in 
Brussels will sometime override those made in Zagreb, which should 
become clear to the Croatian parliament. The government should also 
reconsider the necessity of its “tight grip” and work to render negotia-
tions management more transparent and flexible improving conditions 
for negotiations at home and lessening rigid control of the process of 
coordination. 
Petra Leppee Fraize looks at how the EU, its member states, 
candidate countries and Croatia communicate European issues to their 
publics, emphasizing that Europeanisation of communication should 
be taken into consideration as a way of filling the communication and 
democratic deficits and of rectifying the lack of the legitimacy of the 
EU. Communication should focus not only on teaching facts but also 
on raising popular interest, as an instrument for ensuring the future 
ability to justify and win support for the integration project. Europe-
an integration was for a long time considered a project of the Europe-
an political elite, while citizens showed little interest and were not in-
volved in enlargements, treaties or policies. Consequently people feel 
remote from the EU and national institutions and the decision-making 
process. Despite a rather long process of integration, EU communica-
tion policy remains a young policy that has yet to be developed. EU 
communication in Croatia could be looked upon as a tool to acquire 
support for the final decision on accession but also for better grasp of 
the advantages of the EU and ways of coping with its disadvantages. 
Political elites in Croatia should be aware of public opinion and try to 
communicate better the rights and obligations stemming from member-
ship and the effect of the eventual accession on economic development, 
everyday life and internal policies and sovereignty. The low support for 
the integration, both within the EU and in Croatia shows that the com-
munication should be content-oriented and foster public debates. Cit-
izens should be more active in looking for information and checking 
the performance of their national and EU governments. The EU should 
take a realistic approach in creating a common sphere for communicat-
ing Europe based on more decentralised modes suited to specific polit-
ical contexts and to the diverse requirements of countries, regions and 
sectors. The success of communication will depend on the level of de-
centralisation and on bottom-up approaches. Whether it will in the end 
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result in greater or lesser support for the EU will depend on the EU re-
sults in delivering prosperity (economic growth), solidarity (social di-
mension, employment, ageing population) and security.
The EU is becoming involved in an increasing number of policy 
areas and citizens are more and more looking for channels of influence 
on its policies. Igor Vidačak explores the potential of the EU acces-
sion process for Europeanisation of domestic public policy shaping, the 
adoption of new and modern patterns of interest articulation, provid-
ing incentives for introduction of an adequate regulatory framework for 
lobbying and for legitimising the practice in Croatia. Europeanisation 
might bring not only new knowledge, autonomous sources of EU infor-
mation and new ways of thinking, but also a reorganisation and redefi-
nition of the role of interest groups in national policy processes, chang-
ing perception on good governance and good models of interaction be-
tween organised interests and the state. Interest representation and lob-
bying at EU level may prove to be a very important factor in the Euro-
peanisation of the structures, processes and contents of political deci-
sion-making in Croatia and of accepting lobbying as a legitimate dem-
ocratic practice. 
Snježana Vasiljević claims that European citizenship needs to 
be understood as a developing concept that is consequently for Croa-
tia a moving target. She explains the concept and the paradox of Eu-
ropean citizenship, its implications on fundamental rights and particu-
lar problems for third country nationals. To this day no elaborate the-
ory of European citizenship exists, its nature is limited and it could be 
looked upon as citizenship as nationality or citizenship as practice. De-
spite the influences of globalisation and multiculturalism it is still de-
pendant on national approaches towards citizenship. The EU still seems 
more interested in regulating aspects related to free movement of per-
sons (i.e. workers) than in encouraging social cohesion and placing hu-
man rights and anti-discrimination at the centre. For that to happen, the 
author suggests recognizing European citizenship to nationals of non-
EU countries legally living in the EU. But, first of all the EU should 
clarify European citizenship, what it is and what it could be. Although 
not a member, Croatia is thanks to its close and rapidly increasing con-
nections with the EU, one of the countries in which the developments 
of the European citizenship model should be closely observed. The do-
mestic understanding of and involvement in that topic could affect the 
necessary significant legal and political changes and also the success of 
negotiations. 
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Dealing with euroscepticism
As Croatian political elites have already opted for accession it 
would be pointless now to discuss whether we should or should not pro-
ceed. Croatia is already on the accession path so it should be used for 
promoting the best of the EU values and a better understanding of EU 
shortcomings. Improvement of information and communication should 
contribute to trust-building, both in national and EU institutions, but 
also to the re-questioning of EU institutions, their regulating powers, 
decision-making and requirements posed to national institutions. Key 
words are again information and communication. A reasonable reader 
must pose a question: What if thanks to better information and commu-
nication citizens form even worse views of both national and EU insti-
tutions? What if such views contribute to more scepticism and de-alien-
ation of the citizen? This is why predictions of citizen opinion are very 
important. Political elites should be aware of the attitudes of the popu-
lation, for after all the work done it might happen that after the EU says 
“yes”, the Croatian population says “no”. That could be a serious up-
set for the political elite, although it does not have to be disaster for a 
country. If acceptance by the EU meant that Croatia had transformed it-
self into a “by the book” society, the country would in that case reap the 
benefits of reforms even without joining the EU. 
Aleksandar Štulhofer deals with the characteristics of popular 
euroscepticism in Croatia, defined as a combination of distrust in the 
EU and distaste for membership by the members of public, not by the 
political elites. While distrust in the EU is relatively stable, averaging 
54% during 1995-2005, unwillingness to join the EU was until the end 
of 2003 below 20%, during 2004 it grew to about 40%, and since 2005 
the number of those who are opposed is more or less the same as the 
number of those who are for joining the EU. Motives of euroscepticism 
seem to be heterogeneous like exclusive nationalism and its sociocul-
tural, political and economic premises, while the impact of utilitarian 
motives turned out to be marginal. The lack of trust in the EU partial-
ly reflects distrust in national institutions. The usually stated reasons 
range from bruised national pride (relations with the ICTY), economic 
fears (the rise in the price of real estate, the import of cheaper agricul-
tural products, the obliteration of indigenous products), to loss of trust 
in the EU after the problems with the EU Constitution. The author did 
not find any clear socio-demographic profile for eurosceptics in Croa-
tia. The older and less-educated are more negatively inclined towards 
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joining, but the effect of both variables is weak. In the case of trust 
in the EU none of the demographic and socioeconomic indicators has 
proved significant. Popular euroscepticism is determined neither by hu-
man capital nor by personal success or lack of it during the transition. 
Irrespective of the relatively fluid structure of euroscepticism, symbol-
ic reasons like exclusive nationalism play an important role. The cor-
relation between trust in national institutions and trust in the EU con-
firms the proposition that citizens make their assessment on the basis of 
their experience with local or national institutions. It might be the con-
sequence of the lack of information about EU institutions, but in coun-
tries with low levels of participation and with little or no belief that cit-
izens can have any influence on the making of political decisions it 
might be a justification for apathy and opting-out. The author recom-
mends better provision of information, increasing trust in national insti-
tutions and creating a counterbalance to exclusive nationalism. Citizen 
trust in national institutions is strongly correlated with the perception 
of corruption among civil servants. This means that government should 
promote increased professionalism, effectiveness and transparency, 
identifying responsibilities and entailing sanctions against those who 
break the laws. Counterbalancing exclusive nationalism and strength-
ening rational attitudes toward the EU is dependent on success in creat-
ing conditions for utilitarian assessment. That means regularly repeated 
recommendations to the government: implementation of structural re-
forms aimed at increasing competitiveness of the economy, restructur-
ing social services and improving local and national governance. 
Dragan Bagić and Ante Šalinović conclude that on the basis of a 
utilitarian explanation of support it is possible only relatively poorly to 
predict viewpoints concerning joining the EU. Principled expectations 
of benefits and costs are in good part an expression of general impres-
sions about the EU, (dis)trust in the political elite and political views of 
citizens, and to a lesser extent realistic rational calculations of harms 
and benefits. One could discuss whether distrust in national institutions 
might have led those in favour of the accession to expectations that EU 
institutions might perform their functions in better way than national 
and that hope was channelled towards the EU? Or has the (dis)trust in 
national influenced (dis)trust in EU institutions? Whatever the reason 
for EU euphoria at the beginning and EU scepticism lately, the govern-
ing elite should learn the lesson. Views are formed at a relatively super-
ficial level without any great amount of information and more accord-
ing to impulse than as the outcome of rational evaluation. This might 
be the result of the low number and low quality of public debates about 
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the consequences and significance of entry into the EU. The value and 
political connotations of such a huge social decision should be formed 
in the process of public debate, but it seems that here we are more in ar-
rears than we are with respect to knowledge of facts about the EU. Un-
fortunately, it also seems that too much emphasis is placed on historical 
rather than economic aspects. The authors mention the very important 
perceptions of the attitude of the EU towards Croatia – treatment of the 
war, war-crimes, cooperation with the ICTY, relations with other coun-
tries of former Yugoslavia – that influence the views of Croatian citi-
zens towards the EU. The popular decision about the accession, much 
more than a cold and rational decision based on analyzing losses and 
gains, should be seen as a very complex social and political phenome-
non through which various aspects of the social, political and economic 
reality are refracted. 
Ljiljana Kaliterna Lipovčan and Zvjezdana Prizmić-Larsen 
compare quality of life, life satisfaction and happiness in Croatia and 
in European countries. Analyses show that Croatian citizen subjec-
tive well-being rates fit at the bottom of the EU-15 or at the top of the 
EU-13. Happiness ratings in Croatia are rather high and constantly going 
up. Satisfaction with personal life domains shows that the standard of 
living is the least satisfying, while relationships with family and friends 
were the most satisfying. Among national domains citizens are the most 
satisfied with national security and the environment and the least satis-
fied with social conditions in the country. As it is considered that happi-
ness is correlated with the progress in transition, the fact that happiness 
in Croatia is higher than in most of the transition countries seems both 
intriguing and encouraging. Well-being and happiness indicators might 
also help in evaluating attitudes towards the national and EU institu-
tions, particularly if we have in mind the “delivery factor” of the EU as 
the influential one for the euroscepticism. Dissatisfaction with standard 
of living and with social conditions, irrespective of how factually based 
they are, might indicate that utilitarian factors will become more impor-
tant in forming the views towards the EU in the course of time. 
Confronting the difﬁculties of the Lisbon  
agenda, state aid and health care reforms
The problems posed by the Lisbon agenda, state aid and health 
care reforms are tough even for the most developed countries. As these 
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problems are even more pronounced in Croatia, any improvement along 
the suggested lines would mean a move in the right direction. Lisbon 
goals are difficult to achieve, but they could be used as directions about 
where to go and how to learn from the best performers. 
Ana-Maria Boromisa and Višnja Samardžija claim that since the 
timeframe for implementation of the Lisbon agenda and Croatia’s ex-
pected accession are almost the same, approaching the Lisbon goals is 
extremely important for the country. Although they do not constitute 
additional criteria or economic goals, Lisbon objectives are relevant as 
they will soon be reflected in EU policies and they should be taken into 
account in our reform programs and action plans. It is necessary to pri-
oritize and sequence these goals bearing in mind the specific situation, 
starting position and real possibilities of implementation. The agenda 
aims to sustain economic growth with more and better jobs and great-
er social cohesion to respond to global competition with better policies, 
modernisation of the social model, environmental protection and boost-
ing research and innovation. 
The Lisbon goals should also be the goals of Croatia, but the 
threats faced by Lisbon are also the threats faced by Croatia. The au-
thors single out the disappointing delivery of Lisbon due to goals de-
fined too widely, overloaded agenda, poor coordination and conflict-
ing priorities. Weaknesses are particularly evident in labour markets, 
showing up as poor creation of jobs, regional imbalances, long-term 
unemployment and unfavourable demographic trends. Key challenges 
include increasing employment and labour market performance, sus-
tainability and quality of public finances, improving research, develop-
ment and innovation, strengthening business environment and increas-
ing skills. 
Croatia should have in mind that it will be required to align with 
more acquis than countries that joined previously, that would-be mem-
bers have to comply more strictly than members and that sequencing 
will be particularly important, especially when the time horizon for full 
membership is not known. Although Croatia introduced some of the 
Lisbon aims and objectives into various strategic documents (regard-
ing science, research, knowledge society, competitiveness, social cohe-
sion and welfare), implementation instruments are missing. There is an 
urgent need to develop action plans and other implementation instru-
ments with clear obligations, deadlines and reporting system. It is par-
ticularly important to develop the system of collecting and monitoring 
qualitative and quantitative indicators, following EUROSTAT indica-
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tors that would enable comparisons with member countries and other 
candidates. Accelerating the process of privatization and restructuring 
of state and local public enterprises plus improvements in education 
would also mean steps in the right direction. 
Ivana Jović and Marina Kesner-Škreb claim that state aid de-
viates sharply from that in the EU and that Croatia will have to make 
great efforts to harmonize it. The EU advocates less and better-target-
ed state aid, which has the least distorting effect on competition, i.e. 
horizontal aid which helps establishing a level playing field for all un-
dertakings. The state-aid-to-GDP ratio is four times higher in Croatia 
than in the EU, with the aid being mainly targeted on particular indus-
tries. Croatia will have to reform thoroughly or reduce its sectoral aid 
to the shipbuilding, transport (especially railways) and steel industries, 
as well as aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulties. It will 
also have to increase aid to horizontal objectives, improve significantly 
the transparency of state aid allocation and avoid ad hoc authorizations 
of aid to rescue certain enterprises. The Government is committed to 
reducing state subsidies, but greater efforts will be needed first of all in 
implementing short-term measures to improve transparency, strength-
ening the administrative capacity of the relevant agency and most im-
portantly the restructuring and privatization of the economy. The ship-
building and steel sectors are the burning issues, requiring prompt mea-
sures. One should again emphasize problems of administrative capaci-
ty building, privatization of the economy and decreasing the role of the 
state in the economy.
Problems facing health care in Croatia according to Dubravko 
Mihaljek are not new or unique. A key factor for the success of health 
care reform will be the authorities’ ability to manage the political econ-
omy aspects of the reform. But the technical complexity of health care 
policy and reform should not be underestimated either. Unfortunately 
Croatia lacks health care experts capable of making a much more sub-
stantive contribution to the reform than has been the case so far and 
it also lacks the management skills in the health sector to implement 
the reform. The present model of health care financing will have to be 
changed in the direction that a significantly greater portion of fund-
ing should come from general tax revenue from central and local bud-
gets than from the payroll contributions. Social benefits and costs of 
the current system of sick and maternity leave allowances should be re-
examined and simplified administrative procedures for part-time work 
introduced. To ensure more effective use of public funds, the introduc-
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tion of more competition into health care markets is needed. Public fi-
nancing does not have to mean a public provision of health care and 
as in many other countries the health care sector could function as a 
mixture of public and private providers. For that to happen authorities 
have to elaborate a consistent framework for private sector involve-
ment in health care. Also a consistent institutional, regulatory and mar-
ket framework in which private health insurance companies are expect-
ed to function and incentives for their developments should be elabo-
rated. Having people participate in bearing the costs of health care is 
the first step toward a true health care reform. Briefly, health sector is 
confronted with problems similar to other sectors – the need for priva-
tization, administrative and managerial capabilities, institutional setting 
building for new procedures and selling reforms to population.
The environment: challenges and possibilities
Environment poses challenges of coping with demanding and 
expensive EU requirements that are at the same time essential for the 
future of the country. In the same time the field offers possibilities for 
Croatia, a country with a long Adriatic Sea coastline connecting a num-
ber of countries, to achieve a position as leader in the area of sea pro-
tection and induce activities on regional and international levels. In 
both aspects institutional and administrative capacities will be crucial – 
from decision making to the final implementation, from strategic think-
ing to costly, competent, long-time work in numerous aspects of com-
prehensive environmental field that covers almost all aspects of citi-
zen life. 
Ivana Vlašić and Mirna Vlašić Feketija claim that transposition 
of the acquis, ensuring its adequate implementation and absorbing the 
pre-accession funds constitute an enormous task particularly for a small 
country. The lack of financing strategies and carefully planned timeta-
bles for implementation of the obligations sends a clear message that 
decisions should be made and actions taken immediately. While Vlašić 
and Vlašić Feketija are worried about the state of the environment Ka-
literna-Lipovčan and Prizmić-Larsen state that citizens were the most 
satisfied with national security and the state of environment. While sat-
isfaction with national security might be understandable for a post-war 
country, the high satisfaction with the state of the environment might 
be the result of unawareness of the real state and problems not only in 
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the country but also on the global scale. Despite the existing strategies 
and plans, Croatia still lacks applicable documents, specific steps to the 
fulfilment of what has been envisaged, efficient monitoring and guid-
ance on the management of the possible financial sources. A particu-
lar problem is the lack of a well-trained and experienced administration 
to cope with time-consuming tasks, stringent and rigid EU procedures. 
EU offers various possibilities of funding, the majority of which will go 
into water protection and waste disposal. These possibilities should be 
seen as instruments to improve the environment and to endorse specific 
economic activities that could be considered a comparative advantage 
for the country. The overall administrative capacity at national, region-
al and local levels will determine the level of the absorption of avail-
able EU funds. Appropriate staffing policy will be a key to successful 
institutional-capacity strengthening, which requires a careful develop-
ment of long term-plans to recruit and train staff. Additional dedication 
of the decision-making level in the administration to set the priorities 
as well to the operational level to successfully manage the programmes 
is needed. At decision-maker level, resolution is required in setting pri-
orities, while at implementation level the same resolution must be ap-
plied to the successful management of the necessary programmes. It all 
revolves around the insufficient administrative capacities and scarce fi-
nancial resources. As in all other fields, administrative-capacities build-
ing seems a more serious problem than financial scarcity. 
Davor Vidas discusses the need for the designation of the Adri-
atic Sea as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) and the Croatian 
initiative towards regional cooperation in that direction.ii The rationale 
for this inheres in the special features of the Adriatic Sea while the pol-
icy context was set by the trends within the EU and by the evolving EU 
Marine Strategy. The PSSA status could provide a significant regional 
cooperative framework, in line with EU policy and highlight the aware-
ness of the vulnerability of the Adriatic Sea. Although that sea connects 
six countries the lengths of their coasts vary, from Croatia stretching 
over 75% to Slovenia only 0.5% of that coast. The Italian share of the 
coast is only 15%, but it annually receives 75% of the total commercial 
ship traffic and 80% of cargo. Italy accordingly accounts for over 75% 
of ballast water introduction in the Adriatic ports. Although all Adriatic 
countries certainly should be interested in protection of their own and 
the common sea, the above figures speak enough about the particular 
need of Croatia to strive for achieving the best possible protective mea-
sures. It is particularly important because of the reliance on and orien-
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tation towards tourism, fishing, agriculture and preserving life on nu-
merous islands already facing depopulation. Numerous ideas and plans 
worked out together with some of the Adriatic countries already ex-
ist, but Croatia should take a step further with a concrete proposal for 
designating the Adriatic Sea a PSSA. Croatian and Norwegian institu-
tions already work on a cooperative project and if everything goes as 
planned a joint Adriatic PSSA proposal might work out in 2007. This 
example shows that even without membership status, Croatia could 
navigate through EU possibilities. EU Marine Strategy Directive is di-
rectly applicable only to the EU members and waters covered by their 
sovereignty or jurisdictions, but member states are required within each 
marine region or sub-region to make every effort to coordinate their ac-
tions with third countries. In this case two members, one candidate and 
three aspirants might benefit from that requirement and Croatia might 
make a position for itself as a competent regional player. Of course, 
it all just might happen, but only with determination, competency and 
hard work of Croatian government. 
CONCLUSIONS
It is not difficult to imagine the main EU principles such as lib-
erty, democracy and respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms 
and the rule of law, as well as fundamental social rights and values like 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality 
between women and men as objectives for Croatia. These values at 
least on paper are recognized by all societies, but it does not harm to 
repeat them as often as possible. In that sense the EU should be a role 
model for Croatia. The increasingly frequently recognized motto of the 
EU “Unity in Diversity” could also be appealing both for joining the 
EU and for its application within the country. Of course the threats of 
the EU because of its bureaucratization and overregulation should also 
not be overlooked. 
Fulfilment of Copenhagen political, economic and legal-insti-
tutional criteria, at least to the level that would satisfy the EU, would 
mean that Croatia had reached the goals of a modern, capable and open 
society, irrespective of the potential EU capability to absorb the 28th 
member. As there exists a kind of consensus that in a long run the EU 
has achieved more in the economic than in the political sense, as long 
as the EU delivers economic benefits it will be attractive for current 
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and would-be members and the economic stance will affect the stance 
towards further enlargements. It is of course questionable what “deliv-
ery” might mean for the EU as a whole and for its members. Any eco-
nomic slow-downs within the EU certainly would not be propitious for 
further enlargements. As the institutional structure of the EU has been 
envisaged for 27 members, Croatia – potentially the 28th member – fac-
es a particular problem often overlooked within the country. It seems 
that in Croatia more emphasis is often put on the decision of France that 
it will hold a referendum on any new accession after Bulgaria, Roma-
nia and Croatia. That fact might be comforting, but also the previous in-
stitutional constraint (although remediable) should not be overlooked. 
One should also have in mind various ideas like “modular integrations” 
or “part-memberships” that could also be envisaged even for Croatia, 
not only for countries like Belarus or Ukraine. Such inventive EU solu-
tions do not have to be perceived as a tragic outcome for Croatia. 
Implications of the findings of this work might be summarized 
in a following way:
•  Comparisons with other countries show different results from high 
rankings in measurements of well being and happiness perceptions to 
big differences in state aid as a proportion of GDP. The most impor-
tant problem encountered is lack of reliable data bases, which results 
in the necessity of collecting and monitoring qualitative and quantita-
tive indicators to enable reliable comparisons with other countries. 
•  The economic situation is burdened with the slowness of reforms and 
privatization, and high involvement of the state, resulting with high 
foreign and public debt, dilatory results in increasing employment 
and poor results in decreasing public expenditures. 
•  Irrespective of membership when particularly interested and capable, 
Croatia could try to give initiatives and use the opportunities avail-
able in the EU, as in the protection of Adriatic Sea.
•  Even without membership status, Croatian experts could contribute 
to the discussions of EU topics like communicating the EU or Euro-
pean citizenship models.
•  Popular views might become more important than the views of politi-
cal elites and they should be carefully observed. For that reason com-
munication, interest representation and citizen participation should 
be promoted and developed.
•  Capabilities of Croatian institutions are still the weakest spot. This 
means that administrative and managerial capacity building and im-
proving local and national governance will be crucial and even more 
important than the eventually insufficient financial sources.
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•  Croatia needs accelerated privatisation and restructuring of state and 
local public enterprises, decreasing state intervention in the economy, 
restructuring social services, deregulation of markets, particularly of 
services and more flexible and open labour markets, all aiming at in-
creasing competitiveness of the economy.
•  Improvements in education and training not necessarily heading to 
increased expenditures but reforms oriented towards enabling con-
ditions for the long-term modernization of curricula and diminishing 
the mismatch of labour force demand and supply will be crucial.
•  Key words mentioned as lacking in almost all chapters of the book 
are implementation, enforcement and action plans. 
•  Depoliticization and political determination, competency and will to 
undertake substantial reforms and changes will be crucial, particu-
larly in circumstances when political elites are dominant and citizens 
apathetic and alienated. This is necessarily connected to a capacity to 
develop a public administration capable of mastering new procedures 
and selling reforms to the citizens. Success will depend on leader-
ship that does not produce only plans, agendas and proclamations but 
visible results in the form of economic growth, a functioning market 
economy and the capacity to withstand competition on the one hand 
and a functioning administration that will protect and enhance the 
values of democracy and the rule of law on the other. 
Reforms are always painful and one could expect that for exam-
ple public sector employees who are extremely protected in comparison 
with the majority of those employed in the private sector will obstruct 
changes. They will think twice whether to support changes that might 
benefit the unemployed or young. The willingness of all citizens – trade 
unions, employers, pensioners or patients – who will besides their own 
interests have to have in mind the interests of their children and grand-
children, particularly those already looking for employment and those 
that will be joining this group in future, their ability to obtain loans and 
buy apartments, will be crucial. Of course, the courage of politicians to 
undertake the risk of losing at the next elections will be important too. 
Without liberalization, diminishing the role of the state in the econo-
my, changed role of the government, redirection of state aid from ver-
tical to horizontal purposes, better education, accepting modern tech-
nologies and entrepreneurship in a world characterized by globalization 
and liberalization of capital and labour markets, Croatia could encoun-
ter problems coping with more competitive countries. Briefly said, we 
need readiness of citizens to support changes and willingness of politi-
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cians to undertake the risk, plus a public administration capable of re-
forming first itself, then the whole public sector. Faster privatisation not 
only of big systems like the postal bank or oil industry, but also of nu-
merous state owned shares on all levels of government could accelerate 
the process. Real emphasis on an efficient judiciary, the fight against 
corruption and transparency of the public sector, briefly, a real depoliti-
cization of all aspects of the society, is needed. 
*  The author wishes to acknowledge comments and useful suggestions of peer review-
ers. Eventual errors are the sole responsibility of the author. 
i  This part of the text beneﬁted from inputs of colleagues who closely monitor their
ﬁelds of interest and expertise and I would like to thank them in alphabetical or-
der: Ana-Maria Boromisa, Mirta Kapural, Ines Kersan-Škabić, Danijela Kuliš, 
Dubravko Mihaljek, Siniša Rodin, Paul Stubbs, Igor Vidačak and Siniša Zrinšćak.
ii  As deﬁned by Vidas, PSSA is an area that needs special protection through action by
the International Maritime Organization because of its signiﬁcance for ecological,
socio-economic or scientiﬁc reasons, and because it may be vulnerable to damage
by international shipping activities. 
26
LITERATURE 
Bagić, D. and Šalinović, A., 2006. “Analysis of beneﬁts and harms
as a factor in citizen support to Croatian accession to the European 
Union” in: K. Ott, ed. Croatian accession to the European Union: 
the challenges of participation. Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance: 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 161-188.
Boromisa, A.-M. and Samardžija, V., 2006. “Croatia and the Lisbon 
strategy: convergence towards goals?” in: K. Ott, ed. Croatian ac-
cession to the European Union: the challenges of participation. Za-
greb: Institute of Public Finance: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 209-237.
European Commission, 2005. Croatia: 2005 Progress Report [online]. 
Available from: [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_
documents/2005/package/sec_1424_ﬁnal_progress_report_hr_
en.pdf].
Jović, I. and Kesner-Škreb, M., 2006. “State aid reform in Croatia” 
in: K. Ott, ed. Croatian accession to the European Union: the chal-
lenges of participation. Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance: Fried-
rich Ebert Stiftung, 239-276.
Kaliterna Lipovčan, Lj. and Prizmić-Larsen, Z., 2006. “Quality of 
life, life satisfaction and happiness in Croatia in comparison to Eu-
ropean countries” in: K. Ott, ed. Croatian accession to the Europe-
an Union: the challenges of participation. Zagreb: Institute of Pub-
lic Finance: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 189-208.
Leppee Fraize, P., 2006. “Communicating Europe: the challenge of eu-
ropeanisation of communication” in: K. Ott, ed. Croatian accession 
to the European Union: the challenges of participation. Zagreb: In-
stitute of Public Finance: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 57-84.
Maršić, T., 2006. “Assessing the negotiation experience: quick acces-
sion or good representation” in: K. Ott, ed. Croatian accession to the 
European Union: the challenges of participation. Zagreb: Institute 
of Public Finance: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 29-56.
Mihaljek, D., 2006. “Health care policy and reform in Croatia: how to 
see the forest for the trees” in: K. Ott, ed. Croatian accession to the 
European Union: the challenges of participation. Zagreb: Institute 
of Public Finance: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 277-320.
Ott, K., 2003. “Croatian Accession to the European Union” [online] in: 
K. Ott, ed. Croatian Accession to the European Union: Economic 
and Legal Challenges. Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance: Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung, 1-24. Available from: [http://www.ijf.hr/eng/EU/ott.
pdf].
27
Ott, K., 2004. “Croatian accession to the European Union: institutional 
challenges” [online] in: K. Ott, ed. Croatian Accession to the Euro-
pean Union: Institutional challenges. Zagreb: Institute of Public Fi-
nance: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1-20. Available from: [http://www.
ijf.hr/eng/EU2/ott.pdf].
Ott, K., 2005. “Croatia and the European Union: accession as transfor-
mation” [online] in: K. Ott, ed. Croatian Accession to the Europe-
an Union: Facing the Challenges of Negotiations. Zagreb: Institute 
of Public Finance: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1-30. Available from: 
[http://www.ijf.hr/eng/EU3/ott.pdf].
Štulhofer, A., 2006. “Euroscepticism in Croatia: on the far side of ratio-
nality?” in: K. Ott, ed. Croatian accession to the European Union: 
the challenges of participation. Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance: 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 141-160.
Vasiljević, S., 2006. “The concept of European citizenship” in: K. Ott, 
ed. Croatian accession to the European Union: the challenges of 
participation. Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance: Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung, 113-140.
Vidačak, I., 2006. “Lobbying and channels of inﬂuence of Croatian in-
terest groups in an enlarged European Union” in: K. Ott, ed. Croa-
tian accession to the European Union: the challenges of participa-
tion. Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 
85-111.
Vidas, D., 2006. “Particularly sensitive sea areas: the need for regional 
cooperation in the Adriatic Sea” in: K. Ott, ed. Croatian accession to 
the European Union: the challenges of participation. Zagreb: Insti-
tute of Public Finance: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 347-380.
Vlada RH, 2006. Strateški okvir za razvoj:2006-2013 [online]. Zagreb: 
Središnji državni ured za razvojnu strategiju i koordinaciju fondova 
EU. Available from: [http://www.nhs.hr/download/STRATESKI_
OKVIR_ZA_ RAZVOJ.pdf].
Vlašić, I. and Vlašić Feketija, M., 2006. “The importance of envi-
ronmental protection: Croatia in the European Union accession pro-
cess” in: K. Ott, ed. Croatian accession to the European Union: 
the challenges of participation. Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance: 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 321-346.

29
Chapter 2
ASSESSING THE NEGOTIATION 
EXPERIENCE: QUICK ACCESSION  
OR GOOD REPRESENTATION?
Tomislav Maršić*
ABSTRACT
This article examines the negotiation phase on two levels: First, 
it assesses domestic organising, the processes of adopting a negotiating 
position and the relevant actors involved. By a comparative analysis of 
the experiences from Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary, “best manage-
ment” practises will be condensed. These are subsequently applied to 
Croatian negotiation management in order to identify potential prob-
lems. In a second step, the findings will be put into the wider context 
of the political consequences of the negotiation strategy, providing rec-
ommendations for alternative modes of domestic organising. It will be 
argued that the Croatian negotiation structure is streamlined in order to 
match ambitions to complete negotiations in a very short time. How-
ever, this institutional set-up concentrates one-dimensionally on execu-
tive expertise and reinforces problems in domestic representation and 
legitimisation. It therefore fails to accommodate to new strategic devel-
opments like enlargement-fatigue in the European Union and “euro-fa-
tigue” in Croatia.
Key words:
European Union, Croatia, accession negotiations, negotiation team, 
democratic deficit
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INTRODUCTION
The start of accession negotiations is one of the most complex 
parts of the accession process to manage politically, because it is the 
moment when “political realities begin to sink in” (Grabbe, 2003:4)i. 
This paper investigates the negotiation phase, attempting to clarify the 
processes involved and Croatia’s institutional responses, and also anal-
yses possible problems. The first part of the paper examines the proc-
ess of the accession talks, since awareness of the structural conditions 
of negotiations is a prerequisite for further analysis. Subsequently, a 
comparative analysis of past institutional set-ups is provided, focusing 
on individual advantages and shortcomings.ii The Croatian negotiation 
structure will be subsequently projected against these findings, identi-
fying potential problem areas in the domestic communication and deci-
sion-making chain.iii The paper concludes with recommendations con-
cerning the lay-out of the negotiation strategy and alternative modes of 
domestic organisation.
Accession negotiations from the perspective of the acceding 
country are governed by different underlying norms.iv In this article 
attention is drawn to the conflicting norms “integration speed”, “demo-
cratic control” and “stakeholder participation” which played a promi-
nent role in the experiences of the countries of the last enlargement 
wave. Their realisation poses a dilemma to policy-makers in weigh-
ing normative arguments against each other in order to find a trade-off 
between these contradictory goals. 
As for instance increasing “democratic control” would require 
the inclusion of more actors (e.g. the parliament) into the negotiation 
structure, this would have adverse effects on the “integration speed” as 
coordination processes become more complex. At the same time, incre-
asing the participation of stakeholders in order to raise expertise and 
networking skills runs at the cost of “democratic control” as these ac-
tors are not elected representatives of the public.
Against this background it will be argued firstly that the Croatian 
negotiation structure is streamlined in order to fit ambitions to complete 
negotiations in record time. This institutional set-up however, concen-
trates one-dimensionally on executive expertise, reinforcing problems 
in domestic representation and legitimisation and also failing to accom-
modate to new strategic developments like enlargement-fatigue in the 
EU and “euro-fatigue” in Croatia. This leads to the conclusion that stra-
tegic changes in the domestic negotiation set-up should be impleme-
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nted, in order to ensure better representation by the parliament and a 
less pressured approach to accession – a project which means nothing 
much less than the complete recreation of Croatia’s political system.
ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS:  
A PROCEDURAL OUTLINE
Accession negotiations are “bilateral, state-level negotia-
tions”, with the key interlocutors “at home” being the chief negotiators 
and their teams, and a relatively small number of ministers (Grabbe, 
2001:4). They are not so much political but rather technical talks in a 
sense of “negotiating harmonisation” (Lajh, 2003:9). The strategic ba-
sis are the Agenda 2000 program for enlargement (European Council, 
1999) and the Accession Partnership (Commission, 2005a), concretely 
specified in the (yearly) National Program for the Integration of the Re-
public of Croatia into the EU (MFAEI, 2006).
Real negotiations in the sense of bargaining take place only in 
three contexts. The largest part of the actual negotiations is carried out 
“at home” by finding a national position in concert with the societal 
actors affected.v Second, according to the principle “nothing is agreed 
until everything is agreed” in the end phase of the process, a complete 
package deal has to be achieved with the implication of budgetary is-
sues. In addition, the candidate has informally to engage in negotiations 
on open bilateral issues with the concerned member states. Throughout 
the whole negotiation process the role of public opinion must not be 
underestimated because it can have a significant impact on a member 
(or candidate) country’s negotiating position.
In its strategy paper, the Commission (2002:13) states that “ac-
cession negotiations are based on the principle that candidates accept 
the acquis and apply it effectively upon accession”. Some exemptions 
(“transition periods”) are allowed but they have to be “limited in time 
and scope and be accompanied by a plan clearly defining stages for the 
application of the acquis”. In very rare cases so called “derogations” 
were put in place which allowed the accessing country long-lasting 
exemptions from specific regulations of the acquis.
Although the Commission negotiates on behalf of the mem-
ber states, all decisions (such as opening and closing of chapters) have 
to be made unanimously by the Council. Still, the Commission plays 
a very important role in negotiations, as its proposal to the Council 
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often predetermines the latter’s “Common Position” – the “answer” to 
the negotiation position of the candidate. 
Usually two position exchanges complete one chapter, although 
more difficult issues can demand three (or rarely more) rounds. A chap-
ter is closed only preliminarily until all chapters are negotiated. In con-
trast to the last enlargement wave, the closure of chapters is now seen to 
depend to a greater extent on the implementation of their contents and 
not so much on their mere adoption. This qualitative difference means 
that Croatia will have to work more thoroughly in closing the chapters, 
while it gives the EU wider leeway in rating Croatia’s progress. 
The enlargement sessions are held at intergovernmental (or: 
negotiation-) conferences twice during an EU presidency, one time at 
the level of deputies (Committee of the Permanent Representatives on 
the EU side, chief negotiators on side of the candidate) and one time 
at the level of ministers. In particular, focus is placed on the progress 
achieved by the candidate countries which is monitored by the Com-
mission through progress reports and peer reviews.
Since the EU is a rigid negotiating partner with very limited 
space to manoeuvre, the negotiation process is qualified by “condition-
ality” (the need to meet EU requirements) and “hierarchy” (Grabbe, 
1999). It is characterised by a structural asymmetry in bargaining pow-
er in favour of the EU, which in the past led to the label “policy-tak-
ing instead of policy-making” (Payne, 2003:34). As this asymmetry is 
not only caused by the overwhelming negotiation power of the EU, but 
also by the weaknesses of the candidate countries themselves, particu-
lar importance is attached to the organisation of the negotiation team. 
Accordingly, the next section will deal with the question of how three 
countries, Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary, organised their management 
with respect to leading negotiations on EU accession.
NEGOTIATION MANAGEMENT  
STRUCTURES IN COMPARISON
Estonian negotiation management
Estonian negotiation management was characterised by a com-
paratively flexible and informal structure with a strong overview from 
the central government (Payne, 2003:30). The negotiation structure 
was decentralised, with strong line ministries being responsible for the 
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harmonisation of law, the implementation of the accession agenda and 
advising the relevant working group of the negotiation team (Drechsler 
[et al.], 2002). In the course of negotiations, team leadership shifted 
from the foreign minister to the prime minister, who took over the man-
agement of the accession process shortly before the start of the negotia-
tions. This led to a floating centre of policy coordination, split between 
the prime minister’s State Chancellery and the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs.vi This development also partly originated from the fact that rela-
tions with the EU started as international relations and evolved into do-
mestic affairs. 
The prime minister directed the whole process and was respon-
sible for coordination at the highest level at a weekly and informal “Eu-
ropean meeting” at which the cabinet discussed EU issues. This coordi-
nation role varied to a large extent by the self-definition of the respec-
tive government and its system and was rather the result of situational 
factors than a planned move.vii A newly established cabinet committee 
at ministerial level (Commission of Ministers for EU Affairs) acted as 
a discussion body for preparing negotiating positions to be adopted in 
government (Brusis [et al.], 2000:5). It was chaired by the prime minis-
ter and consisted of the core ministers.
The Office of European Integration was a structural unit of the 
State Chancellery, subordinate to the prime minister; it coordinated na-
tional preparations, mainly providing policy cooperation between the 
line ministries. The Office chaired the Council for Senior Civil Serv-
ants which prepared and approved the presented material and acted as 
a coordinating body, providing solutions to more complex inter-minis-
terial issues.
The foreign minister’s Bureau for Negotiations was responsi-
ble for overall process related coordination and synchronisation of the 
work of the Negotiations Delegation and the working groups. In the 
beginning of the process it channelled all communication between the 
national and the EU level until this was deemed to be counterproduc-
tive as it led to time lags and weak contacts between the line ministries 
and the EU.
The role of the parliament was to provide acceptance and to rub-
berstamp the government’s EU policy. The European Affairs Commit-
tee had twelve members from all political parties, in addition to mem-
bers from all the standing committees.
The mission acted as a vertical channel of information between 
the EU and the domestic government and hosted attachés from most 
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ministries, which gave direct tasks to their respective officials. Nev-
ertheless, the mission’s relations with interest groups remained weak 
throughout the process.
Figure 1 Negotiation structure of Estonia
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One of the main lessons of the Estonian experience was that 
the smoothness of the overall coordination was dependent on the gene-
ral quality of personal contacts at the top of political decision-making 
structures. Of crucial importance was the direct access of the leader of 
the Office of European Integration to the prime minister for the author-
isation of resolving inter-ministerial conflicts. The particular success 
factors of the Office as the main horizontal coordination body were its 
flexibility, small size, openness and speediness in decision-making.
The decentralised approach with strong line ministries helped to 
avoid creating “islands of excellence” privileging the part of the staff 
dealing with EU issues leaving the rest with little expertise. At the same 
time the decentralised system needed very effective coordination as it 
was at risk of single actors avoiding dealing with issues that could be 
handled by somebody else.
The above mentioned dual character triggered problems in the 
exchange of information as some ministerial officials complained about 
the need for double reporting – to the prime minister’s State Chancel-
lery and to the Foreign Affairs Ministry. In this sense the Estonian exa-
mple shows that the establishment of informal contacts sometimes 
proved to be necessary, while at the same time it was recognised that 
they produce plenty of unrecorded information, which are lost to the 
organisation when the specific person leaves.
Slovenian negotiation management
Slovenian negotiation management was characterised by high 
formalisation and high transparency as a consequence of far-reaching 
integration of societal stakeholders and parliament.viii The decision to 
join the EU was supported by a strong societal and political consensus 
and did not generate huge controversy at the national level. Europe-
an integration meant a gradual “internalisation” of EU matters as “do-
mestic matters”, as well as putting the relevant horizontal and vertical 
coordination structures into place (Fink-Hafner, 2002). The decision to 
set up the independent Government Office for European Affairs (see 
below) showed that the key actors did not want to deal with EU inte-
gration in a traditional diplomatic sense and put an end to the informal 
coordinating role of the Foreign Ministry.
The negotiating team was explicitly established to ensure the 
prevalence of expertise over political or sectoral interest – one core cri-
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terion for staff recruitment was the absence of any affiliation to a po-
litical party. The team was responsible for the drafting of negotiating 
positions and consisted of thirty-one working groups headed by senior 
officials from the relevant ministry or government institution. Negotiat-
ing positions were co-ordinated at meetings of all working groups and 
formulated with extensive support from the relevant ministries. Subse-
quently, the draft positions were submitted to the government and the 
parliament for approval. All negotiating positions were fully published.
The prime minister was not very attentive to day-to-day issues 
but focused on strategic matters. He kept constant contact with the 
key actors, particularly the relevant ministers at the weekly “European 
Meeting” and resolved inter-ministerial conflicts.
The bulk of the policy coordinating work was carried out by 
the Government Office for European Affairs, led by a minister with-
out portfolio. While at the beginning it was set up within the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, in course of negotiations it became gradually inde-
pendent.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs channelled the document flow 
between Ljubljana and Brussels through the Mission of Slovenia to the 
EU. The mission’s experts were predominantly recruited from the line 
ministries and provided analysis and technical support. The Embassy 
of Slovenia to Belgium played a rather informal role in the emerging 
network of the Slovenian Business and Research Association. The lat-
ter proved to be an important channel of information and was financi-
ally supported by two ministries.
The Parliament had the tasks of aligning Slovenia’s legislation 
with the acquis and debating as well as adopting the proposed negotiat-
ing positions after they were discussed by the Parliamentary Commit-
tee on Foreign Policy. The Commission for European Affairs engaged 
in public debate and coordinated EU issues within the Parliament as a 
whole.
Throughout the accession process, the line ministries remained 
the main centres of the articulation of national positions, while the 
main strategic questions fell within the responsibility of the prime min-
ister. The foreign minister acted as formal chief negotiator and set the 
political guidelines while the “European minister” held rather techni-
cal meetings on the progress of the negotiations. Despite the central 
position of the Government Office for European Affairs, the Slovenian 
negotiation structure developed a multitude of centres while the line 
ministries remained in the lead in the formulation of negotiating posi-
tions.
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Figure 2 Negotiation structure of Slovenia
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The formal communication channelled through the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs at times proved to be too rigid and gradually led 
to complementary informal channels of communication, especially be-
tween state actors and EU bodies in Brussels. The contacts of the Slov-
enian Mission to the EU facilitated quicker response to EU demands 
and became even more significant after accession.
Hungarian negotiation management
The Hungarian accession negotiations were supported by a 
broad domestic consensus for acceding to the EU in general and for 
the negotiating positions in specific (Ágh [et al.], 2003). After a change 
of government in 1998, the negotiation management saw a centralised 
structure with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the core with very lit-
tle involvement of outside parties or interest groups (Payne, 2003:31)ix. 
The significance of the ministry’s leadership was a direct consequence 
of the relatively minor involvement of the “remote” prime minister. The 
cabinet seldom discussed accession management in detail – the prime 
minister was usually only involved in issues with significant impact 
on daily politics. The ministers were briefed on the negotiations by the 
foreign minister and handled the details of the policy issues. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinated vertical relations 
with the EU, led the negotiation delegation and reported to the govern-
ment and the parliament while at the same time it was host to the cen-
tral bodies in the management of EU business.
The most important such body was the State Secretariat for 
Integration which became the centre for government decisions as well 
as single process and policy coordinator of the work of the line minis-
triesx. The Secretariat was headed by a state secretary, who was directly 
responsible to the minister. It chaired the Inter-ministerial Committee 
for European Integration, which was responsible for coordination at the 
level of senior civil servants. It was composed of expert groups estab-
lished according to the chapters of the acquis and headed by state sec-
retaries leading the European integration departments in the line min-
istries.
The negotiation delegation, chaired by the foreign minister, was 
the formal body charged with handling the accession negotiations. It 
had twelve permanent members from the Secretariat and senior civil 
servants representing the most important ministries and state agencies. 
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Most of the actual negotiations were carried out in an informal way 
through meetings with staff members and ambassadors of the European 
Commission and the permanent representatives of the member states. 
The chief negotiator used a variety of personal contacts with his negoti-
ation counterparts in Brussels and prepared reports for the government 
based on his assessment of the situation on the spot.
Figure 3 Negotiation structure of Hungary
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In the so called “European Integration Council” the foreign min-
ister held regular consultations with representatives from trade unions, 
employers’ organizations, chambers of commerce, etc. (The Hungarian 
Quarterly, 2001). All ministers were obligated to consult economic and 
social partners when they formulated positions on matters within their 
competence.
A Parliamentary Committee on European Integration Affairs 
was established, which had the tasks of monitoring the harmonisation 
of Hungary’s laws with the acquis and raising public awareness (Bes-
senyey Williams, 2000:13). The committee lacked expert staff and the 
financial resources to fulfil these tasks and was one of the least influen-
tial standing committees in parliament – the idea of transforming it to 
a grand committee was rejected by Prime Minister Orbán. The Parlia-
ment as a whole was not able to perform as a communication channel 
for organised interests (Ágh, 1999:843).
The principle of “speaking with one voice” resulted in all com-
munication flows passing through the Secretariat thus rendering the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the head of the Secretariat and the chief 
negotiator the key players. Although the leadership of the Secretari-
at provided guidance in the process of accession, the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs was but a line ministry and as such neither authorized nor 
empowered to resolve inter-ministerial conflicts. At the same time the 
“remote” approach of the prime minister depoliticised and profession-
alised the process (ibid, 107).
CROATIAN NEGOTIATION MANAGEMENT: 
A VIEW FROM CROSS NATIONAL 
COMPARISON
The Croatian negotiation structure is, like Hungarian manage-
ment, highly centralised and is dominated by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and European Integration (Vlada RH, 2005a).xi The structure is 
characterised by a high concentration of procedural and political power 
on a limited number of persons at strategic points with a high level of 
control.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration is an 
amalgam of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the former Min-
istry of European Integration, unified in March 2005 in an ad-hoc de-
cision. An interviewee reported that since unification, the ability to co-
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ordinate, in the sense of pushing line ministries to draft the necessary 
legislation, had deteriorated since the speed of legislative harmonisa-
tion declined. At the same time civil servants responsible for the co-
ordination of the EU pre-accession funds reported considerable com-
plications in working processes due to the handling of essentially two 
ministries. Further critics claim that organising accession by the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs instead of an extra-resort ministry would send out 
the wrong message (expert interview). This is consistent with experie-
nces from Slovenia and Estonia, the former having set up a governmen-
tal body led by a minister without portfolio and the latter seeing a shift 
of power from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the prime minister in 
course of accession negotiations.
The minister holds a powerful role as she is directly responsi-
ble for leading direct talks within the “State Delegation” while simul-
taneously chairing the central policy coordinating body (Coordination). 
The weekly-convening Coordination consists of all ministers, the chief 
negotiator and the negotiator of the respective field of discussion (with-
out a vote). It is responsible for coordinating the negotiation team and 
the line ministries and decides by majority voting. The Coordination 
tackles issues for which no solution has been found at the level of sen-
ior civil servants (expert interview).
In view of the experience of Hungary, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (chair in the Coordination), being only a line ministry, might 
well lack the authority effectively to find proactive solutions in inter-
ministerial disagreements. In countries with a top policy coordination 
structure at senior civil servant level enjoying direct connection to the 
(prime) minister (e.g. Slovenia), establishment of the coordination at 
ministerial level is not an uncommon choice in the context of the ne-
gotiation structures evaluated here, but in terms of transparency and 
stability it is not necessarily the best option. A politicised coordination 
may work well within an environment of broad domestic support, but 
can easily be destabilised when this consensus fails. However, it has to 
be acknowledged that some degree of political control has to be main-
tained as “negotiations between bureaucracies do not necessarily con-
tribute to the development of shared values as a basis for new govern-
ance structures” (Grabbe, 2003:4). In this context the probably most in-
teresting finding from the comparative analysis is that the performance 
of the similarly streamlined management structure in Hungary with re-
spect to decision making on a negotiating position was comparatively 
slow (Payne, 2003:33) while relatively quick in Slovenia, where the 
parliament as an additional veto player confirmed and adopted every 
draft position.
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The prime minister’s role to date has been somewhat similar to 
that of the “remote” prime minister in Hungary, who was involved only 
in issues with a significant impact on daily politics. He is informed 
in a weekly cabinet meeting where EU business is the first item on 
the agenda (expert interview). However, according to the experiences 
above, with increasing dynamics and a growing agenda the prime min-
ister might see the necessity of becoming more involved in negotia-
tions business.
The negotiating team consists of the fifteen negotiators, the Am-
bassador of the Mission of Croatia to the EU in Brussels (the mission) 
and is chaired by the Chief Negotiator and his two deputies. The Chief 
Negotiator manages the work of the working groups which participate 
in screening and draw up the draft proposals of negotiating positions. 
He has a dual role, which includes preparing the positions and negoti-
ating them directly with the Commission and the member states. The 
15 negotiators convene in the weekly “negotiators meeting” where the 
progress of negotiations is discussed (expert interview). As seen in the 
above examples, the line ministries have a rather indirect but power-
ful role as their practical expertise results in a leading technical posi-
tion and high representation among the working group members. Most 
of the higher-positioned members of the negotiation structure originate 
directly from the state administration or a state-affiliated agency. Out 
of fifteen negotiators, eleven come from state institutions, two from the 
scientific sector and two from economic interest groups. Among the 
thirty five working group leaders, this ratio amounts to 26:7:1, while 
one is self-employed (Vlada RH, 2005c). The selection of the negotia-
tors was largely based on criteria of membership in state administra-
tion and agencies, and did not exclude those with party alignment, as 
e.g. in Slovenia. Expert interviews confirmed that in some cases of se-
lecting the negotiators or working group leaders, it was not the person’s 
proficiency level but interpersonal contacts that were the decisive fac-
tors. Still, the European Commission has underlined the proficiency of 
the team on many occasions. Despite signs of party political involve-
ment in the establishment of the structure, it will probably be possible 
to keep party politics out of the negotiation team. By contrast, a bigger 
issue will be whether the negotiation team can be kept out of party poli-
tics in the long-run (see below). 
The Secretariat of the Negotiation Team is the focal point of 
process coordination and primarily provides technical and adminis-
trative support to the State Delegation, the Negotiating Team and the 
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working groups. It is led by an assistant minister of foreign affairs (di-
rectly responsible to the minister) who simultaneously acts as a nego-
tiator. Contacts within the Croatian negotiation structure are strictly 
channelled through the Secretariat which in some way plays the role 
of a “dating-service” in finding and connecting the responsible part-
ners between the institutions. It thus acts as network point for horizon-
tal contacts (e.g. between working groups and line ministries) as well 
as for the vertical communication with EU institutions in Brussels (ex-
pert interview). 
This system proved to be rigid in Slovenia and Estonia, where 
it led to time lags and other difficulties in the communication between 
the national administration and EU civil servants (which the Secretari-
at seeks to control). The Estonian case revealed that weak contacts be-
tween the line ministries or working groups and the EU administra-
tion can add to the emergence of isolated “islands of excellence” in 
the domestic administration. Despite the Secretariat’s determination to 
keep control of the information flow, direct and informal communica-
tion channels evolved between some of the structure’s bodies (e.g. be-
tween working group members and civil servants in Brussels), bypass-
ing the Secretariat as a result of pressures of time and the need to sim-
plify procedures.
All countries relied on institutionalising a formal or informal 
body for interest groups, representing union and employer organisa-
tions in the negotiation process. This body was in all cases limited to 
monitoring, spreading information and networking of interest groups 
with EU institutions in Brussels. In Croatia interest groups are not or-
ganised in an extra body, but instead send representatives to the Na-
tional Parliamentary Committee (however without voting rights). Even 
though interest groups seem to represent a large deal of the working 
group members, they are present within the structure and thus are “un-
der control” of the dominating state-associated actors.xii
The “National Committee for monitoring negotiations for acces-
sion to the EU” set up in Parliament is responsible for supervising and 
giving guidelines on the drafting of positions. It consists of the presi-
dents of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, the Committee of Europe-
an Integration, the Committee for Inter-parliamentary Co-operation as 
well as five representatives from the ruling and five from the opposi-
tion parties and decides by unanimous vote. Its additional members, the 
representatives of the President’s Office, the academic community, the 
unions and the employer associations have only observer status with-
out any voting rights. The chairperson of the Committee, who is a rep-
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resentative of the biggest opposition party in parliament, holds regular 
consultations with the president of the Republic, the prime minister, the 
president of Parliament, the head of the state delegation and the chief 
negotiator. 
Figure 4 Negotiation structure of Croatia
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Source: Vlada RH, 2005a; author´s interviews and illustration
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While in expert interviews committee members confirmed that 
the governmental information policy has been to date satisfactory, the 
chair expressed discontent with the fact that the Committee only receives 
“governmentally approved” information (Šarić, 2006). The Committee 
is not designed to play an independent controlling role since some of its 
members lack competence and dedication (ibid.), while the absence of 
significant technical and analytical capacities means it is impossible to 
counterbalance dependence on governmental resources.xiii 
The symptom of a weak parliament is reflected by the tight grip 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The structure’s design fits the needs 
of an ambitious timetable that does not allow for widespread discussion 
of potentially controversial issues. Yet, it should be kept in mind that 
flexibility (Estonia) and openness (Slovenia) proved to be important 
factors in successful negotiations. The concluding section will outline 
why it might be worthwhile considering a different strategic approach 
to negotiations, which would enable a more thorough, balanced and in-
tegrative approach.
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE INTEGRATION 
STRATEGY: QUICK ACCESSION OR GOOD 
REPRESENTATION?
The existing negotiation structure reflects the priorities of the 
integration strategy, originally devised in the context of government 
change in 2000, focusing on high integration speed. Since then, how-
ever, the background parameters have changed considerably. While 
then the possibility of joining the EU together with Romania and Bul-
garia seemed an ambitious but still attainable goal, this option is not 
open any more. Still, government and parliament plan to access the EU 
within a period of time shorter than that recorded by any new members 
to date.xiv Two trends, however, one domestic and one within the EU 
will put large constraints and question marks on the foreseen time ta-
ble.
On the domestic side, there is a silent preference for ignoring the 
widespread “euroscepticism” among Croatian citizens, while far-reach-
ing reforms will put even more stresses and strains on the population. 
Whereas in 2000 the levels of public support for European integration 
were encouraging, today polls show a rather unstable picture. This is 
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even more striking against the background of increasing trends of eu-
roscepticism which could be observed during the negotiation phase in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Therefore, public concerns should 
be taken very seriously, considering the realistic option of an acces-
sion treaty being rejected by the population, as happened for instance 
in Norway.xv Yet, the only prevailing governmental measure to coun-
ter this stance seems to be pushing through negotiations as fast as pos-
sible.
At the same time, debates within the EU institutions and mem-
ber states on what is called “enlargement fatigue” reflect the decreasing 
level of public approval for further enlargement by states from (South) 
Eastern Europe. One important background reason lies in the unre-
solved problem of the EU’s internal decision structure still drawing on 
the EU-15 at the time of the Nice Summit in 2000. While attempts at 
reform failed with the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France 
and the Netherlands, the EU will first need to adjust its decision-mak-
ing system to the enlarged Union before it is prepared to admit new 
members.xvi,xvii This is reflected in the debates on “enlargement capa-
city”, in which voices calling for freezing enlargement after the acce-
ssion of Bulgaria and Rumania find more and more acceptance.xviii Re-
solving this fundamental problem will require a difficult and probably 
long process in which public opinion in the member states will play a 
decisive role. In this context the lessons of the rejection of the Constitu-
tional Treaty as a project imposed “top-down” should illustrate the dan-
ger of political elites ignoring adequate electorate representation and 
failing to generate the legitimacy necessary to engage in such large 
scale reform. 
The overall focus on quick accession at any cost is part of the 
dominating norms that govern enlargement. This focus rests on the 
shaky presumption that a slower tempo would endanger the whole tran-
sition process. On the contrary, however, especially small states in the 
past lacked the capacity to meet the tight timetable and to draft qualita-
tive reform. In the case of Estonia “the overload and time pressure were 
major reasons for the poor quality of legislation and insufficient policy 
analysis” (Raik, 2004:588), while Ágh (1998) sees the management of 
EU accession in CEE as “a typical case of state or government over-
load, therefore it has been […] politically counterproductive [...]”. The 
above mentioned development in Croatia, with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs showing signs of problems with coordination capacity through 
the declining number of laws harmonised should be seen in this con-
text.
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At a more basic level the persisting “need for speed” of the ac-
cession strategy collides with the goal of fostering democracy (see, 
among others: Beichelt, 2003) by exerting pressures to streamline the 
domestic negotiation process, rendering it the “hour of the executive” 
(Lippert [et al.], 2001:994). Consequently, the democratic deficitxix of 
the EU institutional system, itself overloaded with executive decision 
power, weak parliamentary control and long legitimacy chainsxx (for 
an overview see: Føllesdal, 2004) is being exported to Croatia – rather 
silently, in the form of adaptation pressures to the EU decision making 
process.xxi This in turn happens at the risk of sacrificing participation 
and control of the stakeholders concerned, above all citizens and their 
parliamentary representatives. 
This problem was partially addressed by the establishment of 
the National Committee.xxii As seen above, however, this body has no 
veto power and rather resembles a “debate club”. This is in line with 
the Parliament’s “traditional” politically marginalised position in the 
political system, despite the improvements in the last decade (Zakošek, 
2002:90). Its weak integration in the accession process continues this 
tradition by respective path-dependencies, similar to the Hungarian 
prime minister’s claim that “in practice it is frequently not the Parlia-
ment that is controlling government, but the reverse” (cited after Bes-
senyey Williams, 2001:31). xxiii 
While older member states were able to develop mechanisms of 
national parliamentary scrutiny of the government incrementally as re-
sponses to step-by-step European integration, accession countries like 
Croatia have to adapt to the political system of the EU in a very short 
time. This, however, does not leave room for a responsive adaptation of 
legislative control, as path-dependent institutional processes require a 
wider time horizon. At the same time, effective national parliamentary 
scrutiny is the most important institutional mode of controlling the gov-
ernment in order to provide for representation and legitimacy. Effective 
scrutiny in turn is largely dependent on the domestic political system 
and the general strength of parliament, which is, as pointed out above, 
quite weak in Croatia (for a discussion of conditions for effective scru-
tiny, see Raunio, 2005).
In turn, low degree of responsibility vested in parliamentary rep-
resentatives in the negotiation process will lead to temptations to abuse 
negotiation issues by politicisation instead of problem focused discus-
sion. The National Committee’s alleged strength – its political weight 
reflected by its overwhelming composition of high-ranking party rep-
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resentatives – might also be its greatest weakness. Party politicians will 
hardly miss the chance to compete in defending alleged “national” in-
terests when they are not made responsible for real decisions over ne-
gotiating positions. This is significantly reinforced by the construction 
of the National Committee with very limited access to independent ex-
pertise and the obligation to reach a unanimous vote. 
The conflict potential has already been demonstrated by severe 
political fights between the two big parties, which led to several anno-
uncements of the opposition leader to withdraw support from the Na-
tional Committee. Considering the still early stage of the negotiations 
it seems doubtful that party political quarrelling over negotiating posi-
tions will not be transported into parliament. These dissensions, togeth-
er with a widespread popular perception of the legislature as merely a 
“law-passing machine”, have led to further recoil from “politics” and 
a reinforcement of ongoing delegitimation trends.xxiv Research in this 
field suggests that euroscepticism among Croatian voters can to a sig-
nificant part be traced back to distrust in national institutions, especial-
ly parliament (Štulhofer, 2006). Its preparedness neither effectively to 
control the government in the process of negotiations nor adequately to 
represent the citizens might reinforce this vicious circle and render it a 
mere “facade of democracy” (Rüb, 2001:47).
In light of these arguments, a change in accession management 
should be considered; such a change might have the following ele-
ments:
•  Turn away from an “as soon as possible” to an “as soon as ready” 
policy. Encouraging though an ambitious entry date might be, in the 
present situation it seems to overstrain both the citizens as well as 
the Union. It should be kept in mind that it is not EU membership it-
self that will solve pressing problems, rather the intense reform pe-
riod enabled by the “window of opportunity” and the unique dynam-
ics of the accession period, which should be used as a self-disciplin-
ing instrument. Shortening this period means less time available for 
designing reforms, for sequencing them and to implement them in 
a socially bearable way. Eventually rising scepticism in the EU to-
wards further enlargement should not lead to hectic reactions but to 
a display of determination by more thorough reforms combined with 
high-level political lobbying.
•  Turn away from a top-down to a more bottom-up centred approach 
by installing a parliamentary veto point. It should not be forgotten 
that legitimacy requires control of the citizens over political proce-
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sses and their contents – a control that needs to be “substantive rather 
than symbolic” (Dryzek, 2000:79ff.). A parliament effectively con-
trolling government could play an important role in channelling the 
(often diffuse) eurosceptical attitude of many citizens, returning le-
gitimacy and reintegrating a large part of the society in Croatia’s way 
to the EU. Furthermore, this approach reduces probable, very damag-
ing party politicisation tendencies by making representatives respon-
sible and forcing them to let their words follow deeds.
•  Internalise European Affairs. In the Croatian political system Euro-
pean integration is still treated like a foreign policy issue where tra-
ditionally weak or no legislative control is exerted and the role of 
the parliament lies mostly in ratifying of international treaties. As the 
above experiences in the accession process suggest, European inte-
gration issues are domestic issues, since the decisions made in Brus-
sels will sometime override those made in Zagreb. Thus, the National 
Committee in Parliament should be upgraded to a grand committee 
with open meetings, sector specific sub committees, as well as ade-
quate resources and analytical support. 
•  Reconsider the tight grip of governmental control rendering negotia-
tion management more transparent and flexible. This entails: (i) Im-
proving conditions for “negotiations at home” by enhancing system-
atic participation and integration of interest groups, actors from the 
field of science or other concerned stakeholders and (ii) Lessening 
rigid process coordination allowing for more flexible contacts be-
tween the national and the EU level, thus avoiding the emergence of 
“islands of excellence”. At the same time all informal communica-
tion needs to be recorded in order to avoid loss of information to the 
organisation.
*  I would like to thank Katarina Ott and two anonymous reviewers for improving this 
article by providing helpful comments and suggestions.
i  In this paper it is implicitly assumed that accession to the EU is desirable.
ii  The cases for the comparative analysis were picked on the grounds of a comparative 
research project “Organising for EU Enlargement: A Challenge for the Member 
States and the Candidate States (′Managing Europe From Home′)”, a six-country 
comparative study on the impact of the EU on structures and processes of national 
public policy carried out under the EU Framework V Programme (see: http://www.
oeue.net/). For the purpose of this article a number of studies on candidate states 
were used to depict accession management in order to beneﬁt from the uniform
methodological approach applied in all three cases.
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iii  For that purpose in-depth expert interviews were held in January and February 
2006 with individuals from all levels of the negotiation structure and the National 
Committee in Parliament, ranging from working group members via high ranking 
senior civil servants to politicians. The names of the interviewees will not be 
exhibited in this article but are known to the author.
iv  As such, Raik (2004:567) identiﬁes for instance inevitability, speed, efﬁciency and
expertise.
v  This is especially underlined by the Hungarian experience where the actual 
difference between the national and the EU level disappeared in course of 
negotiations, rendering the EU “another stakeholder (but a powerful one) in the 
national negotiations in formulating the Hungarian government’s negotiating 
position” (Pálvölgyi et al., 2003:22).
vi  In order to structure the cross-national analysis, a difference will be made between 
process and policy coordination (for similar distinctions, see: Brusis, 2000:12; 
Davis, 1997:126ff.). Process coordination means the management of procedures and 
the integration of the most important actors at the speciﬁc stage of the negotiation
process. Policy coordination entails strategic policy formulation and “political” 
coordination as maintaining functionality of coordinated bodies.
vii  While Prime Minister Mart Laar (in ofﬁce 1999-2002) had to outbalance a
foreign minister who was member of a different party, his successor Siim Kallas 
was member of the same party as the chief diplomat and thus able to concentrate 
more on negotiation issues. Still, even in Laar’s term, the role of the prime minister 
continuously increased reaching its peak in 2002.
viii  For example, civil society and independent experts were explicitly invited to co-
operate in the formulation of the draft positions.
ix  In this article, only the management structure relevant for accession negotiations 
(under Prime Minister Orbán) will be referred to. 
x  In course of reorganisation in 2002 it was renamed State Secretariat for Integration 
and External Economic Relations.
xi  It has to be noted that at the time of writing this article (February/March 2006) the 
structure has not yet become fully functional. At the same time, experience with past 
management forms shows that changes within the institutional conﬁguration can
(and probably will) occur within the negotiation process, either through political 
decisions (e.g. changes in government) or informal developments leading to quasi 
facts. Yet its theoretical design alone and experiences made during the ﬁrst screening
sessions provide for a clear picture of the structure’s core features.
xii  According to the report of the chief negotiator to the government (Vlada Republike 
Hrvatske, 2005b:2), from 1,591 people in the working groups, 701 are “not in the 
system of state administration”. Still, it has to be taken into account that some of 
the 701 non-civil servants come from scientiﬁc institutions, thus leaving the exact
origins of the working group members unclear. It might be interesting to note that 
869 members alone are dealing with the chapters connected to agriculture.
xiii  To date there is only one secretary employed while for the future, ﬁve further
employee positions are planned (expert interview). Yet, this still will not make up for 
the lack of supportive expertise.
xiv  The government expects to ﬁnish negotiations speedier than the candidates from the
last round because of policy and institutional learning and the share of the acquis 
already transposed. It plans to close all negotiation chapters by the end of 2007 in 
order for Croatia to take part in elections for the European parliament in 2009.
xv  In Norway’s referendum in November 1994 the accession treaty was narrowly 
rejected (47.7% in favour).
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xvi  With the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, also the “Protocol on the Role of 
National Parliaments in the European Union” was rejected, which provided for 
stronger information rights, their participation in a “ﬁrst reading” of EU proposals
and a “subsidiarity control” which even included a veto right under certain 
conditions.
xvii  France and Germany already stated their preference for deepening to further 
enlargement, while Germany showed some signs of a changed approach towards 
the accession of the “Western Balkans” by applying its concept of a “privileged 
partnership”, originally invented for labelling its preferred mode of relations with 
Turkey. 
xviii  “Enlargement capacity” was to date a merely theoretical aspect of the Copenhagen 
criteria deﬁning the basic conditions for accession to the EU. This concept played a
big role in the amendment of the 2005 enlargement strategy of the Union (Commission, 
2005b) by a report from the European Parliament from mid-march 2006 (European 
Parliament, 2006). There it is stated that the EU is only able to admit new members 
if they can be integrated as well. According to the report, this situation is not given 
at the moment. Having in mind the development of the discussion on enlargement, 
only progress in EU deepening will allow for progress in enlargement.
xix  As differentiated by Scharpf (1996), this democratic deﬁcit is being discussed for the
European and the national level.
xx  The term “legitimacy chain” describes the chain between those making decisions and 
those being affected by them. Critics point out that this link between the sovereign on 
national and political actors on EU level is too long and non-transparent.
xxi  The mechanisms for this export are emulation (“copying” EU institutions) and 
conditionality (EU requirements favouring institutional modes that give preference 
to executives). Examples for a mixture of both are the institutional consequences 
emerging out of the SAA. Its governing bodies are the Association Council 
(political decision body governed by high executive ofﬁcials) and the Association
Committee (civil servants from respective ministries) whereas the third body, the 
Joint Association Parliamentary Committee just makes non-binding proposals to the 
Association Council.
xxii  The decision about the establishment of the Committee was made after few minutes 
of debate in a late parliamentary session. In a ﬁfteen minutes break the party leaders,
the prime minister, the foreign minister and the chief negotiator made the decision 
behind closed doors and thus gave a blow to representatives who pledged to call 
an extra morning session in order to discuss the issue extensively (Hrvatski Sabor, 
2005c).
xxiii  In the context of discussion on countering the democratic deﬁcit on EU and national
level, stronger national parliaments (of member states) are usually connected with 
intergovernmental models of European Integration, which also include strong 
national governments and a strong Council of Ministers. The opposite model of 
parliamentarisation includes strengthening European-level actors, like the European 
Parliament and the Commission. As this article refers to the pre-accession period, 
arguments for strengthening the national parliament are not supposed to provoke 
connotations with the intergovernmental perspective.
xxiv  In this context, there is evidence that satisfaction with democracy is higher in 
consensual democracies, where input from opposition parties is included by the 
government (see Anderson et al., 1997).
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Chapter 3
COMMUNICATING EUROPE: THE 
CHALLENGE OF EUROPEANISATION  
OF COMMUNICATION
Petra Leppee Fraize*
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration
Zagreb
The single biggest problem in communication is the illusion that 
it has taken place.
George Bernard Shaw
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the issue of communicating Europe to the 
European public, the importance of which has been accentuated by the 
acknowledged existence of a communication gap in the European Uni-
on. The paper looks at the experience and practice in the field of com-
munication and refers to evidence of how the EU, its member states, 
candidate countries as well as Croatia have so far communicated Eu-
ropean issues to their publics. The findings suggest several conclusi-
ons. Firstly, the practices resorted to so far have had an impact on the 
democratic feature of the EU and the public support it has acquired, but 
also on its practical everyday functioning. Secondly, there are nume-
rous elements that account for the difficulties that exist in making the 
communication of Europe truly successful. Thirdly, the Europeanisa-
tion of communication should be taken into consideration as a way of 
contributing to the filling of the communication gap. Communication 
focusing not only on teaching facts but also on raising people’s interest 
about European issues has become an EU policy of growing importan-
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ce and a crucial instrument for ensuring the future ability to justify and 
win support for the European integration project. 
Key words: 
communication, information, democratic deficit, communication defi-
cit, Europeanisation, Constitution (European Union Constitutional Tre-
aty), European Union, Croatia 
INTRODUCTION
From the beginning of the European integration process until 
the mid 90s, in line with the perception of the EU as an elitist project, 
communication with the public was marginalised and carried out on an 
ad hoc basis. During the last decade, due to the evolution of the process 
(increase of EU competences, broadening of its scope of action) and 
the rise of public awareness, various general and topic-oriented com-
munication strategies were adopted.
So far, communications have not been entirely successful beca-
use they were not based on principles of good communication. Instead 
of focusing on citizens’ interests and needs, the EU and its members 
presented the information they wanted to distribute. At the same time 
the implementation of communication strategies was inadequate and 
fragmented.
In recent years, partly due to internal events such as the 2004 
enlargement and the Constitutional Treaty (hereafter the Constitution) 
ratification, communication has become an important item on the prio-
rity lists of EU institutions (e.g. the Barroso Commission was the first 
one to have nominated a special vice-president for communication), of 
presidencies, such as the Irish, Dutch, and Austrian, as well as of mem-
ber states.i The EU has adopted a new approach to information and 
communication and introduced specific proposals to enhance openness, 
transparency, accountability and the participation of European citizens 
in decisions about the future Europe. Nevertheless, due to various rea-
sons and obstacles, the EU’s success in communicating Europe is still 
limited in scope.
The paper touches upon five communication-related issues. Fir-
stly, it introduces the concept of democratic and communication defi-
cit. Secondly, it stresses the importance of the communication concept 
and policy. Thirdly, it gives an overview of what the EU, its members 
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and candidate states as well as Croatia have done so far in this field. 
Fourthly, it identifies some of the features of communication that often 
act to its disadvantage and account for its limitations. Finally, it explo-
res the concept of Europeanisation in relation to communication and its 
potential improvements. In the conclusion the paper draws attention to 
elements that need to be taken into account when devising and imple-
menting communication strategies. It suggests that Europeanisation is a 
means to improve the communication of Europe.
DEMOCRACY AND THE COMMUNICATION 
DEFICIT
In recent years there have been debates about the concept of 
democratic deficit in the EU. Considerable efforts were put into analy-
sing it and regularly led to the conclusion that an element inherent to 
this issue is the notion of a lack of legitimacy in the EU. The deficit is 
reflected in the ideas that power holders are not sufficiently accounta-
ble, nor are their decisions responsive to public preferences or subject 
to their scrutiny (de Vreese, 2003; 2004). These discussions worked as 
a trigger for changes introduced into the development of the EU, such 
as direct European Parliament (hereafter Parliament) elections back in 
1979 or the Constitution’s proposal to link the future choice of Euro-
pean Commission (hereafter the Commission) president to results of 
the Parliamentary elections. These changes were introduced in order to 
create a more direct link between the formerly European Communities 
and latterly European Union institutions and the European public.
Today, the EU seems equally to be suffering from a communi-
cation deficit. Communication is one of the many complex issues that 
account for the political crisis that Europe is facing at present. In many 
ways the two deficits are intertwined and exhibit similar symptoms – in 
order to preserve democratic features and justify its continuous existen-
ce, the EU needs to improve communication with its stakeholders, i.e. 
citizens. Democracy is more than merely giving citizens the possibili-
ty to take a decision in a referendum – it is “not a mechanical process 
of aggregating preferences and determining majority opinion” (Kurpas, 
Meyer and Gialoglou, 2004:1). Its requirements can only be fully met 
when complemented by communication. To the extent that European 
institutions and states provide information, they are well advised to 
avoid “feeding” citizens knowledge based on propaganda. Instead they 
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should try and bring European issues home and render them meaning-
ful to people in their daily lives. Above all, raising public awareness 
concerning the EU seems a valuable endeavour, since it contributes to 
the legitimacy and sustainability of the project. Thus a basis is created 
on which the public can form an opinion or even engage in governance 
in an active and responsible way. 
Throughout the EU history there has been evidence of a com-
munication deficit: the no votes in the referendums (Maastricht Tre-
aty in Denmark in 1992, Nice Treaty in Ireland in 2001, euro in Sw-
eden in 2003, Constitution in France and the Netherlands in 2005); a 
record low turnout at the last Parliamentary elections (below 50%) and 
the 2003 accession referendums (e.g. Hungary 46%); a recorded decli-
ne in levels of trust in European institutions (European Commission, 
2005:19-20); general support for EU membership and evidence of a 
rise of negative EU sentiments across Europe not only in traditional-
ly eurosceptic countries like Britain and Denmark, but also in founding 
members such as France and Italy.ii Inadequate communication is fur-
ther reflected in different perceptions of the same concept. For instan-
ce, referring to the same Constitution during ratification referendums, 
French voters argued that under the Constitution their country’s power 
would diminish, while the Dutch were of the opinion that the big coun-
tries, like France, would become stronger (Mulvey, 2005). Finally, de-
spite the fact that over the years the citizens’ own perception of the ex-
tent to which they are informed has become more positive, knowledge-
related questions indicate that citizen awareness and basic knowledge 
about the EU is still very low (European Commission, 2002:86-99). 
The communication gap between the EU and its citizens is not 
new, but today it seems to be greater than ever. As the June 2005 Euro-
pean Council showed, it coincides with a general state of a deep crisis 
in the EU that goes beyond the need to handle the Constitutional issue. 
What seems to be a big issue is the EU capacity properly to absorb the 
ten new member states and the general enlargement fatigue. The fact 
that “old” Europe seems to be saturated by successive accessions partly 
accounts for some of Europe’s current issues, such as the slowing down 
of the further enlargement process. However, the fatigue can also be 
considered a result of insufficient, unsuccessful and often biased com-
munication in the old member states before enlargement. In addition, 
people feel remote from the EU institutions and the decision-making 
process. Voter apathy indicates that the importance of Community deci-
sions and their impact on a national policy is not yet established facts 
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among citizens. Views differ on how to resolve the problem of recon-
ciling global competitiveness and innovation with social security and 
environmental sustainability. There is a sense of uncertainty about the 
finality of the European project and a virtual collapse of a shared, com-
mon view on what the basic purpose and objectives of the EU should 
be (Palmer, 2005). All this puts the issue of communication at the heart 
of the European crisis.
IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATION
The importance of communicating Europe is multifold. Firstly, 
lack of proper and continuous communication can have an impact on 
the democratic concept of the EU, resulting in the low turnout at Par-
liamentary elections. Another result comes in the form of practical re-
percussions in the everyday functioning of the Union, such as the dilu-
tion of the Constitution ratification process, blocking the future effici-
ent functioning of the organisation. 
Secondly, the right to information, freedom of expression and 
communication among citizens and power holders are at the heart of 
democracy in Europe and underpin political systems at the European 
and national levels.iii In line with these principles, all European citizens 
have the right to fair and full information about the EU, to access infor-
mation in their own language, to express their views, to be heard and to 
have an opportunity for a dialogue with the decision-makers. After all, 
EU decisions have impacts on various areas of public life and accordin-
gly merit close public scrutiny and involvement (Kurpas, Meyer and 
Gialoglou, 2004:2).
Although sometimes used as synonyms, there is a clear distin-
ction between information and communication. Information is a one-
way flow of facts and figures whereby a certain policy or particular 
measure and their implementation are presented (often associated with 
a top-down approach). Communication, on the other hand comprises 
information presented in the form of key messages adapted to particu-
lar audiences, and requires an interactive approach. In the EU context 
this two-way process is reflected in the fact that Brussels both dissemi-
nates and receives information. 
Thirdly, communication is crucial for the provision of the kind 
of knowledge about the EU capable of bolstering support for the insti-
tution. As the first Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty showed, the 
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anti-EU camp had successfully taken advantage of the lack of knowle-
dge by putting forward a simple but powerful line: If you don’t under-
stand it, say no. As European issues are increasingly becoming salient, 
holding referenda may become a new trend. Ignorance of the electorate 
can prove risky to future political decisions. This holds true whether a 
referendum relates to a given state or to a group of states. France, for 
instance, plans to hold a referendum on every enlargement after the ac-
cession of Croatia; the recent no-votes in the referenda concerning the 
Constitution affected supporters and opponents equally strongly. 
Fourthly, communication is a tool with which to win support for 
certain measures that have been adopted and to enhance the chances 
of their successful implementation. There is a growing trend of public 
protests and referendums for the expression of views and decision ma-
king on issues such as membership, key policies, endorsement of treati-
es and constitutional documents. In this context public opinion has be-
come an important benchmark for political decisions and is often likely 
to be incorporated in policy making (de Vreese, 2004:3). It can be noted 
that resort to direct democracy rather than reliance on parliamentary re-
presentation and dissatisfaction with party politics are evident trends in 
almost all European countries. This may, therefore, not be an EU-speci-
fic problem, but it still underlines the general value of communication 
– communication matters, because public opinion does. The challenge 
put before communication is to facilitate exchange, the learning pro-
cess and dialogue (European Commission, 2006:13).
It can be debated whether there is a direct correlation between 
communication policies and public support for the EU. One could also 
contest the assumption that a well-informed citizen would necessarily 
be pro-EU. Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, our working hypot-
hesis is that a (good) communication strategy and sound knowledge 
will tend to make the EU more acceptable.
Communicating Europe in the European Union
Although the project is over 50 years old, and was initiated by 
democratic Western European states, an analysis of information and 
communication policy in the EU shows that the process of integration 
was not really communicated until relatively recently. The circumstan-
ces in which the project was launched (the aftermath of the Second 
World War, the beginning of the Cold War) enabled the integration pro-
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cess to start without any direct popular influence or approval. Over the 
course of time, European cooperation had a positive effect on econo-
mic and political stability. All of a sudden, citizens were encouraged 
to require information about national politics and to be involved in the 
national decision-making process. However, for quite some time Euro-
pean integration was considered a project of the European political eli-
te, while citizens showed little interest in European issues and were not 
involved in the development of different integration aspects (enlarge-
ments, treaties, policies, etc).
After the initial negative Danish referendum on the Maastricht 
Treaty, stronger emphasis was put on “getting Europe across”. The idea 
was to stimulate a debate on Community matters, improve public par-
ticipation in the decision-making process and strengthen public confi-
dence in European administration. However, until the mid 90s the cre-
ation and implementation of policy related to communicating Europe 
was mainly within the remit of European institutions, and their appro-
ach to activities was limited. Once a special Press and Communica-
tion Directorate-General was created, the Commission brought its ca-
pacities for the analysis of public opinion and the press, for the design 
and implementation of information campaigns and day-to-day political 
communication together under one roof. 
The first impetus to fostering communication came at the time 
of creation of the monetary union when Communication on the In-
formation Strategy for the Euro was adopted in 1998. The communi-
cation, explaining the reasoning behind a common European currency 
and the mechanisms for its introduction, was rather successful. It ado-
pted a decentralised implementation approach and adapted information 
to the specific characteristics of individual countries and target groups. 
By contrast, the Communication Strategy for Enlargement for Period 
2000-2006 (2000) failed to define any specific concrete actions to be 
deployed, which left EU representations, member states and candida-
te countries on their own to devise communication tools. In 2002 the 
Information and Communication Strategy for the European Union cal-
led for a coherent and comprehensive EU information and communica-
tion policy. It envisaged the EU capacity to formulate messages focu-
sed on priority issues and to disseminate them in partnership with the 
member states. Taking into account the problem of persistent ignorance 
about and indifference towards EU affairs, the Laeken Declaration on 
the Future of Europe (2001) called for a deeper and wider public de-
bate on the future of the EU. As a result, a Convention was convened 
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and was charged with drafting a new treaty.iv The text of the Constitu-
tion incorporated a number of measures to improve democracy in the 
EU. A greater role was assigned to both national and European parlia-
ments and the concept of European citizenship was given greater we-
ight.v This was perceived as an unusually open and transparent incen-
tive to undertake a broad public discussion about future Europe. Obvi-
ously, the Convention had failed fully to meet the criteria of successful 
communication, since Europe soon faced two rejections and several 
postponed ratification procedures. These have contributed to the pre-
sent EU political crisis and provoked a new debate in Europe’s commu-
nication policy.vi 
In June 2005 European Council launched a reflection period, 
aiming at “clarifying the content of the European project and infusing 
it with a fresh political impetus to push reform forwards” for months 
to come (De Clerck-Sachsse, 2005a). Modernisation of the Commis-
sion’s communication service and practices was outlined in the Action 
plan to improve communicating Europe by the European Commission 
(2005). Three principles underpinning the new plan were: not just in-
forming but also listening to the citizens and taking their views into ac-
count; communicating in an understandable way how EU policies af-
fect everyday life and what added value they bring; and “going local” 
by adapting messages, channels and messengers to national and local 
audiences and their concerns. Additional focus was put on strengthe-
ning the Commission’s representations in the member states. In Octo-
ber 2005 the so-called Plan D for democracy, dialogue and debate was 
launched. This communication action plan encourages, structures and 
directs ongoing debates about Europe at the Community and national 
level on the basis of an additional “d”, decentralisation, since the main 
responsibility for effective debating lies with opinion multipliers at the 
state, regional and local level. The most recent White paper on Euro-
pean Communication policy (February, 2006) serves as a consultation 
paper intended to engage stakeholders to express their views and send 
comments on the tabled proposal until July 2006 in order to jointly sha-
pe Europevii. The White Paper identifies five areas in which joint acti-
on, based on the principles of inclusiveness, diversity and participati-
on, should be taken: defining common principles, empowering citizens, 
working with the media and new technologies, understanding Europe-
an public opinion, and doing the job together. With a view to success 
in its objectives, the paper even envisages framework documents such 
as a non-binding Charter on Communication, which would define citi-
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zens’ rights to be fairly and fully informed on European issues, or a vo-
luntary Code of Conduct on Communication, which would bind various 
EU actors to respect good practices of communication.viii 
The results of various communication activities at all levels and 
the outcome of national debates will serve as input for the adoption of 
a concrete Road Map. The map would define the modalities of further 
action for the future Europe in the Constitutional context.
Communicating Europe in member states  
and candidate countries 
As regards the EU member and candidate states, studies demon-
strate that countries take an individual approach to communication, 
their success rates differing accordingly (Brnčić, 2005). Following the 
initial rejections of the Maastricht and the Nice Treaty, Denmark and 
Ireland respectively successfully combated inadequate information and 
popular ignorance by launching intensive and extensive campaigns. 
After a long period of a low-profile communication, the Netherlands 
today bases its communication on decentralisation and a network of 
governmental and non-governmental organisations that adapt target-
oriented activities. In contrast to the decentralised method of commu-
nication in Finland and Sweden, after accession to the EU Austria re-
duced its information and communication activities, eventually brin-
ging about a drop in public support. During the pre-accession period, 
Cyprus, partly due to its focus on internal political issues, neglected the 
importance of communication, while Slovakia, despite its elaborated 
strategy and invested financial resources, failed to make use of these 
advantages. Slovenia was considered to have given a successful exam-
ple of a transparent and coordinated process of communication. Hun-
gary invested a lot of effort and money into cooperation with the me-
dia and developing specialised information for different target groups. 
Malta created the Malta Information Centre, an independent institution 
whose neutrality, expertise, awareness of citizens’ needs, good coope-
ration with the media, budget and involvement in the overall negotia-
tion process contributed to the success of the communication strategy. 
It is worth describing briefly two examples of one more and one less 
successful communication strategy.
For the purpose of preparing the citizens of Ireland for the se-
cond referendum on the Nice Treaty, a National Forum on Europe was 
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created. Various national and European figures – Irish government offi-
cials, European and national parliamentarians, representatives from ci-
vil society and academics from across the EU and beyond – used the 
forum as a framework for a debate about the EU and Irish member-
ship in the Union. The openness of the Forum to the public enabled the 
citizens to get actively involved and its value lay in the creation of con-
ditions in which a national body was able to discuss matters relevant 
at both the national and the European level. People became aware that 
deliberations about the issues at stake were of great importance to their 
future and that their decisions could have a wider impact that extended 
across the national borders (Brnčić, 2005). In addition, in 2002 an ex-
tra impetus to communicating Europe came from a civil society campa-
igning organisation called the Irish Alliance for Europe (Laffan, 2004). 
A “coalition of the willing and the available”, with only two employed 
people and a group of volunteers conducted qualitative research. The-
ir aim was to analyse what had gone wrong during the first referendum 
and to anticipate issues that could prove salient in the near future. The 
Alliance invested a lot of effort into creating a new, energetic and hig-
hly visible image, whilst their good media team made sure the Alliance 
got sufficient media coverage. The idea was to conduct a positive cam-
paign, but also to counteract the arguments of the “no” side. The Alli-
ance supplied speakers and participants for the meetings held by the 
Forum and was committed to having people on the street. Its credibility 
derived from its ability to combine the experience of older people with 
the energy and talent of the young, and a willingness to debate the big 
issues of integration as well as the technical details of the Treaty.
Hungary used to have a fairly long tradition of political and pu-
blic support for the integration process. Just three months before a deci-
sive referendum on the accession in 2003, however, eurosceptical atti-
tudes became widespread, causing a decline of support. Not only were 
the former government communication strategies ineffective because 
of shortages of resources, but the referendum campaign was late in be-
ing launched (mid-March 2003) and was then conducted in a centra-
lised manner. And then the elite and the mass media failed to use the 
long accession process to teach the general public at least the EU ba-
sics. The signing of the Constitution in Rome and the Parliament’s ap-
proval of the current Commission were the first two European events 
ever, in the history of the Hungarian media, to have become headlines 
in the country’s quality press. Neither the centralised communication 
campaign before the referendum, nor the competition of the political 
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parties facing the first European elections in Hungary in 2004 managed 
to get people involved in the ongoing intellectual dialogue and political 
debates about the future of Europe (Hegedüs, 2004). Furthermore, du-
ring the negotiations with the EU, public discourse was mostly limited 
to the timing and the conditions of accession. Discussions about the ne-
eded adjustments focused on the socio-economic and legal dimensions, 
while the issue of “political harmonisation” was largely neglected. In 
the name of “objectivity”, the news media often described accession in 
terms of a simplistic and rather technical dichotomy of the advantages 
(benefits) and disadvantages (costs) (ibid., 2003). Finally, as a conseq-
uence of the domestic political struggle, little space was left for deeper 
intellectual and rational debates, and the citizens maintained their euro-
pessimistic stereotypes.
COMMUNICATING EUROPE IN CROATIA
Given the fact that EU membership is one of the two main stra-
tegic foreign policy objectives of Croatia, the country faces communi-
cation challenges similar to any EU member state or candidate country. 
Communicating Europe is not only an obligation but also a tool to acq-
uire the support needed for the final decision on EU accession. There is 
an increasing public interest in the substance and possible implications 
of Croatian accession in the EU. As the process develops, tasks and in-
formation needs put forward by citizens are becoming more concrete. 
Consequently, in January this year a revised Communication Strategy 
for the period 2005-2007 was adopted.ix The aim was to adjust EU-
related information and communication activities to new public needs 
and bring changes to the approach to communication policy. The provi-
sion of information to the public was invigorated with the aim of reac-
hing as large an audience as possible (through TV shows, for example). 
A sectoral approach to specific target groups according to their interests 
was developed and new activities were initiated in line with the dyna-
mics of the negotiation process; one such initiative was the launch of 
a new website related to accession negotiations.x In addition, a Natio-
nal Forum was established in order to encourage a public debate about 
Croatian accession to the EU at all levels of Croatian governance and 
within society until the referendum day. By including ministers, parli-
amentarians, the business sector, academics, regional representatives, 
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NGOs and students the Forum provides for a variety of views as well as 
specialised contributions to the debate.xi
A comparison of the results of the twelve public opinion surveys 
conducted since the year 2000 reveals the evolution of public opinion.xii 
In the period between 2000 and 2003, the EU was generally perceived 
as being, in the light of the past, a desirable option and support of citi-
zens for EU membership was rather constant (72-79% in favour). Sup-
port decreased to 51% when Croatia acquired candidate status and re-
ached its lowest point in June last year (42%) upon the delayed opening 
of the accession negotiations. Over the years, then, belief among Croats 
that EU membership will bring about general and economic progress 
and a higher standard of living has declined and is now held by less 
than a half as against over two thirds earlier. 
These surveys fail to offer explanations as to why general sup-
port has decreased over time. For this purpose, more thorough research 
is required. An analysis would most likely confirm that some of the re-
asons are general and similar to those other countries experienced befo-
re joining the EU. In the accession process, people’s focus shifted from 
abstract symbolism to the concrete and often painful realities of mem-
bership. In addition, one would certainly find country-specific issues 
that have had negative effect on public opinion polls, such as the speci-
al protocol later added to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, 
increased international pressure regarding cooperation with the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, traditional produ-
ction of cream and cheese and the sale of real estate to foreigners.
The latest round of public opinion surveys conducted in Decem-
ber 2005 showed that almost 49% of citizens support the idea of Croa-
tia acceding to the EU, as opposed to 44% who do not. The participants 
thought that EU information in the media, the most common source of 
knowledge about the Union, is still limited.xiii Opinion-makers should 
make use of these findings and respond to people’s priority concerns 
reflected in the surveys, such as the effect of the accession on economic 
development and everyday life, the rights and obligations stemming 
from EU membership as well as the impact of membership on Croatian 
internal policies and its sovereignty. 
The objective of communication is eventually to “create” a 
well-informed citizen prepared to make a final decision concerning 
accession to the EU in a referendum. In recent years these efforts have 
by and large been complemented by a growing number of diverse acti-
vities initiated and carried out at the regional and local level, as well as 
by the thriving civil society in the country.
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FEATURES OF COMMUNICATING EUROPE
Never before has the EU paid so much attention to communica-
tion and transparency as today. Paradoxically and ironically, the gene-
rally low support for the EU comes at a time when awareness of com-
munication issues seems to be very high on the Brussels agenda. The 
Constitution, which had its origin in a feeling that the EU had become 
remote from its citizens, has ended up alienating some of them even 
more (Reynolds, 2005; De Clerck-Sachsse, 2005b). There are several 
features of communication that may account for this fact and that sho-
uld borne in mind when developing, implementing and assessing com-
munication. 
•  Policy still undeveloped. Governments have traditionally ratified EU 
agreements in their parliaments, assuming a majority would vote in 
favour (Keohane, 2004:1). For years they have lacked a coherent and 
sustainable communication strategy and have assumed that feedback 
from the public would be positive. Therefore, there was very little 
need for explaining, listening and the anchoring of EU issues in con-
temporary national politics. As a consequence, people are still not 
used to forming a view about something they know little about, while 
the EU and European governments are not used to “selling the story” 
to their citizens. 
•  Objective of communication. Communications are rarely clear abo-
ut the goal they want to attain. Is the purpose of communication to 
have half a billion EU citizens informed about EU facts? Or is it to 
make citizens become more active and participative in EU life? Do 
we want to make people understand the EU or to make them love 
it? Not only is the “Union’s message” poorly spelt out, but in additi-
on it is often difficult to avoid making various messages sound like 
propaganda. The Dutch referendum has shown that it is counterpro-
ductive simply to try and win people over, because “the EU is not a 
branded product, but aspires to be a democratic political enterprise 
that citizens may decide not to like, even if they are properly infor-
med” (Kurpas, Meyer and Gialoglou, 2004:3). Communication sho-
uld not be only objective-oriented (gaining support), but content-ori-
ented (fostering public debates). Positive outcomes at referenda or 
high support expressed in opinion polls surveys may well be the ul-
timate objective of the EU and its member states. However, they do 
not necessarily prove that communication has essentially been suc-
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cessful. Communication should not aim solely at teaching facts but 
also at raising people’s interest in European affairs.
•  Who communicates Europe? Since EU governance is multi-level – 
European-wide, national, regional and local – there is no exclusive 
ownership over the European project and thus none over communi-
cation policy. All levels of governance should be able and willing to 
take up their share of responsibility for communication and to coo-
perate.xiv The Commission can induce reform steps, set up an overall 
framework within which more specific communication policies can 
be developed, and generate information and core messages that are 
universally applicable.xv The importance of national parliaments in 
this field is significant, since citizens identify themselves more easi-
ly with them than with the European Parliament. However, EU issu-
es still play a limited role in election campaigns since politicians are 
rarely elected on the basis of their European positions. Some argue 
that the present EU crisis originates at the national level and is due to 
national methods of dealing with the EU (Seidenfaden, 2005:75). In 
practice, national governments often take the credit for favourable re-
sults, but use Brussels – EU institutions or other member states – as 
a scapegoat for unfavourable outcomes. According to some, member 
states have little interest in communicating the benefits of the EU. 
The absence of communication from them serves to preserve the pu-
blic impression of the powerful nation state and increases their room 
for manoeuvre at the negotiation table and in the preparatory stages 
of decision-making (Kurpas, Meyer and Gialoglou, 2004:4). Media, 
often considered more credible than politicians and a key resource 
of information, are a powerful mediator and a vital opinion-maker 
among the public. Over the years, the frequency and spread of co-
verage of EU affairs across a variety of sections in newspapers have 
increased. Nevertheless, the quality, relevance and objectivity de-
pend to a large extent on expertise, cooperation with the government 
in providing information and the role of media as an honest catalyst 
of information. Finally, the responsibility partly lies with the public, 
which needs to be active in exploring and looking for information. 
“Hunger for knowledge has to imply that one is prepared to walk to 
the store cupboard oneself and not to be expected to be spoon-fed by 
a flunkey” (Sainley Berry, 2006). The public appears to be receptive 
to EU intentions to interact more with citizens (47% would like to be 
more involved), although only around a quarter (26%) of citizens feel 
involved in European affairs (European Commission, 2005:38). 
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•  Domestic or European issue? Politicians often play domestic politics 
with European issues. For instance, election campaigns for European 
Parliament are still fought predominantly over national rather than 
EU issues, while 2007 presidential candidate ambitions seem to have 
triggered a division in the French socialist party with respect to sup-
port for the Constitution. On the other hand, during national elections 
European matters may be high on the campaign agendas (the exam-
ple of French presidential elections in 2002). The domestic political 
realm plays an important role both in forming opinion about the EU 
and in voting in European issues. Due to lack of knowledge the ele-
ctorate may often be influenced by government performance and is 
likely to formulate views on the basis of the closest to what it kno-
ws – national political considerations (Keohane, 2004:3; de Vreese, 
2004). EU-related themes, even when they are commonly identifi-
ed in most countries, are often immediately framed in a national con-
text. Different issues dominate the debate in different countries, since 
different issues are high on the agenda in different national contexts 
(Kurpas, 2005). Even irrelevant issues may then become salient and 
divisive. This was the case with the matter of defence policy during 
the Irish referendum on the Nice Treaty even though defence provi-
sions did not affect Ireland’s neutrality. The French and the British 
cannot agree whether there is too little or too much of “social Euro-
pe”. The Spanish benefit from structural funds, while the Dutch com-
plain about their budgetary contribution. But in such cases, at least, 
the problems are perceived as being “European” and a sense of the-
ir apartness from domestic issues is maintained. A greater problem 
occurs when people use the EU frame as an opportunity to “let off 
steam” and express dissatisfaction with their national governments. 
While doing so, they indirectly affect things on scale much larger 
than the national.
•  Referendum. There seems to be a growing tendency to hold referenda 
where public preferences can be articulated, as a way to work around 
the democratic deficit and communication gap. However, some have 
contested the appropriateness of using a referendum in the EU con-
text. Some Europeans are more acquainted with having a say in EU-
related decisions, while others like the Dutch and the Belgians had 
their first referendum ever.xvi Often, the consequences of an individu-
al referendum go beyond the country in which it is held – a French no 
had an affect on other Europeans who had basically no possibility of 
participating in the French debate or influencing French public opi-
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nion. How democratic is it to rely on a referendum that rejects what 
a large number of countries and political institutions, including the 
government and parliament of the no-vote country, agreed to? To a 
certain extent referendum is a tool for testing the ability of national 
politicians to convince the electorate that national interests can effe-
ctively be represented within the deeper and enlarged Union (Crum, 
2005). It is also a “notoriously unsubtle instrument” forcing voters 
to give a yea or nay on issues of immense complexity (Closa, 2004). 
Referenda in the EU context have their advantages and disadvanta-
ges: they may make governments’ decisions more plausible and justi-
fiable, but they may also have a negative spillover effect across bor-
ders. Therefore, except in Ireland where there is a constitutional obli-
gation, a decision to hold a referendum is essentially defined by po-
litical factors. Due to their unpredictability, those who decide to hold 
them must seize the opportunity that referenda offer by running acti-
ve campaigns to convince European citizens of the EU’s merits (Ke-
ohane, 2004:5).
•  Easier to promote no. Those who advocate the EU out of conviction 
or because they have been actively and directly involved in the pro-
cess must understand that the merits of the EU may not be self-evi-
dent to half a billion EU citizens. The pro-European camps appear 
to be weaker in sending out a clear message and to have greater dif-
ficulty in mobilising supporters compared to the eurosceptics who-
se strong calls for withdrawal from the EU or downgrading of EU 
competences better reach out to people. The anti-EU camp is often 
more active and uses its opponent’s failure to communicate as a way 
to dismiss initiatives as unacceptable. In addition, there is something 
in the political dynamic of an EU referendum campaign that favours 
the no side. The parties in the European integration context are divi-
ded along anti-integrationist – pro-integrationist lines. A growing cle-
avage not across, but rather through the party spectrum has taken the 
place of the classic left-right divide. This forms unusual alignments 
of parties in the yes camp who in other circumstances would engage 
in sharp political debate (Seidenfaden, 2005:70; Closa, 2004:4). This 
new ideological cleavage can significantly shake up national politics 
and leave voters confused.
•  Speaking with one voice. Today Europe finds itself amid divisions 
between the EU and its members over the future political course of 
the Union, questions of how much further the EU should deepen and 
enlarge, deliberation concerning how to proceed with the Constitu-
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tion. The inability to find a common stance has made speaking with 
one voice and an attuned communication policy hard to attain, even 
within institutions where more coherency could be expected (e.g. the 
Commission). As long as national override the European interests the 
public will hardly be convinced to give unanimous support to certa-
in EU initiatives. “What interests the Poles is what will come out of 
Poland, not the future of the Union as a whole” (Beunderman, 
2006). 
•  Communica(c)tion. Partly, a gap between elite and public opinion 
stems from their different concerns and the perception of policies 
that should be Europeanised and areas in which power can be con-
ferred on the EU (de Vreese, 2004). The gap certainly cannot be fil-
led only with communication. It requires a switch from symbolism 
(EU flag, anthem, currency or the Internet .eu domain) to practicali-
ties and should be complemented with actions that deliver concrete 
results. The issues that are bothering EU citizens have greater varie-
ty and more subtle nuances than covered by the line between yes and 
no. European citizens are concerned about issues such as further en-
largements and the effects of cheap Eastern labour on the European 
market, the fear of loss of sovereignty and the emergence of a super-
state. Europe is felt to be too liberal and market-oriented and to have 
undermined western European welfare standards. Then there are is-
sues such as the reduced share in the representation of old member 
states in EU institutions due to the last enlargement; contributions to 
the EU budget are perceived as bringing little in return. National in-
fluence is felt to be marginalised, and immigrants are increasingly re-
sented. Therefore, successful communication must necessarily reflect 
and address priority concerns, and convince people that the EU gua-
rantees and improves the quality of life and work. The effects of mo-
dernisation and globalisation have brought about new challenges. In 
order to become more tangible to people, the EU needs to deliver in 
three priority areas: prosperity (economic growth, competitiveness), 
solidarity (social dimension, employment, ageing population) and se-
curity (justice, terrorism). 
•  Understand your public. Knowledge, interest and public support for 
European integration is influenced by many factors. Political involve-
ment and the socio-economic situation, clarity of communication and 
accessibility of information, adaptability of sources to users and the 
political situation at a given moment explain why certain elements 
prevail over others in different settings.xvii An illustrative calculation 
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shows that EU society has stratified into layers (social classes based 
on education and employment) and divided into sectors (government, 
agriculture and business, for example). This in turn produces around 
100 groups of citizens in each country, whose different information 
needs have to be met accordingly (Sainley, 2005). 
EUROPEANISATION OF COMMUNICATION
The term Europeanisation is an increasingly popular concept in 
both public discussion and literature and has been attributed a range of 
definitions.
Firstly, Europeanisation is defined as an increase of crossborder 
public and private issue-formation in Europe, where the increase can 
mean more new issues (volume) and more intensely contested issues 
(contents) (Schendelen, 2003:30-40). It can originate from a public or 
private, European or a domestic dimension (EU, European federation, 
national ministry or a regional trade association). It also occurs in two 
opposite directions: from the European to the domestic level (an issue 
created in the EU or another country) or vice versa (an issue created at 
home). The outcome is either a binding decision or a policy proposal 
made by the EU; a private agreement which may be made among com-
panies from various countries; the issue may remain where it origina-
ted, or even simply disappear. 
Secondly, Europeanisation defined in relation to the impact that 
European policy has upon the public policy of the member states enta-
ils two steps. First is the decision- and policy-making at the EU and se-
cond their incorporation in the discourse, political structures and public 
policies at the domestic level (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004:4). Europe-
anisation in the sense of transformation of national politics comprises 
both legal and institutional obligations. This evolves in line with Eu-
ropean rules and standards, objective changes in economic structures, 
interests of individuals in European affairs and less tangible aspects 
such as subjective changes in beliefs, values, expectations and identity 
(Emerson, 2005). 
Thirdly, another area where Europeanisation seems to be slow-
ly anchoring is European administration. Here Community law gradu-
ally affects its basic principles, such as the process of opening up care-
ers and working conditions for civil servants across Europe. These pro-
cesses may serve as a foundation for the future creation of a European 
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administrative space. Administrative cooperation among states outsi-
de the scope of Community competence could thus have an impact in 
terms of social intercourse, the development of common methods and 
approaches and the invention of new instruments (Mangenot, 2005). 
Further, for instance, the Europeanisation of a truly European 
political culture would entail European political parties in the Parlia-
ment developing their local bases better and national parties coopera-
ting across frontiers.
The process of Europeanisation has two dimensions: a verti-
cal, representing a connection between the EU and respective national 
levels, and a horizontal, which represents a connection among the dif-
ferent national publics themselves (Kurpas, 2005). Vertical Europeani-
sation entails national and regional public spheres paying more attenti-
on to EU issues, concomitantly with adequate continuity, depth and dif-
ferentiation. The Europeanisation of national debates could help clarify 
how national representatives engage in multi-level European governan-
ce and explain that decisions are arrived at with the active and con-
structive participation of national representatives. The Europeanisation 
of communication could use a great deal of support from a more sub-
stantive Europeanisation of policies. This entails anchoring EU policies 
into a country’s political, economic and social life on an everyday basis 
which in turn should allow European (external) affairs to be perceived 
as domestic (internal) issues. Strengthened cooperation, firmer inclu-
sion of the European dimension into the national level (vocational tra-
ining for national and regional multipliers, school curricula) and trea-
ting EU politics as items with more domestic relevance could contribu-
te to a better linking between the national and the EU dimension. The 
vertical flow of information between the EU and the member states has 
improved in recent years, but there is still lack of consistency. Euro-
pean developments usually only make headlines when national leaders 
are meeting in Brussels or when a moment of celebration (enlargement) 
or crisis (directive on free movement of services) can be reported.
Today the public sphere within which political life and deba-
tes take place in Europe is by and large the national sphere. Horizon-
tal Europeanisation in this context would entail that national and regi-
onal spheres create genuine transnational debates and communicative 
exchange across national borders. This process is at present relatively 
weak and still limited. If developed over time, it could eventually cre-
ate a common European public sphere where debates across national 
publics foster mutual understanding and an EU civic awareness (Kur-
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pas, 2005; European Commission, 2006:4-5). Ideally, increased linka-
ge of different national public arenas with each other and with the EU 
level, and an opportunity for a European debate to unfold would also 
lead to a better mutual understanding among Europeans. To a certa-
in extent, the existing positive examples of this dimension are, for in-
stance, the existence and activities of transnational European lobby and 
interest groups (e.g. Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisati-
ons, COPA) whose common goals in the EU arena gather different sta-
keholders beyond national frontiers. This dimension can be further fo-
stered by initiatives such as that which envisages the possibility for one 
million people to sign a petition against a certain EU decision. A failed 
attempt of Europeanisation is reflected in the inability to establish a 
Europe-wide referendum on common European issues such as the Con-
stitution. Arguably, if referenda had been held closer and not according 
to individual national timetables, this could have helped create a more 
pan-European debate on the issue instead of making referenda debates 
mainly national in their content. The horizontal connection of the dif-
ferent national publics has made some progress, but Europeans still di-
scuss things too often in “national isolation”. Although they face many 
of the same problems, they often do not compare each other’s solutions 
in a broader public debate, let alone discuss them with each other.
A common European approach in communication is challenged 
by various factors. For instance, since the new generations in the “old” 
Europe have been born “into” the already existing framework of Euro-
pean integration, it is therefore more difficult to communicate what it 
provides them. Furthermore, different concerns in different states make 
it more difficult to create an efficient common communication appro-
ach and leaves room for misperceptions and misinterpretations. Final-
ly, the Europeanisation of communication is also blocked by the lack 
of a common vision of Europe, of finalité of the integration process 
and of true Europeanisation of politics. As Mazucelli (2005) notices: 
“The Dutch referendum is a true reflection of the popular reality that 
is an uncertain idea of Europe. As the expression of a people, this vote 
is also the chance for us to revisit those images of Europe’s project, 
some of which we have come to take for granted, and others that we are 
only beginning to see.” This is a reality that makes the Europeanisation 
of communicating Europe communicating a moving target (Laffan, 
2004).
It is important to add that the creation of a common European 
public sphere does not imply application of a uniform, one-size-fits-all 
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approach. As already mentioned, an ongoing critical and truly public 
discourse at the European level is difficult to attain due to various hin-
drances. Some of them are a variety of national interests, absence of a 
common language or the fact that people are accustomed to their own 
traditional sources of information. Nevertheless, some degree of Euro-
peanisation is justified by the fact that the present European political 
system is that of joint decision-making, whereas European citizenship 
is a social as well as a legal reality. Political legitimacy is no longer cre-
ated solely by national governments or electorates, and “disconnected” 
national actions are increasingly out of place in Europe (Meyer, 2005). 
Therefore, a realistic and desirable approach is to create a common 
European sphere based on a more decentralised model suited to spe-
cific political contexts and adapted to the diverse requirements of co-
untries, regions, localities and sectors. In addition, the fact is that par-
ty systems, interest groups and media are still firmly anchored in the 
environment of the respective nation states (Nicolaidis and Weatherill, 
2003:121-122). Therefore the model also needs to be denationalised in 
the sense that actions are based on common principles and coordination 
across the continent (European Parliament, 2004). In this way national 
public spheres do not have to be considered as obstacles to be overco-
me, but rather as the building blocks of a European public sphere (Kur-
pas, 2005). 
CONCLUSION
The European integration process brings changes in living and 
working conditions to all parts of European society. The success of be 
it membership or accession depends, among other things, on knowle-
dge and understanding of the European system, institutions and laws, 
as well as on public support. Communication is, therefore, becoming a 
crucial EU policy in changing times when general dissatisfaction with 
how Europe functions is deeper and more comprehensive and as such 
sweeps over the whole continent.
After years of a rather passive communication strategy, with 
the rise of eurosceptic sentiments and the general public awareness of 
European integration, the EU today faces a communication deficit. In 
recent years it has therefore taken steps to re-build a sense of public 
ownership of the EU and acknowledges that decision-makers must li-
sten better, explain better, and connect with citizens. 
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One of the features of communicating Europe is that to the ex-
tent that European issues appear on the agenda at all, what may initial-
ly be a common European issue often becomes entirely dominated by 
the rationale of national politics and is seen by most citizens from a na-
tional perspective. Yet, since many of the policy decisions that affect 
daily life for people in the EU are taken at a joint European level, the 
EU can no longer afford to stay remote from people nor can it ignore 
the fact that an individual country’s decisions often have a bearing on 
other EU citizens.
Therefore, communicating Europe as a joint European project 
has to have a common, complementary approach. Yet, its success will 
largely depend on – apart from coordination, financial and human re-
sources – the level of its decentralisation. An efficient share of respon-
sibility and a collaborative interplay between different levels and key 
players of EU governance may prevent the focus and implementation 
of activities from becoming “too national”, and help integrate EU affa-
irs into a local context.
Communication should be clear, comprehensible and adjusted 
to the specificities of different countries and groups. For this purpose 
the EU needs a comparative analysis of communication mechanisms in 
order to assess what channels and content of communication work for 
whom. However, most of all it should be policy-led and backed up by 
European performance. Legitimacy in the public eye can only be con-
veyed through outcomes and what the EU can deliver. Communication 
can only be as good as the policies it wants to communicate and it can-
not be a substitute for policy failures. It should be considered as a con-
tinuous and sustainable dialogue that should keep raising and maintai-
ning awareness and interest in European issues. This should not be li-
mited only to a pre-accession period or in cases of imminent referenda, 
nor should it be carried out by means of short-term, top-down informa-
tion campaigns. 
A critical public system of communication exists at the natio-
nal, but not at the EU level. In order to revive people’s awareness of 
the European dimension of the integration process, Europeanisation 
may help. Nevertheless, what may work against it is the tradition where 
governance is ultimately dictated by national interests and is shaped 
in particular national circumstances. Any effort at the EU level can be 
pushed into the background by a single current domestic aspect in any 
member state. Therefore, the main task for European communication 
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and national communications is to find the best possible way to recon-
cile and interact successfully.
If the communication problem is not solved, the EU and natio-
nal governments may find themselves in a perpetual crisis of ability to 
convince their citizens to approve of particular European actions and 
more generally to embrace or even constructively engage in EU gover-
nance as a whole. This in turn may call the future justifiability and via-
bility of the whole European integration project in question.
*  All opinions and views expressed in the article are personal and do not reﬂect the
views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration. The author would 
like to thank the referees who anonymously reviewed this paper.
i  The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe is often referred to as the (EU) 
Constitutional Treaty or the (European) Constitution.
ii  According to the Eurobarometer results (July 2006), the percentage of those 
considering the EU membership a “good thing” in Denmark is 65, while in France 
it is 49 (the EU-25 average is 55), see [http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/
eb/eb65/eb65_ﬁrst_en.pdf].
iii  Article F of the Treaty on the European Union establishes as a general principle that 
the Union should respect human rights and fundamental freedoms; Article II-71 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states that “everyone has 
the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions 
and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall 
be respected”.
iv  For the integral text, see: [http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:
C:2004:310:SOM:EN:HTML].
v  Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a signiﬁcant number of member
states may take the initiative of inviting the Commission, within the framework of its 
powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that 
a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Constitution 
(Article I-47:4).
vi  Other aspects that demonstrate the current EU political crisis are enlargement 
fatigue, difﬁcult negotiations for the ﬁnancial perspective 2007-2013, dissatisfaction
with the euro.
vii  The Commission’s White Papers are documents containing proposals for EU action. 
In some cases they follow a consultation process launched by a Green Paper.
viii  The connection between the White Paper, the Plan D and the Action Plan: the Plan 
D invites EU citizens to get involved in a wide-ranging discussion on the EU during 
the reﬂection period; the White Paper does not ask for people’s views on the EU
but on how to set up a long-term communication partnership between EU players; 
the Commission’s Action Plan concerns only improvement of the Commission’s 
communication.
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ix  Communication strategy aimed at informing the Croatian public about the European 
Union and preparations for membership (the ﬁrst one was adopted in 2001 for
the period until the end of 2004). Available from: [http://www.nn.hr/sluzbeni-list/
sluzbeni/index.asp].
x  http://www.eu-pregovori.hr/default.asp?jezik=2. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and European Integration’s communication activities, see: [www.mvpei.hr].
xi  So far, four National Forums have been organised: “Let’s talk about Europe” 
(2004), “Bologna process and reform of high education” (2004), “Sovereignty and 
national identity in the EU” (2005), “Youth mobility in education and employment” 
(2006).
xii  Since mid-2000, every 6 months the Ministry in cooperation with the GfK – Centre 
for Market Research conducts rounds of public opinion research and analyses 
the attitudes of Croatian citizens towards the EU and the process of Croatia’s 
accession. Results from the latest round available from: [http://www.mvpei.hr/ei/
download/2006/01/31/omnibus_prosinac_05.ppt].
xiii  No relevant information or no information at all 54%; satisfactory and fairly 
adequate information 42%.
xiv  For a more detailed proposition of concrete steps for each group of communication 
actors with the aim of contributing to solving the problem and reaching out to EU 
citizens – EU institutions, member states, regional authorities, media, academics 
– see Kurpas, Meyer and Gialoglou (2004:3-6).
xv  Apart from having limited ﬁnancial and human resources, the Commission’s
competences are fragmented among numerous directorates and departments, 
whose different interests may not always be easy to transpose into a coherent EU 
communication policy.
xvi  For a table of EU referenda, see: [http://europa.eu.int/constitution/ratiﬁcation_
en.htm].
xvii  There has been progress in “passive communication” at EU level (more available, 
understandable and useful information on Europe website). However, as much 
as internet-based communication has the advantage of giving access to a larger 
number of citizens and being cost-efﬁcient, it suffers from several shortcomings:
redundancy, the organisation of on-line content, the nature of information and the 
ultimate scope of reach in relation to the percentage of internet users in Europe. 
81
LITERATURE
Beunderman, M., 2006. “No chance for EU constitution in Poland, 
Kaczynski says” [online]. EUobserver, February. Available from: 
[http://euobserver.com/9/20986/?print_1].
Brnčić, A., 2005. “Komuniciranje Europe” [online]. Euroscope, (78). 
Available from: [http://www.imo.hr/europa/publics/euroscope/es0-
78-dodatak.pdf].
Bulmer, S. J. and Radaelli, C. M., 2004. “The Europeanisation of Na-
tional Policy?”. Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation, No 14.
Closa, C., 2004. “Ratifying the EU Constitution: referendums and their 
implications” [online]. The Brooking institution: U.S.-Europe Ana-
lysis series, Center on the United States and Europe, November. 
Available from: [http://www.ceps.be].
Crum, B., 2005. EU referendum Tests the Dutch Political Establis-
hment [online]. Bruxelles: Centre for European Policy Studies. Ava-
ilable from: [http://www.ceps.be].
De Clerck-Sachsse, J., 2005a. The ratiﬁcation process of the Constitu-
tional Treaty and the new challenge for the European Union [onli-
ne]. Bruxelles: Centre for European Policy Studies. Available from: 
[http://www.ceps.be].
De Clerck-Sachsse, J., 2005b. The paradox of European Democracy 
– reﬂections on a Plan D for the EU [online]. Bruxelles: Centre for 
European Policy Studies. Available from: [http://www.ceps.be].
de Vreese, C. H., 2003. Communicating Europe [online]. Available 
from: [http://fpc.org.uk].
de Vreese, C. H., 2004. “Why European Citizens Will Reject the EU 
Constitution” [online]. Center for European Studies: Working Pa-
per, No. 116. Available from: [http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu].
Directorate General Communication. Available from: [http://europa.
eu.int/comm/dgs/communication/index_en.htm].
Emerson, M., 2005. “Deeping the Wider Europe” [online]. Centre for 
European Policy Studies, January 2005. Available from: [http://
www.ceps.be].
European Commission, 2002. Public Opinion in the European Uni-
on, Report 56. Available from: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_
opinion]. 
European Commission, 2005. Public opinion in the European Union, 
Report 64. Available from: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_
opinion].
82
European Commission, 2006. White Paper on a European Communi-
cation Policy. Available from: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/commu-
nication_white_paper/doc/white_paper_en.pdf].
European Parliament, 2004. Debate “Ratiﬁcation of the Constituti-
onal Treaty”, intervention by Thierry Cornillet (ALDE). Available 
from: [http://www.europarl.eu.int].
Hegedüs, I., 2003. After the Accession Talks, Facing the Referendum: 
Hungary and its Media Joining the European Union [online]. Avai-
lable from: [http://www.kontextus.hu/europa/tagok/heg_after.html].
Hegedüs, I., 2004. Political stereotypes in the Hungarian public cultu-
re and the mass media about the European Union [online]. Availa-
ble from: [http://www.kontextus.hu/europa/tagok/heg_politicalste-
reotypes2.htm].
Keohane, D., 2004. A Guide to the referenda on the Constitutional tre-
aty [online]. Available from: [www.cer.org.uk].
Kurpas, S., 2005. When the European Constitution Went National – 
Plea for a European Public Sphere [online]. Available from: [http://
www.ceps.be].
Kurpas, S., Meyer, Ch. and Gialoglou, K., 2004. “After the 
European Elections, Before the Constitution Referenda - Can the 
EU Communicate Better?” [online]. Centre for European Policy 
Studies, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 55. Available from: [http://www.
ceps.be].
Laffan, B., 2004. “EU Referenda and Communicating the Nice Treaty 
in Ireland”. Paper prepared for delivery to the Ministerial Conferen-
ce on Communicating Europe, Druids Glen, Wicklow, 7/8 April. 
Mangenot, M., 2005. “Public Administrations and Services of Gene-
ral Interest: What kind of Europeanisation?”. European Institute for 
Public Administration (EIPA), ISBN 90-6779-198-9, May. 
Mazucelli, C., 2005. The Road Not Taken: Why the Dutch Referendum 
on the Constitutional Treaty “Made all the difference” for Europe 
[online]. Available from: [http://www.eipa.nl/?option=products&se-
ction=B&id=1542]. 
Meyer, Ch., 2005. “A single referendum across Europe” [online]. Ava-
ilable from: [http://www.ceps.be].
Mulvey, S., 2005. Varied reasons behind the Dutch No [online]. Availa-
ble from: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4601731.stm].
Nicolaidis, K. and Weatherill, S. (ed.), 2003. “Whose Europe? Natio-
nal Models and the Constitution of the European Union”. European 
Studies at Oxford: Papers of a Multi-Disciplinary Conference held 
in Oxford.
83
Palmer, J., 2005. “The European Union is not in crisis: It is in deep 
crisis”. European Policy Centre: Communication to Members, S3-
3/05. 
Reynolds, P., 2005. “People’s protest EU-style” [online]. World Affairs 
Correspondent, BBC News, June. Available from: [http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4600099.stm].
Sainley Berry, P., 2006. “Comment Communication strategy is missing 
the point” [online]. Euobserver, February. Available from: [http://
euobserver.com/?aid=202829&rk=1].
Seidenfaden, T., 2005. “Saving Europe from the tyranny of referen-
dums” in: Europe’s World, Section 2, Europe, 65-75.
The Future of the European Union. Available from: [http://europa.
eu.int/constitution/futurum/documents/offtext/doc151201_en.htm].
van Schendelen, R., 2003. Machiavelli in Brussels - The Art of Lobby-
ing the EU. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
DOCUMENTS
The Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union), Ofﬁcial Journal C 
325 of 24 December 2002.
Laeken Declaration on the Future of Europe (2001).
Commission Communication on the Information Strategy for the euro, 
COM (98) 39 ﬁnal (1998).
Commission Communication Strategy for Enlargement for Period 
2000-2006, SEC (2000)737.
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions on an information and communication strategy for 
the European Union, COM(2002)350 ﬁnal/2.
Action plan to improve communicating Europe by the European 
Commission: SEC (2005) 985 ﬁnal, 20 July 2005.
Communication from the Commission - The Commission’s contribution 
to the period of reﬂection and beyond: Plan-D for Democracy,
Dialogue and Debate, COM(2005) 494 ﬁnal, 13 October 2005.
Communication strategy aimed at informing the Croatian public about 
the European integration process of the Republic of Croatia for the 
period 2005-2007.
White paper on European Communication policy COM (2006) 35 
ﬁnal.
84
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (OJ 2004/C310/01).
Treaty of Nice, Ofﬁcial Journal C 80 of 10 March 2001.“ 
85
Chapter 4 
LOBBYING AND CHANNELS  
OF INFLUENCE OF CROATIAN  
INTEREST GROUPS IN AN  
ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION
Igor Vidačak*
Institute for International Relations
Zagreb
ABSTRACT
This paper analyses opportunities for and challenges of repre-
senting interests and the lobbying of Croatian interest groups in the de-
cision-making processes at the European Union level. Taking into ac-
count the predominant trends and channels for the representation of in-
terests in the competitive environment of the enlarged EU, as well as 
the experiences of new EU member states, the logic of access and in-
fluence of interest groups from Croatia on the EU policy-making proce-
dures in the pre-accession period will be highlighted. The paper draws 
attention to the potential of the EU accession process to act as a cata-
lyst for the Europeanisation of domestic public policy shaping and the 
adoption of new and modern patterns of interest articulation. It also 
provides incentives for considering the introduction of an adequate reg-
ulatory framework for lobbying, as a basis for legitimising the practice 
in Croatia. 
Key words:
lobbying, interest groups, European Union enlargement, Europeanisa-
tion, Croatia
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INTRODUCTION
The accelerated dynamics of the European integration process 
in the late eighties gave strong impetus to the proliferation of interest 
groupsi at the EU level. The EU institutions headquarters is character-
ised by an increasingly competitive environment for lobbying. With ap-
proximately thirteen thousand lobbyists, Brussels is the second largest 
centre of lobbying activity, after Washington, where the number of lob-
byists is twice as big. The explosion in the number of lobbyists work-
ing in Brussels over the past decade reflects the increasing number of 
policy areas the Union is becoming involved in – and hence the number 
of organisations affected by its decisions and that accordingly want to 
influence the policy-making process. The spectrum of lobbying actors 
seeking to influence key EU decision makers is rather wide, ranging 
from companies, trade associations, employers and trade union asso-
ciations, NGOs such as environmental or consumer protection associa-
tions to national ministries, local and regional administration and pub-
lic agencies. Lobbyists do not come to Brussels only from all levels 
of member and candidate states but also from other countries like the 
USA, Japan and other parts of the world. Often European Commission, 
Parliament and Council officials act as lobbyists themselves. 
The EU 2004 enlargement taking in 10 new member states has 
changed the lobbying rules for everyone with a stake in the EU policy-
making processes. Generally speaking, the new, more complex envi-
ronment of the enlarged EU requires lobbyists to develop even more 
advanced strategies for each particular legislative and policy initiative 
and to provide for adequate human and financial resources. In addition, 
there is a growing emphasis on the need for tighter control of lobbying 
activities – both for lobbyists and EU institutions. The European trans-
parency initiative launched by the European Commission announced 
more stringent rules for all actors involved in lobbying in Brussels. The 
purpose of the initiative is to strip away the secrecy from the lobbying 
activities in Brussels, to put additional pressure on the EU institutions 
and lobbyists to become more open and aspire to even higher ethical 
standards, as well as to promote lobbying as legitimate component of 
democratic policy processes in the EU.
This article seeks to explore the predominant trends in and chan-
nels for the representation of interests in the enlarged EU and to anal-
yse the logic of access and influence of interest groups from Croatia on 
the decision-making procedures at EU level. On the basis of the expe-
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riences of new EU member states, ex-candidate countries, the potential 
impact of the EU accession process on the Europeanisation of national 
policy-making arenas and the adoption of new, modern patterns of in-
terest articulation and lobbying will be highlighted. Also, the paper will 
analyse to what extent it is justifiable to introduce a better regulatory 
framework for lobbying in Croatia, in accordance with best practices of 
various EU member states. 
PREDOMINANT TRENDS OF INTEREST 
REPRESENTATION AND LOBBYING AT  
THE EUROPEAN UNION LEVEL 
One of the main conclusions of the research on the European 
system of interest groups carried out since the beginning of nineties is 
that the institutional architecture of EU policy-shaping has a crucial in-
fluence on the organisation and articulation of interests at the Union 
level.ii In general, interest groups at the EU level have been largely con-
ditioned by the unique multi-level system of governance and particu-
larities of the EU decision-making processes. The adoption of EU pub-
lic policies includes a range of subnational, national and supranational 
layers of government, while their complex mutual interaction provides 
for multiple points of access to decision-makers. Due to this multi-lay-
er character of the policy-making process and the diffusion of centres 
of powers among different institutions, it is difficult for each group to 
build a dominant position or privileged relationships with institutions 
in this process. Economic and political importance, the scope of mem-
bership, representativity, adequate human and financial resources, in-
ternal cohesion and organisation, expertise and informedness, lobbying 
skills and strategies – these are only few factors that determine the po-
tential influence of interest groups in the EU (Sidjanski, 1995; Green-
wood, 2003). 
Since the beginning of nineties, the phenomenon of the frag-
mentation of the system of interest representation in the EU policy-
making processes has gained in importance. In addition to an abun-
dance of so-called Euro-groups – umbrella European interest organisa-
tions, other patterns of interest representation are becoming increasing-
ly significant – due to the assumption that they are more flexible, more 
efficient and less expensive. In that context, the common feature of the 
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predominant trends in interest representation is that they bypass the ex-
isting European umbrella associations (Grande, 2001). Apart from na-
tional interest groups and associations, which are increasingly active 
at a European level, there is a growing trend of creating smaller, infor-
mal clubs, forums and ad-hoc coalitions – particularly among business 
interest groups. As these groups are generally very selective in choos-
ing their membersiii and focus on achieving very particular objectives, 
they usually reach a consensus more easily and tend to be much more 
efficient in their activities. The next trend concerns individual compa-
nies and especially the big multinational companies that lobby Europe-
an institutions directly, emerging as important political actors in the EU 
– particularly since the establishment of the single market in the middle 
of eighties (Bouwen, 2002). The proliferation of professional lobbyists 
in Brussels is an additional significant tendency to have emerged dur-
ing the nineties. These are PA/PR agencies, law firms, commercial con-
sultancies, which enable their clients, usually big firms, to receive very 
targeted information and strategic advice without having to open per-
manent representative offices and go through the long process of con-
sensus building within an umbrella group. The increase in the number 
of specialised, technical and expert interest groups (Weisbein, 2001) is 
a response to a growing need for a much more specialised type of in-
formation. In this regard, it should be emphasised that an accelerated 
technological development contributes to a greater efficiency of inter-
est groups, due to the possibility of shortening the process of consulta-
tion and using member expertise. The already present diversification is 
even more emphasised by the regionalisation and decentralisation of 
the activities of the EU, which leads to a greater presence of representa-
tive of regions and regional interest groups in Brussels and Strasbourg. 
Broadly speaking, the pronounced pluralism, diversity of inter-
ests and a number of other tendencies in EU interest group activities 
demonstrate the emergence of new European social structures. In that 
sense, we can already speak about a transnational European system of 
interest groups, about a transnational European society, which is being 
developed in parallel with national, regional and local societies through 
communication networks connecting people and their organisations. 
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REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR 
LOBBYING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The large increase in lobbying activity and the proliferation of 
lobbyists in Brussels, the growing attention of the EU institutions to 
public perception and the trust of citizens, as well as the need to de-
mystify lobbying and enhance its transparency are among the most im-
portant incentives for developing a regulatory framework for lobbying, 
at the level of the lobbyist community as well as at the level of the tar-
get lobby structures, i.e. EU institutions and their officials. Despite the 
progress achieved during the past decade in this area, lobbying activity 
at the EU level has not yet been sufficiently regulated, in comparison 
with that in the USA or some EU member states. This is partially due to 
the Commission’s reluctance to introduce the stricter formal measures 
that might discourage organised interests from active involvement in 
the EU policy-making processes, and also to the need to gain support 
for the process of European integration and deal with the problem of 
the democratic deficit.
Proposals to introduce an accreditation system for interest 
groups, similar to that existing at the Council of Europe and the UN 
have never met with the approval of the Commission. The often-quoted 
Communication of the Commission in 1992 emphasised that the “gen-
eral policy of the Commission is not to grant privileges to special inter-
est groups, such as the issuing of entry passes and favoured access to 
information, nor does it confer on associations an official endorsement 
by granting them consultative status’’. In the same document, the Com-
mission justifies that approach by the need to maintain an open dia-
logue with all interested social actorsiv.
On the other hand, the Commission has tried to encourage self-
regulatory measures within the lobbyist community. On the basis of the 
minimum requirements set in the Annex of the 1992 Communication, 
the Commission has proposed to interest groups that they should draft 
their own codes of conduct in the process of lobbying. A certain num-
ber of interest groups gathered around two umbrella organisations – 
Society of European Affairs Professionals (SEAP) and Public Affairs 
Practitioners (PAP), have drafted a Code with twelve principles (large-
ly drawing on the EC proposal) to which its signatories should adhere 
in communicating with the EU institutionsv. In February 2004, SEAP 
announced tighter sanctions for breaching Code principles – follow-
ing strong criticism of inappropriate lobbying methods used by choco-
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late manufacturers in the European Parliamentvi, as well as the growing 
dissatisfaction of civil society organisations at the lack of transparency 
and ethics in representing certain corporate interests. This was realised 
by the adoption of the revised Code which was presented to the public 
in February 2005. The most important changes in the new Code relate 
to the introduction of sanctions – from verbal warnings to exclusion 
from SEAP, the obligatory education of SEAP members about the new 
Code as well as the establishment of a special committee which would 
monitor the conduct of Code signatories. 
While there is a wide spread belief that the current code should 
become legally binding, some argue that is not necessary as far as its 
dispositions are consistently being respected and put into practice – re-
ferring to the assumption that is in the interest of lobbyists themselves 
to maintain good relationships with the EU institutions and not to be 
suspected of bad practices. 
Although still weak, the level of regulation of lobbying at the 
European Parliament is still much better than at the European Commis-
sion or the Council. For more than six years, a series of initiatives for 
the introduction of a regulatory framework for lobbying in the Euro-
pean Parliament have been launched without success. The final agree-
ment was made in 1996 when the new code of good practice for lobby-
ists was introduced as an annex to the Rules of Procedure of the Parlia-
mentvii. The Code is composed of ten points and requires lobbyists to 
abstain from any activity that might imply inappropriate access to in-
formation and references to formal relationships with the Parliament in 
dealing with third parties. 
Lobbyists, defined as people who wish to enter Parliament fre-
quently to provide members of the European Parliament (MEPs) with 
information relating to their parliamentary duties, in their own interests 
or those of third parties, are required to register and are granted special 
passesviii which distinguish them from occasional visitors. 
The new amendments of the Rules of Procedure also regulate 
the problem of financial interests. For example, MEPs are obliged to 
submit a detailed declaration on their professional activities, and their 
assistants are also asked to report other paid activities they undertake. 
The reason a consensus on lobbying regulation has taken so long to be 
found probably lies in the longstanding national differences of political 
culture and the diverging cultural and judicial attitudes towards lobby-
ing in general. 
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Taking into account the current lack of transparency of lobby-
ing activities, the new commissioner for administrative affairs and fight 
against fraud, Siim Kallas, launched the European initiative for trans-
parency which aims at encouraging more responsible conduct on the 
part of the officials of the EU institutions as well as more open and 
transparent activities by lobbyistsix. There are three key components 
of the initiative. The first requires a stronger involvement of member 
states and deals with the proposal to improve information on beneficia-
ries of EU funds, especially on EU agricultural subsidies and EU struc-
tural funds payments. The second component is focused on stepping up 
the ethical standards and accountability of EU institutions, with special 
emphasis on the members of the European Parliament and officials of 
the Commission. The third concerns the increased transparency of the 
activities of lobbyists and the need for disclosing the interests they rep-
resent, their mission and the sources of their financing. By the begin-
ning of May 2006, the Commission published the Green Paper which 
opened public debate on the transparency of lobbying. The document 
makes three proposals in that area: a voluntary registration system run 
by the Commission with incentives for lobbyists to register; common 
codes of conduct for all lobbyists developed by the lobbyist profes-
sion and possibly consolidating and improving the existing codes; and 
a new system of external monitoring and sanctions for cases of incor-
rect registration and/or breach of the code of conduct. The main criti-
cism of the Green Paper is related to the lack of credible incentives for 
the registration of lobbyists, the failure to propose mandatory rules for 
disclosing full details about funding and the inadequate solution of the 
problem of employment of the Commission officials in the private sec-
tor after leaving their duty (the revolving doors phenomenon)x.
Several new EU member states opted for regulating lobbying 
activities by special legally binding acts. Lithuania and Poland were 
the first countries to introduce special laws on lobbying, which largely 
draw on the model accepted in the USA (Wiszowaty, 2005). The Hun-
garian Lobbying Act was finally adopted in February 2006, after years 
of unsuccessful attempts and disputes caused by the first draft of the 
law. Lobbying acts have been proposed, for example, in Ireland and 
Italy, but did not meet sufficient support of the governments of those 
countries. Germany and Great Britain have been usually mentioned 
among the old EU member states that have introduced a certain reg-
ulatory framework for lobbyists and interest group representatives in 
the Parliament. Bundestag Rules of Procedure implement a system of 
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mandatory registration of interest groups that want to represent their in-
terests at Bundestag or Federal Government institutions. The content 
of the Register is published and updated once a year in the Official 
Gazette. In 1996 Great Britain introduced a code of conduct for par-
liamentary deputies which regulates their interaction with lobbyists. A 
similar proposal has been under consideration in Slovakia. 
Generally, current global trends open up new possibilities for 
better regulation of transparency and monitoring of lobbying activities 
in other EU member states as well. While considering the problem of 
regulating lobbying in the EU, it should be stressed that the regulatory 
tendency has not been focussed on eliminating the phenomenon, rather 
on fighting corruption and introducing a clear set of lobbying rules. As 
the open competition of interest groups is an important component of 
democratic policy processes, lobbying regulation should aim at raising 
the awareness of the accountability of all the participants of democratic 
decision-making and the transparency of the process. 
CHANNELS OF INFLUENCE ON EUROPEAN 
UNION POLICY-MAKING PROCESSES
The development of the multi-level system of governance and 
the new institutional architecture with a growing number of public ac-
tors and institutions have considerably changed the target structures 
(Grande, 2001) and possibilities of influence of interest groups on the 
policy-making processes in the EU. The new differentiated institution-
al environment of the EU provides interest groups with a wide spec-
trum of potential channels of influence on the shaping of public pol-
icies. Generally speaking, two major channels of influence might be 
pointed out: national and European (or Brussels) – each of them im-
plying an interaction with a series of institutional and political actors 
the importance of which depends on the modalities of decision-making 
processes. 
Interest-group lobbying through national channels of influence 
depends largely on the role of the national level bodies and member 
states in the decision making in certain areas, as well as on the open-
ness of national institutions to interaction with organised interests. Ac-
cording to Greenwood, the main factors determining the European, 
Brussels strategy of lobbying are: (i) the level of competence of the EU 
and supranational institutions in the relevant field; (ii) the role of the 
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Commission in initiating the policy proposals and enhancing the de-
velopment of the EU interest groups settled in Brussels; (iii) presence 
of formal institutionalised structures for representing interests such as 
consultative committees and (iv) the need for networking and gathering 
the information. 
Results of some research projects show that the national strategy 
and the use of national channels of influence dominated until the adop-
tion of the Single European Act which paved the way for the creation 
of the EU Single European Market. With successive revisions of the 
Founding treaties and the progressive extension of the EU competences 
and the strengthening of supranational or Community methods of deci-
sion-making, the European, that is Brussels, strategy of interest groups 
started to gain importance.xi In the absence of reliable indicators and a 
methodological framework, it is difficult objectively to identify and as-
sess those two main channels of influence in the strategies of interest 
groups. Nevertheless, various actors clearly show different preferences 
and patterns of action with respect to certain lobbying strategies. Em-
pirical research conducted among British business and trade associa-
tions shows that 42% of these associations opt for national channels of 
influence, 27% use the services of European umbrella interest groups, 
17% decide to lobby directly in Brussels, while 11% of them rely on in-
dividual activities of enterprises (Bennet, 1997). The research showed, 
among other things, that human and financial resources usually prove 
to be crucial in selecting the type of strategy, and it is the financially 
stronger groups with the biggest number of members that tend to use 
European channels more often.xii
On the other hand, according to the research carried out among a 
great number of German, British, French and European umbrella trade 
associations during 1998 and 1999, most trade associations follow a 
double strategy of European interests representation (Kohler Koch and 
Quitkatt, 1999). Sixty-nine per cent of all interviewed national trade as-
sociations focus on both European and national institutions, while only 
18% of them still follow only the national approach. The same research 
shows that even European trade associations follow the double strategy 
by maintaining regular contacts with European and national political 
institutions. Also, 62% of European trade associations have continu-
ous contacts with their national governments, 42% develop cooperation 
with their national parliaments, and 41% contact their national regula-
tory agencies. These data clearly confirm the assumption that the prog-
ress of the process of European integration makes the process of inter-
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est representation more complex, requiring interest groups to develop 
a multi-dimensional strategy of parallel action at several political lev-
els and the use of multiple channels of influence. The already existing 
complexity of the concept “channels of influence” has been made even 
more complex by the fact that EU member states and EU institutions 
are not only targets and objects of interest representation but also their 
subjects, since they actively participate in lobbying for various policy 
initiatives. 
In general, due to the role of the Commission in proposing leg-
islative initiatives and the dependency of that institution on the input of 
external interests, the Commission has been considered the first target 
of lobbying at the EU level. In its early stages, the policy-making pro-
cess implies the possibility of influencing the definition of the problem 
at stake, creating an adequate contextual framework and drafting the 
content of new polices. This allows interest groups with specialised, 
technical knowledge to gain a privileged position, especially in cases 
when the Commission does not have enough resources and depends on 
organisations that enjoy almost a monopoly on a very special type of 
information and expertise. The European Parliament is generally con-
sidered as the second important institutional target of interest groups. 
This is mostly due to its openness, stronger democratic legitimacy and 
natural orientation to outside organised interests, but also due to its 
power as co-legislator in certain policy areas. The third pillar of the EU 
institutional triangle and an important lobbying target is the Council of 
Ministers which has a final say in decision-making processes. Clearly, 
at the very end of the legislative process, it is very difficult to exert any 
influence, as most key questions have been already defined and each 
intervention would actually imply changes in positions taken by certain 
institutional actors. 
The growing numbers of experts dealing with interest represen-
tation dynamics at the EU level describe the interaction between the in-
terest groups and the EU institutions as a process of exchange of infor-
mation and analyse the logic of access as an important component of 
potential influence on policy-making procedures. According to Bouwen 
(2002), a potential level of access of certain interest groups to EU in-
stitutions may be explained by the theory of supply and demand of the 
so-called “access-goods”. In other words, the access of interest groups 
to policy-making processes is largely dependent on their capacities and 
potential to provide various forms of access goods to the EU institu-
tions (Bouwen, 2003). Access goods comprise information of key im-
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portance for the Union agenda setting and policy shaping: specific ex-
pert knowledge in the subject matter of decision-making processes, 
needed for preparing an effective and realistic legislative act; informa-
tion about the encompassing interest and needs of the sector in which 
the private actors operate in the European internal market and which is 
likely to be affected by a decision taken (European encompassing in-
terest), and information about the legislative situation in the respective 
member states, and the related needs and interests of certain sectors in 
domestic markets (European domestic encompassing interest).xiii
In order to gain access and a potential influence, interest groups 
use different forms of lobbying and try to position themselves as pro-
viders of specific expertise, depending on the needs of certain institu-
tions. This encourages the development of the informal exchange pro-
cess based on supply and demand principle which enables access to 
those agents who are the most able to adapt to the institutional needs 
for external input. Theoretical and empirical research outlines lobbying 
as a political exchange which implies that both public and private ac-
tors behave rationally and in their own interest. Such a system of inter-
est representation, based on the exchange of information and influence 
within a closed circle of expert elites leaves little room for contribu-
tions of new participants. 
LOGIC OF ACCESS OF CROATIAN  
INTEREST GROUPS TO EUROPEAN  
UNION DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
During last several years, as a response to a number of political 
and economic factors, Croatian interest groups have increasingly start-
ed to develop their activities in a new, European context. The signature 
of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, the opening of new EU 
programmes of financial aid, continuous strengthening of economic co-
operation with the Union, gaining the status of candidate country for 
EU membership and the opening of the EU accession negotiations – 
these are only some circumstances that have contributed to a gradual 
strengthening of the European dimension in the strategies of Croatian 
interest groups. 
The process of EU accession has also brought to the surface a 
number of challenges facing interest groups from Croatia in their ad-
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aptation to a new, more demanding and dynamic environment for in-
terest representation and lobbying at EU level. As in other countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe (Perez-Solorzano, 2005), there is still 
a pronounced lack of clear strategies, skills and organisation, lack of 
understanding of the rules and standards for interest representation de-
veloped in Western democracies, and finally the lack of understanding 
of the concept of lobbying and the possibilities it may provide. This is 
mostly due to the old patterns of behaviour and mindset characterised 
by passivity and expectations that the Government will offer solutions 
for certain social problems (Bežovan, 2004). Even business actors, of-
ten considered an avant-garde of sectoral interest representation, often 
meet difficulties in building fundamental lobbying skills (IMO, 2004). 
Responding to the need to change the patterns of action, adopt 
new strategies and develop modern lobbyist skills, interest groups with 
stronger financial and human resources focused on strengthening com-
munication, networking and exchange of know-how with their partner 
organisations from the EU, gradually developing a more proactive atti-
tude towards decision-making processes at the EU level. 
A literature review in the field of representation of interests of 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe at the EU level (Fink-Haf-
ner, 1994; Perez-Solorzano, 2002) illustrates several possible channels 
of influence of those countries in the EU decision making during the 
pre-accession period: national government bodies and diplomatic mis-
sions, opening own interest representation offices in Brussels and col-
laboration with related umbrella European interest associations. 
Possibilities and constraints  
of national channels of inﬂuence
In the beginning of the nineties, at the very start of the process 
of political and socio-economic transition, the only legitimate represen-
tatives of the interests of Central and Eastern Europe in the EU were 
national governments and parliaments. Clearly, state institutions were 
the most important channels of influence of interest groups on the EU 
decision-making processes – since they had at their disposal more ad-
vanced communication networks and are key interlocutors with the EU 
institutions during the accession negotiations process and the process 
of legislative adjustments. 
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As for lobbying in the EU accession negotiations of Croatia, in-
terest groups face several problems which make difficult the choice of 
national state bodies as adequate channels of influence on the outcome 
of the negotiations process. Although a relatively big number of organ-
ised interests from Croatia have been involved in the work of the nego-
tiating teams in certain areas, the process remains predominantly elit-
ist and does not leave space for contributions from a wider circle of 
organisations interested in certain chapters of the acquisxiv. Working 
groups that prepare the negotiating positions for each chapter base their 
work on very technical and specialist background. The composition of 
these groups is made public only after the official start of the screening 
process of individual chapters – on the day of the explanatory screen-
ing session in Brussels. The access and potential influence of interest 
groups on the negotiations process is largely made difficult by an ambi-
tious target date of the EU accession set by the Government, which im-
plies an accelerated dynamics of negotiations and absence of public de-
bate on specific negotiating positions. This reflects the aspiration of the 
Government for the legitimacy resulting from the expected satisfaction 
of key actors in society and citizens by the final outputs of negotiations 
(output legitimacy), and its indifference to input legitimacy – which 
would be based on participation and contribution of a wider circle of 
interested organisations in the process of the accession negotiations. 
The predominant focus on national government institutions and 
diplomatic representations as possible channels of influence at the EU 
level is rather paradigmatic also for other countries of Central and East-
ern Europe that have recently acceded or are on the path to gaining 
full-fledged EU membership. Some analysts (Fink-Hafner, 1994) em-
phasise the tendency in post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe to rely solely on diplomatic, government channels to commu-
nicate with different actors and institutions involved in the EU policy-
making processes, which reflects the lack of culture of dialogue and 
political communication in those countries. In the context of lobbying 
for Croatian interests in the EU, the dominance of diplomatic commu-
nication channels might be justified by the present level of integration 
of Croatia into the EU structures, which does not provide sufficient in-
centives for a wider involvement and the use of all available channels 
of influence. 
The research conducted by the agency Burson-Marsteller among 
the high officials of the European Commission, members of the Euro-
pean Parliament and representatives of the permanent missions of EU 
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member states to the EU showed that these institutions attach little im-
portance to the lobbying of the governments of non-member countries 
(Burson-Marsteller, 2005). The findings of this research are important 
because they show that the potential influence of governments outside 
the EU is very limited and interest groups can hardly rely on them to 
represent their interests at the EU level. 
Figure 1  Attitudes of the European Union institutions on the effectiveness  
of lobbying
Source: Burson-Marsteller (2005)
On the other hand, according to the same research, governments 
of the EU member states have been scored as the most effective lobby-
ists in Brussels. In this sense, it is justifiable to focus attention on diplo-
matic and lobbying communication channels in the EU-25 capitals. In 
doing so, the possibilities and constraints of lobbying for political and 
economic interests should be taken into account. According to the posi-
tion of the key representatives of the European Commission in Croatia 
(Wunenburger, 2005), lobbying for political interests in the pre-acces-
sion period is effective only if it is supported by well-supported data on 
the real reforms made in the field of the adoption of EU standards, real 
achievements and potential for future EU membership. On the other 
hand, diplomatic lobbying for economic interests often causes doubts 
about the selection of priorities for realisation of particular Croatian 
economic interests, without real analysis and objective criteria which 
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might justify privileged access of different private enterprises and in-
terests. 
Opening interest representation ofﬁces in Brussels
With the progress of a country’s EU accession negotiations, 
more sophisticated forms of pluralist interest representation start de-
veloping. In that regard, interest groups from Croatia are increasingly 
claiming a more active role in the interaction with the EU institutions, 
closer cooperation with partner organisations at the EU level and a 
small number of them decide to open their own interest representa-
tion office in Brussels. A growing trend of opening interest representa-
tion offices in the EU headquarters indicates the development of a new 
“parallel diplomacy”, new forms of direct representation of interests of 
various sectors and actors in society.
The Croatian Chamber of Economy was among first to recog-
nise the advantages of a physical presence in Brussels. Its represen-
tation office in Brussels was opened as early as 2000, in parallel with 
the majority of similar representation offices from Central and Eastern 
European candidate countries that started EU accession negotiations at 
the time. After gaining candidate-country status, Croatia was given the 
possibility to use a wide spectrum of pre-accession aid programmes, 
which was an additional incentive for a number of institutions to take a 
more proactive approach towards decision-making structures at the EU 
level. In 2005, the Croatian Chamber of Crafts and Trades also opened 
its office in Brussels, within the premises of their counterpart umbrel-
la organisation – UEAPME. It was in the same year that Istria County 
finally realised a few year old initiative for the County’s representa-
tive office in Brussels. Regional interests soon became strong advo-
cates of a stronger lobbying presence in Brussels and the example of 
Istria County is to be followed by the Osijek and Baranja County, as 
well as by the City of Split in cooperation with the County of Split and 
Dalmatia. In view of successful Polish and Hungarian examples, there 
were recently discussions on the possibilities for opening a representa-
tive office of Croatian NGOs in Brussels.
The dominance of economic and regional interest representa-
tion offices in Brussels is a phenomenon common to most Central and 
Eastern European countries that have already entered or are on the path 
to gaining full EU membership. In some countries, such as Slovenia, 
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Hungary and Romania, economic representation offices represent in 
the same time the interests of the research and science sector.xv Rep-
resentation offices of cooperatives, NGOs, consultancies and PR agen-
cies are also present, but to a much smaller extent. 
In general, the benefits of opening one’s own representative of-
fice might be linked to several main aspects: comparative advantages 
and better positioning in the sector in which the organisation works, 
more direct contacts with relevant actors and possible business part-
ners, networking and development of better cooperation with related 
organisations, building capacities of organisations in terms of transfer 
of know-how, skills, better access to information on the possible EU 
funding sources and potential changes of relevant legislative acts, but 
also the possibilities of stronger influence on European media present 
in Brusselsxvi.
In addition, better networking and presence at the European lev-
el provide interest groups from Croatia with a source of legitimacy in 
national and supranational contexts. Empirical evidence from Slovenia 
shows that closer cooperation with EU interest groups has been usually 
presented in domestic circles as a proof of the maturity, respectability 
and “Europeanness” of those groups (Fink-Hafner, 1997). 
Apart from a number of advantages and opportunities stem-
ming from the opening of a representative office in Brussels, several 
potential challenges should also be taken into account when consid-
ering the potential sustainability of such an initiative. Of course, the 
most obvious are financial challenges, since the stability and efficien-
cy in running a representative office in Brussels requires a continuous 
and steady inflow of financial resources. Representative offices from 
Croatia and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe have fewer 
human and financial resources, a more diverse and less informed cli-
ent base, less-developed contacts and sources of information, but also a 
more demanding mission due to the fact that their countries, clients and 
constituencies are passing simultaneously through two very complex 
processes – transition and integration into the EU.
The experience of the Croatian Chamber of Economy indi-
cates the continuous problem of the lack of interest and the insufficient 
knowledge and skills of those that should primarily benefit from servic-
es of the interest representation office in Brussels (Martinović, 2004). 
In other words, capacities of Croatian interest groups to absorb and ad-
equately use new possibilities provided through the opening of an in-
terest representation office in the EU are still limited. Therefore, one of 
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the most important challenges that current and future interest represen-
tation offices will need to meet is the necessity of continuous education 
and transfer of know-how and skills acquired in Brussels among their 
own constituencies. 
Networking with European umbrella interest 
associations: prospects and challenges
Experiences of Croatian interest groups in the field of network-
ing and interest representation at the EU level indicate several domi-
nant trends and problems. First, economic interest organisations – such 
as employers associations, chambers of commerce and chambers of 
crafts and trades as well as trade unions (such as HGK, HOK, HUP, 
SSSH) are much more advanced in regard to the level of development 
of contacts with related umbrella organisations active at the EU lev-
el. Second, for some organisations, especially for associations of pub-
lic interest, it is the lack of horizontal cooperation and networking at 
national levels that hampers better collaboration with counterpart Eu-
ropean umbrella associations. Additional obstacles include insufficient 
information about the benefits of membership and enhanced communi-
cation with these umbrella organisations, as well as the lack of finan-
cial resources necessary for covering membership fees in these organi-
sations. 
Given the fact that interest groups from Croatia, as well as from 
other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, do not work in a suffi-
ciently motivating environment for the development of lobbying activi-
ties and skills at national levels, membership in European umbrella as-
sociations could be considered a unique opportunity for gaining expe-
rience and learning from partner associations from developed Western 
European democracies. 
In analysing European umbrella interest associations as po-
tential channels of influence of Croatian interest groups, the new cir-
cumstances in which those associations operate after the last and big-
gest EU enlargement should also be taken into account. The admission 
of new, very heterogeneous groups from new member states as full-
fledged members of umbrella organisations implies a number of inter-
nal organisational difficulties and strategic doubts. European umbrella 
associations must adapt their internal operative structures and working 
methods to new members from Central and Eastern Europe and their 
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requirements or interests may sometimes diverge from those of cur-
rent members (for example in the field of agriculture). In those circum-
stances, it is challenging to maintain the internal cohesion of the group 
and credibility in relations with the EU institutions. In addition, these 
organisations have been faced with increased financial costs, a grow-
ing need for networking and internal communication and the related 
language/communication challenges, the necessity of opening new 
branches in capitals in new member states and dealing with a number 
of problematic issues specific for the environment in which new mem-
ber states work. In other words, European interest groups face the prob-
lem of enlargement of the club similar to those facing member states in 
the context of the new EU enlargement. 
Newcomers expect access to all benefits of club full member-
ship (influence, networks and contacts, human resources, offices), 
while their capacity for contribution to the work of the club remains 
questionable (Perez-Solorzano, 2002). Although due to their represen-
tative character and the density of their membership European umbrel-
la associations often have privileged access to EU institutions, the men-
tioned difficulties decrease their potential for timely reactions on key 
developments in the legislative process and for being able to have an 
impact on EU policy shaping. 
From the perspective of Croatian interest groups, the necessity 
to defend their own specific interests through structures that aim to ad-
vocate more general interests of an umbrella association with 25 and 
more full members remains a challenge. Their area of activity will also 
be rather narrowed down due to the pronounced tendency of umbrella 
associations to put their own “EU identity” before a particular sector’s 
identity which often causes the impression that Euro-groups do not care 
for specific sectoral or national interests. 
Towards developing multi-level lobbying strategies 
Considering the growing proliferation of the lobbyist scene in 
Brussels after the last and biggest enlargement round, the resulting 
changes in structures of the key personnel of the EU institutions as well 
as the announced changes of the mechanisms and dynamics of the de-
cision-making process, lobbyists are facing an even more complex and 
competitive environment. 
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The complexity of the lobbying environment requires Croatian 
interest groups to develop new strategies that involve a simultaneous 
activity at national and supranational level. The model of multi-level, 
multi-dimensional strategy of action implies parallel representation of 
interests and lobbying at several political levels and various channels of 
influence, but also a legitimate, responsible and active relationship to-
wards constituency, clients or beneficiaries and that is still a challenge 
for a great number of Croatian interest groups. 
Among the most important challenges interest groups are fac-
ing in that respect are the lack of human and financial resources, the 
need for more advanced knowledge about the structures and methods 
of decision-making processes at the national, and especially at the EU 
level, weakly-developed lobbying skills, inadequate level of foreign 
language proficiency, the highly technical and bureaucratic character 
of the EU adjustments, and also the lack of time for consultation with 
members due to the routine practice of adopting most so-called “EU 
laws” through the urgent government and parliamentary procedure. 
Regardless of the expected difficulties, most authors stress that 
the lobbying game in the EU should remain open for new actors, so that 
European system of interest groups does not turn into a hermetic, elite 
system. A more proactive European lobbyist activity by Croatian inter-
est groups even in the pre-accession period is considered a potential 
catalyst of transformation of the model of interest representation and 
policy paradigms at national levels which may lead to the gradual in-
stitutionalisation and acceptance of lobbying as a legitimate democratic 
practice. 
TOWARDS EUROPEANIZATION OF POLICY 
PROCESSES AND LEGITIMISATION OF 
LOBBYING IN CROATIA 
Empirical research conducted among Slovenian interest groups 
in the pre-accession period (Fink-Hafner, 1998) shows that European 
networking enables interest groups from candidate countries to estab-
lish contacts with EU officials, learn more intensively about European 
problems, political culture, decision-making methods and conflict res-
olution. New experiences and perspectives opened through network-
ing with Euro-groups are usually considered valuable for two main rea-
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sons: (i) strengthening of the tradition of democratic political culture in 
countries that are still in the process of consolidation and (ii) learning 
and adjustments of the candidate countries to the predominant political 
culture at the emerging, supranational EU level. European Union net-
working has been recognised as a channel for importing new knowl-
edge, new ways of thinking, expert assistance, free of charge informa-
tion and results of expert analysis from the EU to candidate countries. 
It has also been recognised that the context of Europeanisationxvii 
brings not only new knowledge, new autonomous sources of European 
information and new ways of thinking, but also the reorganisation of 
interest groups from transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
following the model adopted by the related organisations from the EU, 
but also the changes of perception of sound policies and good models 
of interaction between civil society and governmental actors in the leg-
islative process. The mentioned impact of Europeanisation also has po-
litical implications since it contributes to the European empowerment 
of domestic interest groups in national policy arenas. The influence of 
European networking has been especially important for strengthening 
capacities of interest groups in the phase of official agenda setting of 
Government and Parliament, and in promoting participatory type of po-
litical culture of interest groups.
The case of Slovenian interest groups, as well as the results of 
other similar research carried out in the past few years, indicate that 
cross-border networking and collaboration of European organisations 
of civil society are becoming an important factor of the Europeanisa-
tion of the structures, processes and content of political decision mak-
ing in candidate countries in the Union (Grabbe, 2001), as part of the 
wider process of adjustments of these countries on multi-level deci-
sion-making processes and the introduction of European standards in 
particular areas. 
In view of the predominantly negative perceptions related to 
lobbying, it is assumed that better regulation in this area would con-
tribute to the gradual acceptance of lobbying as a legitimate democratic 
practice in Croatia. Such an assumption is grounded on the best-prac-
tice examples in several EU member states and also on dominant trends 
in EU policy-making processes. 
The necessity of introducing a regulatory framework for lobby-
ing could be justified by the need to improve the transparency of that 
activity, and introduce the public and interest groups to lobbying con-
cepts, methods and practices. Due to the lack of any tradition of lobby-
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ing in Croatia, a number of prejudices and stereotypes have been cre-
ated around the concept. Therefore, it is to be expected that the intro-
duction of a public register of lobbyists at Parliament, as well as of 
tighter rules and codes of conduct for lobbyists and parliamentary dep-
uties and/or public administration officials, would contribute to the bet-
ter perception and legitimisation of lobbying as a common democratic 
practice in Croatia. 
On the other hand, the progress towards regulation of lobbying 
might be considered as a possible output of proactive investment of ef-
forts of professional lobbyists and experts into the promotion of lobby-
ist profession and lobbying as such. Namely, the trend of over-regula-
tion which is usually not accompanied by adequate implementation is 
still rather pronounced in Croatian policy processes, partly due to the 
ambitious EU accession agenda of the Government which implies an 
enormous and urgent legislative and regulatory dynamics. Such an en-
vironment does not leave much space and time for the maturing pro-
cess that would enable the legitimisation of lobbying. In addition to the 
upholding and promotion of the practice and profession of lobbying, 
the necessary preconditions for the effectiveness of a regulatory frame-
work for and the legitimisation of lobbying should be, on the one hand, 
the fight against corruption, and on the other, the modification of elec-
toral law which, in its present form, entails a high level of party disci-
pline and makes the majority of lobbying efforts directed towards indi-
vidual deputies almost a waste of time.
Debates on the necessity to introduce more stringent regulation 
of lobbying at the EU level showed that professional lobbyists gener-
ally oppose the idea of enforcing tighter rules in the field. Arguments in 
favour of this attitude have been primarily drawn from the basic under-
standing of lobbying as a less institutionalised model of interest repre-
sentation or rather as an informal process which can hardly be precisely 
defined and placed within a rigid normative framework (van Schendel-
en, 2002). Some countries failed to adopt a legislative act on lobbying 
mostly due to the fact that it was impossible to agree on a clear and un-
ambiguous definition of subjects and objects of lobbying and methods 
that might be encompassed by that notion. In this sense, the laws on 
lobbying adopted in Lithuania, Poland and Hungary are interesting ex-
amples that are worth analysing, particularly in terms of influence on 
the development of lobbying practice and its better legitimisation in the 
public of those countries. 
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On the whole, the modernisation of policy processes and the for-
eign policy challenges, particularly the EU accession process, entail the 
necessity of harmonising lobbyist practices in Croatia with some good 
European standards in the area. For the regulation and gradual legiti-
misation of lobbying in domestic policy arena may be considered as a 
pre-condition for successful lobbying in international forums. Such atti-
tudes follow to a great extent the logic of thinking of a number of au-
thors (Young and Wallace, 1997; Greenwood, 2003, etc.) that consider 
the patterns of action of organised interests in the EU as largely condi-
tioned by the national environment and modalities of positioning of in-
terest groups in the national context. 
CONCLUSIONS
Procedures and patterns of interest articulation at the EU level 
are unique and closely related to the particularities of the political sys-
tem of the Union. The complexity and dynamics of mutual relations be-
tween the EU institutions and supranational, national and subnational 
actors, pronounced diffusion and fragmentation of the decision-mak-
ing process, variability of positions of different actors of the political 
system depending on the relevant sector or area, and a number of other 
institutional particularities of the European model of non-hierarchical, 
multi-level governance, have many implications for the models of in-
terest representation and the development of the lobbying system at the 
EU level. Differentiated institutional environment of the EU provides 
interest groups with a wide spectrum of potential channels of influence 
on the policy-making, while each particular lobbying channel implies 
interactions with a series of institutional and political actors the impor-
tance of which depends on the modalities of decision-making process. 
In those circumstances, the entry and positioning of interest 
groups from Croatia requires the development of a multi-dimensional 
strategy of parallel action at several political levels and channels of in-
fluence, along with maintaining a legitimate, responsible and active re-
lationship with their constituencies, members or clients. Notwithstand-
ing a number of deficiencies and limitations of the mentioned national 
and supranational channels of influence, a more proactive approach to 
the EU has important implications on the process of learning and the 
efficient adaptation of Croatian interest groups to the highly populated, 
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heterogeneous and competitive lobbying environment of the enlarged 
EU. 
Experiences of other countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
show that the context of Europeanisation does not only bring new 
knowledge, autonomous sources of European information and new 
ways of thinking, but also a reorganisation and redefinition of the role 
of interest groups in national policy processes, changing perception on 
good governance and good models of interaction between organised 
interests and the state. In that sense, interest representation and lobby-
ing at EU level may prove to be a very important factor in the Europe-
anisation of the structures, processes and contents of political decision-
making in Croatia, and of accepting lobbying as a legitimate democrat-
ic practice. 
*  The author would like to thank the referees who anonymously reviewed this paper.
i  Political science has not yet provided for a consistent and precise deﬁnition of the
term “interest groups”. For the purpose of this work, interest groups will be under-
stood as “organisations, not including political parties, which have a direct inﬂu-
ence on the process of policy making”. That deﬁnition draws on the dominant ap-
proaches to the analysis of complex EU interest groups system and enables us to take 
a sufﬁciently comprehensive approach for studying that topic. Sometimes, the notion
“organised interests” will be used synonymously since it has become a commonly 
used term in the ﬁeld of European studies – to respond to the need of analysis of EU
interest representation which comprises also groups such as corporations, consul-
tancies and law ﬁrms that provide lobbying services but are not perceived as mem-
ber organisations with clear constituency. 
ii  See Schmitter and Streeck (1991); Greenwood [et al.] (1992); Mazey and Richard-
son (1993); Van Schendelen (1993); Hayward (1995); Greenwood (1997); Wallace 
and Young (1997). 
iii  For example, the European Round Table of Industrialists gathers around ﬁfty heads
of major European industrial sectors, exclusively on invitation.
iv  Some authors argue that the Commission initiative CONECCS is actual-
ly the beginning of the accreditation system of the European Commission. 
See web page: http://europa.eu.int/comm/civil_society/coneccs/index_en.htm.
v  The source text of the Code can be found on the following web page: http://europa.
eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/sgc/lobbies/code_consultant/codecon_en.htm. 
vi  The vigorous lobbyist tactics of some members of the European associations of choc-
olate producers (especially Association of the Chocolate, Biscuit and Confection-
ary Industries of the EU − CAOBISCO and Confederation of the Food and Drink 
Industries of the EU − CIAA) made the parliamentary committee for scientiﬁc and
technological options assessment withdraw the report which analysed the cases of 
deaths of small children caused by choking on the plastic toys that can be found in 
some chocolate products. The vice-president of the mentioned parliamentary com-
mittee and member of the European Parliament, Eryl McNally, called that decision 
irresponsible in the extreme and a direct result of intensive pressure from the man-
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ufacturers, almost to the level of harassment. More information on the mentioned 
“affair” can be found in the article Lobbyists seek to add teeth to their code of con-
duct, www.euractiv.com; March, 15 2004.
vii  For the original content of the Code, see the Annex 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Parliament, http://www.europarl.eu.int.
viii  According to the data from the year 2005, the annual number of passes (accredita-
tions) delivered by the Parliament amounts to 4,800. 
ix  More information available at the following web page: http://ec.europa.eu/commis-
sion_barroso/kallas/transparency_en.htm.
  See also the article Brussels lobbyists to come under tighter scrutiny, www.euractiv.
com, March, 7 2005.
x  Among ﬂagrant cases of the “revolving doors” phenomenon is the example of the
former British commissioner for trade, Leon Brittan. Soon after leaving the Com-
mission, he was appointed chief consultant for WTO affairs in the law ﬁrm Herbert
Smith, and also vice-president of the investment bank UBS Warburg, assistant direc-
tor in the ﬁrm Unilever and president of the lobbying agency IFSL which represents
interests of the British ﬁnancial sector in the EU.
xi  It is estimated that approximately 80% of all economic and 50% of all political deci-
sions made by the EU member states are shaped, implemented or directly inﬂuenced
by the EU. See for example Van Schendelen (2002).
xii  Greenwood identiﬁes other possible circumstances that may have an impact on the
positioning of interest groups with regard to particular channels of inﬂuence, such
as eventual changes in the composition of national government and their openness 
for interaction with interest groups, progress of information and communication 
technologies and better access to information via Internet and general progress in 
the implementation of a more coherent EU policy of access to information, etc. See 
Greenwood (2003:34).
xiii  Bouwen identiﬁes two crucial factors that determine the encompassing nature of an
interest group – a clear demarcation of its organisational domain and its represent-
ativity or scope of membership.
xiv  According to the Report on the progress in the EU accession negotiations, presented 
by the chief negotiator, Mr. Vladimir Drobnjak, at a special Government session held 
on 22 December 2005, the negotiations structures include representatives of 53 as-
sociations (unions, networks), 6 economic interest associations, 9 chambers of com-
merce, 9 trade unions, etc. The Report emphasises the involvement of a great number 
of experts outside public administration as an “essential and distinctive feature of 
Croatian negotiations structure”.
xv  See for example the representative ofﬁce of the Slovenian Business and Research As-
sociation (SBRA) in Brussels, www.sbra.be.
xvi  It is estimated that around 500 journalists, reporters from various European media, 
are working in Brussels.
xvii  According to Radaelli, the concept of Europeanisation could be deﬁned as the “proc-
ess of construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles and ways of action, but also shared beliefs and 
norms that are ﬁrst deﬁned and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and
politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political 
structures and public policies” (Radaelli, 2000).
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ABSTRACT
The recognition of European citizenship by the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union (Treaty of Maastricht) introduced a novel legal institution 
into the European construction, hitherto unknown in international law. 
Its historical importance and nature will be analysed through different 
perspectives. The analysis of the structure of European citizenship re-
veals main advantages and disadvantages of the current concept. How-
ever, in its current form, it offers a very limited list of rights. Until re-
cently, citizens’ rights were neglected and invisible at the level of the 
European Union. This is especially visible in the policies towards the 
candidate and accession countries, which are obliged to follow certain 
human rights standards in order to meet the conditions for membership. 
The importance and meaning of European citizenship for third country 
nationals has been emphasised over the last few years.
Key words:
European Union, European citizenship, citizens’ rights, human rights, 
nationality, third country nationals, future of Europe 
114
INTRODUCTION
The recognition of European citizenship by the Treaty on EUi 
introduced a novel legal institution into the European construction, 
hitherto unknown in international law.
This paper will in its first part give a definition, a survey of the 
historical importance and analysis of the citizenship concept. The na-
ture of citizenship will be observed through the debates over its mean-
ing and content.
Legal literature usually calls the concept of European citizen-
ship plastic and empty in its context. That is especially visible if we ob-
serve the legal structure of the concept, which is mainly oriented to the 
free movement of persons and political rights. In analysis of the struc-
ture of European citizenship from a legal point of view, this paper will 
reveal the main disadvantages and gaps in the current concept. 
Through an historical background and analysis of establishment 
of European citizenship, the paper will explore the position of Euro-
pean citizenship yesterday, today and tomorrow. Despite several legal 
changes of the primary European law (Treaty on EU, Treaty on estab-
lishing the European Community, Treaty of Nice and Treaty establish-
ing a Constitution of Europe), the EU institutions have themselves em-
phasised that European citizenship needs to be understood as a devel-
oping concept.ii 
The paper will also reveal that until recently, citizens’ rights 
were neglected and invisible at the level of the EU. Market freedoms 
and market integration have been crucial in the discussions and legal 
documents of the Union. Free movement of persons opened up a place 
for new debates on the concept of European citizenship. At present, Eu-
ropean citizenship rights are not only of great importance, but are on 
the way to becoming the sole basis for enjoyment of a number of rights 
in Community law, without further reference to a person’s status as a 
citizen (Kochenov, 2006:216). In addition to free movement of persons 
and legal changes of European law, in the last part of the paper, the po-
sition of third country nationals will be analysed. 
Even though there are a lot of positive implications of the con-
cept, this paper makes a contribution to further discussion on the cred-
ibility of the concept first introduced by the Treaty on EU. More re-
search is needed to detect gaps and offer possible solution to this prob-
lematic issue (Meehan, 1993; Everson, 1996; Shaw, 1997; Kostako-
poulou, 1998; De Burca, 2002).
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THE CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP
Historical background
The idea of citizenship came into being many centuries ago. In 
the ancient city-state of Athens, citizenship was granted to males of cer-
tain classes. Citizenship was also granted to a few foreigners and freed 
slaves. Citizenship meant that a man could vote, hold office, serve on 
committees and juries, and do military service. He was also expected to 
share the work of government. Women, slaves, and practically all for-
eigners were protected under the law but had few of the rights and priv-
ileges of Athenian citizens. 
Citizenship was also important to the people of ancient Rome. 
Roman citizens often took part in their government. Roman citizenship 
was extended to foreign soldiers serving in the army and to men of 
conquered lands. By A.D. 212 almost all of the men in Roman prov-
inces, except slaves, were citizens. After the fall of the Roman Empire, 
in 476, the idea of citizenship became less important for many centu-
ries. The feudal system spread through Western Europe in the Middle 
Ages. This system was based on services and loyalty to a superior in 
exchange for his protection. 
By the 1600s some kings had made many small states into na-
tions. The common people no longer owed allegiance, or loyalty, to the 
nobles in their immediate region. Their first allegiance now was to the 
king. They began to take pride in their whole country. They also began 
to feel that they should have a voice in their country’s government. As 
these changes took place, people started thinking of themselves as citi-
zens of a nation as well as the loyal subjects of their king.
The French Revolution of 1789 represented one of the biggest 
changes in the history of human rights. After a series of four mini-revo-
lutions from May to July, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen was released on the 26th of August, 1789. Furthermore, the 
French Revolution brought about a head-on clash between church and 
state. Napoleon Bonaparte reached a peace of sorts with the church, 
which was brought under state tutelage, but left alone as long as it con-
fined itself to spiritual matters. The arrangement did not last and amid 
renewed anti-clerical militancy the Third Republic decreed the separa-
tion of church and state. The law of separation meant strict official neu-
trality in religious affairs. The French state could not allow any pros-
elytizing in public buildings – least of all in schools, where the citizens 
116
of tomorrow were being taught. The insistence on schools as religion-
free zones goes to the heart of the French idea of citizenship. The Re-
public has always recognised individuals rather than groups: a French 
citizen owes allegiance to the nation, and has no officially sanctioned 
ethnic or religious identity (Hancock, 2002:2). The concept of citizen-
ship is a relatively young one. Prior to the French Revolution neither 
the concept of nation nor that of citizen as we know them, was in exis-
tence.
Deﬁnition of the concept
Since the 1990s, citizenship has become one of the key issues 
of the political debate. The notion of citizenship is changing at a great 
pace because of the major economic, social and political changes that 
occurred while the 20th century moved into the 21st. Ever since the clas-
sical ages (Greece, Rome) the concept of citizenship has been in a pro-
cess of constant evolution.
Citizenship can be defined as a legal and political status that al-
lows the citizen to acquire some rights (e.g. civil, political, social) as 
an individual and acknowledge some duties (e.g. taxes, military ser-
vice, loyalty) in relation to a political community, as well as the abil-
ity to participate in the collective life of a state. The latter right arises 
from the democratic principle of the sovereignty of the people. Citizens 
of Spain, the United Kingdom, France, Portugal or the United States 
have a series of rights, granted by their constitutions, but also have 
obligations, with regard to their national community. In a democratic 
state, the citizen must fulfil those obligations since they were passed 
by the representatives they have voted in, using one of the main politi-
cal rights of the citizen, the suffrage. Citizenship is restricted to peo-
ple who legally satisfy the conditions for becoming a citizen of a state. 
People that live in a territory but lack the status of citizen are deprived 
of the rights and duties that citizenship involves. Every state has laws 
to regulate the way an individual can acquire its nationality, that is to 
say, citizenship of that state. This concept of citizenship dates back to 
a historical period initiated with the great liberal revolutions in the late 
18th century. It is a notion characterised by the pre-eminence of the na-
tion-state as a political community that comprises individuals. Citizen-
ship is tantamount to nationality.
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In the broadest sense, citizenship can be defined as setting the 
terms for the institutionalised relation between citizens and polity/com-
munity. This set of institutions includes shared principles of justice, so-
cial and cultural norms and rules that establish the procedures of politi-
cal participation, and day-to-day practices of citizen participation in the 
polity/community. Citizenship then entails the entitlement to belong to 
a community that has the right and the obligation to represent commu-
nity interests as a sovereign vis-à-vis other communities and vis-à-vis 
the citizens. This model of a relationship between two entities, namely 
the individual subject or citizen on one side, and the representative of 
a sovereign entity (Queen/estate/nation-state) on the other, has provid-
ed modern history with a basic pattern of citizenship. It follows that at 
least three elements need to be considered in the conceptualisation of 
an ideal-type citizenship. These are the individual, the polity/communi-
ty, and the relation between the two. Any study of citizenship needs to 
refer to these three elements in one way or other. They therefore repre-
sent the three constitutive elements of citizenship (Wiener, 1998:22). 
Conceptual debates over citizenship
Citizenship means different things in different contexts. The 
concept has remained a much-contested one, particularly today, and no 
complete or elaborate theory of citizenship exists (Turner, 1990; Tilly, 
1995). For some, the most basic aspect of citizenship includes the no-
tion of membership in a community or in a nation-state (Barbalet, 1988; 
Brubaker, 1989; Vogel, 1991; Kymlica and Norman, 1994). For oth-
ers, citizenship comprises an understanding of intersubjectively shared 
practices that contribute to democratic changes of and within a commu-
nity (Habermas, 1994; Kratochwill, 1994). Taking conceptual and his-
torical approaches to citizenship into account, two general statements 
about citizenship can be made despite conceptual differences. First, it 
is possible to state that citizenship is about rights, access, and belong-
ing, wherein rights include Marshall’s triad of civil, political, and social 
rights; access indicates the conditions of access to political participa-
tion; and belonging means rootedness in a community. Second, most 
scholars agree both from a conceptual and a historical perspective that 
analyses of citizenship are in one way or another linked to the state or 
the nation-state respectively. That is, talking about citizenship invari-
ably involves the notion of stateness (Barbalet, 1998; Turner, 1990). 
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THE PARADOX OF EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP 
The road toward the launching  
of European Citizenship 
The right of free movement of persons inside the Community 
was introduced in the constituent Treaty of Rome, establishing the Eu-
ropean Economic Community (EEC), signed in Rome in 1957.iii This 
freedom did not appear bound to any citizenship concept but rather it 
was closely linked to the conduct of an economic activity. In conse-
quence, the right of residence was accorded to workers and their fami-
lies, linked to the right to exercise a labour activity in another member 
state of the EEC.
Although in a meeting of the European Council, held in Paris 
in 1974, the necessity to grant special rights in the EEC to the citizens 
of the member states was put forward, it was only in 1976 when the 
Tindemans Report was issued that it was put into practice. Then for 
the first time, the object of proceeding beyond a common market and 
creating a community of citizens was clearly proposed.iv This report, 
edited by the Belgian prime minister at the request of the Summit of 
Paris 1974, had no success with governments, though it had an impor-
tant influence in later steps towards integration. In a chapter entitled 
Europe of the Citizens Tindemans proposed the enactment of different 
measures that made perceptible, by means of outward signs, the rise of 
a European awareness: unification of passports, the disappearance of 
border controls, the common use of the benefits of the social security 
systems, the accreditation of academic courses and degrees.
In 1976 a second step took place when elections to the Europe-
an Parliament by universal suffrage were conducted. Although Parlia-
ment’s competences were meagre, for the first time, one of the key ele-
ments of citizenship, democratic participation, appeared. Later on, after 
the Fontainebleau Council in 1984, a Committee of Europe of the Citi-
zens, presided over by the Italian Euro MP Adonnino, was established.v 
This committee approved a series of proposals that were seemingly un-
ambitious but nevertheless led to the constitution of a European citi-
zenship. 
More audacious was the Project of Treaty of European Union, 
passed by the European Parliament, in February of 1984, and present-
ed by the Euro MP Alterio Spinelli (Spinelli Project). In spite of its re-
straint, the Single European Act (1986) hardly included any of the Spi-
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nelli project proposals, although it adopted, and that is fundamental, the 
objective of a political EU.vi In this manner, a few years later, two in-
tergovernmental conferences were convened to reform the treaties. One 
of them focused on the Economic and Monetary Union, the other one 
on political union.
A meeting of the Rome Council in October 1990, in the course 
of establishing the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) guidelines, 
introduced the notion of European citizenship, as an essential element 
of the Treaties reform, and with some characteristics and similar rights 
to those that were later included in the Treaty on EU or Treaty of Maas-
tricht.vii It was the Spanish delegation that first presented to the IGCs, 
in October 1990, a document on European citizenship. After diverse 
negotiations, and with the enthusiastic support of the European Parlia-
ment that passed two favourable resolutions in 1991, the Treaty of the 
EU came finally to institutionalise European citizenship. 
European citizenship and European  
supranational statehood
These common understandings of citizenship were dramatical-
ly challenged when citizenship was established within a supranational 
context in the Treaty on EU in 1993. The Union is not a nation-state. 
Nonetheless, citizenship policy making has been part of European 
Community, now Union, politics for over 20 years and “citizenship of 
the Union” has been defined in the Treaty on EU according to Article 8. 
Since the ratification of the Treaty on EU in 1993, citizens of the Union 
have enjoyed a series of rights that will be discussed later in this text. 
This newly institutionalised link between the citizens of the 
Union and the EU as a polity differs in many ways from the familiar 
citizen-polity relation as established in nation-states over the past two 
centuries. The euro-polity is a political arena without fixed boundaries 
or a centralized political structure; instead it has been characterized as 
a multi-level polity with a weak core that cannot claim the legitimate 
monopoly of force over a population within a bounded territory (Ca-
poraso, 1996; Marks and McAdam, 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 1997).
Placing citizenship in a supranational context instantly provoked 
debates over its political and conceptual implications (Closa, 1995; 
Preuss, 1995; Habermas, 1994; O’Keeffe and Twomey, 1993; Hobe, 
1993; Shaw, 1997; La Torre, 1997). If such a political entity, which is 
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best defined as a polity in the making, offers citizenship rights despite 
the fact that a national state is not the final goal, then the questions at 
hand are: What does Union citizenship entail? How have Union citizen-
ship rights been established? Is the EU proposing rights, access and be-
longing as national states do? The questions lying at the centre of these 
discussions are first, whether or not citizenship remains a valid concept 
at a time when multiple issues of governance are practiced beyond state 
level and when an awareness of difference contributes to push for new 
ways of representing a multiplicity of identities (Young, 1989; Turner, 
1990; Held, 1991; Meehan, 1993; Kymlica, 1994; Tull, 1995). Further-
more, can citizenship be meaningfully applied as an organizing prin-
ciple that institutionalizes the relation between citizens and the polity/
community in a democratic way, providing both just and equal access 
to participation for the citizen and setting the terms for legitimate gov-
ernance? Secondly, does the unprecedented establishment of citizen-
ship within a supranational framework indicate a qualitative leap for-
ward towards a notion of statehood in the EU (Hobe, 1993; König and 
Pechstein, 1995)?
Together these questions pose a tremendous challenge to famil-
iar understandings of both citizenship and statehood. If citizenship has 
a meaning as a component in the process of modern state-building, then 
its application in a non-state context suggests the notion of European 
supranational statehood. However if the euro-polity is not going to de-
velop the institutional characteristics of a modern state despite the in-
troduction of Union citizenship, then we need to shed light on the para-
dox of citizenship in a non-state and ask: what is the meaning of Union 
citizenship? 
The crumbling structure of the nation-state involves a complex 
process of shifting boundaries and polity restructuring. This process in-
cludes new models of policy making in emerging polities such as the 
EU. If it is true that citizenship has a crucial role in process of pol-
ity formation, then such changes involve a possible reconfiguration of 
citizenship to bind complex levels of identities (subnational, nation-
al and supranational) in new forms of political community (Linklater, 
1996:97). It is this role of citizenship as more than an organizing prin-
ciple, in fact as an identity-generating practice with community-build-
ing capacity that has emerged from the history of modern state-making 
as a powerful, if much contested idea. To this day, no fully worked-out 
theory of citizenship exists. The visible emergence of a supranational 
“European” citizenship has led to a renewed debate over the question 
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of whether citizenship as nationality is a precondition for polity forma-
tion, or whether citizenship as a practice contributes to identity-building 
as the glue of a new polity on citizenship have mostly referred to citi-
zen identity by using the terms of “national identity” or “nationality”, 
that is, by simply adding either an adjective or replacing it with a noun 
to clarify its meaning. Both are derived from the term “nation” which 
is a construct itself (Tully, 1995:29). However, it does not go without 
saying whether or not this attachment to a nation is reflected in citizen-
ship identity. As identities are multiple and dependent on context, we 
cannot assume one identity as a hegemonic constant but need to show 
how it came to the fore in the first place. If the terms national identity 
and/or nationality were used in a meaningful way, they would have to 
reflect citizens’ identity at a particular time and place, that is, express 
actual allegiances of citizens.viii However, as nationality is often used 
synonymously with citizenship, the interchangeable use leads scholars 
to fall into the trap of taking the construct for real. It is then important 
to note that the term national identity often wrongly appears as a sine 
qua non for the establishment of citizenship (Anderson, 1993:6). Na-
tionality becomes easily reified once the distinction between constitu-
tive and historical elements is not respected. Accordingly, to take the 
decline (or increase) of national identity as an indicator for citizenship 
has led to assumptions which may lead to wrong conclusions because 
they are part of the powerful construct of “nationality” itself. Although 
the nation-state continues to be the key element of the world political 
map, changes are taking place that portend an evident challenge to this 
kind of political organisation. 
Two major transformations are calling in question the role of the 
contemporary state-nation and the concept of citizenship that it embrac-
es. Firstly, globalisation, that is to say, the fact that the central and stra-
tegic economic activities are integrated on a world scale through elec-
tronic webs of capitals, goods, and information exchange. A key ele-
ment of this globalisation is the development of the Internet and the in-
formation society. This globalisation of markets is the decisive factor 
that has impelled the last step in European integration, the Economic 
and Monetary Union. The nation-state is less and less able to cope with 
the challenges of globalisation. Secondly, the existence of more mul-
ticultural societies, which breaks up the theoretical homogeneity of 
nation-states. Regional or national diversity (Spain, Belgium, United 
Kingdom) and multiculturalism and multiethnicity brought about by 
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growing immigration are key aspects of the new European society. Eu-
ropean citizenship will rise from this new European society.
The institutions of the EU itself and some socio-historical stud-
ies have pointed out that union citizenship needs to be understood as a 
“developing concept”.ix It is not only that the concept is “developing” 
but is also a “dynamic” one. As O’Keeffe (1994:106) observes, “the 
importance of the Treaty on EU citizenship provisions lies not in their 
content but rather in the promise they hold out for the future. The con-
cept is a dynamic one, capable of being added or strengthened but not 
diminished. This understanding involves an approach to citizenship not 
primarily from a topical and analytical viewpoint but from a contextual 
perspective instead. Meehan (1993:80) has characterized the difference 
in approach in the two perspectives as stemming from a “minimalist” 
and “dynamic” understanding of citizenship respectively. The minimal-
ists base their evaluation of Union citizenship predominantly on a posi-
tivist rights approach, the impact of new policy options and opportuni-
ties on citizenship as an organizing principle of communities (Meehan, 
1996:81). Strictly legal interpretations thus stand in contrast with so-
cio-historical analyses, which claim that Union citizenship entails more 
than rights, that citizenship is more than the sum of its parts. They sug-
gest that the substance of citizenship is not only derived from the stip-
ulation of rights according to the principles of law, but it also contains 
context specific meaning which has been developed through social, po-
litical and cultural practice (Garcia, 1993; Turner, 1990; Soysal, 1994; 
Conover and Hicks, 1996; Calhoun, 1996). 
It is, of course, possible that the term “European citizenship” 
can be used as a collective term to describe the laws on citizenship of 
the member states. However, such a term has no clear content in itself. 
Citizenship in national terms varies considerably amongst the coun-
tries, above all concerning acquisition of citizenship and the legal con-
sequences. In certain member states it is quite easy to become a citizen; 
in others it is harder. Many individuals are affected by the obvious in-
equities and differences arising due to the fragmented laws on citizen-
ship. No uniform rules on citizenship exist in the EU countries, nor do 
common rules on how a citizen of the Union may obtain citizenship of 
a member state other than his country of origin. Differences between 
the laws on citizenship in the various member states are reflected di-
rectly in the citizenship of the Union. 
Thus, some of the problems concerning citizenship of the Union 
are connected to national citizenship in the EU countries and the great 
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differences which exist between the national concepts of citizenship. 
Differences between the concepts of citizenship in the EU, which have 
arisen due to various political and legal transitions, can clearly be dis-
tinguished. One of the main weaknesses of the citizenship of the Union 
is its lack of independence, due to fact that citizenship of the Union 
is totally founded on the fragmented national concepts of nationality. 
The possibility of becoming a citizen of the Union varies according to 
where in the Union that person lives. A means of overcoming these dif-
ferences, and thereby strengthening citizenship of the Union, would be 
to harmonise the laws on citizenship in the member states. Harmonisa-
tion would, at present, be politically impossible.
To sum up, despite the continuous efforts of building a “Euro-
pean” model of citizenship based on the modern blueprint, the Union 
is neither a centrally organized polity nor does it follows state-centric 
types of policy making. Instead it is developing a polity without a cen-
tre. Citizenship practice related to this polity/community has generat-
ed a fragmented type of citizenship. Union citizens direct demands to-
wards the member states and to the Union as well; they may belong to 
a local community of one member state (in terms of their social, cultur-
al, economic and political activities) and at the same time to a national 
community of another member state (legal/national ties and political ac-
tivity). Thus, “European” citizenship does not supersede national iden-
tities. Instead, it has evoked multiple identities as citizenship practice 
has involved a growing number of target groups, such as workers, wage 
earners, students, etc. and created access to certain social rights, new 
voting rights, a “European” Passport, changed rules of border crossing 
and practices to contribute to create a feeling of belonging. 
IMPLICATION OF EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP 
FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Fundamental rights of European citizens
According to the Article 17 of the Treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Community, every person holding the nationality of a member 
state of the EU is a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union sup-
plements national citizenship without replacing it. From the very word-
ing of Article 17 and the history of its drafting, one is tempted to con-
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clude that Union citizenship is nothing but a corollary of nationality of 
one of the member states.x Citizenship always attaches to member state 
nationality. In one judgement the European Court of Justice (ECJ) made 
clear that member states, and member states only, may determine the 
creation and abolition of nationality.xi They may, however, not put re-
strictions on it if another member state has already granted nationality. 
Citizenship of the Union is made up of a set of rights enshrined 
in the EU Treaties, additional to those of national citizenship. In con-
crete terms, it gives all nationals of member states the following rights:
•  the right to move and reside freely within the EU;
•  the right to vote for and stand as a candidate at municipal and Euro-
pean Parliament elections in whichever member state an EU citizen 
resides;
•  access to the diplomatic and consular protection of another member 
state outside the EU;
•  the right to petition the European Parliament and to complain to the 
European Ombudsman;
•  the right to contact and receive a response from any EU institution in 
any one of twenty languages;
•  the right to access Parliament, Commission and Council documents 
under certain conditions;
•  the right to non-discrimination on grounds of nationality within the 
scope of Community law;
•  the guarantee of fundamental rights as upheld by the European Con-
vention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU;
•  protection against discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic ori-
gin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation;
•  equal access to the Community civil service.
The question is how one can become an EU citizen. Any per-
son who holds the nationality of an EU member state is automatically a 
citizen of the EU. The question of whether an individual possesses the 
nationality of a member state is settled solely by reference to the na-
tional law of the member state concerned. Thus it is for each member 
state to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nation-
ality. Creating an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe is the 
first aim to be mentioned in the EU Treaties. The concept of EU citi-
zenship has been developed gradually. Though free movement of peo-
ple has existed since the foundation of the Community in 1951, it was 
confined to workers. In 1986, the Single European Act set out to create 
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a Europe without internal frontiers. The concept of European citizen-
ship is enshrined in the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(Articles 17-22 and 255). The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, aimed 
to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of 
its member states through the introduction of citizenship of the Union. 
Union citizenship confers on every Union citizen the fundamental and 
personal right to move and reside freely without reference to an eco-
nomic activity. With this Treaty also came additional voting rights and 
extra consular protection.
The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997, extended citizens’ 
rights by introducing a new anti-discrimination clause on the grounds 
of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation. Amsterdam also reinforced the free movement of people by 
integrating the Schengen Convention into the Treaty. 
The Treaty of Nice, signed in 2001, confirmed citizens’ rights. It 
facilitated, for example, legislating relating to free movement and resi-
dence by introducing the qualified majority for the decision-making in 
Council. The majority of Europeans are not well or not at all informed 
about their rights as EU citizens.xii
In addition to the rights attached to the citizenship of the EU that 
are explicitly mentioned in the Treaties, there is a whole series of fun-
damental rights which stem from the EU Treaties, the case-law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities, the Council of Europe’s 
Convention on Human Rights and the constitutional traditions of the 
member states. These rights have been assembled into a single, simple 
text called the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Unionxiii, 
which was proclaimed by the Commission, the Parliament and EU 
leaders just before they signed the Treaty of Nice in December 2000.
The Treaty of Nice contains a declaration calling for a deeper 
and wider debate about the future of the EU. This debate was launched 
at the beginning of 2001, in view of the next treaty due to be signed in 
2004. The issues at stake include the demarcation of responsibilities be-
tween the EU and the member state, the status of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights, simplification of the Treaties and the role of the national 
parliaments in the institutional architecture of the EU. As a contribution 
to this debate, in July 2001 the Commission adopted a White Paper on 
European governancexiv, setting out a vision of a Union made more rel-
evant to its citizens. Examples of the proposals made are a clearer divi-
sion of powers among EU institutions, a simplification of EU legisla-
tion and a clearer definition of policy objectives.
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EU citizens still encounter real obstacles, particularly in exer-
cising their right of free movement. In December 2003 the Council of 
ministers reached the common position on the Commission’s amended 
proposal on the right of citizens of the Union and their family mem-
bers to move and reside freely within the territory of the member states, 
aimed at clarifying and simplifying the rules on the right of entry and 
residence in any of the EU member states.xv
Limitations of citizens’ rights
The EU has long faced a problem: as the Community has shift-
ed from common market to Union, with certain attributes of a state, 
it needs a people who are its members, who identify with its objec-
tives, and with whom it has a relationship. The principle of citizen-
ship introduced by the Treaty on EU was intended to create this link 
between nationals of the member states and the European Union 
(Barnard, 1999:383). Even though the first intention of the Treaty of the 
European Union was to create a link between nationals of the member 
states and the Union, since then a little has been done in bringing citi-
zens closer to the EU. Citizenship of the Union does not replace the cit-
izenship of a member state and the rights and duties listed in the Treaty 
of Amsterdam are simply not enough in obtaining a full membership 
in the Union. This argument could be supported by quoting Marshall 
(1950:40) who argued that “citizenship involves full membership of the 
community which has gradually been achieved through the historical 
development of rights, starting with civil rights (basic freedoms from 
state interference), political rights (such as electoral rights) and, most 
recently, social rights, including rights to health care, unemployment 
insurance and old age pensions – the rudiments of a welfare state”. Ac-
cording to the fact that a European citizen is defined as one holding the 
nationality of a member state, the concept as such is exclusionary. The 
concept excludes a priori any third-country national.xvi 
Since the list of rights contained both in the Treaty on EU and 
Treaty establishing European Community is rather poor and very lim-
ited, there is no doubt that the list of citizenship rights serves its pur-
pose. The first express use of citizenship to extend the rights of Union 
citizens was the judgment in the case of Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bay-
ern.xvii
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Article 13 of the Treaty establishing European Community was 
designed to foster citizenship of the Union. It has an important role to 
play in this evolutionary process, where the emerging concept of citi-
zenship is complex and multi-faceted, involving relationships between 
individuals, their own and other states and the Union. However, legis-
lation alone is not enough. Furthermore, individuals will primarily en-
force any right provided by legislation adopted under Article 13 their 
own state or any other state to which they have moved. Here lies a fur-
ther paradox: rights intended to foster a commitment to the Union are 
actually being exercised against the member states. This highlights the 
complex nature of citizenship (Barnard, 1999:385).
Weiler (1996:30) claims that simply adding new rights to the list, 
or adding lists of new rights, has little effect. Rights are taken for grant-
ed; if you managed to penetrate the general indifference towards the 
European construct by waving some new catalogue or by broadcasting 
imminent accession to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the likely reaction would be to wonder why 
those new rights or accession were not there in the first place. 
Human rights have a place in the discourse of citizenship. The 
concept of European citizenship established by the Treaty of Maas-
tricht is an example of how citizenship rights can be scattered across 
the Treaty. However, this catalogue of citizenship rights is exceedingly 
limited and hardly comparable with domestic conceptions of citizen-
ship and it does not have an independent status since the member states 
decide who are their nationals, and not the EU. Yet, there is still a ques-
tion whether citizenship rights will bring citizens closer to the Union 
or not. But given how things stand, developing political means of con-
trol is more central to European citizenship than piling on new human 
rights. The major problem of European citizenship is giving it meaning, 
actually developing some measure of shared understanding about what 
it can and should (and should not) mean. 
It has to be pointed out that only rights developed by the citi-
zenship context are political rights. However, there are some difficul-
ties in exercising these rights, so we come to the conclusion that they 
are weak in their content. The political dimension of EU citizenship is 
underdeveloped. The instruments for participation in the public life of 
the Union are lacking as this public life itself, as distinguished from the 
public life in the member states, is virtually non-existent: a weak Par-
liament, next to no direct access to the European courts, and so forth. 
Furthermore, Jessurun d’Oliveira (1994:126-148) emphasizes that 
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rights of political participation are weak, whilst social rights evident-
ly are non-existent. Furthermore, the EU does not represent a shared 
public realm in any meaningful sense of the term. Following the argu-
ments mentioned above, there is certainly a concern that the concept of 
European citizenship introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht does not 
offer very much in terms of protection of fundamental rights. It must 
be stressed that the whole problem of European citizenship is not only 
the problem of which rights are incorporated or left out of the concept. 
Probably, the real problem of the Community is the absence of a human 
rights policy with everything this entails: a Commissioner, a Director-
ate-General, a budget and a horizontal action plan for making effective 
those rights already granted by the treaties and judicially protected by 
the various levels of European courts. Most of those whose rights are 
violated have neither the knowledge nor the means to seek judicial vin-
dication. The EU does not need more rights on its list or more lists of 
rights. What are mostly needed are programmes and agencies to make 
rights real, not simply negative interdictions which courts can enforce 
(Weiler, 2002).
Consequently, there is a legitimate question whether the citi-
zenship chapter should be broadened or whether it would be better to 
broaden the definition of citizenship? From my perspective, simply 
adding a broader definition will not make any improvement. On the 
other hand, adding more rights to the list could cause a negative effect 
in terms of diminishing rights that already exist. This problem deserves 
special attention in the literature and more research is still needed in or-
der to provide possible solutions. 
CITIZENSHIP TOMORROW
Towards a European citizenship  
for third country nationals 
A culture of rights accessible to third country nationals is slowly 
emerging at EU level. As early as 1984, the Economic and Social Com-
mittee had called for Community intervention in relation to the resident 
status of third country nationals. At the time however, member states 
were very reluctant to consider interference with what they regarded 
as their exclusive competence. With Maastricht cooperation on migra-
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tion-related issues a new institutional structure was provided: the third 
pillar. While the first pillar, i.e. the provisions contained in the Trea-
ty on establishing the European Community, was characterised by su-
pranational decision-making procedures, the third pillar only provided 
the basis for intergovernmental cooperation. The new third pillar pro-
vided that policy activity concerned with third-country nationals was 
of “common interest” and therefore should be the subject of coopera-
tion (Picard, 2004:70). Despite the gross inadequacies of the third pillar 
system, lessons had been learned about what could be done at suprana-
tional level and the policy instruments provided by the Treaty of Maas-
tricht proved that there were sufficient grounds amongst member states 
to go further in the process of developing new initiatives. In 1997, the 
Treaty of Amsterdam made migration issues important for the Commu-
nity by incorporating a new title on visas, immigration, asylum and free 
movement of persons. The EU institutions were given competence to 
define conditions.
Indeed, during the post-Maastricht phase there had been increas-
ing recognition that insufficient attention had been paid to the role of 
third country nationals in EU labour markets. The new EU powers con-
stituted a major change as EU institutions had only been loosely asso-
ciated under the old Maastricht third pillar. The Commission, which 
emerged as the big winner of the institutional reshuffle, used its newly 
acquired right of initiative to play a very pro-active role on migration 
related issues. It issued a number of proposals, the most significant of 
which was the 2001 proposal, for a directive on the status of long term 
resident third-country nationals. 
Recent years have seen progress in terms of political will. In 
1999, the Tampere Council concluded that the status of long-term- 
resident third-country nationals should be approximated to the status of 
member states nationals, i.e. with a set of similar rights.xviii It is in the 
right of free movement that citizenship is most developed.xix 
Arguably, economic considerations have achieved precedence 
over the “patriotic” elements of citizenship in the EU. Critics have ex-
pressed concerns that the Treaty of Amsterdam merely provided for 
flanking measures to ensure free movement. There is a clear attempt in 
the Treaty establishing a Constitution of Europe to enhance the politi-
cal and social rights of non-nationals and the inclusion of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the Union is to play an important role in the 
representation of migrant interests in EU law. The Charter was initially 
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promulgated as a declaratory act and was annexed to the Nice Treaty in 
December 2000.
By enshrining a common set of rights and values, the Charter, it 
is thought, will make the Union more palpable to its citizens. The Char-
ter ignores the interface between national and EU citizenship: funda-
mental rights apply to all individuals, including non-nationals having 
regard to their nature as humans rather then as citizens of a given state. 
In June 2002, the Seville Council further acknowledged the im-
portance of the contribution by third-country nationals to economic, so-
cial and cultural life. To put this rhetoric in practice was one of the ma-
jor challenges for the Convention on the Future of Europe. The Consti-
tutional Treaty represents a notable attempt at enhancing a culture of 
rights accessible to all.xx
Individual membership of the EU is unlike traditional models of 
citizenship. Its nature is complementary nationality of one of the mem-
ber states as an essential prerequisite. Although modern economies rely 
more and more on an immigrant labour force a significant number of 
this force is left out of the benefits of EU citizenship due to divergent 
nationality laws in the member states. It is still early in the process of 
integration for a postnational citizenship, namely one based on criteria 
other than the nationality of one member state, such as legal residence. 
The Treaty establishing a Constitution of Europe does not change the 
complementary nature of EU citizenship; citizenship of the Union shall 
be additional to national citizenship. However, in a bid to make EU 
citizenship more credible, the EU has for the past ten years adopted a 
culture of rights, mostly applicable to EU nationals but also to a lim-
ited extent to third country nationals residing in the EU on a long term 
basis. 
The Treaty establishing European Community has been amend-
ed to insert new Title IV, Visas, Asylum, Immigration and Other Poli-
cies Related to Free Movement of Persons which follows on from Title 
III, Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital. Title III contains 
provisions on the free movement of workers, the right of establishment 
and service provisions which apply to nationals of the member states 
and their family members of any nationality. 
Here too is the base for movement of third-country national em-
ployees of service providers sent by their employer to fulfil contracts 
for services in other member states. The new Title in part applies to 
Community nationals whose position is already regulated to a great-
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er or lesser extent by arrangements between the Community and third 
countries (Guild, 2001:296).
The reference to the nationalities of the member states is im-
portant. It states clearly the limited nature of EU citizenship. It links 
back directly to one of the framework “constitutional” provisions of 
the Treaty of Maastricht itself, Article F (1) Treaty on EU: “The Union 
shall respect the national identities of its member states, whose systems 
of government are founded on the principles of democracy.” xxi
How, then, could and should European citizenship be construct-
ed? What should be the political attributes forging the linkages that 
must flow, at the European level, from citizen to public authority? How 
should a European demos be understood? Does it exist? Can it exist? 
What are its implications for European identity?
Since citizenship depends on nationality, the nationals of acces-
sion countries will only be EU citizens after accession. This means that 
the fundamental right of free movement granted to EU citizens cannot 
yet be invoked by nationals of these countries, including citizens from 
Croatia.xxii 
Rights of citizens from accession countries as third country na-
tionals in the EU are regulated by international treaties. The most im-
portant instruments in this respect have been association agreements 
between the EU and third countries. Examples of these agreements are 
the Europe Agreements and Stabilisation and Association Agreements 
(Reich, 2001:20). 
Citizenship under Union law contains a bundle of different 
rights like freedom to look for work, right to take residence where de-
sired, possibility of family reunion and so on. Obviously, these rights 
have not yet been extended to the nationals of countries of the Eu-
rope Agreements. This depends on the status of the accession coun-
tries themselves, and has to be negotiated in the respective Treaties. 
The Commission has put forward certain proposals on whether the ac-
quis should be taken over immediately in favour of the citizens of the 
new member states or not.
However, by preparing a “constituent project”, the Convention 
on the Future of Europe by drafting the Treaty establishing a Constitu-
tion of Europe is going to have to examine the question of EU citizen-
ship. Under Title II, Article 5 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
of Europe:
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“Every citizen of a member state is a citizen of the Union; en-
joys dual citizenship, national citizenship and European citizenship; 
and is free to use either as he or she chooses; with the rights and duties 
attaching to each. 
This article sets out the rights attaching to European citizen-
ship (movement, residence, the right to vote and to stand as a candi-
date in municipal elections and elections to the European Parliament, 
diplomatic protection in third countries, right of petition, right to write 
to, and obtain a reply from the European institutions in one’s own lan-
guage).
The article establishes the principle that there shall be no discrim-
ination between citizens of the Union on grounds of nationality.”xxiii 
In order to encourage social cohesion, it is essential to place hu-
man rights and anti-discrimination at the centre, as an integral part, of 
all Community policies and to include among the fundamental values 
of the EU respect for minorities and cultural diversity. Recognising Eu-
ropean citizenship to nationals of non-EU countries legally living in 
the EU satisfies all these requests. Granting full European citizenship 
to the nationals of third countries would enable them to vote and run 
for office in municipal and European elections just like European citi-
zens who reside in a different member state than their own. It would 
also enable them to live, study, work or retire in the EU country of 
their choice, in the same way European citizens are able to. Extending 
EU citizenship to the nationals of third countries legitimises a de fac-
to form of citizenship that is already expressed through the exercise of 
social, trade union or cultural rights. This de facto citizenship must be 
matched with legal citizenship (Shaw, 1997:22). 
To grant the same rights to all the people who reside on EU ter-
ritory, regardless of their nationality, is to recognise the legitimacy of 
their presence and participation in the cultural, social, working and po-
litical life of the EU. It is a way of asserting the will to live in a democ-
racy and to defend the indivisible and universal values of human digni-
ty, freedom, equality and solidarity on which the EU is founded. 
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CONCLUSION
“The traditional, classical vocabulary of citizenship is the vo-
cabulary of the State, the Nation. European citizenship, on this view 
is to people, what European Monetary Union is to currencies. To some 
– both europhiles and eurosceptics – this is exactly what European cit-
izenship is about. It should not surprise us that both europhiles and 
eurosceptics can hold a similar view of what European citizenship is 
about. We have long understood that often the debate between these two 
extremes is not a debate of opposites but of equals – equals in their in-
ability to understand political and social organisation in non-statal, na-
tional terms. The introduction of European Citizenship to the discourse 
of European integration could, however, mean not that the telos of Eu-
ropean integration has changed, but that our understanding of citizen-
ship has changed, is changing, or ought to change” (Weiler, 2002:35). 
To date there is very little knowledge about the efficiency of the 
EU citizenship model. Moreover, we still do not know what actually 
this model implies and how it will be implemented at the level of the 
individual state. There are a lot of questions that should be answered in 
order to understand the advantages and disadvantages of this model and 
what “Union citizenship” is and could be. An extensive search of the 
literature has failed to identify studies that have examined these par-
ticular questions. There are very few studies which have tried to iden-
tify possible solutions but they do not offer us an unambiguous answer. 
Much research is still needed to go beyond present knowledge, which 
is insufficient to give us a proper explanation. Moreover, European cit-
izenship is no longer a symbolic institution and the mirror image of 
“market citizenship”. It is thus unfortunate that much of the relevant lit-
erature in the 1990s did not recognise that the value of European citi-
zenship existed not so much in what it was, but in what it ought to be. 
As an institutional designer and agent of change, the European Court of 
Justice has succeeded in institutionalising European citizenship that is, 
in giving meaning and value to it, thereby establishing new institution-
alised norms which will impact on and modify national legal culture. 
Ultimately, better understanding of the European citizenship model and 
the fundamental rights protection within its scope is of great importance 
for the future implications of this model on third countries and their na-
tionals. Croatia is one of those European states in which the application 
of this model could cause a significant change from the legal and po-
litical point of view. Therefore, all the questions raised do need answer-
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ing. In this respect, let us hope that this study will be able to contribute 
to the further analysis of EU citizenship policy and to the understand-
ing of the concept of supranational citizenship and democracy.
*  The author would like to thank the referees who anonymously reviewed this paper.
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ABSTRACT
This paper deals with the characteristics of euroscepticism in 
Croatia, defined as a combination of distrust in the European Union 
and distaste for membership. An analysis of the dynamics of the two 
dimensions shows that initially these two factors did not coincide, but 
that after 2004 they converged. Starting off from a theoretical model 
according to which the attitude to the EU is affected by both utilitarian 
or pragmatic as well as ethnic-cum-nationalist (symbolic) factors, the 
analysis of data collected at the end of 2003 on a probabilistic national 
sample draws attention to the heterogeneous motives behind eurosce-
pticism, which calls into question the effectiveness of any single inter-
vention strategy. Exclusive nationalism and its socio-cultural, political 
and economic premises have been confirmed as an important source of 
euroscepticism. As against symbolic motivations, the impact of utilita-
rian motives on the attitude to the EU turned out to be marginal, but it 
is not clear to what extent this result is the consequence of methodolo-
gical constraints. The data also show that lack of trust in the EU parti-
ally reflects distrust in national institutions. The paper concludes with a 
brief list of recommendations, focused particularly on ways of increa-
sing trust in both national and EU institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
The last five years have seen a marked decline in the desirability 
of joining the EU in Croatian public opinion.i Unlike the views of the 
political elite – that is, most of the political parties, including the two 
biggest – fewer than 50% of Croatian citizens now support EU acces-
sion (Gfk Hrvatska – Omnibus, 2006). This dissipation of enthusiasm 
must be alarming for the Government and the Parliament, who have 
proclaimed entry into the EU the core of the country’s foreign policy 
objectives.ii This is particularly striking if we bear in mind the fact that 
a little more than two years ago, the great majority of Croatian citizens 
shared the views of the politicians. 
A number of press commentaries and analyses have been writ-
ten on the reasons for the reduced support for accession. Although we 
are still waiting for detailed empirical studies, several explanations of 
the dynamics described have been put forward. The reasons range from 
bruised national pride (the issue of the extradition of a suspected ge-
neral to The Hague) and the strengthening of the appropriate symbolic 
resistance, via economic fears (the rise in the price of real estate as a 
result of demand from foreign purchasers, the import of cheaper agri-
cultural products, the obliteration of indigenous products and the like), 
to loss of trust in the whole of the EU project after the shipwreck of 
the European Constitution in France and Holland. Most commentators 
have stated several reasons behind the fall in the support for EU acces-
sion, emphasising the complexity of the situation as well as the questi-
onable success of any attempt to reverse the trend.
In this short paper, I shall attempt to throw light on the growth 
of euroscepticism in Croatian public opinion, analysing particularly the 
dynamics of support for Croatia’s joining the EU, and trust in the EU. 
Although it handles an issue that has already received a fair share of 
debate, the advantage of the paper is in its use of empirical analyses 
founded on a nationally representative dataset. On the other hand, it is 
precisely here that the shortcoming of the proposed analyses inheres. 
Unfortunately, the research study (South East European Social Survey 
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Project; SEESSP-A and SEESSP-B) was not designed to measure, or 
test out public opinions to do with the EU.iii From this point of view, 
the indicators that are available are anything but ideal.
The first part offers a definition of euroscepticism and sets forth 
the current state of knowledge concerning the symbolic and material 
interests that affect its dynamics. In the second part I outline the dyna-
mics of two basic dimensions of euroscepticism in Croatia; the rise in 
the disinclination to joining and the relative stability of the lack of trust 
in the EU. The lack of association between the two dimensions in the 
period prior to 2004 is discussed, as well its occurrence in 2004. The 
third section is devoted to an analysis of the social-demographic pro-
file of local eurosceptics, and to testing the relative influence of sym-
bolic and materialistic factors on the basic dimensions of euroscepti-
cism. The last, fourth, part puts forward a debate that places the fin-
dings in the context of the debate on the rational (pragmatic) and irra-
tional (symbolic) bases of euroscepticism in general. The paper ends 
with a brief list of recommendations founded upon the results of the 
analyses carried out with the aim of increasing trust in national and Eu-
ropean Union institutions.
EUROSCEPTICISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE
As mentioned, this paper does not investigate the euroscepti-
cism of the political elites. For this reason I use the expression popular 
euroscepticism throughout the rest of the paper to describe the degree 
to which members of the public in Croatia express the lack of trust in 
the EU and/or their disinclination to join the Union.iv Popular eurosce-
pticism, in other words, can be either more theoretical (the utterance of 
lack of trust) or practical (the disinclination to accede) and it can vary 
in degrees, with radical euroscepticism being marked by a high degree 
of distrust in the EU as well as unconditional opposition to Croatian ac-
cession. 
Although it might seem at first glance that these dimensions of 
popular euroscepticism are almost identical, it should be noted that so-
meone might have trust in a given institution and yet still be of the 
opinion that it is better for him or her to stay out.v This has, for exam-
ple, been to date the majority viewpoint in Norwegian public opinion. 
A similar situation can be found in the case of the opposition of most 
Swedes to replacing their national currency by the Euro. The differen-
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ce between the wish to accede and trust is clearly contoured in a case 
when they are marked by a cause-and-effect relationship. After the fall 
of communism, in the countries of Central Europe there was very qu-
ickly a highly marked desire for EU accession that, irrespective of the 
lack of information, resulted in emphatic trust in the EU. On the ot-
her hand, precisely the opposite relationship is also possible. If Norw-
ay and Switzerland ever join the EU, the readiness of their citizens for 
their countries to accede will necessarily reflect widespread trust in the 
effectiveness of the Union’s institutions.
Research to date into euroscepticism in the post-communist co-
untries of Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe has concentrated 
on two aspects: (i) the connection of the phenomenon with party dyna-
mics and (ii) non-party causes of popular euroscepticism. This appro-
ach is well illustrated by the frequently quoted works of Taggart and 
Szczerbiak (2002; 2004), who claim that the euroscepticism to be seen 
in all the post-transitional countries (except, perhaps, for Bulgaria) is 
the consequence of the opposition’s confrontation with the Europhile 
parties in power (Sitter, 2001). Because of the relative marginality of 
parties that stand for hard-line euroscepticism, party-induced popular 
euroscepticism should be of a quite limited extent. Although most euro-
sceptic or indeed Europhobic parties belong to the right, within which 
the process of European integration is criticised with the rhetoric of 
nationalism, sometimes they can be found on the left as well (Evans, 
2000). Here the attack on the EU seems to be based on a critique of 
neo-liberalism and globalising capitalism. 
Research focused on the viewpoints and values of public opinion 
very often discuss the influence of symbolic (cultural, identity-related) 
and materialistic (economically rational) factors in euroscepticism.vi
The authors, in other words, endeavour to quantify the relative contri-
bution of these two dimensions to the negative attitude of the public 
vis-à-vis the EU. The impact of what is usually called exclusive nati-
onal identity on popular euroscepticism has been borne out in several 
studies (Care, 2002; McLaren, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2004).vii Wit-
hin this value pattern, the integration, multiculturalism and cosmopoli-
tanism that EU-isation embodies are considered a threat to the national 
culture and indigenous traditions. Resistance to the EU is thus percei-
ved as an act of patriotism. 
The analyses also throw light on the powerful influence of eco-
nomic rationalism, that is, the importance of pragmatic calculation of 
the costs and benefits of accession (Hooghe and Marks, 2004; McLa-
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ren, 2002; Tucker et al., 2002).viii Both the macro and the micro dimen-
sion are at issue here. In the first case, popular euroscepticism will de-
pend on the success of the country during transition. As suggested by 
Linden and Pohlman (2003), countries that have successfully carried 
out the transition will have less benefit from joining than countries that 
are still grappling with the transitional processes. The Czechs, hence, 
necessarily showed less enthusiasm for joining the EU than, for exam-
ple, the Romanians today (Linden and Pohlman, 2003:328).ix Differen-
ces in success at the macro level can work in another way as well. Sin-
ce the economic benefits of joining are smaller in successful transition 
countries, the weakening of economic interests in such countries could 
well affect the increase in the perception of the symbolic costs (fear of 
loss of identity, for example).
At the micro level, inside both successful and less successful 
transition countries, the affinity for euroscepticism tends to depend on 
personal perception of the costs and benefits of joining. Somewhat sim-
plified, the greater the human resources that the individual can deploy 
(education, skills, age, professional status, income) the greater are the 
potential benefits from European integration and the smaller the likeli-
hood of euroscepticism. Empirical research has provided some support 
for these hypotheses, showing that popular euroscepticism is mainly a 
marker of transitional losers (Szczerbiak, 2001; McLaren, 2002; Jacobs 
and Pollack, 2004; Tucker et al., 2002).
EUROSCEPTICISM IN CROATIA
The proposed working definition of popular euroscepticism 
brings out two basic dimensions: disinclination to join the EU and di-
strust in the EU. The first of these, the point of view that rejects Croati-
an joining in European integration, has in the last two years been much 
more widespread than in the earlier period. As Figure 1 shows, unw-
illingness to join was until the very end of 2003 quite marginal (up to 
20%). During 2004 a dramatic growth ensued (to about 40%), which, 
though with considerably diminished dynamics, went on in 2005. In 
the last year, the number of those who were opposed to Croatia joining 
the EU was more or less the same as the number of those who expres-
sed the opposite viewpoint.
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Figure 1  Dynamics of attitudes concerning accession to the European Union, 
Croatia 2000-2005
* Source: Gfk Croatia − Omnibus, 2006
Unlike the first, the second dimension of popular euroscepti-
cism, lack of trust in the EU, is not regularly measured. Still, an overvi-
ew of the existing studies carried out on probabilistic national samples 
provides at least a rough picture of the dynamics of lack of trust in the 
EU in the last ten years (Table 1). Unlike the dynamics of attitudes to-
ward accession, distrust in the EU is relatively stable during the period. 
On average, distrust of the EU was felt by 54% of the population.x
Contrary to expectations, the dynamics of the two dimensions 
of popular euroscepticism do not overlap. How are we to explain their 
different dynamics up to 2004? Since they show greater instability, it 
should be hypothesised that the attitudes toward joining the EU are 
more affected by situational factors than is the case with the dynamics 
of trust in the EU. It is also plausible that respondents may think the 
EU is generally a good idea, but not necessarily for their country. The-
oretically, then, a situation in which there is a relatively high degree of 
trust in the EU and a relatively low level of willingness to join need not 
be unusual. The problem though is that up to 2004, exactly the opposi-
te situation was present in Croatia: the desire to join the EU (80% for) 
was widespread in spite of the relatively low degree of trust in the Uni-
on (34%).xi 
Bearing in mind the low level of information about the EU 
among the members of the public during the nineties, it seems reasona-
ble to assume that the majority support for the accession of Croatia to 
�
��
��
��
��
��
��
��
��
��
�
��� �������
��
���
�
��
���
�
��
���
��
���
��
���
�
��
���
�
��
���
��
���
�
��
���
��
���
�
��
���
��
���
�
147
the EU was based on motives typical of the initial reactions of transitio-
nal societies to European integration (Malova and Haughton, 2002).  
Table 1 Trust in the European Union, Croatia 1995-2005 (%)*
WVS a
1995
EVSb
1999
SEESSP-Ac
2003
EB-62d
2004
EB-63d
spring
2005
EB-64d
autumn
2005
Yes 32 38 31 42 28 35
No 57 54 58 43 58 52
Don’t know 12 8 11 16 14 12
*  No precise comparison between the 1995-2003 and 2004-2005 periods is possible. 
Up to 2004, trust in the EU was measured on a scale of one to ﬁve (“a great deal of
trust”, “quite a lot”, “not very much”, “none at all” and “I don’t know”), and in 
the Eurobarometer research (2004 and 2005) only two categories of answer to the 
same question were provided: “I am inclined towards trust”, “I am inclined towards 
distrust”. The data collected in the 1995-2003 period were recoded so that “a great 
deal” and “quite a lot” were taken to denote trust, while “not very much” and “none 
at all” denote distrust in the EU.
a   World Value Survey – Croatia (Erasmus gilda, Zagreb; N = 1196)
b   European Value Survey – Croatia (Catholic Theology Faculty, Zagreb; N = 1103)
c   Southeast European Social Survey Project (international consortium; N = 1250)
d   Eurobarometer Research (Eurobarometer, 2004; 2005a; 2005b; N = 1000)
This is on the whole a desire to show that they belong to Euro-
pe, both in a cultural sense and in terms of political compatibility, and 
a belief that becoming a member of the EU will result in a rapid incre-
ase in the standard of living. When the negotiation process started, this 
naïve idealism dissolved fairly rapidly in the countries that recently be-
came EU members. A similar process, it would seem, has been at work 
in Croatia in the last few years. As shown by the most recent public 
opinion survey carried out in Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria by the Au-
strian Paul Lazarsfeld Institute, most citizens of Croatia do not believe 
that entry into the EU will result in a diminution of corruption in the 
country or in a rise in wages. On the other hand, more than 90% of re-
spondents thought that joining the EU would result in a price rise (Ian-
cu, 2006).
If, then, the earlier inclination towards joining can be understood 
in terms of a need for the legitimation of the Croatian state (and its 
post-communist political and socio-cultural achievements) – which 
was unaffected by relatively low levels of trust in the EU – it is very li-
kely that different reasons are behind the current convergence between 
148
disinclination to join and distrust in the EU.xii Furthermore, the stability 
of popular euroscepticism in the last two years suggests that eurosce-
pticism is today a coherent socio-political option with relatively stable 
motives. 
THE BOUNDED RATIONALITY  
OF CROATIAN EUROSCEPTICISM?
The claim that from 2004 onwards euroscepticism is a cohe-
rent social and political option that could be marked by relatively stable 
symbolic and materialistic interests needs to be verified empirically. 
The used data (SEESSP) were collected in December 2003, and mark 
the transition between the period in which the two dimensions of po-
pular euroscepticism were disparate (1995-2003) and the later period, 
marked by convergence.
With this objective, in the rest of the paper I present two analy-
ses. The first attempts to draw the social and demographic profile of di-
sinclination of joining and lack of trust in the EU. Bearing in mind re-
cent findings suggesting that euroscepticism is more prevalent among 
the transitional losers (McLaren, 2002; Jacobs and Pollack, 2004; 
Tucker et al., 2002) it can be expected that age, education, income and 
occupational status will be important determinants of popular eurosce-
pticism in Croatia.
The findings presented in Table 2 suggest that there is no clear 
socio-demographic profile of Croatian eurosceptics. Although the ana-
lysis does show that the older and lesser educated respondents are more 
inclined to say no to accession, the effect of both variables is weak. In 
case of trust in the EU, none of the demographic and socioeconomic in-
dicators has proved a significant predictor. In contrast to expectations, 
the analysis suggests that popular euroscepticism is determined neit-
her by human capital nor by personal success, or the lack of it, during 
the transitional years. Does this mean that the perception of the EU 
in Croatia is based on purely irrational motives and bizarre situational 
effects?xiii
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Table 2  The socio-demographic proﬁle of attitudes toward the accession and
trust in the European Union* 
SEESSP-B
(N = 802)a
Accession to the EU b
SEESSP-A
(N = 793)a
Trust in the EU
Beta (p<)c
Gender  0.02 (n.s.)  -0.01 (n.s.)
Age  -0.10 (0.05)  0.07 (n.s.)
Education  -0.10 (0.05)  0.02 (n.s)
Occupational statusd  0.02 (n.s.)  0.04 (n.s.)
Household income  -0.04 (n.s.)  0.08 (n.s.)
Size of domicile  -0.01 (n.s.)  -0.05 (n.s.)
* Multiple (linear) regression analysis
a  This concerns the statement “Croatia should join the EU”, to which respondents 
replied on a scale of 1 (I do not agree at all) to 5 (I wholeheartedly agree)
b This concerns separate SEESSP samples, each of which covered 1,250 subjects
c  n.s. – association is not statistically signiﬁcant
d  The variable was dichotomised, in such a way that 1 denotes occupations requiring 
some level of expertise and 0 denotes all other occupations
The impossibility of identifying Croatian eurosceptics suggests 
either certain fluidity or a micro-diversity of motives, but the issue is 
whether they can be considered irrational. If we should characterise po-
pular euroscepticism in Croatia as irrational, this would imply that the 
eurosceptics have no materialistic expectations from European integra-
tion. If citizens form their expectations of the EU on the basis of their 
experience with national institutions, such expectations are not irrati-
onal, but, rather, boundedly rational. In this case, bounded rationali-
ty describes the indirect but personally (and materially) relevant per-
ception of the EU. Put more simply, when we cannot evaluate the EU 
institutions on the grounds of our own experience (which the citizens 
of a non-member country cannot have), but use proxies – assessing lo-
cal or national institutions – such a procedure can not be termed irra-
tional. This is the so called proxy mechanism, elaborated in the well 
known paper by Anderson (1998). Anderson claims that in the absen-
ce of information about the EU institutions, citizens will have to make 
their assessment on the basis of their experience with local or national 
institutions.xiv
The findings in Table 3 provide some empirical arguments for 
the irrationality vs. (bounded) rationality debate regarding the motives 
for trust or lack of trust in the EU. The analysis included seven po-
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tential correlates of trust in the EU. The first two, trust in the national 
government and the legal system, are indicators of Anderson’s proxy 
mechanism. Occupational status and social self-positioning are indi-
cators of utilitarian motives, pointing to the cost-benefit assessment 
of the EU.xv Political self-positioning is an indicator of compatibili-
ty of political values, with the existing literature predicting associati-
on between right-wing political positioning and lack of trust in the EU 
(Carey, 2002; McLaren, 2002). The last two indicators, the index of na-
tional exclusivity and membership in cultural and art associations, me-
asure the presence of symbolic motives. While the first variable repre-
sents the impossibility of establishing complete trust between different 
ethnic and national groups, the second indicator reflects loyalty to (and 
personal importance of) ethnic and national culture.xvi 
Table 3 Predictors of trust in the European Union
             SEESSP-A (N = 624)
Beta (p<)a
Trust in the legal system  0.10 (0.05)
Trust in the government  0.40 (0.001)
Occupational status  -0.06 (n.s.)
Social self-positioning (top-bottom)  -0.05 (n.s.)
Political self-positioning (left-right)  -0.12  (0.01)
Index of national exclusivityb  -0.11 (0.01)
Membership in culture and art associations  0.01 (n.s.)
R2  0.22
a   n.s. – association is not statistically signiﬁcant
b   The index is composed of the following  four statements: “Ethnically mixed marriages 
are always more unstable than others”; “A man can feel completely safe only if he lives 
in a community in which his/her own ethnic group constitutes the majority”; “Among 
various peoples cooperation can be achieved, but never absolute trust”; “In the choice 
of a marriage partner, ethnicity should be one of the most important factors”. The index 
has excellent reliability (Alpha = 0.86)
The findings point to a coexistence between symbolic and boun-
dedly rational motives. The correlation between trust in national insti-
tutions and trust in the EU confirms Anderson’s proposition (Anderson, 
1998; Rimac and Štulhofer, 2004). On the other hand, negative associ-
ation of right-wing political self-positioning and exclusive nationalism 
with trust in the EU lends cogency to the proposition concerning the 
impact of symbolic factors.
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THE STRUCTURE OF CROATIAN 
EUROSCEPTICISM
The analysis of the factors that affect trust or lack of it in the EU 
drew attention to the importance of two processes. The first is asses-
sment-making on the basis of the proxy mechanism, concerning which 
there will be more below. The second process is the influence of sym-
bolic values on the attitudes toward the EU, the findings indicating the 
central role of exclusive nationalism.xvii The association between the 
exclusive variant of the nationalistic worldview and popular eurosce-
pticism seems to a great extent self-evident. But in this way it would be 
easy to underrate the complexity of their relationship, which exceeds 
mere disdain of multiculturalism and resistance to the supranational 
processes (Vukman, 2004). The symbolic foundations of popular eu-
roscepticism include socio-cultural, political and, somewhat more sel-
dom in evidence, economic convictions (McLaren, 2002).xviii 
As for the socio-cultural dimension, exclusive nationalism bla-
mes European integration for the fragmentation of the national identity 
and the attack on traditional communal values, particularly their reli-
gious foundations − all in the name of contemporary liberal individua-
lism. Also, the integration processes are often perceived as an insult to 
the national pride (the “conditions” imposed for accession), which indi-
rectly contributes to the destruction of the collective identity and natio-
nal values. The political aspect is particularly visible in the concern for 
the loss of national sovereignty, and the claimed inherently fraught po-
sition of small countries within the EU decision-making processes. Alt-
hough less often present, economic ideas are no less important an ele-
ment of exclusive nationalism. In general, these consist of various ty-
pes of criticisms of global, neoliberal capitalism, which is held respon-
sible for the demise of corporate social organisation and related welfare 
of the people. At the level of everyday practice, exclusive nationalism 
is quite often at odds with the ultimate consequences of the free mar-
ket that European integration takes as its point of departure, for it sees 
them as a threat to domestic production.
The predominance of symbolic over utilitarian motives in the 
attitudes toward the EU in Croatia should be viewed with caution. Alt-
hough the authors of a recent paper concluded that nationalism is a 
more powerful predictor of support to European integration than eco-
nomic rationality (Hooghe and Marks, 2004:3), the marginal impact of 
utilitarian motivations on the Croatian public assessment of the EU co-
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uld also be the consequence of methodological shortcomings, such as 
the absence of quality indicators (a list of personal expectations from 
EU accession). This limitation does not call into question the importan-
ce of exclusive nationalism, but it warns that it would be a mistake to 
conclude, on the basis of the presented analyses, that utilitarian (mate-
rialistic) motivations are completely irrelevant for the dynamics of po-
pular euroscepticism. The impact of utilitarian motives remains to be 
investigated (see Bagić and Šalinović, 2006).
Analyses shown in the previous chapter confirmed the existen-
ce of the proxy mechanism (Anderson, 1998), a specific cognitive stra-
tegy through which respondents evaluate institutions the workings of 
which they are insufficiently informed about on the basis of their as-
sessment of institutions that they do have experience with. This, accor-
ding to the findings, relates particularly to trust in the national gover-
nment, which has turned out to be the most powerful predictor of trust 
in the EU. Although the proxy assessment is not an irrational procedu-
re, its results can be highly problematic, not the least since trust in na-
tional institutions can be based on the general perception of corruption 
in society rather than on concrete evidence about the functioning of the 
institutions in question (Štulhofer, 2004; Rimac and Štulhofer, 2004; 
Štulhofer, 2001).
The use of the proxy mechanism does not depend only on ava-
ilability of information about the EU. In countries with low levels of 
participation and/or widespread disbelief that citizens can have any in-
fluence on the making of political decisions this mechanism might have 
a practical purpose, particularly as justification for apathy and opting-
out. The assumption that derives from this is that the success of in-
formation campaigns, the objective of which is to increase knowledge 
about the EU, will depend on the reputation of national institutions as-
sociated with the campaigns.
As already point out, the empirical analyses presented in this 
work suffer from some serious methodological limitations. The first 
relates to the instruments used. The fact that SEESSP questionnaires 
were not designed to explore views about the EU, but were intended to 
measure a broad range of social attitudes and values, has as its conseq-
uence a highly limited choice of relevant variables. Each of the questi-
onnaires entailed a single indicator of attitudes towards the EU – trust 
in the EU in SEESSP-A and views about the accession in SEESSP-B. 
Questions concerning the understanding of the institutional structure 
and manner of working of the EU, personal expectations from Croatia’s 
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joining the EU or reasons for (dis)trust in the EU were not covered by 
the questionnaire.
Another limitation is the timing of the SEESSP field work. Data 
collection started at the end of 2003, just before the parliamentary ele-
ctions. Although it is not entirely clear in which direction the pre-ele-
ction mood might have systematically biased the results, it is likely that 
various situational factors are embedded in the dataset. In itself, this is 
not a problem as long as it is possible to quantify (and control for) these 
situational effects. In the SEESSP study this was not the case.
The final limitation is related to the dynamics of attitudes tow-
ard joining the EU, that is, to the fact that the SEESSP data were col-
lected at the time point that immediately preceded the period characte-
rized by a sudden disappearance of the majority support for Croatian 
membership in the EU (Figure 1). Since the change happened in the 
first half of 2004, it is plausible that the end of 2003 (the time when the 
SEESSP field work took place) was in a certain sense a period of tran-
sformation.xix Following this logic, the SEESSP dataset could contain 
only indications of the change of attitudes toward the EU, but not com-
pletely clear and coherently formed (new) viewpoints.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Put briefly, the analyses presented suggest the following:
•  Several factors affect the dynamics of euroscepticism. It would seem 
that various social groups, the members of which do not necessarily 
share the same or similar social positions, state various motives for a 
negative perception of the EU. If so, it would be a mistake to believe 
in any single successful strategy for the reduction of euroscepticism.
•  Exclusive nationalism and its socio-cultural, political and economic 
premises are an important source of popular euroscepticism. In com-
parison with these symbolic motives, the influence of utilitarian mo-
tives on the attitude to the EU has turned out to be marginal, although 
it is not clear to what extent this could have been the consequence of 
the methodological shortcomings.
•  Some of the dynamics of popular euroscepticism are determined by 
situational influences, which are often generated by the tactical (po-
lemical) use of the idea of European integration in party competition, 
which is then picked up by mass media.
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•  Trust in the EU is formed partly through trust in national institutions. 
The reputation of the EU, an institution of which citizens of non-EU 
countries are less knowledgeable of, is at least partially a reflection 
of the reputation of the national government, the parliament and legal 
system.
From these conclusions a short list of recommendations could 
be composed. Their main aim is to contribute to a reduction in popular 
euroscepticism, particularly through increasing (better-informed) trust 
in the EU. It could well be that increasing citizens’ trust in institutions 
is a public good in itself, irrespective of the speed and ultimate out-
come of the processes of European integration (Uslaner and Badescu, 
2004).xx
Recommendation 1: Continued provision of information about the 
European Union, the integration processes and the course of the 
negotiations
As the experience of the new European ten indicates, acceptan-
ce of the EU idea and trust in its institutions are inseparable from the 
ongoing process of informing citizens about the pertaining symbo-
lic and material benefits, as well as about certain costs of integration 
(Vetik, 2003; Rulikova, 2004). As a project that was created from the 
top, through the agreement of political elites, the EU has always inclu-
ded the risk of the absence (or evaporation) of public support. This pu-
blic opinion-related vulnerability was clearly shown in the recent Eu-
ropean Constitution referenda, which resulted in debates about slowing 
down further enlargement, the aim being to restore public trust in the 
very idea of the EU. 
Data concerning the degree to which Croatian citizens are in-
formed about the EU are relatively meagre. Eurobarometer research 
would suggest that Croatian citizens systematically overestimate their 
knowledge about the EU (Eurobarometer, 2004; 2005a; 2005b), which, 
as a potential obstacle, should certainly be taken into account in the 
drawing up of the strategy of a systematic information campaign.xxi A 
substantial rise in the understanding and the knowledge of the EU in 
Croatia requires continuous dissemination of information rather than a 
new campaign. Bearing in mind the likelihood that the negotiation pro-
cess will additionally strengthen popular euroscepticism, as suggested 
by the experience of the ten new members of the EU, systematic infor-
mation dissemination will not only have to be better designed and plan-
ned, but also efficiently and vigorously executed. According to the fin-
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dings presented in this paper, it will be necessary to diversify content, 
approaches and messages to address the various fears, dilemmas and 
prejudices. Efficient implementation of systematic information disse-
mination will require a core of high-quality journalists who will specia-
lize in reporting on the EU related issues.
Recommendation 2: Implementation of measures that increase trust in 
national institutions
This is an activity of exceptional importance, as the Government 
acknowledged, at least in principle, in the recent presentation of the 
proposal of the National Plan for Combating Corruption, 2006-2008. 
According to the existing research (Štulhofer, 2001; 2004; Rothstein, 
2003; Uslaner and Badescu, 2004) citizens’ trust in national institutions 
is strongly correlated with the perception of corruption among civil ser-
vants. Measures that increase professionalism, effectiveness and tran-
sparency, measures that clearly identify responsibilities and entail con-
crete sanctions against the government employees who break the laws 
and rules of professional conduct are an important part of the strategy 
of reducing euroscepticism. An increase in trust in the national institu-
tions should result in a reduction of distrust in the EU institutions and 
may even encourage utilitarian stance toward the integration processes 
– for better or worse.xxii
Recommendation 3: Creating counterbalance to exclusive nationalism
The relationship between the symbolic and the utilitarian expe-
ctations from the EU depends on a number of structural and situational 
factors. In brief, the current domination of the first cannot be dismis-
sed as the fleeting outcome of political and/or media manipulations. 
Strengthening rational attitudes toward the EU is dependent on the suc-
cess of the government in creating the conditions for utilitarian asses-
sment of the accession to the EU. This has at least partially been touc-
hed on in both of the previous recommendations. It is almost trivial to 
remind the reader that the implementation of structural reforms, aimed 
at increasing competitiveness of the Croatian economy, restructuring 
social services and improving the local and national governance, are 
key steps in this direction. It is less inconsequential to stress the need 
for a new national cultural policy, which will encourage an open under-
standing of national identity, the one that is essentially unfinished (un-
closed) and continuously “under construction” (Katunarić et al., 2001). 
Exclusive nationalism feeds on a rather mythical concept of traditional 
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culture and on the idea of a fixed (somehow given) ethnic-cum-national 
identity, which any changes and influences from abroad will necessary 
threaten. This kind of anti-modern, essentially xenophobic and chroni-
cally frustrated and “besieged” vision of national culture and identity 
can be found in other European societies as well, but its scope is on the 
whole marginal. To marginalise such a position in Croatia would assu-
me redefining the historical and literary canons represented in the nati-
onal curriculum during the last 15 years, as well as strategic promotion 
of an open (“not yet completed”) concept of the national culture that re-
places exclusive nationalism with an enlightened patriotism.
*  The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments and 
suggestions.
i  To a small extent, this paper is based on the address Trust in the EU: Croatian 
1995-2003 (Štulhofer, A., Landripet, I. and Rimac, I.), prepared for the UACES 35th 
Annual Conference and 10th Research Conference “The European Union: Past and 
Future Enlargements”, Zagreb, September 5-7, 2005. 
ii  Although a waning of enthusiasm for EU entry was recorded in most post-transitional 
CE countries that recently became EU member states, this negative trend was related 
to the negotiation process (Jacobs and Pollack, 2004:5). In Croatia it has preceded 
the negotiations, which means that the negotiation process could have an additional 
negative effect of the perceived desirability of the EU.
iii  Because of it large initial size, the SEESSP questionnaire, which was designed to 
measure a wide range of social attitudes and values, was divided into two separate 
surveys (SEESSP-A and SEESSP-B). They were carried out simultaneously on 
probabilistic nationally representative samples, each including 1,250 respondents. 
Only a portion of questions were asked in both surveys. Unfortunately, the indicators 
of attitudes toward the EU were not among these core questions. Trust in the EU was 
included in SEESSP-A and the attitude toward Croatia joining the EU in SEESP-B. 
iv  This deﬁnition differs from the frequently used one according to which Euroscepticism
is a well-founded or unfounded opposition to the process of European integration 
(Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002:27). The difference between the two lies primarily in 
the degree to which they can be operationalised.
v  It is also possible to imagine a viewpoint in which European integration is good for 
a large but not for a small country.
vi  The same terminology was applied in a recent analysis of European identity (cf. 
Giannakopoulos, 2004).
vii  Unlike inclusive national identiﬁcation, exclusive nationalism is marked by distrust
and social distance toward other ethnic or racial groups (Carey, 2002).
viii  For a more detailed debate of the range of potential costs and beneﬁts of joining the
EU, see Samardžija [et al.] (2000) and Malova and Haughton (2002).
ix  Another research study pointed that the highest scores on the composite index of 
trust in the EU were recorded in Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, and the lowest in 
the Czech Republic and Slovenia (Gfk Gral-Iteo, 2002).
x  In 1995-2005 period distrust means “a little” trust in the EU or “none at all”.
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xi  The explanation, it is worth observing, cannot be sought in the amount of information 
about the EU, because it is on the rise (Gfk Croatia – Omnibus, 2006).
xii  The relatively low level of trust in the EU during the nineties might be the consequence 
of the disappointment with the way it handled the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
xiii  A good example is a recent public campaign that warned Croatian citizens that the 
accession to the EU would end the production of the much-vaunted locally produced 
cottage cheese and sour cream.
xiv  It should be observed that such a procedure, irrespective of the outcome, is not 
irrational as long as there is a systematic shortage of reliable information on how 
the EU works and what it is about.
xv  Social position was measured by respondents’ estimations of their position on the 
social hierarchy scale where 1 means the bottom and 10 the top.
xvi  For adherents of exclusive nationalism the EU is a multicultural and transnational 
entity that threatens cultural identity of smaller nations. The deﬁnition of exclusive
nationalism assumes the existence of the inclusive variation, which is sometimes 
simply called patriotism.
xvii  The ﬁnding was partially corroborated by a recently published study. Using data
collected on another probabilistic national sample, the authors reported on the 
negative impact of general national pride on the desirability of European integration 
(Lamza Posavec [et al.], 2006). When the components that constitute the scale of 
general national pride are considered, four of the ﬁve variables denote exclusive
nationalism (Lamza Posavec [et al.], 1006:145).
xviii  Another regression analysis (not presented in the paper) has revealed a clear socio-
demographic proﬁle of a propensity for exclusive nationalism. The predictors are
age (p<0.01), education (p<0.05), income (p<0.05) and the degree of urbanisation 
of the domicile (p<0.001). Exclusive nationalism is overrepresented among older, 
less educated, less economically well-off and less urbanized respondents. 
xix  Also indicated by the Puls Crobarometer data (Bagić and Šalinović, 2006).
xx  Particularly in the light of the beginning of negotiations with the EU and their 
impact on institutional evolution (cf. Malova and Haughton, 2002).
xxi  In both 2004 and 2005 Croatian citizens provided higher estimates of their knowledge 
about the EU than the EU citizens. In sharp contrast to this self-assessment, the 
results of the Eurobarometer knowledge quiz show that Croatian citizens are less 
knowledgeable than their EU counterparts.
xxii  During 1995-2003, trust in national institutions fell sharply (Štulhofer, 2004). In 
1995, the level of trust in national institutions was much lower in Croatia than in 
Slovenia, Austria and Italy (Štulhofer, 2003).
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ABSTRACT
This paper deals with the analysis of the utilitarian model of the 
explanation of popular support for Croatian entry into the European 
Union. The utilitarian model for explicating support or lack of support 
for accession to the EU has been analysed through subjective principled 
expectations of benefits and harms of entry into the Union at a personal 
and at a national level, and through concrete expectations at the level 
of twenty-two aspects of social and economic life. The research results 
show that on the basis of principled expectations it is possible precisely 
to predict support for entry into the EU, but that the principled expecta-
tions are not to any very great extent founded on concrete expectations 
in the observed aspects of social and economic life, and that they are 
to a certain degree linked with political viewpoints. On the other hand, 
concrete expectations are relatively weakly correlated with support for 
Croatian entry into the EU. Such a result suggests the conclusion that 
on the basis of a utilitarian explanation of support it is possible only 
relatively poorly to predict viewpoints concerning joining the EU, and 
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that principled expectations of benefits and harms are in good part an 
expression of general impressions about the EU, trust in the political 
elite and political views of Croatian citizens, and to a lesser extent reali-
stic rational calculations of harms and benefits. The paper is based on 
empirical survey of the views and expectations performed on a proba-
bilistic national sample of a thousand citizens older than 15. 
Key words:
European Union, utilitarian explanation of attitudes toward accession, 
analyses of harms and benefits, political attitudes, Croatia
INTRODUCTION 
Since mid-2003 there have been considerable changes in the atti-
tudes of Croatian citizens to accession to the EU. According to Puls 
agency investigations of mid-2003, about three quarters of Croatian cit-
izens then supported Croatian accession, after which, from the autumn 
of the same year, the process of a decline in support began. Through 
several phases, the process of a weakening of public support for the in-
tegration of Croatia into the EU has arrived at the critical level of today, 
when the number of those who are against is equal to, and sometimes 
even higher than, that of those who are for Croatian membership.
Several explanations for the downward trends in public support 
in Croatia for EU accession have been tendered at various levels of ab-
straction, which can be more or less subsumed under the approaches 
that are met in the relevant professional literature. Rachel Cichowski 
(2000) says that in the literature that deals with the first three waves of 
enlargement (finishing with the entry of Austria, Finland and Sweden 
in 1995) it is possible to identify three approaches to an explanation 
of public support for the integration of a country into the EU: utilitar-
ian, valued-based and economic and political issue-based. The utilitar-
ian explanation is based on the hypothesis that the individual attitude 
to European integration stems from a profit and loss analysis vis-à-vis 
quality of life. The value-based explanation assumes that certain value 
orientations, such as post-materialist values (Inglehart, 1970) are more 
“fertile ground” for the acceptance of integration processes than other 
value orientations. The third explanation is based on the assumption 
that a positive macroeconomic situation and positive trends have a pos-
itive effect on the assessment of the processes that brought them about 
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and hence it is possible accordingly to explicate the pro or contra views 
of citizens to European integration. Political reasons are also to be add-
ed to this list of reasons for support or lack of support for European in-
tegration, such as the relation between national and supranational insti-
tutions, and the theory of social capital. A political explanation appears 
in several sub-versions. Sànchez-Cuenca (2000) suggests that the level 
of trust in national institutions is in inverse proportion to trust in supra-
national institutions and hence to the level of support for accession to 
the EU. According to this explanation, citizens look for some institu-
tional authority that is capable of settling their problems. If domestic 
institutions are capable of this, supranational institutions are not nec-
essary, and conversely, when national institutions do not perform their 
functions at a satisfactory level, hope is channelled towards the Euro-
pean institutions. Anderson (1998) suggests three types of political ex-
planation that correlate citizen views about domestic political institu-
tions and actors and views about European integration. The first type of 
argument suggests an opposite correlation between trust in national and 
supranational institutions than that found in Sànchez-Cuenca (2000), 
which means that it is proportional. This is backed up with the propo-
sition that citizens use their own government and national institutions 
as a proxy or example or model via which they make judgements con-
cerning supranational institutions concerning which they have far less 
knowledge and information. The fact that two authors give diametri-
cally opposite explanations of the ways in which perception of national 
institutions affect attitudes about the EU can be explained by the diver-
sity of the contexts with which they are concerned. Anderson is mainly 
concerned with the older members and Sànchez-Cuenca with the transi-
tion countries, in which the EU is seen as an ideal as compared with the 
young and undeveloped national institutions. Anderson’s second prop-
osition implies the existence of a directly proportional link between 
trust in the domestic government and support for European unity. This 
can be explained by the fact that those mainly spearheading European 
integration are officials of the governments of the member countries 
(and candidates) and trust in them as domestic political actors is pro-
jected onto trust in the processes of European integration that they are 
heading. The third argument links support for traditional political par-
ties as compared with new parties that appear on the political scene as 
an expression of resistance to the policies that are implemented by the 
traditional parties, and views about European integration. This hypoth-
esis posits that electors who support traditional political parties support 
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the processes of European integration to a greater extent because it is 
these parties that are heading the process. An explanation based on the 
concept of social capital implies that individuals who have greater so-
cial capital and are more open to cooperation and association in every-
day life will also more easily accept the idea of European integration 
(Rimac and Štulhofer, 2003).
All these approaches certainly explain part of the whole pro-
cess of attitude formation among citizens concerning European inte-
gration, but they are not all equally applicable to the understanding of 
the sudden changes in the views of citizens about the entry of a coun-
try into the EU. Explanations that are based on long-term and relatively 
recalcitrant characteristics, such as value orientations or quantity of so-
cial capital, can be employed with difficulty to explain the sudden fall 
of public support for Croatian accession to the EU of some 30-40%. 
These explanations would have to posit the occurrence of earthshaking 
social changes that in a relatively short period of time have altered val-
ue orientations and the amount of social capital. An explanation of sud-
den change can more convincingly be based on one of the approaches 
using changing social phenomena, such as perception of the domestic 
government, trust in domestic or European institutions or perception of 
the harms and benefits of EU accession. 
An unsystematic analysis of Croatian public discourse about 
European integration leaves the impression that the utilitarian perspec-
tive is one of the dominant angles from which the process of European 
accession is observed. If an analysis of the contents of newspaper ar-
ticles and the public statements of politicians and analysts were made, 
probably it would be found that in the context of EU accession, most 
of the discussion is couched in terms of harms and benefits, even when 
the many motives for a negative attitude are actually to be found in the 
sphere of political views. Political actors expect citizens to perceive the 
harms and benefits of entry into the EU and therefore think that in the 
event of a referendum on this issue they would make their decisions 
pursuant to rational cost-benefit calculations. Of course, the possibil-
ity of a rational calculation of cost-benefits on the part of most citizens 
is quite restricted for several reasons: lack of basic information about 
the way the EU works; lack of interest in information about integration 
processes (Anderson, 1998); lack of information about the dimensions 
of changes that happen as a consequence of EU accession; the impos-
sibility of a rational calculation of pros and cons even when there is 
a certain amount of information because of the absence of theoretical 
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knowledge and analytical abilities. But in spite of all this, it can be as-
sumed that most citizens have their general (principled) expectations 
from EU accession, expectations that stem from information, half-info-
rmation and interpretations that are conveyed via the media, personal 
experience and informal communication.
The possibility of forming a rational viewpoint (understood as a 
viewpoint founded on a calculation of cost-benefits) concerning entry 
into the EU depends to a very great extent on the atmosphere in which 
a decision is made, that is, on the vigour and character of public debate 
about the topic. When we speak of public debate, it is important to dis-
tinguish public debates among stakeholder groups and experts and pub-
lic debate that the ordinary person can take part in and can understand. 
The first kind of public debate is important and essential, but has little 
effect on the formation of citizen viewpoints. The second kind, which 
we might call public debates in front of the citizens and aimed at them 
is much more important for the formation of public opinion about EU 
membership. The vigour of public debates performed in front of the 
public to date (meaning above all else debates in the media) concerning 
the importance and consequences of EU accession has been relatively 
slight, and they have been mainly of a superficial and generalised na-
ture. We can expect in consequence that the views and expectations of 
citizens themselves are also relatively generalised and hazy, and that 
they are more under the influence of political point-scoring than of se-
rious discussion and rational cost-benefit analysis. 
The objective of the present paper is to analyse current expec-
tations of people in Croatia about the harms and benefits for them per-
sonally and for the country as a whole from EU accession and to es-
tablish just how consistent they are and to what extent they explain the 
current viewpoints. We are also interested in the relation between con-
crete and general (principled) expectations, at a personal and a nation-
al level. The goal is better to understand the mechanism of expectation 
formation, and to define how much expectations are influenced by gen-
eral and superficial impressions, and how much the consequence of an 
analysis of changes in individual aspects of social and economic life. 
An understanding of the character and structure of citizen expectations 
can clearly indicate the need to step up public debate in front of and for 
the citizens and the directions in which such a debate should be led. If 
it should be shown that the views of citizens are generalised, and that 
concrete expectations have no strong influence on the creation of view-
points about EU accession, this might be understood as a clear evalua-
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tion of the previous efforts of government and the line ministry to pro-
vide public information.
Also discussed in the paper are the factors that influence the 
general expectations of respondents, as well as concrete analyses of 
harms and benefits in given areas, primarily from the perspective of 
political viewpoints. We are interested how much principles expecta-
tions of profits and losses from EU accession are in fact rationalisations 
of other motivations for supporting or not supporting EU entry. For the 
purpose of analysing hypotheses concerning general expectations as 
expression of a rationalisation of political viewpoints, we decided to 
measure perceptions of the attitude of the EU to Croatia. This is above 
all concerned with cooperation with the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the hypothesis being that such 
pressures lead to a conviction that the EU does not accept us, which in 
turn produces the reaction in which EU accession is rejected.
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE 
UTILITARIAN APPROACH TO EXPLAINING 
THE ATTITUDES TO MEMBERSHIP OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION
The utilitarian approach to an explanation of public support for 
European integration is one of the most highly-investigated theoreti-
cal perspectives and hence appears in several variants. In the first one, 
which we will call objective, the focus is directed on immediate eco-
nomic gains that individual groups will have from the integration pro-
cesses. It can be hypothesised that in any society certain groups can be 
identified that have a greater immediate benefit than others, as well as 
groups that will have to pay heavier losses. In line with this hypoth-
esis, and with the theoretical model of economically motivated vot-
ing behaviour, it is expected that between these there will be an impor-
tant difference in support to European integration (Gabel and Palmer, 
1995; Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Gabel, 1998). Groups that can be 
supposed to have greater benefits from the integration processes, be-
cause they will be more competitive in the single market, are relative-
ly young, well educated and have higher social and professional posi-
tions, with higher incomes. On the other hand, people who have less 
education, manual workers and persons with lower incomes will have 
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more harms than benefits from the process of European integration (be-
cause of their lower direct competitiveness), and it is expected that they 
will accordingly be less inclined to support the integration processes 
(Gabel and Palmer, 1995). By way of adjustment of this model of ex-
planation so it can fit the conditions of the transitional countries, Tuck-
er, Pacek and Berinsky (2002) offer a theory about transition winners 
and losers. Transition winners are defined as those groups that have 
profited from the transition processes, who have enjoyed benefits from 
the concomitant economic and political reforms. The transitional losers 
are those groups that have suffered negative consequences of transition-
al reforms.i The second variant of the utilitarian explanation is based on 
a subjective evaluation of the economic situation (Gabel and Whitten, 
1998) and an evaluation of the potential personal harms and benefits 
in the case of a country’s accession to the EU (Nelsen and Guth, 2000; 
Ehin, 2001). Here the main emphasis is placed on perception instead of 
on the objective position of a person in the social structure and hence 
it is called subjective. Research in the Baltic countries shows that it 
is possible to predict views on integration more precisely on the ba-
sis of expectations of personal losses or benefits than on the basis of 
personal competitiveness as measured by social-professional position. 
This tends to lead to the conclusion that the subjective dimension of ex-
pectations is independent of the objective market position of the person 
(Ehin, 2001).
In essence, the utilitarian model of explanation does not stick 
to economic arguments alone. Cichowski (2000) also includes in this 
group of explanations arguments that take for granted that entry into 
the EU means, for transition countries, a guarantee of the continuation 
of political reforms and political stability, that is the guarantee that to-
talitarian and communist regimes have been abandoned forever. From 
this point of departure, researchers in some eastern European countries 
have investigated the relation between satisfaction with democracy and 
support to democratisation and development of the free market as pre-
dictors of support to European integration (Mishler and Rose, 1997; 
Cichowski, 2000).
The utilitarian model of explaining public support for European 
integration in more recent time has met with two-pronged criticisms. 
The first criticism emphasises political factors, above all from the point 
of view of the impact of the perception of the national government and 
national institutions and party affiliation, which is a continuation of a 
line of reasoning familiar earlier in the older members. Thus Cichowski 
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(2000) demonstrates that party preferences are a key factor in the ex-
planation of support in five of the new members of the EU just before 
accession. In other words, entry into the EU is more often supported 
by pro-European voters, and less by voters of eurosceptic parties.ii The 
great drawback of this argument is that it is impossible to see what is 
cause and what is effect in connection with party affiliation and views 
concerning European integration. The existence of such a correlation 
does not exclude the possibility that in the background of political in-
clinations there is some hidden utilitarian orientation in the sense that 
groups that have greater benefits from the integration processes will 
have more positive views on European integration and hence will sup-
port pro-European parties. A second type of political counter-argument 
to the utilitarian explanation is provided by Sànchez-Cuenca (2000), 
who suggests that there is a strong correlation between the perception 
of national and supranational institutions and views about European in-
tegration. In a situation in which citizens have a highly positive view 
about national institutions and a bad view of supranational (European) 
institutions there is a greater likelihood of a negative viewpoint about 
European integration and vice versa. As in the previous line of reason-
ing, here too it can be noticed that the viewpoint concerning national 
and supranational institutions can be the consequence of a utilitarian 
analysis of the consequences of membership.
The other line of criticism stresses the importance of national 
identity, national exclusiveness and openness to other cultures (McLar-
en, 2002). The EU does not after all mean just free trade and economic 
integration, but it has, increasingly, a cultural and symbolic dimension, 
as well as a political, in the sense of impacts on national identity and 
sovereignty. McLaren (2002) showed that pursuant to openness to oth-
er cultures the strength of support for the EU can be predicted extreme-
ly well, while Carey (2002) showed that the attitude to the EU is con-
ditioned by a feeling of national identity almost just as much by utili-
tarian motivations (see Štulhofer, 2006). But irrespective of the critical 
attitudes to utilitarian explanations of public support for the EU, most 
investigations have shown that such considerations do play an impor-
tant role in the process of explicating public support for European inte-
gration and trust in the EU.
Some methodological and epistemological criticisms may be di-
rected at the utilitarian model or the various versions of it, criticisms 
that are not to be found in the literature to any great extent. The objec-
tive version of the utilitarian model can be criticised for starting out 
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from the assumption that certain groups support EU membership more 
than others because they would be more competitive on the common 
market, without convincing and direct proofs being given to show that 
these groups really are more competitive and that membership of their 
country in the EU will bring them direct benefit. It is particularly du-
bious when the main argument is derived only pursuant to correlations 
of levels of education, income levels and professional status on the one 
hand and views among EU membership on the other.iii It could easily 
be shown that the same groups could be more or less well-disposed to 
EU membership for other reasons, such as a greater amount of social 
capital (Rimac and Štulhofer, 2003) or other kinds of value orientations 
(Ingelhart, 1970). For example, how can it be proved that people with 
higher educations and with higher professional status are more support-
ive of EU membership because of the utilitarian motivations related 
to their supposed greater competitiveness and not because of different 
value orientations, better levels of informedness or some other reason 
again? It may be objected in principle to the subjective version of the 
utilitarian explanation (apart from the choice of indicators in some re-
search – as in Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky, 2002) that it is based on an 
expressed viewpoint that does not necessarily have to be the expression 
of real expectations but can rather be the result of a process of rational-
isation of other motives for anti-European stances. The whole process 
of European integration is presented in public within the framework 
of the primarily economic cost-benefits, and all other kinds of reason-
ing are put out of court as undesirable. This can lead to the rationalisa-
tion of real motivation through the assertion of utilitarian grounds. On 
the other hand, an advantage of the subjective version of the utilitarian 
model is the possibility that some of the members of the public who at 
the moment have no benefit from the transition process can view the 
EU in the light of a saviour that will solve their key problems. Another 
weakness of the utilitarian model is that it is on the whole focused on 
egoistic utilitarianism, at the personal level. Little attention has been 
devoted to a broader understanding of cost-benefits, not focused only 
on interests and benefits of the individual, but on those of the broader 
society or particular groups in it, which can also be a subject for analy-
sis of the advantages and disadvantages of EU membership.
Our point of departure is in the utilitarian model that explains 
people’s views about European integration. One of the most well-re-
searched approaches, it can provide an explanation for the relatively 
fast change of views about an important number of citizens concern-
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ing the accession of their country to the EU. From the evident require-
ment that this model of explanation should be subjected to further criti-
cal interrogation and analysis, in this work we shall test the following 
hypotheses:
•  The general expectations of citizens from EU accession are a power-
ful predictor of support for entry into the Union. Since in most tran-
sition countries this hypothesis proved to be correct, we expect that 
it will also be shown to be so in Croatia. It is a truism to hypothe-
sise that those citizens who expect more positive effects from EU en-
try at a personal or national level will support accession to a greater 
extent. The question arises however as to what part of the variance 
of the total attitude to the EU is explicable by these utilitarian ex-
pectations, and which part remains inexplicable and can be related 
to some of the other models for explaining support to EU member-
ship. The question also arises of whether the attitude to membership 
can be predicted more accurately on the basis of general or concrete 
expectations. Concrete expectations would be closer to the theoreti-
cal model of the utilitarian explanation since it can be supposed that 
they are to a greater extent based on a cost-benefit analysis, and less 
influenced by general impressions or political viewpoints.
•  General expectations from entry into the EU are based on a rational 
evaluation of concrete changes to be expected from entry into the EU, 
above all in aspects that are directly linked with the standard of liv-
ing of the people, such as the prices of goods and services, wage lev-
els and unemployment levels. In the literature relatively little atten-
tion is devoted to the structure of expectations from EU membership 
and to the manner of structuring the system of expectations. First of 
all the general or principled expectations should be distinguished in 
the sense of ratio of harms and benefits, whether at a personal or at a 
national level from concrete expectations in individual life domains. 
The first model implies that on the ground of the general impression 
or some other motives the general expectations are first of all formed, 
which are then projected onto concrete issues and areas of life. The 
second model assumes a rational construction of general expecta-
tions that are the resultants of expected changes in concrete aspects 
of economic or other conditions. Another important issue related to 
the mechanism for the formation of general expectations is the extent 
to which general utilitarian expectations are the consequence of con-
crete expectations relating to the standard of living of the individual, 
to what extent of general economic expectations, and to what extent 
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they are the consequence of expectations that do not at all refer to the 
economic sphere of social life. This hypothesis seems to us to be very 
important for an evaluation of the utilitarian approach to an explana-
tion of support for European integration. Although it is used as one of 
the key indicators for the utilitarian approach to European integration 
in most of the research published to date, there has been a relative-
ly poor analysis of the rationality of general expectations from the 
membership of a country in the EU. The utilitarian model of explana-
tion is primarily founded on the assumption that actors are rational, 
and form their views on this issue on the basis of estimates of their 
own personal interests. This would necessarily entail the assumption 
that general personal expectations are founded on concrete rational 
expectations. In order actually to evaluate the rationality of general 
expectations it would be important to test the extent to which expec-
tations concerning individual concrete areas explicate general expec-
tations from EU accession. The relation between general (principled) 
and concrete expectations can also be an indicator of the vigour and 
quality of public debate and the level of people’s information about 
the importance and consequences of EU membership.
•  General expectations are correlated with political views about the 
EU attitude to Croatia. In essence, behind this hypothesis lies the as-
sumption that general and individual expectations from membership 
in the area of economic cost-benefits are actually partially also the 
consequence of the rationalisation of other motives for supporting or 
not supporting membership, particularly political motives. One of the 
motives that might be expressed in this kind of rationalisation is a 
sense of outraged national pride as the result of the political pressures 
of the EU on Croatia.iv Since politicians and analysts rarely openly 
articulate the feeling of hurt national pride as a reason for euroscep-
ticism, and do not clearly express the resistance to such pressures, it 
can be hypothesised that citizens rationalise this feeling, if it does ex-
ist, through other forms of reasoning. We can assume that such a ra-
tionalisation will primarily be expressed through utilitarian expecta-
tions, because this is the dominant discourse in public debate about 
the entry of Croatia into the EU. Although the aspect of injured na-
tional pride in the literature has not been analysed to any great ex-
tent, we think that in the case of Croatia and of other countries from 
the former Yugoslavia it could have an important impact on the gen-
eral attitude to association, yet mediated through the rationalisation 
mechanism described also upon utilitarian expectations from entry 
into the EU.v
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In order to test out these hypotheses a separate investigation was 
carried out on a two-stage, stratified, probabilistic sample of 1,000 cit-
izens above the age of 15 as part of the omnibus survey of the Puls 
agency.vi The sample taken statistically significantly deviated from the 
structure of the overall population because of the level of education, 
which was adjusted by weighting of the sample (the method of rim 
weighting was used). This deviation was caused by the refusal bias, the 
rate of refusal being about 40%. The field part of the survey was car-
ried out in February 2006. 
We posed six questions by which we collected the necessary 
data for testing the hypotheses, along with the standard demographic 
questions. As indicator of general viewpoint of citizens to EU entry the 
following question was used: Taking it all in all, do you personally sup-
port the accession of Croatia to the EU or not? This indicator was se-
lected as a simple and direct manner of measuring stances towards ac-
cession. It does not involve additional factors and subject characteris-
tics that might affect answers to the questions, as is the case concerning 
the question about voting in any referendum there might be. The ref-
erendum question actually contains a quantification of the intention of 
the respondent to vote in such a referendum which might lead to a cer-
tain distortion of response from that part of the electorate that does not 
go to the polling stations.
To measure general expectations from entry into the EU, two 
questions were used, similar to the standard questions used in Euroba-
rometer research, often the main source of data for testing out hypoth-
eses related to the influence of utilitarian factors on the understanding 
of attitudes to EU integration.vii One question was asked about personal 
expectations: Do you think that you personally will have more benefit 
or more harm from the accession of Croatia to the EU? and one con-
cerning expectations at a national level: Do you think that Croatia will 
have more benefits or more harm from the accession of Croatia to the 
EU? We expected respondents to evaluate their own personal and gen-
eral social benefits and harms from entry into the EU separately. For 
both questions, the same scale with five points expressing the expected 
beneficial and harmful consequences.
As one of the objectives of the paper was to check out the con-
crete structure of expectations that were concealed behind principled 
expectations at a personal and national level, a special instrument was 
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developed for the measurement of concrete expectations. For twenty-
two different aspects of social and economic life in which the impact 
of EU accession could be expected, subjects were asked to evaluate the 
extent of the impact and the consequences to the life of the average citi-
zens. A five-point scale was used, from “Will deteriorate considerably” 
to “Will improve considerably”.  
Table 1 Groups of concrete expectations*
Quality of life Liberalisation of 
commerce and 
migration
Working 
of national 
institutions
General 
economic 
expectations
Level of crime 
(0.74)
Sale of Croatian 
ﬁrms to foreigners
(-0.85)
Working of state 
of law (0.83)
Development 
of farming  
(-0.83)
Risk of terrorism 
(0.69)
Sale of Croatian 
real estate to 
foreigners (-0.85)
Efﬁcacy of civil
service (0.73)
Export of 
Croatian 
products and 
services (-0.74)
Job security  
(0.66)
Import of foreign 
products (-0.80)
General level 
of democracy 
(0.70)
Opportunity 
to produce 
domestic food 
products (-0.69)
Cost of healthcare 
services (0.65)
Immigration from 
less developed 
countries (-0.74)
Defence 
capacity of the 
country (0.60)
Development 
of the economy  
(-0.65)
Price of goods and 
services (0.65)
Emigration of 
young abroad  
(-0.67)
Level of 
corruption 
in public 
institutions 
(0.58)
Wages and 
salaries (-0.55)
Level of 
unemployment 
(0.64)
Development of 
economy (0.56)
Level of 
unemployment 
(-0.49)
Level of social 
security (0.53)
Wages and salaries 
(0.51)
* Factor structure matrix after oblimin transformation (saturation)
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This kind of approach is necessary because change in a given 
area does not necessarily mean an improvement or a deterioration, rath-
er depends on the value- and interest-laden evaluation of the respon-
dent. For example, the migration of the young abroad can be a negative 
or positive consequence, depending on the personal preferences of the 
subject. Areas were chosen such as to cover the most important of the 
dimensions that, in public debate, were considered to be likely to be af-
fected by EU accession. These areas mostly relate to people’s standard 
of living and generally to economic conditions. Apart from these areas, 
there were also areas relating to the working of government institutions 
and other areas of society.
In order to reduce the amount of data and make them suitable for 
further analysis, factor analysis was carried out on the concrete expec-
tations with the use of an oblique oblimin transformation. Four groups 
of areas were picked out with respect to the correlation of expectations 
in each of them.viii The groups brought together areas that were (i) pri-
marily related to personal living standard and eventual personal risks of 
the subject, (ii) primarily related to liberalisation of commerce and in-
vestment as well as population migration, (iii) with their effects related 
to the function of national institutions and (iv) economic expectations 
not directly linked to the quality of life of the individual citizen. This 
kind of structure suggests the conclusion that the expectations of Croa-
tian citizens are relatively logically and rationally structured. 
In order to be able to test out the hypothesis vis-à-vis political 
viewpoints and concrete and general utilitarian expectations from entry 
into the EU, we added a question designed to elicit perception of EU at-
titudes to Croatia. We chose this dimension of political views because 
of the frequently voiced hypothesis that some of the citizens of Croatia 
interpret the demands of the EU for cooperation with the ICTY, region-
al collaboration and other, similar, political demands through the prism 
of danger to national pride, out of which, by way of reaction, euroscep-
ticism is produced. This dimension is operationalised through six state-
ments, four of which express views about EU attitudes in the context of 
regional politics and the Homeland Warix, while two are concerned in 
general with an evaluation of the justification of the demands the EU 
is making on Croatia,x to which a five point scale of agreement asso-
ciated. In the factor analysis of these six assertions, two factors were 
formed, the first of which is primarily formed by statements about the 
attitude of the EU to Croatia in the context of regional politics and atti-
tudes to the Homeland War, and a second to claims relating to an evalu-
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ation of the requirements that the EU is making with respect to Croatia.xi 
The reliability of the first factor is 0.8 and of the second 0.6, which can 
be considered satisfactory. The latent scales formed in this way were 
employed in further analyses.xii
RESULTS
Predictions of views about entry into the European 
Union on the foundation of general expectations
The main reason behind a given country wishing to join the EU 
lies in the expected positive consequences for the functioning of gov-
ernment and the standard of living of the people. The main resource for 
making a utilitarianly grounded decision as to whether to support or 
not the accession of Croatia to the EU should be an estimate of wheth-
er membership will bring more harms or more benefits, whether at a 
personal or a national level. The results of this investigation show that 
Croatian citizens think membership in the EU will result much more 
in harms to them personally and to the country as a whole than in ben-
efits. The proportion of respondents who thought that positive conse-
quences on personal life would be preponderant was only 21%, or 24% 
for the overall impact at the national level. As against this, as many as 
40% thought that the consequences would be mainly deleterious for 
them personally, and 45% for Croatia as a whole. As could be expe-
cted, views about the consequences for Croatia and for personal life 
were correlated. The correlation of these two variables comes to 0.79 
(p<0.01), which puts it in the order of large correlations and indicates 
the strong link between expectations at personal and national levels. 
The high correlation between these two dimensions is on the whole un-
derstandable because the consequences for a large number of individu-
als are also consequences at the national level, or consequences at the 
national level cannot avoid having direct or indirect consequences for 
most individuals. But still, to some extent there is a distinction between 
the two dimensions, and it is not possible with any certainty to state 
which of the two levels of utilitarianism has the greatest effect on the 
formation of views. Because of the high reciprocal correlation, in the 
further analysis, both dimensions of the explanation are used.xiii
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Table 2  General/principled expectations from the accession of Croatia  
to the European Union at a personal and at the national level (in %)
National level Personal level
Much more harm than beneﬁt 21.8 18.4
A bit more harm than beneﬁt 24.4 21.2
Equal amounts of harm and beneﬁt 20.0 27.6
A bit more beneﬁt than harm 18.7 16.3
Much more beneﬁt than harm 5.5 4.5
Don’t know 9.6 12.0
Total 100.0 100.0
A logistic regression analysis shows that there is a strong corre-
lation between general expectations at a personal and a national level 
and a general view about Croatian accession to the EU.xiv Such a result 
is not an astounding discovery, but it does confirm the correlation of 
the first hypothesis between expected harms and benefits and the over-
all attitude about EU membership. The correlation between general ex-
pectations and the general attitude about EU membership can be seen 
in table 3. 
Table 3  Comparison of utilitarian expectations with general viewpoint about 
Croatian membership in the European Union
N Don’t support Support Don’t know/ 
no opinion
Whole sample 1,000 47.4 39.4 13.2
Croatia
 More harm than beneﬁt 462 76.7 15.1 8.2
 Equal harm and beneﬁt 200 35.0 46.5 18.5
 More beneﬁt than harm 242 9.6 87.7 2.7
 Don’t know 96 26.9 20.3 52.7
Personal
 More harm than beneﬁt 396 77.8 15.5 6.7
 Equal harm and beneﬁt 276 39.1 45.2 15.7
 More beneﬁt than harm 208 11.9 85.5 2.6
 Don’t know 120 27.4 25.4 47.2
It can be seen quite clearly that over three quarters of respon-
dents who support EU accession expect more benefits than harms for 
themselves personally, as well as at the level of the country as a whole, 
177
while over 85% of those who are against entry have the opposite ex-
pectations, that is, they expect more harms than benefits to themselves 
personally as well as to the country as a whole. But this result does not 
necessarily mean a confirmation of the utilitarian model of explaining 
support for European integration. It is possible that the utilitarian ex-
pectations expressed in terms of harms and benefits are just a ratio-
nalisation of some other reasons on the basis of which the basic stance 
about Croatian membership in the EU has been formed.
Prediction of views about accession to the 
European Union on the basis of concrete 
expectations
At the level of concrete expectations, in each of the twenty-two 
areas analysed, most of the subjects had pronouncedly negative expec-
tations. In two thirds of the areas, more subjects thought that the chang-
es would lead to negative consequences for the lives of the population 
of Croatia. By far the most negative effects are expected in the matter 
of the prices of goods and services, particularly of healthcare services, 
which we surveyed separately.xv Interestingly, in third place in terms of 
expectation of negative consequences lies “ability to produce domes-
tic food products” (for example, cottage cheese, sour cream and cured 
meat). The view that these changes would considerably diminish the 
quality of life of the average inhabitant of Croatia suggests that citizens 
still do not have full information and that they think only within the 
terms that have been foisted on them at the moment through the me-
dia. The subjects expected the most positive changes in the working of 
a state of law, efficacy of the civil service and the development of the 
economy. Apart from these three, there are four more aspects in which 
more pollees expect positive than negative changes. 
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Table 4  Expectations of citizens from accession to the European Union  
in 22 aspects of social and economic lifexvi
 Will 
deteriorate
Won’t 
change
Will 
improve
Don’t 
know
Difference
Working of state of law 7.3 40.8 34.1 17.7 26.8
Development of the 
economy
13.3 36.5 33.7 16.5 20.4
Efﬁcacy of civil service 10.3 43.3 28.5 17.9 18.2
Export of Croatian goods 
and services
17.5 32.4 33.0 17.2 15.5
General level of democracy 8.8 46.7 23.9 20.7 15.1
Defence capability of 
country
7.7 48.7 21.5 22.1 13.8
Level of corruption in public 
institutions
17.4 42.7 21.9 18.1 4.5
Development of farming 25.9 32.9 24.7 16.5 -1.2
Emigration of young people 26.9 32.0 22.3 18.8 -4.6
Level of social security 26.3 37.1 19.5 17.0 -6.8
Import of foreign products 31.0 29.3 23.7 16.0 -7.3
Wages and incomes 30.3 35.4 20.0 14.3 -10.3
Level of unemployment 34.6 34.5 16.5 14.3 -18.1
Immigration from less 
developed countries
34.7 28.9 15.0 21.4 -19.7
Sale of Croatian ﬁrms to
foreigners
41.8 23.9 17.6 16.8 -24.2
Job security 36.1 35.6 11.0 17.3 -25.1
Sale of Croatian real estate 
to foreigners
42.6 23.6 16.4 17.4 -26.2
Risk from terrorism 39.1 31.1 12.3 17.5 -26.8
Level of crime 39.3 31.3 11.8 17.5 -27.5
Ability to produce domestic 
food products such as 
cottage cheese, sour cream 
and cured meats
41.3 30.4 11.7 16.6 -29.6
Price of goods and services 54.2 20.0 13.0 12.8 -41.2
Price of healthcare services 54.4 21.8 10.4 13.4 -44.0
Logistic analysis shows that on the basis of concrete expecta-
tions it is possibly only rather poorly to predict support for member-
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ship in the EU. Only about 65% of cases are exactly assigned, which is 
a relatively small percentage considering that with random choices the 
probability of a correct classification into groups would be about 50%. 
That this is a relatively weak correlation is shown by the coefficient of 
determination, which in this case is only 0.21, if all 22 aspects are in-
cluded into the analysis or 0.17 if the latent dimensions of concrete ex-
pectations are included.xvii
With literally all the analysed aspects one can see a difference 
in prediction of changes and the effect of these changes between those 
who support and those who do not support EU accession. This is indi-
cated by the inverted sequence of the logic of thinking as compared to 
expectations of the utilitarian aspect of the definition of views about 
support to integration. It can be assumed, that is, that individuals will 
make decisions about supporting or not supporting entry on the founda-
tion of objective analyses of advantages and disadvantages. If this were 
true, at least in some aspects, both groups of subjects would have the 
same expectations. A real and objective analysis would have to lead to 
more or less concordant results of thinking in at least a few of the indi-
vidual expectations of changes deriving from accession and the results 
of these changes. The fact that subjects who differ in their views about 
support differ from each other in absolutely all the expected conse-
quences suggest that expectations are in fact the consequences of a par-
ti pris. A viewpoint about support is clearly not adopted mainly pursu-
ant to objective analysis of the consequences, but is highly determined 
by some other predictors. On the basis of an attitude towards support 
already formed, the consequences are evaluated in such a way as to jus-
tify the viewpoint. Of course this conclusion does not mean that a de-
cision about support is not based in a certain measure on an objective 
analysis of consequences, but only that other elements too affect it to a 
very great degree.
The relation between general  
and concrete expectations
Regression analysis in which concrete expectations are used as 
predictors for general expectations show a weak correlation between 
the two levels of expectation. With the use of concrete expectations, it 
is possible to predict only about 22% of the variance of the general ex-
pectations.xviii It is possible that some important areas have been omit-
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ted from the list of measured concrete areas, but since a relatively large 
number of areas were included in the research, it is hard to believe that 
an increased number of areas would significantly increase the corre-
lation between the concrete and the principled expectations. All those 
aspects that are stated in the literature as being crucial are certainly in-
cluded into the areas measured, that is, the economic aspects related to 
personal standard of living, and aspects that relate to the continuation 
of political and institutional reforms. This kind of result suggests the 
conclusion that principled expectations are founded on concrete expec-
tations only relatively weakly. Apart from this they are not to any great 
extent the result of rational calculation and an informed estimate of 
harms-benefits in individual areas and aspects of social and economic 
life. Principled expectations are rather the result of a generalised emo-
tional stance or perhaps a stance based on value orientations or politi-
cal views (see Štulhofer, 2006), which would tend to suggest that the 
second hypothesis can be partially discarded. This kind of result can be 
considered evidence of the weak results of public debate, which clearly 
has not helped people clearly to structure their expectations from EU 
accession and pursuant to this to make a rational estimate of the harms 
and benefits, and hence make a more rational decision to support or not 
to support Croatian accession. 
Views about the consequence to personal income and wages and 
the possibility for the production of domestic food products are the best 
predictors of principled expectations. While the importance of expec-
tations that relate to income for the quality of life is inherently intelli-
gible and justified, the prominence of this second aspect is astounding. 
An aspect that in itself is not crucial for the quality of life of the majori-
ty of people has become, pursuant to a single campaign based on main-
ly erroneous premises and insufficiently clear reasoning concerning, or 
provision of information about, European consumer protection rules, is 
positioned as the top topic of an analysis of the consequences of mem-
bership in the EU. The conclusion that must inevitably be drawn here 
is that the crucial influence on ultimate judgments of consequences and 
hence to a certain extent on viewpoints about giving support to acces-
sion will be exerted by the quality and strength of the campaigns man-
aged by the proponents and opponents of accession. The other statisti-
cally significant elements are expectations that relate to the functioning 
of a state of law and the level of corruption in the public institutions.
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Table 5  The impact of individual expectations on principled expectations 
of membership in the European Union (regression analysis)
Beta 
weighting
Direct 
correlation 
with criterion
Percentage 
of variance 
explainedxix
Incomes and wages 0.227 0.342 7.76
Possibility of producing 
domestic food products such as 
cottage cheese, sour cream and 
cured meat
0.234 0.335 7.84
Functioning of a state of law 0.140 0.267 3.74
Level of corruption in public 
institutions
0.118 0.244 2.88
In order to verify the hypothesis about the rationalisation of po-
litical motivation for support or lack of support via utilitarian expec-
tations from entry into the EU, we correlated expectations from entry 
into the EU with views about how the EU was politically treating Croa-
tia. An analysis showed that among these dimensions there was a link, 
but a relatively weak link. Correlation of the factor of the perception of 
the EU attitude to Croatia in the context of the Homeland War/regional 
politics and general expectations comes to 0.26 (p<0.01). Correlation 
of the factor of the justification of EU demands on Croatia and general 
expectations is a bit stronger, but is still in the sphere of small correla-
tions, and comes to 0.35 (p<0.01). The two dimensions of the views 
about the way the EU treats Croatian politically also explain a relative-
ly small part of the variance of general expectations (R2=0.14). These 
results suggest that general expectations are not dominantly dependent 
on political views, or at least not by those political views measured in 
this investigation. Still, if we measure the common effect of political 
views and concrete expectations on general expectations, we will see 
that political views make up almost 40% of the total variance explained 
(27.7%) which is cumulatively explained by factors of political views 
and concrete expectations. A result of this nature means that concrete 
expectations have an only slightly greater impact on the formation of 
general expectations than political views. This shows that the general 
expectations that should be an indicator of a utilitarian attitude towards 
EU accession are in fact not that, or not that alone.
When the correlation of political views about the attitude of the 
EU to Croatia and support to membership is analysed, it will be seen 
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that this dimension explains significantly less of the total variance of 
support to entry into the EU than the general expectations, and as much 
as the concrete expectations in individual aspects of social life. On the 
basis of familiarity with the political viewpoints it is possible correct-
ly to predict the viewpoint about Croatian entry into the EU in 67% of 
the cases. This is approximate to the percentage of accurate prediction 
on the basis of concrete expectations and significantly lower than the 
percentage of correct predictions on the basis of general expectations. 
Such a result shows however that political views are at least as good an 
explanation as the utilitarian approach, as long the utilitarian approach 
is operationalised through concrete expectations, the methodologically 
more correct approach than general expectations, since general expec-
tations to a great extent express a general attitude about the EU, not just 
an analysis of harms and benefits.xx 
CONCLUSIONS
 This paper has endeavoured to verify the hypothesis concerning 
the utilitarian basis of viewpoints on whether Croatian accession to the 
EU should be supported or not, and above all the subjectivist version of 
the utilitarian explanation, which assumes that citizens form their view-
points about European integration on the grounds of expected gains and 
losses for themselves as individuals and for the country as a whole. It is 
assumed that the actors are rational, which implies that they make their 
evaluation on the basis of a more or less detailed analysis of the harms 
and benefits that would accrue to individual aspects of personal and so-
cial life on membership.
The results of the investigation bear out the proposition that on 
the basis of general expectations of benefits and harms from EU entry 
it is possible precisely to predict support for EU accession. On the other 
hand, general (principled) expectations are grounded quite weakly on 
concrete expectations about individual aspects of social and economic 
life, being rather the result of generalised impressions about member-
ship in the EU. Only a few of the general expectations can be explained 
by the expectations in the twenty-two concrete areas of social and eco-
nomic life, while most of the general expectations at personal and na-
tional level are not explained by concrete expectations. This is a result 
that clearly indicate two conclusions, one of them essential and one 
methodological. Firstly, viewpoints about entry into the EU are formed 
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at a relatively superficial level, without any great amount of informa-
tion or rational calculation. Just how true this is can be confirmed from 
the fact that one of the strongest predictors of general expectations from 
the group of concrete expectations is the view about the possibility of 
producing domestic food products, which is itself the outcome of a su-
perficial and on the whole unfounded public campaign. Thus the gen-
eral expectations on the basis of which it is possible to predict the ul-
timate viewpoint concerning entry into the EU are much more formed 
according to impulse than they are the outcome of rational evaluation.
This is to a large extent the result of the relatively low num-
ber and low quality of public debates about the consequences and sig-
nificance of Croatian entry into the EU. There are very few public de-
bates that are carried on in front of members of the public and that are 
aimed at helping people to form and articulate their views, irrespective 
of whether these are negative or positive. Previous endeavours to in-
form people were on the whole aimed at providing basic information 
about the institutional system of the EU. Passive forms of communica-
tion have been mostly used, such as brochures, leaflets, web sites, quiz-
zes and workshops for the young, which is not appropriate for getting 
to the majority of the population. This population is on the whole not 
interested in topics related to the institutions of the EU and is not ready 
to put in the amount of effort that such passive forms of communication 
require. Citizens on the whole do not want, after a hard day at work, 
to read brochures, no matter how interesting, or to comb the Internet 
for news about the EU. This cuts down the effect of such activities on 
the general population. On the other hand, information provided by 
the media and politicians can be judged as being diffuse and confused. 
There are some media which do try to inform people about the EU (the 
special broadcasts of Croatian TV and Radio 101, for example, spe-
cialised pages of T-portal), but these efforts are few and far between, 
scattered at the end of broadcasting schedules or spaces. Special broad-
casts tend to appear every two to three weeks, at non-prime times. This 
kind of topic is not at the centre of the media, nor does it thus reach 
any significant proportion of the population. On the other hand, these 
same media often have stories that are over-generalised, quite often the 
product of the ignorance and error of the journalist, and often with ad-
mixtures of scandal mongering and gutter journalism, the result being 
that one and the same medium will send messages of varying qualities; 
those that explain, and those that confound. Politicians adapt their com-
munications about the consequences of accession from case to case, 
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on the whole depending on short-term political needs. When it suits 
them, politicians can be very concrete and precise, and in other situ-
ations very unfocused and diffuse, clouding the issues. All this results 
in an absence of adequately qualitative, concrete and clear information 
and, what is most important, the explanation and demystification of in-
dividual aspects of the common policy of the EU (for example, why 
the EU is interested in cheese and cream, domestic slaughtering and 
the production of home-made plum brandy). Naturally, the function of 
public debates about entry into the EU is not just to give citizens the 
information on the basis of which they can make a rational decision, for 
such a decision cannot be made just on the basis of rational elements. It 
will necessarily have value and political elements, and public debates 
are equally important for their formation and definition, for in them-
selves they are not clear either to citizens, politicians or experts (with 
or without inverted commas). The value and political connotations of 
such huge social decisions are also formed in the process of public de-
bate. Our impression is that these also are not at the moment clear and 
well formed in Croatia, and that at this level we are more in arrears than 
we are with respect to knowledge of facts about the EU.
The second, methodological, conclusion, which derives from 
the weak correlation of general and concrete expectations, is that gen-
eral expectations cannot be used as indicator of a utilitarian basis for 
stances about the EU. General expectations are clearly more founded 
on impulsive and situational relations than on a rational evaluation of 
personal and collective interests and the benefits and harms. The in-
vestigation showed that the general evaluation of personal and collec-
tive harms and benefits to a small extent also represents a rationalisa-
tion of political views about the attitude of the EU to Croatia. The need 
for rationalisation of political motives for not supporting entry into the 
EU can be provoked by the general public discourse in which there is 
discussion of membership, and which is dominantly framed in the lan-
guage of benefits and harms, effects on the economy and standard of 
living. From the sphere of political viewpoints, in this paper we have 
analysed the influence of the perception of the attitude of the EU to 
Croatia as the most important aspect of the political dimension of Cro-
atian joining the EU. The issue of the treatment of the Homeland War, 
the war-crimes trials relating to the Croatian army and the associated 
issue of cooperation with the ICTY and the attitude of Croatia to the 
other countries of former Yugoslavia became during the last decade key 
political issues that determine the great majority of other political is-
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sues in Croatia (Bagić, 2006). It is these political matters that constitute 
the political dimension of Croatian association with the EU and these 
often produce (or produced until quite recently) disputes between Cro-
atia and the EU. Hence it is justified to assume that these questions will 
be a potential rival to the utilitarian explanation for (lack of) support for 
entry into the EU, as well as an occasion for a possible rationalisation 
via general expectations.
It is a fact that on the basis of concrete expectations it is not pos-
sible accurately to predict support for EU accession, and their predic-
tiveness is the same as the predictiveness that the political viewpoints 
have, which leads to the conclusion that the utilitarian model of expla-
nation is equally as valid as that based on political viewpoints. This in 
turn suggests that a decision about EU accession from the perspective 
of Croatian citizens, much more than a cold and rational decision based 
on an analysis of losses and gains, should be seen as a very complex 
social and political phenomenon through which various aspects of the 
current social, political and economic reality of Croatia are refracted.
*  The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions 
as well as Katarina Ott for her committed efforts to make this paper more readable 
and understandable. The authors contributed equally to the paper and are given in 
alphabetical order.
i  With the difference that Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky (2002) differently operationalise 
the concepts of winner and loser as against the traditional version of this behaviour 
model. While Gabel and Palmer (1995) used the objective features of the subject 
(education level, social and professional status, income level) to describe groups 
that beneﬁted from European integration, the ﬁrst group of authors operationalised
their concepts of transitional winners and losers via the subjective impression about 
the change in personal ﬁnancial situation in the previous 12 months and expected
changes in the coming 12 months. This kind of operationalisation of theoretical 
concepts can be criticised because the concept about positive or negative ﬁnancial
moves in the last 12 months does not exactly have to mark the transition winners and 
losers, particularly when the research is carried out ten years after the beginning of 
transition. 
ii  The concept of party afﬁliation here should be considered provisionally, since it
does not relate to membership of a party, rather the support for a given party at the 
moment the inquiry was carried out.
iii  It is worth pointing out that in some investigations other measures of attitudes to 
European integration are used.
iv  The authors use this concept as an analytical category and its use does not express 
their own judgement about the policy of the EU to Croatia and the countries of the 
region.
v  We think there is a signiﬁcant difference between a feeling of national identity or
cultural openness (enclosedness), which have been investigated as predictors of 
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views about membership in the EU (Carey, 2002; Štulhofer, 2006) and the feeling 
of outraged national pride. This feeling can appear in persons who do not have 
a particularly marked feeling of national identity, and can as such have a very 
important role in the formation of views about membership of the EU among persons 
for whom national identity is averagely important, while among the same people, if 
a feeling of outraged national pride develops as a consequence of political pressures 
from the EU, then resistance to membership can be expected as a reaction.
vi  The authors would like to thank Puls agency for its kindness and the ﬁnancing of the
implementation of this investigation.
vii  Eurobarometer is the name of regular public opinion surveys in member countries 
and candidate countries, carried out for the European Commission. For more 
about these surveys, and the results, see: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_
en.htm.
viii  The extracted factors explain 54% of total variance.
ix  Statements: The EU is not pushing Croatia into the Balkans; the EU is not partially 
responsible for degrading the dignity of the Homeland War; the EU is not attempting 
to equate the roles of Croatia and Serbia in the recent war; the EU is not treating 
Croatia worse than other countries in the region.
x  Statements: Most of the requirements of the EU are for our own good; the EU is 
treating Croatia decently, and asking of us only what is essential.
xi  Factor analysis was carried out with component model and with perpendicular 
transformation.
xii  Reliability of the scale tested with Chrombach’s alpha coefﬁcient.
xiii  A signiﬁcant factor was extracted with factor analysis, on which both variables were
saturated at 0.95 and through which 89% of variance as explained, the reliability 
being 0.88. Of course, no new information is gained with this kind of factor analysis 
between two variables. Factor analysis is carried out only so that the latent 
dimension created in this way can be used in further analysis.
xiv  R2=0.55 and 81% of correctly distributed subjects into the appropriate category of 
criteria on the basis of value in the predictor variable.
xv  This result can be the consequence of the fact that at the moment the research was 
carried out a public debate was going on about reforms in the healthcare system that 
might mean much more expensive healthcare services to users, which it would seem 
people connected with entry into the EU.
xvi  The scale was recoded from a ﬁve-point to a three-point scale for the sake of easier
readability of results and easier interpretation.
xvii  Coefﬁcient of determination is derived from the coefﬁcient of correlation and
marks the strength of the correlation among the variables. It ranges between 0 and 
1, and the closer to one the stronger the correlation among the phenomena being 
compared.
xviii  In the analysis of data a linear regression analysis was used with the stepwise 
method. If a regression analysis is carried out on concrete particles of concrete 
expectations 22% of general expectations are explained, or 20% if the analysis is 
carried out on the latent dimensions of concrete expectations.
xix  Obtained as the product of the standardised beta weight and the direct correlation of 
predictor with criterion, in line with the regression formula: R2=ß1*r1+ ß2*r2 + ß3*r3 
+ …
xx  As proved by the weak correlation of concrete and general expectations. 
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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to analyse various dimensions of subje-
ctive well-being in Croatia: life satisfaction, happiness, personal and 
national well-being, to compare some of these dimensions between 
2003 and 2005, and to compare our data with available data from ot-
her European countries. The data used were obtained from two national 
surveys (2003 and 2005). In both surveys participants were represen-
tative samples of Croatian citizens. Comparisons with other European 
countries were based on the data set from the project on monitoring 
quality of life in Europe conducted in 2003 by the European Founda-
tion for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Results 
of analyses showed that Croatia’s subjective well-being rates fit at the 
bottom of the EU-15 or at the top of the 13 acceding and candidate co-
untries, according to their status in 2003. Happiness ratings in Croatian 
citizens were rather high and increased between 2003 and 2005. Sati-
sfaction with personal life domains showed that the standard of living 
is the least satisfying, while relationships with family and friends were 
190
the most satisfying. When rating national domains, Croatian citizens 
were the most satisfied with national security and the state of the envi-
ronment and the least satisfied with social conditions in the country.
Key words: 
subjective well-being, life satisfaction, happiness, domain satisfaction, 
Croatia
INTRODUCTION
Growing evidence suggests that subjective well-being should be 
taken seriously into account when measuring national welfare. For de-
cades, economic indicators played a central role in policy decisions, 
under the assumption that money is the prime generator of well-being. 
Nowadays, as some authors argue, societies are growing wealthier and 
differences in well-being are due less frequently to income and more 
often to factors such as social relationships, emotions and satisfaction 
(Diener and Seligman, 2004). Measuring subjective indicators of well-
being became quite common in the last decade and there are many sur-
vey-based data sets gathered in the EU, USA, Australia and elsewhere 
that enable international comparisons at least with some of indicators 
and instruments that are used widely. The most commonly used measu-
res of subjective well-being are life satisfaction, happiness and satisfa-
ction with different life domains as indices of quality of life i.
Besides psychology, which has a long tradition of studying su-
bjective well-being and its correlates (Diener, 1984; Diener, Lucas and 
Socollon, 2006), extensive contributions on this topic come from eco-
nomics, starting with the work of Easterlin (1974; 2001; 2005) and ot-
hers (Frey and Stuzer, 2000a; 2000b; Namazie and Sanfey, 2001; Lay-
ard, 2005). In most of these studies happiness, defined as a “subjective” 
measure of individual well-being, was analysed in relation to objective 
variables such as unemployment, income, education, and marital sta-
tus (Layard, 2005). Recently, literature from both disciplines indicates 
that there is no constant global happiness set point that remains stable 
over time. Instead several set points and different forms of well-being 
exist (i.e. pleasant and unpleasant emotions, life satisfaction) and they 
can change in different directions (Diener, Lucas and Socollon, 2006; 
Easterlin, 2001; 2005). 
Reviews of various subjective well-being measures have shown 
that individuals reporting higher life satisfaction, happiness or satisfa-
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ction with different life domains have better social relationships, a bet-
ter marriage, perform better at work and have higher resilience to stress 
(Car, 2004; Diener and Seligman, 2004). There are also data showing 
that life satisfaction is positively related to longevity since it affects he-
alth-related behaviour (Koivumaa-Honkanen [et al.], 2000).
In a comparison of subjective well-being measures across nati-
ons and cultures, the situation is more complex. Evidence shows that 
some forces can increase subjective well-being at the cultural level; 
these include gross national product (GNP), political freedom, social 
equality, social security, satisfactory citizen-bureaucrat relationships, 
high levels of trust and efficient public institutions. Some forces howe-
ver can lower subjective well-being at the cultural level: civil and inter-
national conflicts (war), oppression of the political opposition and un-
democratic government (Triandis, 2000). According to the Economist 
Intelligence Unit report (2005) more than 80% of the variance in natio-
nal levels of well-being could be explained by nine determinants: GNP 
per person, life expectancy at birth, political stability, divorce rate, com-
munity life, climate, unemployment rate, political liberties and gender 
equality. Of all these forces, the most frequently researched in relati-
on to subjective well-being is GNP. There are many studies comparing 
GNP with life satisfaction or happiness across countries. Although the 
results are controversial, a common finding in the majority of such stu-
dies is that there are no linear relationships between these two measu-
res of “national well-being”, however high the correlation tends to be. 
The usual figure of such a relationship shows an almost linear increase 
of subjective well-being with increase of GNP at the lower end of the 
scale, but this relationship weakens up the economic scale. Inglehard 
and Klingeman (2000) compared GNP with happiness and life satisfa-
ction (measured in the World Value Study 1997) in 65 countries. They 
found out that above GNP per capita of 13,000 US dollars there was 
no significant linkage between wealth and subjective well-being. Si-
milar results were repeated in some other studies reviewed in Boarini, 
Johanson and D’Ercole (2006). After analyzing this relationship Ingel-
hard and Klingeman (2000) concluded that varying levels of well-being 
were more closely linked with society’s political institutions than with 
economic development. 
It is clear that the well-being of individuals does not depend on 
economic prosperity alone and therefore some authors argue that policy 
decisions at the organizational, corporate and governmental levels sho-
uld be more heavily influenced by issues related to people’s evaluations 
and feelings of their lives (Diener and Seligman, 2004). As monitoring 
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of subjective well-being became standard procedure in the majority of 
developed countries, the European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions launched a project on monitoring the 
quality of life in Europe in 2003. The survey included the EU-15 (Au-
stria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK), 
the EU-10 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) as well as the CC-3 (Turkey, 
Romania and Bulgaria). The survey was aimed at analyzing trends in 
quality of life on a comparative basis, identifying emerging issues and 
areas of concern within the enlarged Europe and providing EU policy-
makers with a solid basis from which to promote improvements in the 
coming years (Fahey, Nolan and Whelan, 2003).
In 2003 Croatia did not take part in the study as it was not con-
sidered a candidate country. In February 2003 Croatia officially appli-
ed for EU membership and obtained the status of candidate country in 
June 2004. Since March 2005 Croatia has been in the process of acce-
ssion negotiations. It would be interesting to see the possible changes 
in the indicators of subjective well-being between the years 2003 and 
2005 (pre- and post-EU accession negotiations) and to compare the po-
sition of some indicators with other European countries. Surveys on su-
bjective well-being in Croatia were conducted in November 2003 and 
June 2005 on representative samples of Croatian citizens. 
Therefore, in the first part of this paper we will describe and 
analyze various dimensions of subjective well-being in Croatia 2005: 
life satisfaction, happiness, personal well-being and national well-be-
ing. In the second part we will compare life satisfaction, happiness and 
personal well-being scores obtained in 2003 and 2005 surveys. In the 
third part we will compare subjective well-being variables obtained in 
Croatia 2003 with quality of life in Europe survey data (Bohnke, 2005; 
Delhey, 2004).
METHODS
Participants and procedure
The data used in this study were obtained from two national sur-
veys. The first survey was conducted in November 2003 and second 
one in June 2005. In both surveys participants were chosen as a mul-
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ti-stage probability-based sample of Croatian citizens. The surveys 
were conducted at 125 sample points in 2003, and 102 sample points 
in 2005 by in-person interview at the respondent’s home. In the 2003 
survey there were 1,242 participants with ages ranging between 18 and 
89 (mean age = 47.5, sd = 17.34). In the 2005 survey there were 913 
participants with ages ranging between 18 and 85 (mean age = 44.56, 
sd = 17.09). Demographic characteristics of the samples are presented 
in Table 1. 
Table 1  Characteristics of the representative samples of Croatian citizens 
from 2003 and 2005 surveys
Frequency (%)
2003 2005 
Age groups 
18-29 
30-39
40-49
50-59
60 +
Gender
Female
Male
Education (in years of schooling)
less than 8
9-12
13 and more
Monthly income (in euros)*
less than 70
70-130
130-270
270-400
400-530
530 and more
236 (19)
198 (16)
223 (18)
212 (17)
373 (30)
684 (55)
558 (45)
364 (29)
646 (52)
231 (19)
103 (8)
238 (19)
479 (39)
186 (15)
105 (8)
116 (9)
232 (25)
167 (18)
148 (16)
172 (19)
193 (21)
482 (53)
429 (47)
134 (15)
513 (56)
254 (28)
  40 (4)
119 (13)
303 (33)
258 (28)
107 (12)
  69 (8)
*  Monthly income: Both surveys provided income information in kuna (Croatian 
currency) so the values are converted according to the exchange rate list from 
the Croatian National Bankii 
Source: Pilar Croatian Survey (2003; 2005)
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Measures of subjective well-being
There are numerous measures of subjective well-being from 
global measures to more specific indicators of well-being that have 
been shown to be useful in describing well-being of a nation (Diener 
and Seligman, 2004). In our study we used measures of both cognitive 
and affective components of subjective well-being as well as specific 
domain satisfactions.
As a cognitive measure of subjective well-being the Satisfaction 
with life scale (Diener [et al.], 1985) was used. It captures one’s apprai-
sal of life as a whole and consists of five items that subjects have to rate 
in accordance with how much they agree with particular statement. The 
rating is done on the 5-point scale ranging from 1 “strongly disagree” 
to 5 “strongly agree”. Scores were calculated as the mean of 5 items as 
recommended by the scale’s authors. A higher result means greater life 
satisfaction.
The affective component of subjective well-being was exami-
ned by using the Happiness measure from the Fordyce (1988) scale. 
The question In general, how happy or unhappy do you usually feel? 
was rated on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 “extremely unhappy” to 
10 “extremely happy”. 
Subjective well-being in specific life domains was assessed by 
the International Wellbeing Index (IWI) (Cummins, 2002) which con-
sists of two parts. The first part is the Personal Wellbeing Index (PWI) 
which measures satisfaction with life domains. Participants have to rate 
how satisfied they are with seven life domains: material status, perso-
nal health, achievement in life, relationships with family and friends, 
feelings of physical safety, acceptance by the community and future se-
curity. The second part is the National Wellbeing Index (NWI) which 
measures satisfaction with living conditions in the country. It consists 
of six different national domains with participants being asked to rate 
how satisfied they are with: the economic situation, state of the envi-
ronment, social conditions, government, business and national security. 
Both indices use an 11-point rating scale ranging from 0 “not at all sati-
sfied” to 10 “extremely satisfied” and are scored for separate domains, 
as well as the average scores of each group of domains (personal, nati-
onal). Within the framework of the same study a short demographic qu-
estionnaire was also administered consisting of several questions about 
gender, age, education level, living arrangement and income.
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Data analyses
In order to get a descriptive account of various dimensions of 
subjective well-being in Croatia data from 2005 are presented descri-
bing overall life satisfaction, happiness and satisfaction with specific 
personal and national domains. To examine the possible changes in su-
bjective well-being between the years 2003 and 2005 we compared 
the data from these surveys in those variables that were repeated: ove-
rall life satisfaction, happiness and satisfaction with personal domains. 
The statistical significance of the level of mean differences between the 
2003 and 2005 samples was tested by independent samples t-test. The 
null hypothesis was that there were no significant differences between 
the means. Finally, from a cross-country comparison perspective, we 
compared the existing data on subjective well-being in European coun-
tries obtained in 2003 (Delhey, 2004; Bohnke, 2005) with our data set 
from 2003. We examined the differences in level of happiness and spe-
cific personal domains satisfaction between Croatia and different gro-
ups of European countries. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Subjective well-being in Croatia in 2005 
Croatian citizens in 2005 rated their life satisfaction as moderate 
(mean = 3.0, sd = 0.85)iii, indicating that their evaluation of their life as 
a whole is neither extremely high nor extremely low. On the other side, 
the average Happiness ratings (mean = 7.8, sd = 1.69) found its place 
at the higher end of the distribution (Figure 1). Almost 30% of partici-
pants rated themselves as being pretty happy and 27% as mildly happy. 
According to Ott (2005) the distribution of happiness among na-
tions appears to be very different in terms of level, measured as an ave-
rage response, and inequality, measured as a standard deviation (i.e. 
a low standard deviation indicates low inequality in happiness ratings 
while a high standard deviation indicates high inequality). He finds that 
in nations where the average happiness is high, the standard deviation 
tends to be low, which speaks in favour of harmony in society instead 
of tension. If we apply that finding to our data, Croatia can be viewed 
as a country with a relatively high level and low inequality of happi-
ness. Most of the happiness ratings concentrated around categories 6 to 
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10, while the frequency of scores of 5 and less were rather small which 
resulted in relatively high mean and low standard deviation. 
Figure 1 Distribution of happiness ratings in Croatia 2005 (%)
Source: Pilar Croatian Survey 2005 (N = 913; M = 7.8; sd = 1.69)
To explore further the domain-level representation of subjecti-
ve well-being, the International Wellbeing Index was employed. This 
index is widely used in other countries to monitor national well-being 
(Cummins [et al.], 2003). It covers two subsets of domains, the first set 
related to one’s personal life and the second to national living conditi-
ons. The average satisfaction ratings of each domain, as well as their 
average score for each scale are presented in Figure 2. Our data confir-
med the trend found in other studies, that the average NWI is normally 
lower than PWI (ibid, 2003; Tiliouine [et al.], 2006). 
With regard to personal domains level, Croatians were the most 
satisfied with the domains of family and friends, followed by acceptan-
ce by the community and feelings of physical safety. The three first va-
riables were found to lie above the PWI mean score. Satisfaction with 
their health status and achievement in their life shared the fourth rank 
followed by satisfaction about future security. Respondents reported 
being the least satisfied with their standard of living (i.e. material sta-
tus).
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Figure 2  Average satisfaction ratings for personal and national domains in 
Croatia 2005
Source: Pilar Croatian Survey 2005 (N = 913)
When rating national domains, Croatian citizens were the most 
satisfied with national security and the state of environment. Both vari-
ables were rated above the average NWI score. Their satisfaction with 
the status of business in the country, economic status, government and 
social conditions was below the average. The last two were given the 
lowest ratings. Since NWI mirrors perceived external conditions of li-
ving in Croatia, these findings reflect some objective circumstances in 
the country. The relatively high satisfaction with national security might 
be the consequence of relative stability (peace) after the long years of 
war as well as the prospects of accession to the EU and the NATO. 
However, high satisfaction with the environment is, in our opinion, 
more probably the consequence of the fact that the people are unawa-
re of the problems, or even ignorant, than of really good environmental 
conditions in the country. Low satisfaction with social conditions and 
government shows concerns about fulfilling basic needs, and obviou-
sly, the government is blamed for such a situation. 
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Comparison of subjective well-being  
in Croatia between 2003 and 2005
To examine the differences in mean levels in subjective well-be-
ing within the period 2003-2005 we compared those variables that were 
used in both surveys: overall life satisfaction, happiness and satisfacti-
on with personal domains (PWI). Since in the 2003 survey subjects ra-
ted their satisfaction on PWI domains on a 10-point scale (Kaliterna Li-
povcan and Prizmic-Larsen, 2006a; 2006b) and in 2005 on an 11-point 
scale, a linear transformation to the 11-point scale was performed to the 
2003 data to make direct comparison possible (Aiken, 1987). 
Results of the t-test analysis, presented in Table 2, show that the 
rank of satisfaction with life domains stayed the same in the compared 
years, with satisfaction with family and friends at the top and material 
status at the bottom.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for subjective well-being indices 2003 and 2005 
Survey 2003
M (SD)
Survey 2005
M (SD)
t-test sig.
Satisfaction with speciﬁc
domain:
material status 4.98 (2.70) 5.03 (2.46) n.s.
health 6.59 (2.86) 6.76 (2.76) n.s.
achievement in life 6.51 (2.39) 6.37 (2.47) n.s.
relationships with  
family and friends
8.37 (1.88) 8.44 (2.04) n.s.
safety 7.80 (2.07) 7.34 (2.37) p<.01
acceptance by the 
community
8.13 (1.92) 7.87 (2.28) p<.01
Happiness 7.12 (1.86) 7.80 (1.69) p<.01
Life satisfaction 3.03 (0.86) 3.03 (0.86) n.s.
Source: Pilar Croatian Surveys 2003 (N =1242) and 2005 (N = 913)
When average ratings of domain satisfaction in the two surveys 
were compared, significant differences were found for satisfaction with 
physical safety and acceptance by the community. Both variables decli-
ned from 2003 to 2005. A possible explanation for the relative decline 
in physical safety and acceptance by the community rankings can be 
that the 2003 survey was conducted in the pre-election period, when 
people were expecting positive changes that did not happen subsequen-
tly, which resulted in feelings of alienation and insecurity.
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Overall life satisfaction stayed exactly the same in the compa-
red years, while happiness ratings significantly increased. It is difficult 
to explain the increased happiness when most of the other indices of 
subjective well-being stayed the same and some of them – satisfaction 
with safety and acceptance by community – decreased. One possible 
reason can be that people feel optimistic about the country’s position as 
a prospective EU member state, and at this point it is expressed more 
by the affective (happiness) than cognitive (life satisfaction and doma-
in satisfaction) component of subjective well-being. Some authors ar-
gue that happiness, as affective component, is more strongly related 
to the emotional climate in a given culture than to changes in specific 
life areas (Gundelach and Kreiner, 2004). As shown in another study 
(Kaliterna Lipovcan and Prizmic-Larsen, 2006b) and documented by 
this analysis, happiness ratings in Croatian citizens have been constan-
tly increasing since 1995. It can be concluded out of this evidence that 
the emotional climate in Croatia has been improving since the war en-
ded 1995 and that enthusiasm for a better life is captured by people’s 
happiness ratings. 
On the other hand, life satisfaction ratings have not changed in 
the observed period. Previous research has shown that life satisfaction 
is moderately stable over time, as the variability of that measure is re-
latively small (Eid and Diener, 2004). The authors argue that life sati-
sfaction, as a global judgment of well-being, should not be sensitive to 
mood and affect variability but rather to changes of living conditions. 
Some other studies showed that at the individual level, circumstances 
like unemployment alter people’s ratings of life satisfaction (Lucas [et 
al.], 2004). Similar results are found in the economics literature, sho-
wing that unemployment is associated with a lower level of subjecti-
ve well-being (Frey and Stutzer, 2000b). Recent reviews of Diener and 
others (2006; Easterlinin, 2005) indicate that different components of 
well-being can change in different rates or in different directions, and 
the extent of adaptation varies for different life events (i.e. widowhood, 
divorce, unemployment, marriage).
In other words, life satisfaction does not assess short-term flu-
ctuation in subjective states, but rather the significant changes that take 
place in an individual’s life or national well-being. The results of our 
study could thus imply that in the period 2003 to 2005 there were no si-
gnificant or radical changes in the living conditions of the Croatian po-
pulation capable of affecting life satisfaction ratings. It is also possible 
that the time lapse between two surveys (i.e. two years), was not long 
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enough to detect a significant change in living conditions. Nonetheless, 
this finding confirms that, in assessing a nation’s well-being one should 
take into account both components (affective and cognitive) of subje-
ctive well-being in order to get a real picture.
Comparison of subjective well-being  
in Croatia and other European countries
A comprehensive study on quality of life in 28 European coun-
tries gave valuable data on various aspects of living conditions and qua-
lity of life, both objective and subjective. The survey was carried out by 
Intomart GfK which assigned national institutes to draw random sam-
ples and conduct the interviews in each country. Around 1,000 persons 
aged 18 and over were interviewed in each country. The questionnaire 
was developed by a research consortium and covers a broad spectrum 
of life domains (Saraceno and Keck, 2004). Due to the limited financi-
al resources available for our study we have to limit our comparisons to 
evaluations of happiness and satisfaction with specific life domains like 
standard of living, family life and health, as these are the variables that 
are comparable in the European and in our study. 
A general finding from the European study was that subjecti-
ve well-being was quite unequally distributed across the enlarged 
Europe in 2003. Besides the observed gap between the north and the 
south, a huge gap appeared in subjective well-being between the east 
and the west. This was more or less a gap between the member states 
of the EU-15 and the EU-10 as well as the CC-3 countries (Bohnke, 
2005). What would be the position of Croatia in that respect?
Table 3 presents the average happiness ratings for 28 Europe-
an countries. Happiness ratings showed that there were differences be-
tween the EU-15, EU-10 and CC-3, the EU-15 being happier on the 
average. The average happiness rating for the EU-15 was 7.6, for the 
EU-10 6.9 and for the CC-3 6.6. Scandinavian countries rated their 
happiness the highest (with Denmark on the top) while Portugal was 
the least happy country among the EU-15. In the EU-10 and CC-3, the 
happiest were Malta and Cyprus, which were exceptions because the-
ir average happiness scores were higher than those of some of the EU-
15 countries, while the most unhappy were Bulgaria, Turkey, Lithuania 
and Latvia. 
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With a score of 7.1 on happiness ratings obtained in the same 
year (2003) Croatia fits within the top EU-10 and CC-3 countries, ran-
ked 12th when all the 28 studied countries are taken together (Hungary 
and Romania had the same ratings as Croatia).
Table 3  Average happiness ratings of European countries on a scale from 1-10 
with rank number for each country 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Denmark
Finland
Ireland
Luxembourg
Sweden
Malta
Austria
Spain
United Kingdom
Cyprus
Belgium
Netherlands
8.3
8.1
8.1
8.0
7.9
7.9
7.9
7.8
7.8
7.8
7.7
7.7
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Germany
Greece
Italy
Slovenia
France
Czech R. 
Hungary
Romania
Poland
Portugal
Estonia
Slovakia
7.6
7.6
7.5
7.4
7.3
7.2
7.1
7.1
6.9
6.8
6.8
6.5
25
26
27
28
Turkey
Lithuania
Latvia
Bulgaria
EU-15
EU-10
CC-3
EU-25
6.4
6.4
6.4
5.8
7.6
6.9
6.6
7.5
1  Sources for average happiness ratings in European countries are from 
European Quality of Life Survey (Bohnke, 2005)
Ratings of specific life domains in EU countries showed a simi-
lar trend in happiness ratings, with the EU-10 and CC-3 being less con-
tent with their material and social living standards compared with the 
population in the EU-15. On the other hand, family life was evaluated 
as the most satisfying life domain in all countries. With its results, Cro-
atia fits well into this trend. Family life was also evaluated as the most 
satisfying, while the standard of living was the most unsatisfying. In 
Figure 3 we compare average satisfaction ratings of certain life doma-
ins in 2003, in Croatia, EU-15, EU-10 and CC-3 countries. Satisfaction 
with standard of living and health turns out to be more similar to that 
in the acceding countries (EU-10) than in EU member states (EU-15). 
However, satisfaction with family life in Croatia exceeds the average 
ratings of all the other three country groups. In our previous research 
(Kaliterna Lipovcan and Prizmic-Larsen, 2006b) Croatian people rated 
relationship with family and friends as the second most important life 
domain, the most important being health.
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Figure 3  Average ratings of satisfaction with the standard of living, family life 
and health domain1
1  Sources for satisfaction ratings of life domains in European countries are 
from European Quality of Life Survey (Bohnke, 2005) and for Croatia – Pilar 
Croatian Survey, 2003
When evaluating domain satisfaction scores to explain happi-
ness within the European countries, standard of living appears to have a 
high impact, but not as high as satisfaction with family and social life. 
However, the results were different for life satisfaction scores. The Eu-
ropean study showed a different impact of domain satisfactions on life 
satisfaction within the EU-15 than in the EU-10 and CC-3 countries. 
The best predictor of life satisfaction in the EU-10 and CC-3 was a sa-
tisfactory standard of living. On the other hand, within the EU-15 co-
untries, especially the Scandinavian countries with highest levels of life 
satisfaction (Denmark, Finland and Sweden), family life impacted most 
on the outcome of life satisfaction. This is in line with other research 
that showed that family and social life are important when the overall 
economic prosperity in a country is high and basic needs are satisfied 
(Delhey, 2004). Thus, it could be expected that in Croatia the standard 
of living would have greater impact on life satisfaction scores than sa-
tisfaction with family and friends, as Croatia’s economic prosperity at 
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the moment is more similar to that in the EU-10 and CC-3 than the EU-
15 countries. 
CONCLUSION
“Promoting people’s well-being is a primary goal of European 
social policy: happy, satisfied, fulfilled and engaged citizens nurture 
flourishing European societies. In the course of European enlargement, 
the interest in living conditions and the distribution of life chances in 
different European countries has grown considerably. Subjective well-
being is one of many subjects that need to be explored from this per-
spective.” (Bohnke, 2005:1).
Our study attempts to improve the European data set on happi-
ness and life satisfaction by adding Croatian data as a (hopefully) new 
country in the EU. There are various sources of cross-country data on 
subjective well-being indices, such as World Value Survey, Eurobaro-
meter, World Database on Happiness, but we have chosen the Europe-
an monitoring of quality of life data, since it was conducted in the same 
year as our national survey, using the same sample size (about 1,000 
respondents in each country, aged 18 and over) and was carried out by 
the conducting of separate national surveys with the same methodology 
applied (Saraceno and Keck, 2004). In that respect we do hope that the 
data are comparable at least on the descriptive level.
Generally speaking, our data show that Croatia’s subjective 
well-being rates fit at the bottom of the EU-15 or at the top of EU-10 
and CC-3 countries, as of 2003. Happiness ratings were rather high and 
showed an increase in the past ten years, which leads us to the conclusi-
on that the subjective well-being in the country is improving.
This study also shows that monitoring of subjective well-being 
can provide valuable data, especially at the time when a society expects 
substantial changes and reforms, as Croatia is expecting to become an 
EU member. Recently, the literature on the effects of transition on peo-
ples’ subjective well-being has been growing, especially in ex-commu-
nist countries, (Namazie and Sanfey, 2001) although some authors ar-
gue that the majority of such studies hold good for individual countries 
only and therefore do not provide a good overall picture (Sanfey and 
Teksoz, 2005). Analysing the data on life satisfaction from the World 
Value Survey (1999-2002) Sanfey and Teksoz (2005) concluded that 
“people are generally happier in countries that have made more pro-
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gress in transition than those where transition has lagged”. The eviden-
ce from our study shows that the level of happiness in 2003 in Croatia 
was higher than in most of the transition countries that were included 
in the pan-European survey on quality of life. Should we also conclude 
that the transition process in Croatia made substantial progress? Surely, 
for such a conclusion more work is needed in this field, especially tar-
geted surveys comparing objective (economic) and subjective indices 
of the nation’s well-being. Only regular monitoring at certain points in 
time can yield a clear picture of the impact of social change on people’s 
perceptions and experience (Kim-Prieto [et al.], 2005). In this respect, 
this study can serve as a starting point to monitor the position of Croa-
tia as an acceding country and follow how economic and social chan-
ges influence the quality of life and the satisfaction with particular do-
mains of people’s everyday life.
Policy interventions to increase the subjective well-being of a 
population are important as, on the one hand, it feels good to be happy, 
and on the other hand, happy people tend to volunteer more, have more 
positive work behaviour and are successful across multiple life doma-
ins, including marriage, friendship, income, work performance, and he-
alth (Diener, Lucas and Oishi, 2002; Lyubomirsky, King and Diener, 
2005). The recent work of Lyubomirski [et al.] (2005) suggests that 
happiness is not only associated with successful outcomes but may also 
be the cause of success. In that respect subjective well-being should not 
only be a subject of scientific interest, but should be seriously conside-
red in policy making as an increase in the happiness and life satisfacti-
on of individuals benefits the society as a whole.
*  The authors would like to thank the referees who anonymously reviewed this paper.
i  Subjective well-being refers to all of the various types of subjective evaluations, both 
good and bad, of individuals’ lives. It includes reﬂective cognitive evaluations, such
as life satisfaction and work satisfaction, interest and engagement, and affective 
reactions to life events, such as joy and sadness. Thus, subjective well-being is an 
umbrella term for the different valuations people make regarding their lives, events 
they face, and the circumstances in which they live. Life satisfaction represents a 
report of how a respondent evaluates or appraises his or her life taken as a whole. 
It is intended to represent a broad, reﬂective appraisal the person makes of his or
her life. Happiness has several meanings in popular discourse, as well as in the 
scholarly literature, but it is usually used as a measure of the affective component 
of subjective well-being. Happiness refers to the feeling of more pleasant than 
unpleasant emotions most of the time. Quality of life usually refers to the degree 
to which a person’s life has desirable versus undesirable characteristics, often with 
an emphasis on external components, such as environmental factors and income. 
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Quality of life when measured subjectively usually includes domain satisfactions, 
i.e. judgments people make in evaluating major life domains, such as health, work, 
leisure, social relationships, and family. People indicate how satisﬁed they are with
various areas, but they might also indicate how much they like their lives in each 
area, or how important to them each area is (Diener, 2005). 
ii  The exchange rate for 2003 was 1 euro = 7.66 kuna (according to the November 
exchange rate list 210/2003) and in 2005 the exchange rate was 1 euro = 7.31 kuna 
(according to the June exchange rate list 125/2005).
iii  sd is standard deviation.
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ABSTRACT
The paper investigates the interdependence of the Lisbon strat-
egy and Copenhagen criteria in the process of European Union enlarge-
ment and a candidate’s ability to catch up with new member states. It 
aims to deepen the understanding of the nature and dynamics of the 
Lisbon policy mix and implementation instruments. It concludes that 
convergence with Lisbon goals is relevant for a country in the pre- 
accession stage. Since the timeframe for implementation of the strategy 
and Croatia’s expected accession are almost the same, approaching Lis-
bon goals is extremely important for the country. Experience of mem-
ber states in strategy implementation and evaluation of Croatia’s start-
ing position vis-à-vis Lisbon targets are used to identify policy recom-
mendations. 
Key words:
Lisbon strategy, membership criteria, national reform programmes, 
Croatia
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the paper is to investigate the interdependence of 
the Lisbon agenda and the Copenhagen criteria. The starting hypothe-
ses are the following: (i) the implementation of Lisbon agenda goals is 
complementary to fulfilment of the Copenhagen economic criteria for 
EU membership; (ii) prioritisation and sequencing of Lisbon agenda 
goals according to needs is indispensable for a candidate country; (iii) 
progress towards Lisbon goals at the level of the EU will make Croa-
tia’s adjustment with EU economic requirements even more demand-
ing (the EU being a “moving target”) and (iv) Croatia is lagging behind 
member states in terms of Lisbon strategy implementation. 
The paper starts with an overview of the evolution of the Lisbon 
strategy and its implementation instruments. This is followed by analy-
ses of relevant approaches in dealing with the Lisbon agenda in mem-
ber states and some particular issues of the agenda. Next, Croatia’s po-
sition vis-à-vis selected EU member states and candidates is evaluated. 
Based on this, conclusions are briefly summarised and policy recom-
mendations identified.
EUROPE AT THE CROSSROADS:  
THE LISBON STRATEGY
The Lisbon strategy (also referred to as the Lisbon agenda) was 
agreed in 2000 at the spring European Council in Lisbon. The EU set 
itself the strategic goal “to become the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010, capable of sustain-
able economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social co-
hesion” (European Council, 2000). The strategy included a comprehen-
sive series of reforms. It was a response to global competition, particu-
larly to US progress in the “new” knowledge economy and its leader-
ship in information and communication technologies (ICT), in which it 
had begun to outperform the individual European economies. However, 
achieving this goal required preparing for a knowledge-based economy 
and society by better policies and completing the internal market; mod-
ernising the European social model and sustaining a healthy econom-
ic outlook and favourable growth by an appropriate macro-economic 
policy mix.
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The Göteberg Council in 2001 added an environmental protec-
tion dimension to the Lisbon strategy (European Council, 2001). In 
order to close the gap between the EU and its major competitors, the 
Barcelona Council (European Council, 2002) agreed to boost the re-
search and innovation efforts in the EU through increasing the overall 
spending on research and development (R&D) and innovation with the 
aim of approaching 3% of GDP by 2010, with two-thirds of investment 
coming from the private sector.i
Almost five years after Lisbon, midway to the goal, the results 
of implementation were mixed. Although there were positive achieve-
ments in some areas (the European social model), slow and insufficient 
progress has been made in reaching the Lisbon objectivesii. The de-
livery was disappointing, due to widely defined goals, an overloaded 
agenda, poor coordination and conflicting priorities. Responsibilities 
between the national and the European level had become blurred re-
sulting in limited “ownership” of the process in member states. Weak-
nesses were particularly evident in the labour market, such as: an in-
sufficient number of jobs had been created in the services sector; deep-
ened regional imbalances; high rate of long-term unemployment; short-
age of women participating in the labour market; unfavourable demo-
graphic trends, ageing of the population.
Analyses (Sapir et al., 2003) showed that better implementa-
tion was needed to make up for lost time.iii In March 2004, a high lev-
el group headed by Wim Kok was established by the European Com-
mission to carry out a mid-term review. The findings of the mid-term 
review could be summarised as follows: there was an urgent need to 
accelerate employment and productivity growth through a wide range 
of reform policies as well as a wider macroeconomic framework, sup-
portive to growth, demand and employment (Kok, 2004). The scenario 
for more growth and jobs was envisaged through urgent action across 
five policy areas: the knowledge society, the internal market, the busi-
ness climate, the labour market and environmental sustainability. It was 
concluded that individual member states had made progress in one or 
more of these policy priority areas, but none had succeeded consistent-
ly across a broad front. Therefore, the group recommended develop-
ing national policies in each member state, supported by an appropriate 
European-wide framework. The report was one of the bases for the re-
launched strategy in 2005.
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The revised Lisbon Strategy
The spring European Council in 2005 decided that Europe must 
renew the basis of its competitiveness, increase growth potential and 
productivity and strengthen social cohesion, placing the main empha-
sis on knowledge, innovation and the optimalisation of human capital. 
The relaunched strategy re-focused priorities on growth and employ-
ment (European Council, 2005). The Commission proposed a partner-
ship with member states on growth and jobs and introduced a Commu-
nity Lisbon Programme that outlines actions to be taken at EU and at 
national level in three key policy areas (Box 1). The focus was on en-
suring delivery of a renewed programme.
Box 1 Community Lisbon Programme
Making Europe a more attractive place to invest and work
• Extend and deepen the internal market.
• Ensure open and competitive markets inside and outside Europe.
• Improve European and national regulation.
• Expand and improve European infrastructure.
Knowledge and innovation for growth
• Increase and improve investment in research and development.
•  Facilitate innovation, the uptake of ICT and the sustainable use of 
resources.
• Contribute to a strong European industrial base.
Creating more and better jobs
•  Attract more people into employment and modernise social protection 
systems. 
•  Improve the adaptability of workers and enterprises and the ﬂexibility
of labour markets.
• Invest more in human capital through better education and skills.
Source: European Commission (2005d)
In addition to streamlining the targets, the relaunched strategy 
introduces new implementing mechanisms focused on concrete mea-
sures and national action plans. Responsibilities and implementation 
are divided between the EU and member states, with an important role 
for the European Council, the European Parliament, other EU institu-
tions and social partners.
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On one hand, a programme for European level reform – the 
Community Lisbon Programme – is implemented on the basis of pro-
posals by the Commission adopted by the European Parliament and the 
Council. On the other hand, member states undertake reforms at nation-
al level (national reform programmes, prepared every year) on the ba-
sis of agreed guidelines, proposed by the Commission and endorsed by 
the Council. The Commission works with member states on implemen-
tation and assesses progress in the annual progress report (also known 
as the “Spring Report”) allowing stakeholders and citizens to see how 
far the European-level programme and that of each individual member 
state has gone. The European Council gives practical guidance at every 
spring summit.iv
The new governance mechanism includes, where appropriate, 
appointment of a Lisbon national coordinator. The reporting system 
was simplified, comprising a single Lisbon report at the EU and at na-
tional level on progress made.
Such governance builds on the open method of coordination 
(OMC), which was introduced by Lisbon Council. The Lisbon Council, 
that is, agreed that implementation of the strategy would be achieved 
through the existing processes if the OMC were introduced at all 
levels.
It is extremely difficult to quantify the impact of Lisbon-type 
reforms, since they are comprehensive and interdependent. One of the 
best examples of a Lisbon-type reform aimed at creating a more com-
petitive business environment is the single market programme (SMP). 
A simulation carried out ten years after the launch of the SMP (Europe-
an Commission, 2002a) showed that GDP would have been 1.8% low-
er in 2002 if the SMP had not been implemented over the period 1992-
2002. The level of employment would have been 1.5% lower than it ac-
tually was in 2002. Turning to reforms more directly linked to the Lis-
bon strategy, a recent study by Copenhagen Economics (2005) provides 
estimates of the medium-term impact of the opening up of services to 
competition. The study shows that freedom of establishment for service 
providers and free movement of services between member states would 
raise GDP and employment by 0.6% and 0.3% respectively.
Estimates show that the costs of non-achieving Lisbon are large 
and quantifiable, particularly through the evidence of the widening gap 
in Europe’s growth potential compared to that of economic partners 
(European Commission, 2005f). In the same time, the potential gains 
from wider and more efficient economic integration in an enlarged Eu-
rope are significant (Gelauff and Lejour, 2005).
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Box 2  Four priority areas for action (accepted by the Spring 
European Council 2006) 
(1) Investing more in knowledge and innovation
•  Promote polices and actions aiming at the established overall 3% 
objective for R&D spending by 2010, taking into account different 
starting positions of member states.
•  Speedily adopt the 7th Framework Programme for R&D and the 
new Competitiveness and Innovation Programme (CIP).
•  Establish a European Research Council aimed at raising the 
excellence of the best research teams.
•  Create a single, competitive and open European labour market for 
researchers.
•  Develop a broad-based information strategy for Europe that 
translates investment in knowledge into products and services.
•  Member states should develop comprehensive lifelong learning 
strategies; the EU Lifelong Learning Programme 2007-2013.
•  Facilitate universities’ access to complementary sources of 
funding, in line with national practices.
•  Develop managerial skills and competencies for the people 
involved to transfer the research results to the business 
community.
(2)  Unlocking business potential, especially of small and medium-
sized enterprises
•  Develop national strategies to foster competitiveness, innovation 
and productivity.
•  Explore options for establishing measurable targets in speciﬁc
sectors for reducing administrative burdens by 2006.
•  Establish by the end of 2007 a “one-stop-shop” or arrangements 
with equivalent effect.
•  Reduce the average time for setting up a business, especially an 
SME, with the objective of this being possible within one week 
anywhere in the EU by the end of 2007.
•  Recruitment of a ﬁrst employee should not involve more than one
public administration point.
(3) Getting people into work 
•  Reduce unemployment from a peak of 9% at the end of 2004 by 
roughly 1% in 2007.
•  Adopt a real lifecycle approach to employment by:
− reducing early school leaving by 10% by 2010,
−  ensuring that at least 85% of 22-year-olds should have comple-
ted upper secondary education,
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−  offering every young person who has left school or university a 
job, apprenticeship or additional training within six months of 
becoming unemployed by the end of 2007, and within 4 months 
by 2010,
−  implementing policies to promote women’s employment; 
approval of the European Pact for Gender Equality,
−  increasing availability of quality childcare in line with member 
states’ own national targets,
−  implementing active ageing strategies, consideration of 
incentives for prolonging working lives, gradual retirement, 
use of part-time work and improvements to the working 
environment,
−  pursuing reforms by member states in the labour market and 
social policies in an integrated approach,
−  establishing the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, to 
be operational as soon as possible and preferably on 1 January 
2007.
(4) Efﬁcient, secure and sustainable energy
•  Electricity and gas markets to be open to all consumers by July 
2007 (already the aim).
•  Better cooperation between grid and gas pipeline systems in 
member states, enabling the functioning of a single European 
network.
•  Stimulation of research on energy efﬁciency, renewables and on
clean energy technologies and incentives to promote their use.
•  Common operational approaches for crisis situations.
•  Develop common external policy approach and furthering energy 
dialogue between the EU and its member states on the one hand, 
and their main partners (producer, transit of consumer countries) 
on the other, in synergy with relevant international organisation.
Source: authors’ compilation 
However, some of the studies that have been carried out in the 
meantime came to the conclusion that the Lisbon strategy still does not 
have clear common goals and lacks financial sources and that the re-
sults of implementation are still lower than expected (e.g. Pisany-Ferry 
and Sapir, 2006). The study underlines the weaknesses in implemen-
tation particularly in big member states, while the new members are 
achieving better results. The study estimates that the integrated guide-
lines are still too general and should be made more concrete and de-
tailed.
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IMPLEMENTATION INSTRUMENTS
The new governance three year cycle started in 2005, and com-
prises the following main instruments: Integrated guidelines (presented 
by the Commission in April 2005, for the period 2005-2008); Nation-
al reform programmes (prepared by member states by the end of No-
vember 2005), and Commission progress report (published in January 
2006).
The open method of coordination (OMC) introduced by the Lis-
bon Council is still an important implementation instrument.
Integrated guidelines for growth and employment
The integrated guidelines constitute the beginning of a new gov-
ernance cycle (the first one was 2005-2008), bringing together broad 
economic policy guidelines (BEPGs, Treaty art. 128) and employment 
guidelines (EGs; Treaty art. 99). 
The integrated guidelines (Box 3) dealing with macro- and mi-
cro-economic and employment issues are mainly based on the priority 
action areas as identified in the Lisbon mid-term review.
While the macroeconomic guidelines (covering for instance 
budgetary policy, reduction of public debts and EMU issues) have no 
counterpart in the Lisbon Action Programme (see Box 1), the micro-
economic guidelines are built on Lisbon action areas (points 1 to 7, 
Box 1), and the employment guidelines are also built on Lisbon action 
areas (points 8 to 10, Box 1). 
Integrated guidelines simplified the implementation of the strat-
egy and integrated different policy guidelines, targets and reporting 
processes. Since they are soft law, i.e. not legally binding, peer pressure 
and financial incentives are the main enforcement instruments. 
New financial incentives are developed under the Financial 
Perspective 2007-2013, such as the Competitiveness and Innovation 
Framework Programme (CIP). CIP allocated 3.6 billion euros which 
should facilitate implementation of the Lisbon Strategy.v The horizon-
tal contribution of the European Investment Bank (EIB), European In-
vestment Fund (EIF) and other sources is also envisaged, since studies 
have shown the high added value in EU support for loan guarantees, 
with each euro from the EU budget resulting in a loan volume of 72 eu-
ros (European Commission, 2006d).
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Box 3  Integrated guidelines for growth and employment  
2005-2008
Macroeconomic guidelines intended to:
(1) secure economic stability,
(2)  safeguard economic sustainability,
(3)  promote an efﬁcient allocation of resources,
(4)  promote greater coherence between macroeconomic and 
structural policies,
(5)  ensure that wage developments contribute to macroeconomic 
stability and growth,
(6)  contribute to a dynamic and well-functioning EMU. 
Microeconomic guidelines intended to:
(7)  extend and deepen the internal market,
(8)  ensure open and competitive markets,
(9)  create a more attractive business environment,
(10)  promote a more entrepreneurial culture and create a supportive 
environment for small and medium-sized enterprises, 
(11)  expand and improve European infrastructure and complete 
agreed priority cross-border projects, 
(12)  increase and improve investment in R&D, 
(13)  facilitate innovation and the take-up of ICT, 
(14)  encourage the sustainable use of resources and strengthen the 
synergies between environmental protection and growth,
(15)  contribute to a strong industrial base. 
Employment guidelines intended to:
(16)  implement employment policies aimed at achieving full 
employment, improving quality and productivity at work, and 
strengthening social and territorial cohesion,
(17) promote a life-cycle approach to work, 
(18)  ensure inclusive labour markets for job-seekers and 
disadvantaged people,
(19) improve the matching of labour market needs, 
(20)  promote ﬂexibility combined with employment security and
the reduction of labour market segmentation, 
(21)  ensure employment-friendly wage and other labour cost 
developments, 
(22)  expand and improve investment in human capital, 
(23)  adapt education and training systems in response to new 
competence requirements.
Source: European Commission (2005c:10)
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Open method of coordination
The OMC is still the most important method of coordinating the 
Lisbon strategy, although it still has some weaknesses (Radlo, 2006). 
Lisbon strengthened the OMC, making peer pressure and monitoring 
more effective. 
The OMC includes in-depth analyses of situations, support-
ed by appropriate measurements, such as enterprise policy or innova-
tion scoreboards, competitiveness reports or composite indicators on 
knowledge society in areas such as R&D and human capital. It is usual 
to make comparisons between the performances of individual member 
states with a view to conducting benchmarking exercises, with appro-
priate follow-ups. In addition, an increasing use of the OMC is envis-
aged for future quantitative targets. Such targets, to be set by member 
states, could be used as yardsticks for monitoring competitive improve-
ments when accompanied by corresponding measurements (European 
Commission, 2002b). There is an obligation to include certain specif-
ic elements from the OMC into national reform programmes and EU 
annual progress reports. There are policies characterised by a stronger 
OMC and policies where the OMC is weak. 
NATIONAL REFORM PLANS 
The national reform plans (NRPs) together with the Commu-
nity Lisbon programme, are among key instruments of the new Lisbon 
strategy. Member states were supposed to prepare NRPs by October 
2005 for the period 2005-2008 on the basis of the 23 integrated policy 
guidelines (Box 3).vi 
Member states identified different challenges and policy re-
sponses reflecting their different starting positions and political prefer-
ences. Starting positions and pace of reform are monitored by a number 
of benchmarks, which should, at a latter stage, help in identifying best 
practices and serve to name and shame the laggards.vii
In the overwhelming majority of cases, five key challenges 
emerge: (i) increasing employment and labour market performance, 
(ii) the sustainability and quality of public finances, (iii) improving 
R&D and innovation, (iv) strengthening the business environment, and 
(v) increasing skills. 
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Policy responses to these challenges include implementation of 
measures announced earlier (such as measures developed in the frame-
work of broad economic policy guidelines (BPEGs), and in the Stabil-
ity and Convergence Programmes) and new measures (such as raising 
the retirement age). 
Insufficient time has elapsed for any implementation of NRPs. 
Existing assessment of the NRPs evaluates whether goals and reform 
strategies are realistic (e.g. Begg, 2006; European Commission, 2006b; 
European Policy Committee, 2006; European Environmental Bu-
reau, 2006; European Employment Committee, 2006). Their conclu-
sions diverge: the European Commission (2006b) considers that the 
main shortcomings of the NRPs are macroeconomic, while according 
to Begg (2006), the NRPs seem to be better in explaining how macro-
economic objectives will be pursued and less successful with respect to 
microeconomic goals. 
Macroeconomic issues 
All but three member states – Sweden, the Netherlands and Italy 
– have explicitly identified macroeconomic challenges in their NRPs. 
The priorities of national reform plans are based on the Treaty provi-
sions on fiscal discipline and are generally in line with the Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
All member states recognize the need for sound and sustainable 
public finances while many of them intend to improve their deficit and 
debt position. These efforts are assessed under fiscal surveillance rules 
(i.e. evaluation of the Stability and Convergence Programmes). Fiscal 
consolidation strategies are typically expenditure-based and embed-
ded in the broader structural reform plans. As regards long-term fiscal 
sustainability, ageing is projected to affect public expenditure for pen-
sions and health care strongly. Pension reforms are being implemented 
in many member states to enhance the sustainability of public finances. 
The peer review of the NRPs suggests that given the scale of the ageing 
challenge, Europe must do more to ensure the sustainability of its pub-
lic finances (European Policy Committee, 2006).
Weaknesses identified by the Commission include insufficiently 
explicit short-term measures for budgetary consolidation, and the fact 
that budgetary implications of the actions envisaged in other policy ar-
eas (e.g. employment and social policy) are seldom spelled out (Euro-
pean Commission, 2006d).
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Microeconomic issues
The main themes of the microeconomic part of the revised Lis-
bon strategy are knowledge and innovation, and making Europe a more 
attractive place to invest and work in (see Box 1, Lisbon Action Plan). 
The main microeconomic challenges identified by NRPs are improv-
ing R&D and innovation, strengthening the business environment and 
increasing skills. The challenges are dealt with by policy measures that 
vary across sectors and member states, ranging from general targets 
to concrete measures to be taken, tailored to the specific need of the 
country. 
For example, all member states address research and innovation 
policies as a priority. Most of them also tackle strengthening the busi-
ness environment and increasing skills. Many member states plan a sig-
nificant increase in overall R&D expenditure at national level by 2010. 
The EU-25 target for R&D expenditure is defined at 3% of GDP by 
the year 2010. National targets range from 0.75% (Malta) to 4% (Fin-
land and Sweden). Most of the old members (Belgium, Denmark, Ger-
many, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Austria) set their nation-
al target in line with the EU-25 target (3%). Most of the new members 
set targets between 1.5% and 2%. Measures aimed at meeting this tar-
get include increasing public expenditure on R&D, encouraging pri-
vate R&D expenditures by extension of tax credits for private R&D ex-
penditure, improving the quality of education, increasing of number of 
PhD holders in enterprises by co-financing contracts and measures to 
strengthen science-industry links. 
However, targets do not always have a close link to specific 
measures, so it is difficult to asses the general level of ambition and 
feasibility of the plan. Also, despite some concrete measures, meeting 
the targets is beyond government control. Policy measures can influ-
ence decisions to invest private capital in R&D, but there is no way to 
ascertain that numerical target will be achieved (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 
2004). Furthermore, even if all member states meet their national tar-
gets by 2010, the R&D expenditure on the EU-25 level might reach up 
to 2.7% GDP (compared with the 3% target), which, as already men-
tioned does not ensure any direct link with increased innovation.viii 
Next, most member states have highlighted the need to improve 
the business climate. The NRPs indicate that member states are in-
creasingly recognising the importance of a more competitive market-
place. Around half of the member states identified competition and re-
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moving obstacles to market access, particularly in services, as a chal-
lenge. Only a few NRPs tackle this challenge effectively. The measures 
include transposition of internal market directives, strengthening com-
petition agencies and better regulation. 
The Commission considers that the choice of priorities is in gen-
eral appropriate to the current situation in the member states, but that 
competition issues will require further attention. 
Employment
The European Employment Strategy (EES), the employment 
pillar of the Lisbon strategy is based around three objectives: (i) full 
employment, (ii) productivity and quality at work, and (iii) social and 
territorial cohesion.ix 
Employment guidelines provide a policy framework to focus 
action on these priorities by attracting and retaining more people in em-
ployment; increasing the labour supply and modernising the social pro-
tection system; improving the adaptability of workers and enterprises, 
and increasing investment in human capital through better education 
and skills (see Box 3, integrated guidelines).
The EU-25 target for 2010 is a total employment rate 70%. Em-
ployment rates in 2004 varied from 51.7% in Poland to 75.7% in Den-
mark. Not all national targets have been defined (Germany, France, Ire-
land, Luxembourg). Defined targets range from 62.5% (Greecex), to 
71% (Cyprus), though the measures proposed to achieve this are not 
always adequate. 
Measures aimed at increasing the employment rate include in-
centives to attract and retain more people in employment, increase the 
labour supply and modernise the social protection system. In a number 
of member states especial attention is given to youth by the integration 
of policies on education, training, mobility, and the reconciliation of 
working life and family life in the Youth Pact. Several member states 
also plan to raise the exit age by five years by 2010. 
More investment in human capital to improve employment and 
productivity growth has received widespread attention. Implementing 
lifelong learning, embracing education, training and adult learning, 
particularly for the low-skilled, requires a coherent policy linked to the 
economic and social situation of each member state. Such measures are 
funded under the convergence objectives of the European Social Fund, 
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but do not always pay enough attention to increasing the adaptability of 
workers and enterprises.
The main conclusions that can be drawn from National Reform 
Programme are following: 
•  Member states start from different positions. Generally, the old mem-
ber states are more concerned with social cohesion, ageing of the 
population, job creation and support to research and development. 
The new members are more focused on raising the level of competi-
tiveness. 
•  There is a large convergence of views on the diagnosis and on key 
challenges which need to be addressed as a matter of priority: for 
example, sustainability of public finances, labour supply, R&D and 
innovation, the business environment and environmental sustainabil-
ity. 
•  The differences in the programmes can, to a certain extent, be 
explained by different starting positions, but the policy mix also de-
pends on the political priorities defined by each member state. 
•  Reform programs range in terms of breadth and ambition and the 
likelihood that they will be implemented. Some of them have in-
troduced new policies, while others have presented only existing 
measures. 
•  Quantified targets should be handled with care, since they can be 
helpful in monitoring progress of reforms, but are not necessary 
linked with achievement of main goals. 
•  A surfeit of targets and measures makes it more difficult to measure 
progress towards the main goal: increased growth and more and bet-
ter jobs. 
RELEVANCE OF LISBON STRATEGY  
GOALS FOR CROATIA
Lisbon strategy and Copenhagen criteria
In order to become member, a candidate country has to meet po-
litical and economic membership criteria. Membership presupposes the 
candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary unionxi. 
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The Lisbon agenda is focused on economic and social issues, 
while political issues are less relevant in the Lisbon context. Therefore 
we will focus on economic membership criteria and ability to assume 
obligations of the membership. As regards economic criteria, Croatia 
can be regarded as a functioning market economy. It should be able to 
compete with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU in 
the medium term, provided that it continues implementing its reform 
programme to remove remaining weaknesses (European Commission, 
2005a:46). 
Croatia’s official target date for integration into the EU (2009) 
coincides with the timeframe for meeting Lisbon goals. This implies 
that in order to meet Copenhagen economic criteria Croatia should be 
able to withstand competitive pressure from and compete with market 
forces in the most competitive economy in the world, which will make 
Croatian alignment more demanding than it already is.
As regards ability to assume the obligations of membership, the 
Commission’s report showed that in a number of chapters Croatia will 
be required to make significant efforts to meet the EU requirements 
(European Commission, 2005a).
As concerns the acquis, in the pre-accession phase Croatia will 
have to align with “more acquis” than the countries that joined the EU 
in 2004. Continual alignment is necessity for member states as well, 
but the experience of the last round of enlargement shows that “would-
be” members comply with the rules more strictly than member states. 
In member states delays in implementing new acquis is subject to peer 
pressure and eventually, at a later stage, can be challenged before the 
European Court of Justice. For a candidate country, negotiation pres-
sure is a much more powerful instrument for implementation of re-
forms than peer review within the EU.
Next, it should be underlined that the sequencing of reforms in 
order to implement new acquis is not an issue in member states. They 
adopt it as it comes (or with reasonable delays). From the candidate 
country perspective, sequencing is important, especially when the time 
horizon for full membership is not known and might heavily depend on 
internal EU development, rather than on the alignment process. 
As concerns harmonisation of policies, the requirement to take 
on the obligations of membership includes adherence to the aims of the 
EU policies. The negotiating framework for Croatia explicitly states 
that Croatia will have to apply, inter alia, the content, principles and 
political objectives of the Treaties on which the Union is founded and 
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also acts that are not legally binding but that are adopted within the 
Union framework, such as guidelines (Negotiating framework, point 
7). Lisbon objectives are defined by treaties: one of the objectives of 
the Treaty is the promotion of sustainable development, a high level 
of employment and social protection, sustainable and non-inflationary 
growth and a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of eco-
nomic performance (Article 2). The Treaty also defines what shall be 
done at the EU level, and which decisions should be left to national 
authorities. As concerns employment, the Treaty defines the advisory 
role of the Employment Committee and responsibility for actions on 
the member state level (Title VII of the TEU). The Constitution has 
comparable provisions (e.g. Article I-3, or Article III-117). 
In this respect the added value of Lisbon does not inhere in the 
new goals, but in the definition of benchmarks, timeframe and the gov-
ernance mechanism. Consequently, the Lisbon objectives do not con-
stitute additional criteria or economic objectives, but the EU policies 
towards the region will reflect Lisbon activities that can be considered 
priorities under the European/Accession Partnerships. The Lisbon ob-
jectives will be reflected in the EU’s policies for the region and coun-
tries are encouraged to take these into account in their reforms and ac-
tion plans (European Commission, 2006a). 
The Lisbon Strategy, that is, cannot be isolated from general EU 
policies. Lisbon is about policy coordination enabling balanced sus-
tainable development. This implies that a candidate should accept the 
goals of Lisbon Strategy and develop such a policy mix that will enable 
it to catch up with the EU even as it is catching up with the USA, while 
keeping up with the EU acquis. This limits policy choices and increases 
reform pressures, which makes the alignment process more demanding 
than it was in the last round of enlargement. 
Croatia’s starting position 
Member states’ annual progress towards Lisbon goals is mon-
itored on the basis of short-listed structural indicators, agreed with 
the Council (Table 1)xii. We use the same indicators to identify Croa-
tia’s starting position vis-à-vis most important challenges identified by 
NRPs.
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Table 1  Short-listed structural indicators for EU-25, Croatia and other 
candidates, 2004
EU-25 Croatia Bulgaria Romania Turkey
General Economic Background
GDP per capita in PPS 100 45.6 30.4 32.2 28.5
Labour productivity per person employed 100 56.4 31.5 36.4 41.0
Employment
Employment rate  
 Total 70% goal** 63.3 54.7 54.2 57.7 46.1
 Females 60% goal** 55.7 47.8 50.6 52.1 24.3
 Males 70.9 61.8 57.9 63.4 67.8
Employment rate of older workers 
 Total  50% goal** 41.0 30.1 32.5 36.9 33.2
  Females 31.7 21.0 24.2 31.4 20.0
 Males 50.7 40.9 42.2 43.1 46.9
Innovation and Research
Gross domestic expenditure  
on R&D 3% goal**
01.9 00 1.1* 0.5 0.4 -
Youth education attainment level 
 Total 76.6 92.5 76.0 74.8 41.8
 Females 79.6 94.4 76.3 76.4 50.9
 Males 73.7 91.5 74.8 73.8 74.2
Economic Reform
Comparative price levels 100 - 43 43.2 58.7
Business investment 17.1 - 17.8 18.3 16.6
Social cohesion
At-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers
 Total 16.0 18* 15 17* 26*
 Females 17.0 19* 17 18* 26*
 Males 15.0 17* 17 17* 25*
Dispersion of regional employment rates
 Total 12.2 - 7.0 3.5 -
 Females 17.3 - 8.8 6.1 -
 Males 10.2 - 5.9 2.6 -
Long-term unemployment rate 
 Total 4.1 7.3 7.2 4.5 4.0
 Females 4.7 8.9 7.0 3.6 4.5
 Males 3.6 6.0 7.3 5.3 3.9
Environment
Total greenhouse gas emissions 92* 94* 50* 54* -
Energy intensity of the economy 209 453* 1.756.2 1.369 480
Volume of freight transport relative to GDP 105 - 39 100 100
* Data for 2003
** Denotes goals deﬁned at the EU level
Source: Eurostat (2006)
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As is obvious from Table 1, the short-listed indicators do not fol-
low Lisbon priority areas defined at Community level (Box 2). They do 
not enable monitoring progress towards all goals defined by the inte-
grated guidelines (Box 3). This makes progress monitoring more com-
plex, and less transparent, since links between priorities, designed mea-
sures and measurable outputs are not straightforward. Also, a number 
of social cohesion indicators might be misleading, suggesting that Lis-
bon is more concerned about social issues than it really is. 
Next, data on economic reform (comparative price levels, busi-
ness investment), and some environmental and social cohesion data are 
not available for Croatia. Consequently, the short-listed indicators are 
not sufficient to identify Croatia’s starting position vis-à-vis member 
states and candidates. 
Still, it can be concluded that employment is a very challeng-
ing area for Croatia. Data for 29 countries (individual EU-25, Croatia, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey) show that only three countries (Malta 
54%, Poland 51.7% and Turkey 45.8%) have lower total employment 
rates than Croatia, while long-term unemployment rate is higher only 
in Slovakia (11.8%) and Poland (10.3%). Since employment is gener-
ally a challenge for new member states (Rydeman and Tornell, 2004), 
analysis of employment policies and measures aimed at reaching the 
2010 target in new member states can be helpful in designing and im-
plementing Croatia’s employment strategy.
According to available indicators, it seems that Croatia can be 
compared with new member states and that in some areas has better 
starting position than adhering states. GDP per capita for Croatia is 
comparable with Lithuania, Latvia and Poland, and higher than in Bul-
garia, Romania and Turkey. Energy intensity (which is comparable with 
Poland and Hungary) and level of greenhouse emission (which is much 
closer to the Kyoto target than achieved by the new member states) in-
dicate that the structure of Croatian industry is comparable with that of 
the new member states, and that a significant investment in energy effi-
ciency will be needed to comply with the Kyoto targetxiii. This is linked 
with industrial restructuring, which might be connected with social 
transfers and could further increase the public deficit, as well as having 
an impact on employment. Although the government debt and govern-
ment balance are not among the short-listed indicators, they seem to be 
important element for designing the NRPs. 
Consequently, this brief overview of indicators shows that the 
Lisbon reforms needed in Croatia should take in consideration the spe-
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cific starting position (such as issues related with the sustainability of 
public finances) but also the fact that in some areas the starting position 
is hard to identify due to incomparability of statistics. 
Lisbon goals as a challenge for Croatia
Croatia does not have a comprehensive action programme to 
implement the Lisbon strategy goals capable of being compared to the 
documents some other countries prepared during the accession pro-
cess. However, some of the aims and the activities leading to its im-
plementation were introduced in the different strategic documents that 
were prepared after the year 2000. For example, Government prepared 
a number of sectoral strategic documents under the common title Cro-
atia in the 21st Century, and some of them are very much in line with 
Lisbon goals. This particularly relates to the strategy covering science 
and research, which approaches the issues of knowledge-based society, 
catching up with innovation and new technologies (Government of the 
Republic of Croatia, 2003). Understood in a wider sense, Lisbon goals 
are introduced in the 55 Recommendations of the National Compet-
itiveness Council, covering all the areas relevant for raising the lev-
el of competitiveness in Croatia, including education, innovation and 
technology development, strengthening of small and medium-sized 
enterprises and creating leadership (National Competitiveness Council, 
2004). 
Most recently, Croatia adopted the Strategic Development 
Framework 2006-2013, a key document for the coming period.xiv It 
gives highest priority to knowledge society and introduces the frame 
for the overall development in the next seven years. The main goals are 
raising the level of competitiveness, together with strengthening social 
cohesion and welfare. The development of human resources is recog-
nised as being crucial for the competitiveness of the Croatian econo-
my (Dalić, 2006). The document thus follows some of the key Lisbon 
agenda goals, although it does not cover all the areas of the redefined 
Lisbon agenda. Furthermore, there is an urgent need to develop acti-
on plans and other implementation instruments with clear obligations, 
deadlines and a reporting system, in order to converge on and imple-
ment specific Lisbon strategy goals during the process of accession. 
Being a candidate country, Croatia does not have the obligation 
to prepare a national reform programme. However, several documents 
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that were prepared during the past few years include some elements 
of national reform programmes, although much they differ in type and 
scope.xv
Entering into negotiations on full membership with the EU, Cro-
atia committed itself to accept not only the acquis, but also to harmon-
ise its policies with EU programmes and strategic documents. Primari-
ly, these “soft” obligations start with the need to accept horizontally the 
Lisbon agenda instruments, in order to be able practically to implement 
policy measures. With acceptance of the acquis, Croatia will share the 
goals envisaged in the Lisbon strategy in numerous communications 
and action plans. The screening process has already highlighted some 
of the areas in which Croatia should start with preparations to imple-
ment Lisbon strategy goals.
There is a need to develop a national 3% Action Plan, with co-
ordinated measures and precisely defined targets and actions, togeth-
er with mechanisms for monitoring the implementation. The purpose 
of such document should be to define Croatia’s own priorities in this 
particular sphere, having in mind the country’s specific situation and 
particular needs and possibilities. This should be based on the model 
of the EU 3% Action Plan, but not necessarily adopting the same tar-
get. The 3% target is far for being realistic for Croatia – current in-
vestment in R&D in Croatia is 1.14% of GDP, while the EU average 
is 1.9% (see Table 1). In spite of the fact that Croatia has not prepared 
action plan comparable with the EU 3% Action Plan, there are initia-
tives which are in line with the target to “raise overall R&D investment 
to 3% of GDP by 2010, two thirds of which will come from the private 
sector” xvi. In this context, Croatian Programme for Innovative Techno-
logical Development (HITRA) should be mentioned; this is a govern-
ment programme aiming to establish an efficient national innovation 
system through fostering cooperation between science and industry, re-
vitalising industrial R&D and encouraging the commercialisation of 
research findings. 
Among other achievements, it should be mentioned that a “one-
stop-shop” (hitro.hr) has already been established in Croatia, and in the 
EU this is a goal that should be met by the end of 2007. However, this 
measure alone, although considered important, cannot increase busi-
ness potentials or foster links between entrepreneurship and innova-
tion.
The open method of coordination, as a tool for implementing 
European soft law in many areas should be implemented in consulta-
tion procedures during the process of development of policies in Cro-
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atia. The system of benchmarking is extremely important for Croatia, 
enabling the country to be compared with EU member states and ac-
ceding countries in different areas. It is therefore necessary to develop 
the system of collecting and monitoring qualitative and quantitative in-
dicators in Croatia in all the areas. This system should be linked in the 
future to the EU system of following indicators (EUROSTAT) and en-
able Croatia to be compared on an equal basis with the member states 
and other candidates.
There are examples showing that Croatia has successfully in-
troduced the system of benchmarks for certain areas. Croatia has been 
included in some reports (e.g. World Economic Forum, 2006) through 
a benchmarking system. In the year 2006 Croatia was for the first time 
included in the rankings of the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook xvii, 
while the country has been comparatively presented in Global Com-
petitiveness Report since 2003. According to the IMD report, the main 
competitiveness challenges facing Croatia in 2006 are a new govern-
ment role in strengthening innovation and technological development; 
improving cooperation between R&D institutions and business; in-
creasing public and private investment in R&D and education; accel-
erating the process of privatization and the restructuring of state and 
local public enterprises. The challenges correspond quite well with the 
Lisbon goals, as well as with the priorities underlined in the Govern-
ment’s Strategic Development Framework (Government of the Repub-
lic of Croatia, 2006).
Furthermore, Croatia is comparatively positioned by benchmark 
indicators in a number of recent comparative international studies, such 
as the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (CEPOR, 2005), which shows 
significant improvements in Croatia’s rank over the previous period. 
The country’s position rose from 32nd place in 2002 to 19th place in 
2005, in measurements of several composite indicators of entrepreneur-
ship development and the competitiveness of the enterprise sector.
Another example is the area of education and training. The re-
cent European Commission (2006e) report on progress towards the 
Lisbon objectives in education and training gives comparative indica-
tors for 30 European countries (EU-15, the acceding countries, candi-
date countries, and European Economic Area). Due to insufficient sta-
tistics Croatia is not comparatively positioned according to all indi-
cators but is presented in most of the areas. There are areas in which 
Croatia performs even better than the old member states. For example, 
progress in the field of completion of upper secondary education – the 
Lisbon benchmark is 85% of population while Croatia is already above 
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90% (European Commission, 2006e:18; see also Table 1). These indi-
cators (EUROSTAT) are somewhat better even than those from Croa-
tian sources, which opens the question of the compatibility of the statis-
tical methodology applied.
The mentioned examples show that some progress has been 
made in approaching the Lisbon goals, although a coherent approach is 
lacking and the coverage is insufficient. It is clear that Croatia needs to 
prioritise the Lisbon goals, having in mind its specific situation, start-
ing position and real possibilities of implementation. In this respect, it 
is necessary to raise the awareness that approaching the Lisbon strategy 
goals is crucial not only for being able to undertake successfully the 
obligations of a future member state, but for reaching the Copenhagen 
criteria and overall implementation of reforms, which is in the coun-
try’s own interest. It is also necessary to raise the awareness and lev-
el of understanding of the Lisbon agenda implementation mechanisms 
and their relevance for the process of approaching the EU.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The main conclusions and recommendations, relevant for Croa-
tia, resulting from this paper are following: 
•  The Lisbon Agenda objectives are relevant for Croatia and the coun-
tries of the region. They do not constitute additional criteria or eco-
nomic objectives. However, the Lisbon objectives will soon be re-
flected in the EU’s policies for the region and the countries should 
take these into account in their reform programmes and action plans.
•  Due to different starting positions in the overall reform programmes 
the Lisbon agenda priorities should be differently interpreted by each 
country. Prioritisation and sequencing of the Lisbon agenda goals ac-
cording to needs is necessary for a candidate country like Croatia. 
•  In order to have comparable statistics, it will be necessary to devel-
op a system of collecting and monitoring qualitative and quantitative 
indicators in Croatia. It is likely that this system will correspond to 
the structural indicators published by EUROSTAT, enabling Croatia 
to be compared on an equal basis with the member states and oth-
er candidates. Consequently, where appropriate, such data should be 
collected. 
•  It is necessary to raise the awareness and level of understanding of 
the Lisbon agenda implementation mechanisms and their relevance 
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for the process of converging on the EU since approximation to the 
Lisbon strategy goals is crucial not only for being able to undertake 
successfully the obligations of future member state status, but for 
overall success of reform implementation. 
•  Croatia should speed up the preparations to develop an “umbrella” 
programme with specific action plans. By doing so it will get clos-
er to Lisbon strategy goals in different areas during the process of 
accession. 
•  Although it is unlikely that all Lisbon strategy goals will be imple-
mented by 2010, it will remain the main reform framework for the 
EU, raising the overall standards, thus making Croatia’s adjustment 
to the EU requirements even more demanding (the EU being a mov-
ing target) than it was in the last round of enlargement. 
*  The authors would like to thank Katarina Ott and the anonymous referees for useful 
comments.
i  See Presidency Conclusions on the Lisbon strategy 2000-2004 at http://europa.
eu.int/growthandjobs/pdf/thematic_lisbon_conclusions_0604_en.pdf.
ii  Although EU productivity levels grew faster than those in the US for ﬁve decades,
since 1996 the EU has been trailing the USA every single year. Labour productivity 
in the USA grew twice as fast as in Europe in the period 2000-2005. As a result rela-
tive levels of wealth have also started slipping. Investment has been growing by only 
1.7% compared with 5.4% per year in the USA. The EU has only 25% of the num-
ber of patents per head of population found in the USA. In the USA 32% of popula-
tion has a university or similar degree, while this percentage stands at only 19% in 
Europe. In addition, the USA is also investing about twice as much per student than 
most European countries. In 2004, the average growth of the eurozone was a mea-
gre 2.2%, while the USA economy grew by 4.3%, Japan by 4.4%, India by 6.4% and 
China by 9% (European Commission, 2005d).
iii  “An agenda for a growing Europe – Making the EU system deliver” was drawn up 
in 2003 by a group of independent experts under the chairmanship of André Sapir. A 
six-point agenda was proposed with a view to achieving the objective of the Lisbon 
strategy and making the enlargement a success: to make a single market more dyna-
mic; to boost investment in knowledge; to improve the macroeconomic policy frame-
work; to redesign policies for convergence and restructuring; to achieve effective-
ness in decision-taking and regulation, and to refocus the EU budget. 
iv  Spring Report deals with achievements at EU and member state levels and has three 
main elements: (i) an analysis of the 25 new national reform programmes; (ii) iden-
tiﬁcation of the strengths in different national programmes with a view to promoting
the exchange of good ideas, and (iii) identiﬁcation of areas where there are shortco-
mings and proposals for concrete action at EU and national level to deal with them. 
An analysis of national reform programmes includes a four to ﬁve page assessment
of each member state’s programme and proposes measures that should be implemen-
ted by 2007. The Report also contains a succinct general evaluation of programmes 
and structural indicators showing the evolving economic situation for each member 
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state. The annexes contain a short list of examples of successful and innovative poli-
cies from member states and more detailed – but still “to the point” – analyses of the 
macro-economic, micro-economic and employment position at European and natio-
nal level.
v  CIP will provide support to small and medium-sized enterprises to invest in innova-
tion through three speciﬁc programmes: (i) “Entrepreneurship and Innovation Pro-
gramme” will support start up and growth of small and medium-sized enterprises: 
with a budget of 2.17 billion euros; (ii) the “ICT Policy Support Programme”, with 
a budget of 730 million euros will support investment in information and communi-
cation technologies, and (iii) “Intelligent Energy-Europe Programme” will support 
increased use of renewable energy and reduced energy consumption with a budget 
of 730 million euros. It is expected that some 350,000 small and medium-sized en-
terprises will receive EU support in the period 2007-2013. 
vi  Until 2005, member states issued separate employment and economic action plans. 
National action plans for employment issues described how the employment guideli-
nes are put into practice at the national level. They presented the progress achieved 
in the member state over the last 12 months and the measures planned for the co-
ming 12 months: they were both reporting and planning documents. National reform 
plans consist of employment and economic measures in the same document. Hence, 
national action plans and national reform plans are not the same. 
vii  Differences in starting positions among individual member states and pace of reform 
in the Lisbon process are monitored by around 130 indicators grouped into 6 cate-
gories: general economic background, employment, innovation and research, eco-
nomic reform, social cohesion and environment. Some are also available for the re-
gion. The complete list of indicators is available at: http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/
DownLoad/kceuA9JBmmG9wx7dvqm-Ev_VvAKd0qYFxyJ_Z-bz4IJ3Sp9uLj2p0Dj3
hCmX9RmCY4331ET67Y2wPb2D2r/Headings%20database%20SI%20as%20of%
20Nov%202005.pdf. Table 1 presents a short list of 14 structural indicators that are 
covered in the statistical annex to the 2006 Annual Progress Report. This short list 
has been agreed with the Council and allows for a more concise presentation and a 
better assessment of achievements over time vis-à-vis the Lisbon agenda. In keeping 
with the recent streamlining of procedures in the wider context of the Lisbon strate-
gy, it is planned to keep this list stable for three years, with a start in 2004.
viii  Based on the 2004 GDP data, meeting the national targets will lead to a 2.7% R&D 
expenditure on the EU-25 level. Taking into account different growth rates between 
old and new members would lead to lower results. 
ix  For short listed employment indicators and comparisons among Croatia, candidates 
and member states see Table 1.
x  Target for 2008.
xi  For more about membership criteria see, for instance, Boromisa (2004:169-170).
xii  Short-listed indicators, selected by the Council (see endnote vii), are published in 
the Annual Progress Report for EU member states. Based on these indicators we 
compare Croatia’s starting position with EU member states and other candidates. 
xiii  Energy intensity of Croatian economy (gross inland consumption of energy divided 
by GDP in kilograms of oil equivalent per 1,000 Euro), which measures the energy 
consumption and overall energy efﬁciency is much higher than the EU average. To-
tal greenhouse emission is close to the Kyoto target (94% of the base year, the target 
being 95%).
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xiv  The document was prepared by the Central State Ofﬁce for Development Strategy
and passed wide range of consultations during April and May 2006.
xv  These documents include Pre-accession economic programme for Croatia (PEP), 
which is annually prepared by the Government and National programme for the in-
tegration of the Republic of Croatia into the European Union (2006-2008). PEP 
might be considered a forerunner of the Convergence Program and National Reform 
Programme (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2005:3). Its structure differs si-
gniﬁcantly from NRPs, but it has some of its elements, e.g. measurable targets (ibid,
95).
xvi  These initiatives are within the framework of national science policy and based on 
the concepts outlined in the Croatian Strategy for Science in the 21st Century and 
some other acts, including 55 Policy Recommendations of National Competitiveness 
Council.
xvii  The 2006 Report encompasses 61 countries. Croatia is ranked 59th in the group of 
countries – behind Bulgaria (47th) and Romania (57th), candidates for membership, 
and behind EU member countries.
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ABSTRACT
State aid as a part of industrial policy should be implemented 
cautiously, taking account of all its advantages and shortcomings. The 
European Union has established an elaborate system for state aid al-
location and control, advocating “less and better-targeted state aid”, 
which has the least distorting effect on competition. This is so-called 
horizontal aid, which helps to establish a level playing field for all un-
dertakings. The state-aid-to-GDP ratio is four times higher in Croatia 
than in the European Union, state aid being mainly targeted to particu-
lar industries. Croatia will have to reform thoroughly or reduce its sec-
toral aid to shipbuilding, transport (especially the railways) and the 
steel industry, as well as aid to rescuing and restructuring firms in diffi-
culty. Croatia will also have to increase aid to horizontal objectives and 
improve significantly the transparency of state aid allocation.
Key words:
state aid, reform, industrial policy, European Union
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INTRODUCTIONi
The objective of this paper is to give a description of the gener-
al framework of state aid in Croatia and to indicate the direction of its 
future development based on EU rules. This provides a general direc-
tion for state aid reform, i.e. the reform of industrial policy in broader 
terms.
The data on state aid were collected for the period 2001-2004 
and were classified by objective (i.e. sector or industry), and by instru-
ment (e.g. grants, soft loans, tax exemptions, guarantees, etc.).ii The au-
thors applied the methodology used in the EU for the preparation of the 
State Aid Scoreboard.iii
The second part of the paper following the Introduction gives 
a brief presentation of state aid in the framework of industrial policy, 
and determines the content of state aid in the EU. The third part deals 
with the size and structure of state aid in Croatia in the period from 
2001 to 2004, and the fourth part provides guidelines for future state 
aid development. The paper is focused on four selected sectors which 
will require the strongest adjustments to the EU standards: shipbuild-
ing, transport (especially railways), and the steel industry, and the res-
cue and restructuring of firms in difficulty. In these sectors, Croatian 
state aid deviates sharply from that in the EU, and Croatia will have to 
make great efforts to harmonize it with EU standards.
THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK  
FOR STATE AID
State aid as a part of industrial policy
As an industrial policy instrument, state aid to enterprises can 
increase public welfare. However, it can distort competition and also 
reduce public welfare. Public welfare declines if aid is granted to less 
efficient companies producing low-quality products at high costs. On 
the other hand, public welfare increases and the economic growth ac-
celerates if state aid is aimed at correcting market failures, i.e. situa-
tions when the market functions inefficiently. Consequently, “bad” aid 
distorts the market by favouring one company over another, thus reduc-
ing welfare, while “good” aid corrects market failures and thus contrib-
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utes to the growth of welfare (Neil, 1990). However, it should be em-
phasized that state aid results in increased welfare only if the resulting 
efficiency improvement exceeds the direct and indirect costs of aid im-
plementation (Nicolaides and Bilal, 1999).
There is extensive literature about whether, when and how the 
state should provide aid to companies and entire economic sectors. Most 
authors argue that state aid can only be justified if it is aimed at correct-
ing a market failure. The EU agrees with this argumentation, deeming 
that state aid should mainly be targeted at market failures (Commission 
of the EC, 2003). Redirecting state funds to “good” aid which is unlike-
ly to distort market competition remains the primary strategic objective 
of state aid reform in the EU member states. The future reform of state 
aid in Croatia will have to follow the same course.
The implementation of state aid, particularly that which is the 
subject matter of a selective industrial policy, i.e. a policy aimed at 
providing assistance only to selected economic sectors or companies, 
offers many challenges:
•  State aid costs money. In order to justify the implementation of state 
aid it is not sufficient to establish the existence of a market failure. 
It is also necessary to provide valid arguments that the public sec-
tor, i.e. the government, is capable of resolving the problem more 
successfully than the private sector (the market). Prior to the imple-
mentation of state aid it is necessary to estimate all the direct or indi-
rect costs necessarily involved. This is because the very existence of 
a market failure does not necessarily mean that corrective measures 
should be implemented: sometimes the cure is worse than the disease 
(Martin and Valbonesi, 1999). 
•  The state is unable to recognize “winners” or “losers”. A selective 
industrial policy usually implies that the government selects eco-
nomic sectors or companies needing support. These are either future 
“winners”, i.e. economic sectors and companies expected to achieve 
higher growth rates, or “losers”, i.e. industries or companies in diffi-
culties that need government assistance for their survival and recov-
ery. Such state intervention requires great analytical skill for a gov-
ernment to be able to outperform the market in selecting industries 
or companies that are potential winners, or decide which losers are 
worth saving, and determine the measures through which all this can 
be realized. However, the state is usually too bureaucratic and insuf-
ficiently qualified and informed to get to grips with such challenge.
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•  The state cannot pick the right moment to stop providing assistance. 
Owing to the shortage of information on products, prices or new tech-
nologies the state has generally proved to be inefficient. It has usu-
ally been unable to select “winners” among industries and/or major 
“losers” and unable to determine when to stop providing assistance, 
i.e. when a company becomes capable of independent operation. Its 
economic policy measures, often inappropriate, result in numerous 
distortions that reduce economic efficiency.
•  The state is incapable of resisting various pressure groups. Under the 
pressure from various interest groups the state intervention network 
becomes more liable to corruption. Once state intervention stabilizes 
there is a danger of the state falling under the influence of various 
interest groups lobbying actively to retain state aid, although it has 
ceased to be economically justifiable. Moreover, there are always 
new prospective beneficiaries who “could make good use” of state 
aid. Owing to the influence of interest groups, it is difficult to discon-
tinue state aid; new forms of state aid are introduced, and it is hard to 
break this vicious circle.
•  State aid results in unfair competition. State aid also leads to un-
fair competition between subsidized and non-subsidized companies. 
More specifically, owing to the lower prices offered by subsidized 
companies, not however as the result of the higher quality of their 
products or increased productivity, good but unsubsidized companies 
whose products are more expensive are forced out of the market.
•  State aid burdens the state budget. Growing state aid increases the 
pressure on the state budget, thus threatening fiscal stability. As state 
aid is financed from tax revenues, its cost is borne by all taxpayers. 
Thus, despite lower prices of subsidized products, in the end con-
sumers indirectly pay the full non-subsidized prices through higher 
taxes.
•  State aid can create problems in international trade. Subsidizing do-
mestic production by state aid provides a basis for the implementa-
tion of predatory policy and appropriation of international market 
shares. The affected country may react to state aid by taking retalia-
tory measures. For this reason, the EU has established a state aid con-
trol system, the intention of which is to reduce such irregularities.
The above mentioned considerations suggest that successful 
state aid reform is a laborious process in which account should be taken 
of numerous issues, from the particular economic policy measures to 
the existing political, economic and social environment.
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State aid in the European Union 
State aid distorts competition by discriminating among compa-
nies that receive aid and those which do not. In response to this threat 
to the common market, the EU established a state aid control system. 
The system relies on the principle that state aid is incompatible with 
the common market, but still allows its implementation under certain 
circumstances. Article 87(1) of the Treaty Establishing the Europe-
an Community provides the following definition of state aid: “... any 
aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form 
whatsoever which distorts competition by favouring certain undertak-
ings of the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade 
between member states, be incompatible with the common market”. 
Based on this provision, the EU has developed a very sophisticated sys-
tem of rules defining “allowed” and “non-allowed” state aid. Over the 
years, these rules have been supplemented by a number of instructions, 
legal opinions and court rulings.
Box 1 State aid in the European Union
According to the EU deﬁnition, state aid is any aid that: 
(1) is granted through the state resources, (2) constitutes an economic 
advantage to a certain company, economic sector or region, (3) is 
selective, as it affects the balance between companies receiving the 
aid and their competitors, (4) has an adverse effect on competition 
and trade between member states.
State aid in the EU is classiﬁed into horizontal aid (allocated to
all enterprises in the economy), sectoral aid (provided to selected 
companies), regional aid and aid to agriculture and ﬁsheries. Aid
can be provided through various instruments: grants, tax exemptions 
and relief, equity participation, soft loans, tax deferrals (liabilities of 
taxpayers to tax authorities) and guarantees (issued and revoked). 
In all these instruments the amounts of aid are not always equal to 
the nominal value of the instrument. Therefore, in preparing data 
on state aid the EU assesses, the so-called “state aid element”. This 
relates in particular to equity participation, soft loans, tax deferrals 
and guarantees, while in the case of grants, or tax exemptions their 
entire amount represents state aid. A more detailed presentation of 
this methodology is available on the Internet at: http//ec.europa.eu/
comm/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/conceptual_remarks.html 
and in Kesner-Škreb and Mikić (2003).
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The purpose of the system of state aid control in the EU is to 
monitor the proposed and implemented state aid in member states and 
to determine whether it complies with the EU legislation and whether it 
distorts competition within the EU. The European Council has repeat-
edly called on the governments to reduce state aid and redirect it to hor-
izontal objectives having the least distorting effect on competition, like 
environmental protection, education and training, research and develo-
pment and incentives to small and medium-sized enterprises.iv The EU 
objective is to have “less and better” state aid, i.e. to reduce “bad” aid 
and to increase “good” aid provided for horizontal purposes.
Box 2 International sources of data on state aid
Apart from the European Commission which regularly publishes 
data on state aid in the EU member states, the data on grants are also 
published within the System of National Accounts (SNA), the IMF 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS), as well as by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and OECD. 
Under the System of National Accounts the term “grant” only 
covers current direct transfers to companies from the state budget, 
excluding other forms of assistance like subsidized loans, tax 
exemptions, etc.
The World Trade Organization also provides data on grants. 
They arise from the obligation to notify those grants that include 
direct transfers of funds, ﬁscal incentives and government supply
of goods and services (excluding general infrastructure). However, 
these data are often incomplete and incommensurable, owing to the 
difﬁculties in collecting and submitting data on grants in certain
countries.
OECD published annual data on grants to industry for twenty ﬁve
of its member states in the periods 1989-1993 and 1994-1995. These 
data included budget transfers, subsidized loans, inputs purchased 
at prices lower than the market prices, and tax revenue losses. 
These data are special because they rely on the net government cost 
principle, i.e. government expenditures for grants are reduced by 
repayments (e.g. of loans). However, these data only relate to grants 
to industry (Lee, 2002).
The Commission has recently become aware of the need for 
a thorough revision of the rules on state aid. The EU enlargement to 
twenty five member states in 2004 called for improvements in state aid 
management. In addition, the number of rules, exemptions and deci-
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sions on state aid has increased unnecessarily over time, which result-
ed in a complicated and non-transparent system, as well as lengthy and 
complex allocation procedures. Therefore, in June 2005, the Commis-
sion unanimously adopted the State Aid Action Planv for a five-year 
period with the purpose of carrying out a comprehensive, coherent and 
far-reaching reform of state aid policy, which is also expected to con-
tribute to the re-launch of the Lisbon Strategyvi. The reform has the fol-
lowing four features:
•  The concept of “less and better aid” constitutes the basis for the state 
aid reform philosophy.
•  An analysis should be carried out to show that certain goals cannot 
be achieved on the market without state aid. This primarily relates to 
the identification of market failures.
•  Improvement of the efficiency and transparency of procedures and 
acceleration of taking decisions.
•  Cooperation between member states and the Commission for the pur-
pose of timely notification of aid and the submission of complete 
documentation, and cooperation in the process of aid approval.
By signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) 
Croatia committed itself to harmonizing its state aid legislation with 
the relevant EU regulations. Thus, a State Aid Act was first enacted 
in March 2003, and a new act to this effect was passed in December 
2005 (NN 140/2005). The Regulation on State Aid (NN 121/2003 and 
50/2006) has been implemented since August 2003. Given the need to 
harmonize the entire Croatian legislation with the EU acquis, these reg-
ulations are very similar to those of the EU. However, the screening 
process revealed certain differences, which will have to be reconciled. 
Moreover, Croatia entrusted the Croatian Competition Agency with the 
powers to approve and supervise state aid and to ensure the recovery of 
aid granted or utilized contrary to the regulations.
Consequently, state aid as a part of industrial policy should be 
implemented cautiously, taking account all of its advantages and short-
comings. The EU has established an elaborate system of state aid allo-
cation and control, and it advocates “less and better state aid”, which 
is likely to have the least distorting effect on competition. This is so-
called horizontal aid, which helps to establish a level playing field for 
all undertakings. By passing the State Aid Act and Regulation and es-
tablishing the Croatian Competition Agency, Croatia started the process 
of harmonizing its state aid system with that in the EU.
246
THE SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF STATE AID  
IN CROATIA IN THE PERIOD 2001-2004
Total state aid
In the period from 2001 to 2004, total state aid to enterprises in 
Croatia amounted to 32.3 billion kuna. The annual average state aid in 
the observed period slightly exceeded 8 billion kuna or 4.4% of GDP. 
Thus, the average annual amount allocated for state aid per employed 
person was almost 6,000 kuna. Excluding aid for agriculture, fisheries 
and transportvii, total aid comes to 3.3 billion kuna or 1.8% of GDP.
Table 1 Total state aid in Croatia, 2001-2004
2001 2002 2003 2004 Average
billion kuna
Total state aid  8.5  6.4  8.1  9.4  8.1
Total state aid less railways  7.4  6.2  6.0  6.4  6.5
Total state aid less agriculture,  
ﬁsheries and transport
 3.6  2.8  3.3  3.6  3.3
% of GDP
Total state aid  5.2  3.6  4.2  4.6  4.4
Total state aid less railways  4.5  3.5  3.1  3.1  3.6
Total state aid less agriculture,  
ﬁsheries and transport
 2.2  1.6  1.7  1.8  1.8
Index (previous year)
Total state aid  74.7  127.3  115.8
Total state aid less railways  84.0  96.9  105.9
Total state aid less agriculture,  
ﬁsheries and transport
 79.3  118.2  109.2
Per employee (thousand kuna)
Total state aid  6.3  4.7  6.0  6.8  5.9
Total state aid less railways  5.5  4.6  4.4  4.6  4.8
Total state aid less agriculture,  
ﬁsheries and transport
 2.6  2.1  2.4  2.6  2.4
Sources:  Central Bureau of Statistics (GDP and the number of employees) and 
authors’ calculations
It is shown that the total nominal amount of state aid expressed 
in kuna grew continuously, except in 2002.viii In 2003 and 2004, total 
state aid rose by 27.3% and 15.8% respectively.
247
A comparison of state aid, less agriculture, fisheries and trans-
port, between Croatia and the EU-15 shows that Croatia is a country 
with a large participation of state aid in GDP. In 2003, it was four times 
the share in the EU.
Table 2  State aid less agriculture, ﬁsheries and transport, in Croatia and EU-15
(as a % of GDP), 2001-2004
2001 2002 2003 2004
EU-15 0.43 0.44 0.40
Belgium 0.32 0.34 0.24
Denmark 0.77 0.70 0.49
Germany 0.79 0.78 0.68
Greece 0.33 0.22 0.22
Spain 0.63 0.57 0.43
France 0.33 0.35 0.31
Ireland 0.65 0.45 0.31
Italy 0.38 0.40 0.44
Luxembourg 0.17 0.25 0.15
Netherlands 0.16 0.19 0.11
Austria 0.25 0.21 0.26
Portugal 0.90 0.87 0.96
Finland 0.31 0.36 0.36
Sweden 0.18 0.16 0.39
United Kingdom 0.11 0.17 0.19
Croatia 2.16 1.58 1.73 1.77
Sources: Commission of the EC (2005); authors’ calculations (for Croatia)
In 2003, total state aid, less agriculture, fisheries and trans-
port, accounted for 0.4% of GDP in the EU-15 and 1.73% in Croatia. 
In 2004 the share in Croatia rose to 1.77%. Within the EU, the larg-
est total amount of state aid was allocated in Portugal (0.96% of GDP) 
and Germany (0.68%), and the lowest levels of state aid were recorded 
in the Netherlands (0.11%), and Luxembourg (0.15%). Ireland saw the 
sharpest decline in the level of aid over the three observed years (from 
0.65% to 0.31%), while the most sizeable growth of state aid was re-
corded in Sweden (from 0.18% to 0.39% of GDP).
However, it is far more interesting to compare the state aid 
trends in Croatia with those in the countries with similar economic in-
dicators, i.e. the new EU member states. The available data relate to the 
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period between 2000 and 2003 (immediately before the accession), in 
which the state aid, less agriculture, fisheries and transport, in the ten 
new member states accounted for 1.38% of GDP. For the sake of com-
parison, the average share of state aid in the Croatian GDP in the period 
2001-2004 was 1.81%. 
Figure 1  State aid less agriculture, ﬁsheries and transport, 2000-2003, 
average in the EU-15, EU-10 and Croatia (as a % of GDP)
Sources:  Commission of the EC (2005); authors’ calculations (2001-2004 
average in Croatia)
However, considerably higher levels of state aid than the EU-
15 average in the observed period were also recorded in the Czech Re-
public, Cyprus and, particularly, Malta. Only three new member states 
were close to the EU-15 average, i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
The levels of state aid in Slovakia and Slovenia were slightly above the 
EU-15 average.
State aid objectives and instruments 
The data set out below clearly show that, during the entire pe-
riod, Croatia gave priority to sectoral aid, followed by agriculture and 
fisheries and regional aid, while horizontal aid was the last priority.
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Figure 2 The structure of total state aid in Croatia, 2001-2004 (%)
Source: Authors’ calculations
Despite the absence of a major change in the structure of state 
aid, the share of sectoral and agricultural aid in total aid varied from 
year to year. This was due to various rescue schemes for particular 
industries, e.g. agricultural conglomerates, ironworks or shipyards. 
However, in order to make a true comparison of the structure of aid ac-
cording to objective, it is necessary to adjust the method of presenting 
the data on state aid to that in the EU, by excluding aid to agriculture, 
fisheries and transport.
Table 3 State aid by objective in Croatia, EU-15 and EU-10
Amount of aid  
(in million euros)
Structure of aid  
(%)
EU-15 EU-10 Croatia EU-15 EU-10 Croatia
Horizontal 20,651 902 77 52.2 14.9 17.2
Sectoral 9,816 4,608 251 24.8 75.9 56.1
Regional 9,086 560 120 23.0 9.2 26.7
Total aid* 39,553 6,070 448 100.0 100.0 100.0
*  less agriculture, ﬁsheries and transport. Croatia: 2001-2004 average; EU-15
and EU-10: 2000-2003 average
Sources: Commission of the EC (2005); authors’ calculations (for Croatia)
The structure of state aid in Croatia differs from that in the EU-
15. In the period 2001-2004, average aid to individual economic sec-
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tors accounted for the largest share in total aid (56% of total state aid) 
in Croatia, compared with only 25% of the total in the EU-15. In con-
trast to the EU-15, where horizontal aid participated with somewhat 
more than 52% in overall aid, in Croatia it accounts for as little as 17% 
of total state aid. A comparison of the structure of state aid between 
Croatia and the new member states shows that Croatia is in a favour-
able position, because its deviation from the EU-15 structure is signifi-
cantly lower. More specifically, Croatia’s assistance to certain regions 
is relatively more generous than that in the EU-10, and it invests more 
funds for horizontal purposes and less in individual sectors.
Apart from the objectives of state aid, it is interesting to look at 
the instruments of state aid allocation.
Table 4 The structure of total state aid in Croatia by instrument (%)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001-2004
Grants 57.5 79.7 68.4 70.5 68.3
Tax exemptions and relief 10.5 1.6 4.2 4.4 5.4
Equity participation 2.5 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.8
Soft loans 13.9 3.0 2.6 2.0 5.50
Tax deferrals 4.3 4.0 6.7 7.8 5.9
Guarantees issued 3.7 1.9 12.2 1.7 4.9
Guarantees revoked 7.5 9.9 5.6 13.4 9.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Authors’ calculations
In the observed four-year period, the largest portion (almost 
70%) of aid to companies was granted through direct grants from the 
state budget, followed by guarantees revoked, tax deferrals and soft 
loans.
It is indicated that in the observed period, Croatia made a much 
heavier use of guarantees than the EU-15 member states, while it gra-
nted tax exemptions and relief less frequentlyix. The system of guaran-
tee provision is much less transparent than other instruments of state 
aid, e.g. grants. However, due to the establishment of the Croatian Com-
petition Agency and its system of approval and supervision of state aid, 
this aid instrument should also become more transparent. It is interest-
ing to note that tax exemptions and relief are mostly used in Ireland and 
Portugal, while grants are most frequently resorted to in Belgium, Den-
mark, Spain, Luxembourg, Austria and Sweden.
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Table 5  The structure of state aid to manufacturing and services sectors 
by instrument in the EU-15 and Croatia (as a % of the total) 
Grants Tax 
exemptions 
and relief
Equity 
participation
Soft  
loans
Tax 
deferrals
Guarantees
EU-15 67.0  22.7  0.7  14.8  2.6  12.2
Belgium 85.3  16.4  0.1  16.0  1.2  11.1
Denmark 94.3  15.7  -  -  -  -
Germany 64.3  29.0  1.0  11.6  -  14.1
Greece 72.6  27.1  -  10.3  -  -
Spain 93.8  -  0.2  16.0  -  -
France 59.9  26.0  -  111.3  10.1  12.7
Ireland 35.2  62.1  1.9  10.2  10.4  10.1
Italy 69.2  19.1  0.6  13.5  17.5  10.1
Luxembourg 96.3  -  -  13.7  -  -
Netherlands 63.5  18.1  -  14.9  10.1  13.4
Austria 89.8  -  -  17.2  -  13.0
Portugal 11.7  82.2  0.3  15.2  10.6  -
Finland 68.5  19.1  6.4  15.9  -  10.1
Sweden 86.5  17.9  1.0  14.6  -  10.1
United Kingdom 56.7  27.0  1.1  15.2  -  -
Croatia 58.7  15.9  0.4  14.3  9.6  21.2
EU-15: 2001-2003 average; Croatia: 2001-2004 average
Sources: Commission of the EC (2005); authors’ calculations (for Croatia)
The situation is slightly different in the new member states as 
shown by the table below.
As in Croatia, the use of guarantees is relatively frequent in the 
new member states, led by the Czech Republic. Estonia is the only 
country with a more frequent use of grants than Croatia. However, the 
use of tax exemptions and relief is far more extensive in these countries 
than in Croatia, particularly in Lithuania and Latvia, as well as Hunga-
ry, Slovakia and Cyprus.
Consequently, state aid is used more frequently in Croatia than 
in the EU, and its share in GDP is about four times larger than that in 
the EU-15 and about 30% larger than in the EU-10. Croatia mainly 
subsidizes particular sectors providing less aid to horizontal objectives. 
Moreover, compared with the EU-15, the use of guarantees has been 
much more extensive and the use of tax exemptions and relief is less 
extensive in Croatia. 
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Table 6  Aid to manufacturing and services sectors by instrument  
(as a % of total)
Grants Tax 
exemptions 
and relief
Equity 
participation
Soft  
loans
Tax 
deferrals
Guarantees
EU-15  61.2  26.8  1.6  5.4  2.4  2.6
EU-10  18.4  33.6  4.9  3.5  1.7  37.8
Cyprus  17.9  80.9  -  -  -  1.2
Czech R.  11.7  3.3  5.7  1.3  0.4  77.7
Estonia  68.6  14.5  -  0.2  -  16.7
Hungary  31.7  66.7  0.1  0.6  -  0.9
Lithuania  3.0  65.4  2.0  1.4  3.2  25.0
Latvia  4.9  50.2  27.6  8.9  6.1  2.3
Malta  17.5  41.1  -  30.0  2.7  8.7
Poland  20.7  47.9  8.3  7.2  6.5  9.5
Slovenia  41.4  36.7  11.5  6.4  -  4.0
Slovakia  10.2  69.7  -  -  -  20.1
Croatia  58.7  5.9  0.4  4.3  9.6  21.2
EU-10: 2000-2003 average; Croatia: 2001-2004 average
Sources: Commission of the EC (2005); authors’ calculations (for Croatia)
STATE AID REFORM IN CROATIA
As the share of state aid to companies in GDP is more than four 
times larger in Croatia than in the EU, and aid is mainly targeted at cer-
tain economic sectors rather than at horizontal objectives, in the proc-
ess of its EU accession Croatia will have to carry out extensive reform 
of its state aid. This will include downsizing overall aid and redirect-
ing aid from selected sectors to horizontal objectives, e.g. environmen-
tal protection, education and training, research and development and 
support to small and medium-sized enterprises. The most radical cha-
nges will affect those economic sectors that currently receive the larg-
est amounts of state aid and that come under special EU-rules. They in-
clude shipbuilding, transport, the steel industry and the rescue and re-
structuring of firms in difficulty which accounted for almost 80% of to-
tal sectoral aid in the period from 2001 to 2004.x The strategic develop-
ment of these sectors will have to include reductions in the amount of 
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state aid and its harmonization with the EU rules. These sectors will be 
the main subjects of the Croatia-EU negotiations on state aid, and will 
have to undergo the heaviest adjustments to the EU rules. It is impor-
tant to note that the aid awarded to these economic sectors will not be 
abolished, but will have to be restructured significantly during the har-
monization process. The situation regarding state aid in the aforemen-
tioned four sectors (i.e. shipbuilding, transport, steel industry and the 
rescue and restructuring of firms in difficulty) and a summary of EU 
rules governing these sectors are set out below, followed by some esti-
mates of the future developments of state aid in Croatia in the context 
of its harmonization with the EU rules.
Table 7 Sectoral state aid in Croatia, 2001-2004 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001-2004
 100  100  100  100 100
Steel industry  3.71  0.08  0.82  0.94 1.45
Shipbuilding  11.96  24.67  12.32  12.65 14.49
Transport  49.57  44.21  63.39  66.31 57.53
Railways  25.21  4.65  45.80  53.15 35.83
Other transport  24.36  39.55  17.59  13.17 21.70
Trade  1.57  1.48  3.45  1.76 2.09
Other manufacturing  10.72  8.95  6.75  5.24 7.64
Tourism  6.82  2.61  6.72  2.29 4.61
Rescue and Restructuring  5.45  11.32  1.64  1.51 4.24
Culture  6.32  1.26  0.08  0.00 1.82
Other  3.88  5.44  4.83  9.30 6.13
Source: Authors’ calculations
Shipbuilding
The economic position of the industry
Shipbuilding has been traditionally considered one of the stra-
tegic industries and claimed to have multiplier effects on the overall 
economy. It accounts for a significant share in Croatian exports and 
provides a large number of jobs. However, this industry has operated at 
a loss for many years; it is mainly state-owned and is technologically 
lagging behind economically competitive countries.
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Unfortunately, Croatian shipbuilding is characterized by a slow 
restructuring process and lack of modernization. The numerous rescue 
attempts and subsidies from the state budget have still not resulted in 
the rationalization of production and investment in the development of 
the industry, so that its non-profitable production is mainly focused on 
technically less sophisticated vessels.
Box 3  Some data illustrating the advantages and shortcomings 
of the Croatian shipbuilding industryxi
•  82% to 100% of shipyards are state-owned.
•  The shipbuilding industry provides jobs to its 15,000 employees 
and 5,000 workers in sub-contractors.
•  The multiplier effect of the industry was 2.8% in 2003, which 
means that its annual production capacity of 0.8 billion US dollars 
generated domestic demand worth 2.3 billion US dollars.
•  The share of domestic substance in the cost price of ships 
completed in 2003 was 65%.
•  With exports worth 500-700 million US dollars, shipbuilding 
accounts for 12% to 15% of total exports. Along with the chemical, 
foodstuffs, clothing and oil derivatives industries, shipbuilding is 
one of the ﬁve top exporting industries that together account for
about 50% in total Croatian exports.
•  According to the world’s stocks of orders, Croatian shipbuilding 
takes the fourth position in the world (followed by Japan, South 
Korea and China), and accounts for 1.5% to 2.3% of the total 
world’s shipbuilding output. With Poland, Germany and Denmark, 
Croatia counts itself among the strongest shipbuilders in Europe.
•  A total of 12 billion kuna was spent on ﬁve rescue programs
for shipbuilding companies carried out by 2002. In 2002, the 
Government decided to increase subsidies to shipbuilding to 10% 
of the realized selling price per ship.
•  According to the ﬁnancial operating results of undertakings in
2004, losses amounted to 2.6 billion kuna, so that shipbuilding 
accounted for 43% in overall losses in manufacturing. However, 
owing to transferred losses, the majority of shipyards are 
permanently insolvent.
•  Croatian shipyards are technologically underdeveloped, producing 
low-value ships (1.45 euros per ton), while the shipyards in the 
Scandinavian countries, as well as in Spain produce highest-value 
ships, i.e. of over 3,200 euros per ton.
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State aid
In the period from 2001 to 2004, total state aid to shipbuild-
ing amounted to somewhat more than 2.5 billion kuna, accounting for 
0.34% of GDP on average per year.
Table 8 State aid to shipbuilding, 2001-2004
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001-2004
Shipbuilding  
(million kuna)
529.6 761.3 559.4 716.2 2,566.6 
% of GDP 0.32 0.42 0.29 0.35 0.34
Source: Authors’ calculations
Grants that account for 60% of total state aid include aid of 10% 
of the contract value per ship and direct transfers from the state budget 
to finance the shipbuilding rescue and restructuring programs. After 
2001, when they accounted for 28% of total aid, guarantees issued sta-
bilized at about 16% on average, while the amounts of guarantees re-
voked varied the most. Soft loans dropped to as low as 1% of total aid 
in 2004, and were about 10 times below their level in 2001. They were 
granted within the Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(CBRD) exports crediting scheme, and were used for the financing of 
new shipbuilding (in 2001 and 2002) or as bridging loans in the cases 
of current insolvency of shipyards (in all years).
State aid to shipbuilding in the EU-15 declined from an annual 
average of 1.2 billion euros in the period 1999-2001 to 0.7 billion euros 
in the period 2001-2003. In 2003, total aid to shipbuilding amounted 
to of 635 million euros and was mainly allocated to shipyards in Ger-
many (55%), France (13%) and Demark (8%). Aid to shipbuilding acco-
unted for 2% of total aid in the EU-15 (Commission of the EC, 2005)xii. 
Of the new member states, the largest amount of aid to shipbuilding 
was allocated in Poland, about 6% of total aid (Commission of the EC, 
2005a).
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Table 9 State aid to shipbuilding by instrument (%)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001-2004
Grants 55.2 45.1 82.6 60.2 59.6
Tax exemptions and relief - - - - -
Equity participation - - - - -
Soft loans 10.2 11.2 1.9 0.9 6.1
Tax deferrals - - - - -
Guarantees issued 27.8 10.3 13.5 15.2 16.0
Guarantees revoked 6.8 33.3 1.9 23.7 18.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Authors’ calculations
Compared with EU-15, where aid to shipbuilding accounted for 
2% of total aid, in the period 2001-2004, Croatia allocated almost 20% 
of total state aidxiii to shipbuilding, i.e. almost 10 times more than the 
EU. 
State aid to shipbuilding in European Union  
and in Croatia
According to the EU rules, current aid to shipbuilding can be 
used in the form of subsidies related to the contract value of ships and 
long-term aid for the development and modernization of facilities.
The EU is aware that, in the long run, tough competition can 
only be sustained through long-term investment in innovation, but also 
through the elimination of inefficient production capacities. In Decem-
ber 2003, the Commission published new rules on state aid to the ship-
building sector which superseded the rules issued in 1998. The new 
rules are applicable from 1 January 2004 to 31 December 2006xiv. Ac-
cording to the definition comprised in the new Commission rules, state 
aid constitutes aid to any shipyard granted directly or indirectly for 
building, repair or conversion of ships. The Commission considers the 
following to be compatible with the common market: the aid granted 
for research, development and innovation, aid for the closure of ship-
yards, employment aid, aid in the form of export credit facilities, devel-
opment aid and regional aid.
By providing short-term aid to shipyards of up to 6% of the con-
tract value per ship, the EU tries to help them face tough competition 
from Korean shipyards. This measure, known as the temporary defence 
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mechanism, ceased to be valid on 31 March 2004. However, as the dis-
pute with Korea was still not settled because it had not met its obliga-
tions, the temporary defence mechanism was prolonged until 31 March 
2005. About 55% of total aid to shipbuilding relates to defensive aid 
approved by the Commission as an extraordinary and temporary aid 
granted directly at the time of negotiations for the building of particular 
types of vessels.
Box 4 The case of public shipyards in Spain
In May 2004, the European Commission decided that the aid 
provided to the public Spanish shipyards was not in line with the 
EU rules governing state aid to shipbuilding. The Commission 
established that in 1999 and 2000, the state holding company 
Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI) granted aid 
worth 500 million euros to the public shipyards that are currently 
owned by a private company, IZAR. The aid took the form of a 
capital injection of 252.4 million euros, a loan of 192.1 million 
euros and a selling price for three shipyards that was 55.9 million 
euros above their market value. The Commission concluded that 
the above measures constituted further state aid which, after the 
approval of a ﬁnal restructuring package in 1997, could no longer
be approved under the EU rules governing aid to shipbuilding. As 
IZAR paid back the loan amounting to 192.1 million euros, it is 
required to reimburse other aid to the amount of 308.3 million euros 
plus interest. 
Source: European Commission, 2004
Aid to shipbuilding accounts for 2% of total aid in the EU-15, 
and 20% in Croatiaxv. This means that Croatia supports its shipbuild-
ing sector tenfold more than Europe. As suggested by the data from 
the order book, Croatia is the top shipbuilder in Europe, whose aid to 
shipbuilding is very generous. It can therefore be expected that, during 
the accession negotiations, there will be strong pressures for the reduc-
tion of aid to this sector. Croatia should strive to reduce its aid to ship-
building to the levels prescribed by the EU state aid structure, which 
implies a manifold reduction in its amount. Croatia will not only have 
to considerably reduce subsidies to this sector but will also be required 
to redirect state aid from rescue programmes, which have so far been 
the main motives for state aid allocation, to those forms of aid that are 
in line with EU rules, e.g. aid for the closure of shipyards, aid aimed at 
providing for workers made redundant and aid to innovation, research 
and development.
258
The implementation of the program for the restructuring and 
rehabilitation of Croatian shipbuildingxvi, which is in the preparatory 
stage, and the privatization of shipyards will finally result in downsiz-
ing state aid in the long run, improving its transparency and focusing 
on the improvement of shipyard efficiency.
Transport
State aid
In view of Croatia’s geographic and traffic-related position, the 
transport industry and infrastructure play an extremely important role 
in the overall economic and social development of the country. The 
current transport situation in Croatia is generally unsatisfactory, par-
ticularly as concerns the railway, port and sea and river shipping indus-
tries. Aid to transport accounts for the largest share in total sectoral aid. 
According to the 2001-2004 data, it accounted for almost 60% of total 
aid to selected economic sectors. State aid to transport is mainly allo-
cated to the railways. It is interesting to note that aid to transport decli-
ned in the observed period, both as a share of sectoral aid and overall 
state aid. The figure below shows the developments in aid to transport 
with a noticeable growth in aid to railways and a decline in aid to other 
types of transport.
Figure 3 Developments in state aid to transport (billion kuna)
Source: Authors’ calculations
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Railways
Railways account for the largest share in state aid to transport. 
In the period 2002-2004, total aid to the transport sector amounted to 
10.2 billion kuna. Of this total amount, 6.4 billion kuna was related to 
Croatian Railways and 3.8 billion kuna to other types of transport.
The data for 2004 show that aid to Croatian Railways account-
ed for slightly more than 3 billion kuna of total state aid, i.e. 1.5% of 
GDP. However, in 2003, aid to the railways exceeded 2 billion kuna, 
which equals about 1% of GDP. For the entire observed period, aid to 
Croatian Railways amounted to 6.3 billion kuna.
Table 10 State aid to Croatian Railways, 2001-2004  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001-2004
Railways  
(million kuna)
 1,116.5  143.6  2,080.1  3,008.9  6,349.1
% of GDP  0.67  0.08  1.08  1.45  0.82
Source: Authors’ calculations
Aid does not normally include government investment in rail-
way infrastructure and the share in loans for this purpose. It is notice-
able that there was a break in the series for aid granted to Croatian Rail-
ways during 2002. This was due to a shortage of detailed information 
on the schedule for loan principal repayment related to the Ministry of 
Finance, which is why it was impossible to establish clearly whether 
the item constitutes state aid or investment in infrastructure. Aid to 
Croatian Railways includes funds used for severance payments to 
employees, incentives for passenger and combined transport, as well as 
aid for the payment of wages to employees. It is worth noting that the 
collection of data on state aid to Croatian Railways for 2003, and par-
ticularly 2004, was greatly facilitated by a more detailed and transpar-
ent presentation of this aid in the government budget.
Looking at the instruments of state aid to Croatian Railways, it 
is obvious that the aid was mainly granted in the form of direct trans-
fers from the state budget, state guarantees issued (with a 100 percent 
probability of being revoked), and state guarantees revoked. The avail-
able data indicate that, during the observed four-year period, state aid 
in the form of soft loans was allocated only once, by CBRD in 2003.
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Table 11 State aid to Croatian Railways by instrument, 2001-2004 (%)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001-2004
Grants 98.2 100.0 55.7 70.1 71.0
Tax exemptions and relief - - - - -
Equity participation - - - - -
Soft loans - - 1.1 - 0.3
Tax deferrals - - - - -
Guarantees issued 1.8 - 43.2 - 14.5
Guarantees revoked - - - 29.9 14.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Authors’ calculations
Transport less railways
The last two years saw a decline in aid to other types of trans-
port, so that in 2003 and 2004, aid amounted to 800 million kuna and 
750 million kuna respectively. Thus, aid as a proportion of GDP halved 
over these two years, i.e. it went down to 0.36% of GDP in 2004 com-
pared with 0.68% of GDP in 2002.
Table 12 State aid to transport less railways, 2001-2004
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001-2004
Transport  
(million kuna)
1,079.0 1,220.7 798.7 745.5 3,843.9
% of GDP  0.65  0.68  0.41  0.36  0.52
Source: Authors’ calculations
As with the railways, aid in the form of grants from the state 
budget also prevails in the remaining part of the transport sector, and 
accounts for over 90% of total transport aid. However, this aid is much 
more frequently allocated through other instruments, e.g. tax deferrals 
and state guarantees revoked. It is interesting to analyse the dynamics 
of these instruments. While aid to transport in the form of grants from 
the budget trended downwards in the last two years, tax deferrals and 
guarantees revoked showed no clear trend, which leads to the conclu-
sion that these aid instruments are more often used by enterprises in 
financial difficulties.
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Table 13 State aid to transport less railways, by instrument (%)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001-2004
Grants 89.1 98.3  98.0 89.1 93.9
Tax exemptions and relief - - 0.2 0.2 0.0
Equity participation - - - 0.0 0.0
Soft loans 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0
Tax deferrals 4.9 - 1.0 9.4 3.4
Guarantees issued - 0.6 0.0 - 0.2
Guarantees revoked 5.8 1.1 0.7 1.2 2.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Authors’ calculations
In the period 2001-2003, in the EU-15 around 1.5 billion euros 
per year was awarded to the transport sector less railways. This repre-
sents an increase of over 50% relative to the period 1999-2001. Two-
thirds of total transport aid (about 1 billion euros per year) was awa-
rded to the maritime transport sector, the most sizeable amounts being 
granted by Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and Uni-
ted Kingdom.
The favourable treatment of the railway sector is also reflected 
in figures. Thus, the EU allocates several times larger amounts of aid 
to railways than to other transport. Over 2004, the EU-15 allocated as 
much as 25 billion euros to railways, almost sixteen times more than to 
other transport. The most sizeable amounts of aid to railways were allo-
cated by France (6.2 billion euros), Italy (3.9 billion euros), Germany 
(3.5 billion euros), United Kingdom (3.1 billion euros) and the Nether-
lands (2.7 billion euros) (Commission of the EC, 2005a).
State aid to transport in European Union and in Croatia
The EU rules governing the control of state aid to the trans-
port sector are far more complex than those related to other sectorsxvii. 
These issues fall within the competence of two EU Commission Direc-
torates, i.e. DG Competition and DG Transport.
Aid to the transport sector is focused on the following three 
areas:
262
•  compensation for the provision of services of general economic in-
terest (SGEI),
• investment in infrastructure, and
• state aid to railways.
The Commission adopted a package related to the compensation 
for the provision of SGEI. The package provides that undertakings can 
receive public funds to cover all costs, including reasonable profit, of 
the provision of public services defined and delegated to them by pub-
lic authorities, without causing the payment of excessive compensa-
tion, which is likely to threaten competition. The public funds used for 
the provision of SGEI do not constitute state aid to the transport sector.
Similar treatment is given to investment in infrastructure. Infra-
structure is open to all users on a non-discriminatory basis, and not to a 
particular undertaking or economic activity, and as such does not meet 
the criteria for state aid. Consequently, compensation for the provision 
of SGEI and infrastructure does not normally constitute state aid and 
need not be notified to the Commission.
Box 5 State aid to the United Kingdom rail sector
In 2002, the Commission took some important decisions related 
to the infrastructure management of the national railway network 
in the United Kingdom. First, it approved a ﬁnancial rehabilitation
package to ensure the continued provision of railway services, 
without which the UK railways risked collapsing. After that, the 
Commission approved funds to allow a newly established company, 
Network Rail, to take over the responsibility for managing the UK 
rail network on a non-proﬁt basis. The Commission deemed the
total amount of about 36 billion pounds not to constitute state aid 
but compensation for the provision of services of general economic 
interest.
Source: Commission of the EC, 2005
State aid to railways is given a special treatment. In view of its 
environmental awareness, the Commission has marked railways as a 
strategic industry. In principle, the Commission has followed a favour-
able approach to aid in the rail sector, both as regards rail services and 
investments, which are not viable without public co-financing. For this 
reason, actually, a major portion of the state subsidies to railways need 
not be notified to the Commission. This may be due to the fact that, 
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given the lack of competition in this sector, such financing is not con-
sidered to be state aid, or because it represents either compensation for 
SGEI or investment in infrastructures. However, member states are re-
quired to report to the Commission their overall public expenditures for 
the railways. The Commission considers the revitalization of the rail-
way sector to be one of the focal points of the EU transport policy. It 
maintains that state aid control is of crucial importance for the competi-
tiveness and efficiency of railways (Commission of the EC, 2005).
In 2004, aid to transport in Croatia accounted for almost 65% 
of total sectoral aid, or about 40% of overall state aid. As the largest 
amount of transport aid was granted to the railways, this sector is expe-
cted to come under close scrutiny from the EU. Therefore it will be 
necessary clearly to determine which subsidies to this sector constitute 
compensation for the provision of services of general economic inter-
est or investment in infrastructure, because these do not constitute state 
aid. Similarly, as concerns the rail sector in particular, a clear-cut dis-
tinction will have to be drawn between the subsidies for investments 
and those provided for covering current losses incurred by the Croatian 
Railways. Currently, there is no such distinction. It can be considered 
that subsidies to Croatian Railways do not constitute state aid, given 
the current monopolistic position of this company, owing to which such 
subsidies do not distort competition. However, it can also be argued 
that this monopolistic position only exists in terms of railway transport 
and not in relation to the other transport.
Steel industry
The economic position of the industry
In 2004, manufacture of metals and metal products accounted 
for about 6.5% of gross domestic industrial production. This division 
also accounted for 11.3% of total employment in manufacturing. The 
Croatian metal manufacturing industry comprises the manufacture of 
welded and seamless iron tubes, reinforcement steel, rolled wire and 
reinforcement steel nets for construction purposes, as well as alumini-
um processing and casting of metals.
A significant portion of metal processing facilities is still in state 
ownership, operating at a loss. Their losses are covered by transfers 
from the state budget.
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Željezara Sisak (Sisak Ironworks) has reduced its production 
over time. Its production capacities are underutilized, its technologi-
cal processes are obsolete and currently there is no demand for its prod-
ucts. After a number of failed attempts to privatize and “re-nationalize” 
the plant, the only viable solution for the survival of the plant would be 
its takeover by a serious purchaser from this industry.
Željezara Split (Split Ironworks). Owing to high electricity pri-
ces, growing imports of electrodes and ferro-alloys, expensive short-
term loans and low utilization of production capacities, the company 
reduced its production and raised its consumption standard. This resul-
ted in a 65% increase in production costs and losses. After bankruptcy 
was declared, the government invested sizeable funds in the modern-
ization of the company’s facilities. However, given its accumulated 
losses, the plant has not succeeded in finding a new owner, despite a 
number of international tenders, but its privatization prospects are still 
better than those of the Sisak Ironworks.
TLM Šibenik is the only producer of aluminium and aluminium 
products. Its production facilities are also obsolete and its annual turn-
over fell significantly (to 19% of the turnover recorded in 1989). The 
company imports 95% of its raw materials (from the aluminium facto-
ry in Mostar) and exports 75% of its total output. Owing to insufficient 
working capital, TLM Šibenik mainly operates at reduced capacity.
Despite stronger performance in recent years, the members of 
Đuro Đaković Holding company dealing with metal processing still 
rely excessively on the state, i.e. the majority of their activities depend 
on government investments in road construction and railways. 
State aid overview
In the period 2002-2004, state aid to steel industry totalled 257.1 
million kuna, the largest amount of 164.2 million kuna being allocated 
in 2001. According to the available data, the amount of state aid de-
creased to 2.3 million kuna over 2002, and in 2003 and 2004, it stabi-
lized at 37.3 million kuna and 53.3 million kuna respectively.
Of the total amount (164.2 million kuna) of aid allocated to 
ironworks in 2001, as much as 160 million kuna was spent on the con-
solidation of Sisak Ironworks through the write-off of government and 
public enterprise claims. The remaining 4.2 million kuna relate to aid in 
the form of state guarantees issued for the benefit of TLM Šibenik. 
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Table 14 State aid to ironworks, 2001-2004 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001-2004
Ironworks (million kuna) 164.2 2.3 37.3 53.3 257.1
% of GDP 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04
Source: Authors’ calculations
The entire amount (2.3 million kuna) of aid allocated during 
2002 related to state guarantees issued to Split Ironworks. State guar-
antees revoked accounted for the largest portion (25.9 million kuna) of 
total aid allocated in 2003, which amounted to 37.3 million kuna. The 
remaining 11.4 million kuna related to state guarantees issued for the 
benefit of TLM Šibenik and Split Ironworks. The smallest amount of 
aid allocated in 2003, 133 thousand kuna, related to soft loans extended 
during that year, particularly the loan granted by the Croatian Privatiza-
tion Fund, to Split Ironworks. The structure of aid in 2004 was similar. 
The largest portion of total aid, 27.8 million kuna, was allocated in the 
form of state guarantees revoked in that fiscal year. The amount of 19.2 
million kuna was granted in the form of financial transfers for equity 
participation, and the remaining 6.3 million kuna related to state guar-
antees issued for the benefit of TLM Šibenik. 
Table 15 State aid to ironworks by instrument (%)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001-2004
Grants - - - - -
Tax exemptions and relief 97.4 - - - 62.2
Equity participation - - - 36.0 7.5
Soft loans - - 0.3 - 0.0
Tax deferrals - - - - -
Guarantees issued 2.6 100.0 29.8 11.8 9.3
Guarantees revoked - - 69.9 52.2 20.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations
In the period 2001-2004, aid in the form of tax exemptions and 
relief accounted for the largest share in total state aid to this sector, 
owing to its large amount in 2001. However, aid in the form of state 
guarantees revoked gained in importance in the last two years, and was 
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allocated to Split Ironworks (26 million kuna and 27.8 million kuna in 
2003 and 2004 respectively).
The EU-15 has sharply reduced its aid to ironworks, from an 
annual average of about 2 billion euros in the mid-90s to 12 million eu-
ros in 2004, when aid was mainly allocated for environmental protec-
tion. Among the new member states, the largest amounts were allocated 
for this purpose by the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland (Commis-
sion of the EC, 2005a).
State aid to steel industry in European Union  
and in Croatia
The rules governing state aid to the steel sector are no longer in 
force, so that this area is now subject to the rules regarding rescue and 
restructuring aid or regional aidxviii. The rules governing regional aid 
to large investment projects prohibit the allocation of investment aid to 
this sector. Similarly, according to the rules on rescue and restructur-
ing aid and closure aid for the steel sector, rescue and restructuring aid 
is also considered incompatible with the common market. The only al-
lowed aid is the aid for the closure of enterprises in this sector subject 
to certain conditions, i.e. the aid for covering retirement costs of re-
dundant employees, and aid to ironworks that stop production comple-
tely. The European Commission considers that the allocation of such 
aid would undermine the efforts of the steel industry to reduce its costs 
and strengthen competitiveness.
It is obvious that state aid to the steel industry in Croatia is 
mostly targeted at financial rehabilitation and consolidation or at issu-
ing guarantees. Therefore, this segment of state aid will have to be har-
monized with the EU rules, which prioritize aid aimed at reducing costs 
and strengthening competitiveness of businesses and aid for closing 
down low-performance production facilities and providing for redun-
dant labour over aid for the rescue of existing business facilities. The 
forthcoming National Ironworks Restructuring Programme will finally 
define the state aid policy for this industry.
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Box 6  Reduction of tax concession granted to the Slovakian 
Ironworks US Steel Košice
Pursuant to the EU Accession Agreement, Slovakia was granted 
permission to continue to grant tax exemptions to US Steel Košice 
until the end of 2009. In order to compensate for the company’s 
competitive advantage resulting from the aid, as from 2002 a cap for 
production, and as from the date of the EU accession also a cap for 
sales were established. However, US Steel Košice did not respect 
the production cap in 2002 and 2003. In order to counterbalance 
the effect of the overproduction, the Slovak government requested a 
signiﬁcant reduction in state aid and asked the Commission to revise 
the conditions for granting the transitional period. On 22 September 
2004 the Commission decided that the tax exemption should be 
reduced from 500 million to 430 million US dollars and that the 
beneﬁciary should make a tax payment of 32 million dollars to the
Slovak government.
Source: European Commission, 2004 
The rescue and restructuring of ﬁrms in difﬁculty
State aid overview
It should be noted that aid for rescue and restructuring of a spe-
cific industry was classified to that industry. However, aid related to 
rescue and restructuring, where the sector was not clearly indicated, 
was classified as general rescue and restructuring aid. For example, all 
amounts of aid aimed at rescuing and restructuring shipyards were clas-
sified as aid to the shipbuilding sector and not as rescue and restructur-
ing aid. The purpose of this was to classify aid as accurately as possi-
ble according to the final beneficiary. In view of this it can be conclu-
ded that the total amount of rescue and restructuring aid in Croatia was 
much larger than reported. For example, total aid to shipbuilding and 
Croatian Railways, amounting to almost 9 billion kuna (50% of total 
sectoral aid) in the period 2001-2004, was allocated for the rescue and 
restructuring of these sectors.
In the last four years, state aid allocated for various rescue and 
restructuring schemes amounted to somewhat more than 750 million 
kuna or 0.1% of GDP. The largest amount (about 590 million kuna) 
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was allocated in 2001 and 2002, and the remaining 160 million kuna 
relates to 2003 and 2004. Such developments in state aid were partly 
due to the course of the privatization process, as the number of busi-
nesses needing to be rescued by the state was decreasing.
Table 16 Rescue and restructuring aid, 2001-2004 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001-2004
Rescue and restructuring 
(million kuna) 
241.2 349.3 74.5 85.5 750.6
% of GDP 0.15 0.19 0.04 0.04 0.10
Source: Authors’ calculations
Table 17 Rescue and restructuring aid by instrument (%)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2001-2004
Grants 7.1 82.4 - 32.0 44.3
Tax exemptions and relief - - - - -
Equity participation - - - - -
Soft loans 54.3 17.6 100.0 68.1 43.3
Tax deferrals - - - - -
Guarantees issued 38.6 - - - 12.4
Guarantees revoked - - - - -
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations
The most frequent aid instruments are grants from the state 
budget and soft loans. In 2004, grants from the budget for the rescue 
and restructuring of firms were given by the Ministry of Economy 
within its re-industrialization programme and by the Croatian Devel-
opment and Employment Fund for the revitalization of the company 
Diona d.d. in Bankruptcy. The largest amount of budget subsidies for 
this purpose was allocated in 2002, mainly for the restructuring of the 
Croatian Postal Bank.
Over the observed period, state aid for rescuing and restructur-
ing purposes was largely financed by soft loans. These were the CBRD 
loans extended throughout the observed four-year period within the 
Loan Programme for the Development of the Economy and Loan Pro-
gramme for the Financial Restructuring of Business Entities. These pro-
grammes are intended for the restructuring of business entities, mod-
ernization of the existing and introduction of new technologies, and are 
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available to all beneficiaries in Croatia who are engaged in various busi-
ness activities. The loans were not intended for the restructuring of any 
particular sector but of all sectors and were classified as general rescue 
and restructuring loans. The amount of aid allocated through this in-
strument has decreased continuously, falling from 130 million kuna in 
2001 to 58 million kuna in 2004. State guarantees for these loans were 
only issued in 2001, to various domestic banks for the benefit of the 
Croatian Privatization Fund. The most generous subsidies were provid-
ed in 2002 for the rehabilitation of the Croatian Postal Bank.
The last EU State Aid Scoreboard with separately presented data 
on rescue and restructuring aid for 2000 was issued in 2002.xix In this 
year, rescue and restructuring aid in the EU-15 accounted for barely 1% 
of total aid and was mainly granted in Spain.xx In Croatia, this aid ac-
counted for 6.7% of total aid in 2001, but decreased to 2.3% of total aid 
in 2004. Consequently, within the structure of total aid in Croatia, res-
cue and restructuring aid is still above EU levels.
Rescue and restructuring aid to enterprises 
in difﬁculties in European Union and in Croatia
The EU considers rescue and restructuring aid sectoral aid, be-
cause it is believed that this aid has the most distorting effect on com-
petition and that state support must not be provided as a rule any time 
an enterprise gets into financial difficulties.xxi It is natural that low-effi-
ciency enterprises should withdraw from the market, and the state is 
not allowed to keep them artificially in operation. 
In October 2004, the EU introduced new, clearer and more trans-
parent rules on rescue and restructuring aid, which will apply till 2009. 
Such aid is still allowed, subject to the following basic rules:
•  Aid allocation is based on the “one time, last time” principle, mean-
ing that the aid can only be allocated once in a 10 year period.
•  Rescue aid can be provided for the maximum of six months. Aid pro-
vided after this period is considered to be restructuring aid.
•  The Commission considers that the recipient of the restructuring aid 
must participate in financing the restructuring.
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Box 7 Rescue aid in favour of MG Rover Group Ltd.
In 2004 MG Rover Group Ltd. was supposed to be taken over 
by Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp. However, due to a lack 
of conﬁdence about the solvency of MG Rover, there was no
reasonable prospect of a deal. In order to support the company, the 
UK Ministry of Trade and Industry agreed to provide a 6.5 million 
pounds loan for one week to cover the costs of staff wages and 
salaries. The European Commission considered that this loan was 
state aid because MG Rover Group Ltd. would not have obtained 
it on commercial conditions. The Commission also considered that 
this state aid was allowed. More speciﬁcally, it was granted for an
area deﬁned by Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty, which allows aid for
the development of underdeveloped regions. Moreover, the loan 
was granted for the duration of one week, which was much shorter 
than the allowable duration of 6 months, at an interest rate of 7.5%, 
considered as market rate. The loan was granted on the grounds of 
serious social difﬁculties (possible job loss for 6,100 employees and
12,200 sub-contract workers). MG Rover had only a limited share 
in the car market; the United Kingdom had committed to submit 
the liquidation plan within 6 months; MG Rover had not received 
rescue aid on an earlier occasion. In view of the above, in 2005 the 
Commission decided that the rescue aid concerned was compatible 
with the common market.
Source: Commission of the EC, 2005b
As rescue and restructuring aid is still sizeable in Croatia com-
pared with that in the EU-15, it seems likely that it will be reduced in 
the forthcoming period. In addition, this aid will have to be adjusted 
to the EU rules providing that aid can be granted to an enterprise only 
once in ten years and that the enterprise must participate in financing 
the restructuring costs. The implementation of the EU rules will also 
improve transparency of state aid allocation in this area where arbitrary 
and ad hoc decisions have been taken too frequently.
CONCLUSION
State aid is a part of industrial policy and one of the measures 
used by the state to influence the market position of particular indus-
tries and/or enterprises. “Bad aid” distorts competition giving priority 
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to one enterprise over the other, and thus reduces public welfare, while 
“good aid” corrects market failures and thus contributes to the growth 
of welfare. The allocation of state aid, particularly that which is the 
subject to selective industrial policy, i.e. the policy aimed at providing 
help only to selected economic sectors or companies, offers many chal-
lenges, e.g.: state aid involves direct and indirect costs; the state has in-
sufficient information to be more successful than the market in select-
ing “winners” and “losers”, and it cannot pick the right moment to stop 
providing assistance; it is incapable of resisting various lobbies; state 
aid results in unfair competition; it can harm international trade; and, 
finally, state aid imposes a burden on the state budget. All the above-
mentioned challenges have to be borne in mind when deciding on the 
implementation of a particular form of state aid.
This paper presents an overall picture of the size and structure of 
state aid in Croatia and indicates the direction of its future development 
following EU rules. This provides a general framework for Croatian 
state aid policy, i.e. Croatian industrial policy in broader terms. The rec-
ommendations given for particular sectors relate to the harmonization 
of state aid with the EU rules and practices, and to improving transpar-
ency in state aid allocation, especially as concerns the avoidance of ad 
hoc authorizations of aid to “rescue” certain enterprises.
The state aid-to-GDP ratio in Croatia is four times higher than 
that in the EU, and aid is mainly targeted at “problem sectors” like 
shipbuilding, transport (particularly the railways) and the steel industry, 
as well as rescue and restructuring of firms in difficulty. The harmoni-
zation of these sectors with EU standards will need the greatest effort. 
By contrast, aid to horizontal objectives (e.g. small- and medium-sized 
enterprise, research and development, education and training, environ-
mental protection) will need to be increased, aid allocation transpar-
ency will need to be improved, and it will have to be ensured that state 
aid regulations are consistently applied by all system participants. Be-
ing aware of the necessity for these adjustments, the Government of the 
Republic of Croatia in its Pre-accession Economic Programme 2006-
2008, drawn up in December 2005, committed to reduce state subsi-
diesxxii from the 2.5% of GDP in 2006 to 2.2% of GDP in 2008 (partic-
ularly those granted to Croatian Railways).
In its latest State Aid Scoreboard (Commission of the EC, 2006), 
in which Croatia is mentioned for the first time, the European Commis-
sion calls attention to the crucial tasks facing Croatia in its state aid 
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reform. This particularly relates to sectoral state aid to shipbuilding and 
steel industry.
•  Shipbuilding. A sustainable program to restructure the shipbuilding 
sector should be adopted as soon as possible, following the EU rules 
and taking account of the importance of this industry for Croatia.
•  Steel sector. Croatia has not fulfilled its obligation from the SAA to 
adopt a programme to restructure its steel industry by March 2004. 
As aid to shipyards and ironworks continues to be allocated, the sta-
ted programmes should be adopted without delay.
The Commission points to the necessity to implement short-term 
measures aimed at improving the transparency of the state aid system, 
e.g.: to strengthen the administrative capacity of the Croatian Compe-
tition Agency, to ensure the efficient implementation of all aid-related 
measures, to harmonize the Croatian legislation with the acquis, to esta-
blish a comprehensive list of state aid including all measures related to 
state aid which are adopted at all levels of authority. The restructuring 
and privatization of the Croatian economy, particularly in the area of 
shipbuilding and steel industryxxiii, and the promptness in harmonizing 
the Croatian state aid system with the EU rules will have a significant 
influence on the opening of the negotiations on Chapter 8 of the acquis 
dealing with competition, which also includes state aid.
* The authors would like to thank the referees who anonymously reviewed this paper.
i  We express our gratitude to the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia for 
providing ﬁnancial support and permission to publish these data.
ii  The data for the period 2001-2002 were collected independently by the Institute of 
Public Finance, and the data for the following two-year period were gathered within 
the research project developed by the Institute of Public Finance for the purposes of 
the Ministry of Finance. The data originate from various sources, e.g.: Ministry of 
Finance, Tax Administration, Croatian Government, Croatian Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, Croatian Privatization Fund, etc.
iii  The essentials of the methodology applied in State Aid Scoreboard are available on 
the EU website: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/con-
ceptual:remarks.html.
iv  The European Council’s meetings in Stockholm (2001), Barcelona (2002) and Brus-
sels (March, 2003).
v  State Aid Action Plan: Less and Better State Aid: A Roadmap for State Aid Reform 
2005-2009; available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/others/
action_plan/saap_en.pdf.
vi  A set of common strategy rules adopted at the European Council meeting in Lisbon 
in 2000, according to which, by 2010, the EU should become the world’s most com-
petitive and dynamic economy based on knowledge and capable of sustainable eco-
nomic growth, with the highest employment rate and strong economic and social co-
hesion.
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vii  This way of presenting state aid is used in the EU State Aid Scoreboards.
viii  The 2002 ﬁgures are based on the available data, which are less detailed than the
data for other years. Therefore, it is not quite accurate to compare the amounts of 
state aid in 2002 with those granted in other years.
ix  A comparison between Croatia and the EU by aid allocation instrument is only pos-
sible for aid to manufacturing and services, because it is so presented in the EU 
State Aid Scoreboard.
x  Sizeable amounts of state aid are allocated to tourism and other industries. How-
ever, as they are not subject to any special EU regulation and are governed by gen-
eral rules on state aid, they are not speciﬁcally mentioned here.
xi  The sources of data: Croatian Chamber of Economy (http://www.hgk.hr) and Hrvat-
ska brodogradnja Jadranbrod d.d. Zagreb.
xii  Total aid less agriculture, ﬁsheries and transport.
xiii  Total aid less agriculture, ﬁsheries and transport.
xiv  Framework on state aid to shipbuilding; available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/
pri/en/oj/dat/2003/c_317/c_31720031230en00110014.pdf.
xv  Total aid less agriculture, ﬁsheries and transport.
xvi  The obligation set out in the Pre-Accession Economic Program, 2006-2008 of the 
Government of the Republic of Croatia; available at: http://www.mﬁn.hr/str/102/.
xvii  Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/legislation/.
xviii  Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/legislation/.
xix  Subsequently, the data were not presented separately but were included in other sec-
tors (Commission of the EC, 2002).
xx  Total aid less agriculture, ﬁsheries and transport.
xxi  Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/legislation/.
xxii  Including subsidies to agriculture, but excluding other aid instruments (guarantees, 
tax exemptions and relief, etc.), which are included in state aid according to the EU 
methodology.
xxiii  The National Programme for the Rehabilitation and Restructuring of Croatian Ship-
building should be completed by 15 June 2006. The National Program for the Reha-
bilitation and Restructuring of the Iron and Steel Industry has been completed and 
submitted to the EU (---, 2006).
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Chapter 11
HEALTH CARE POLICY AND REFORM 
IN CROATIA: HOW TO SEE THE FOREST 
FOR THE TREES
Dubravko Mihaljek*
Bank for International Settlements
Basel, Switzerland
ABSTRACT
This paper reviews current issues in health care policy and re-
form in Croatia. It analyses the microeconomic foundations of health 
care (characteristics of health as an essential good, market and govern-
ment failures in allocation of health care services); the role of health 
care in the process of European Union accession; the status of health 
care in Croatia (health status of the population, demographic trends, 
health care resources); microeconomic and macroeconomic aspects of 
health care financing; and recent reform proposals for the health care 
sector. On this basis a number of recommendations for health care re-
form in Croatia are formulated. The proposals refer to financial sustain-
ability of health care in the medium and long term; the mix of general 
taxes and mandatory health insurance contributions as sources of pub-
lic funding; the mix of public and private funding; the impact of differ-
ent financing instruments on the operations of health care providers; 
labour market effects of different financing methods; and the political 
economy of health care reform.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper provides a broad overview of current issues in health 
care policy and reform in Croatia. The focus is on the “big picture”, 
on seeing, from the perspective of an informed citizen, the health care 
“forest” for the trees that are being planted or cut down daily by health 
care specialists and policy makers focusing on details of health care 
policy and reform. The relationship between the health care reform and 
Croatia’s EU accession is also discussed. However, this relationship is 
only tangential: the health care sector is not really a part of the acquis; 
and even if it were, the authorities in Croatia would need to implement 
health care reforms primarily for the benefit of Croatian citizens, not 
because the authorities in Brussels demanded that they did so. 
Croatia spends about 8% of GDP annually on health care, which 
is somewhere between the average for the 15 old EU member states 
(8.8% in 2003) and the 10 new member states (7.1%; for data sources 
see Annex tables). About 84% of health care spending comes from pub-
lic sources and 16% from private sources. Within the public sector, the 
Croatian Health Insurance Institute (HZZO) accounts for 96% of gen-
eral government spending on health care. HZZO also plays a key role 
on the supply side by setting health care delivery standards (together 
with the Health Ministry) and negotiating volumes and prices of health 
services with providers. 
The bulk of resources for health care financing are collected 
from employers through mandatory payroll contributions. The remain-
der of public sources consists of transfers from the budget, i.e. general 
(rather than earmarked, as in the case of payroll contributions) tax reve-
nues. Private resources for health care financing are almost entirely pa-
tients’ out-of-pocket expenditures, given that the role of private health 
insurance is negligible. 
The health care sector has undergone major changes since the 
early 1990s. These changes have transformed a once highly decentral-
ised and overstaffed system with major regional imbalances in fund-
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ing and quality standards, into a more centralised, better funded and 
overall more efficient system of mixed public and private health care 
delivery. The system nonetheless continues to face major problems. 
Most reforms of recent years have focused on cost containment. This 
has resulted, on the one hand, in the shifting of an increasing portion of 
health care costs to households, and, on the other hand, a constant shift-
ing of “fire-fighting” efforts from one segment of the health care sector 
to another. Most of the stakeholders in health care reform are dissatis-
fied with the current situation, as reflected in an increasingly acrimoni-
ous public debate. However, since no one is willing to lose even more 
benefits, implementing more fundamental reforms has become a politi-
cal non-starter. 
Against this background, one aim of this paper is to try to in-
ject a dose of sound economic analysis into public debate on health 
care policy, so that different stakeholders in health care reform could 
perhaps start discussing the real long-term issues more dispassionate-
ly. Another aim of the paper is to encourage Croatian economists to 
do more research on the economics of the health care sector. This area 
has been rather neglected in the domestic literature and research pro-
grammes, which has contributed to the problems currently facing the 
health care sector. Problems in the health care sector will be analysed 
from both microeconomic and macroeconomic perspectives, as has be-
come the norm in the profession over the past quarter of a century. To 
highlight the scope of the problems, the focus will be on identifying 
key issues rather than elaborating details in different segments of the 
health care sector. 
The next section will thus start with some basic microeconomic 
foundations: why health care is different from other essential goods and 
which market and government failures arise in its allocation. Some in-
sights on the situation in Croatia with regard to these micro foundations 
will also be provided. Section 3 will then turn to the role – or rather, 
the search for a role – of the health care sector in the process of EU ac-
cession. Section 4 will analyse health care in Croatia from a demand-
supply perspective, looking at basic health outcomes and demographic 
trends on the demand side, and human resources and developments in 
health care delivery on the supply side. Section 5 discusses the micr-
oeconomic and macroeconomic aspects of health care financing. The 
emphasis is on uncovering flaws in the design of financing arrange-
ments that give rise to the observed negative trends and to the dissat-
isfaction of different stakeholders with the health care system. Section 
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6 analyses how far the recent reform proposals have (or have not) ad-
dressed these flaws. Section 7 concludes with remarks on the more fun-
damental health care reforms that Croatia will have to implement in the 
medium term. The main conclusion is that health care reform is much 
more complex and difficult to design and implement than, for instance, 
pension reform.
MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS
Why is health care different from other  
essential goods and its reform so complex?
The literature on health care economics has been primarily de-
veloped in English-speaking countries. As a result, the institution-
al frameworks of these countries have influenced the way economists 
think about health care even more than in other branches of public eco-
nomics. This refers in particular to institutional frameworks in the Unit-
ed States and the United Kingdom, which are polar opposites in that the 
former has no government health insurance (except that for the elderly 
and the poor) while the latter has comprehensive government health in-
surance. 
The literature usually starts from the assumption that health care 
can be analysed like any other competitive industry, and then explains 
why markets alone cannot produce efficient outcomes in the health care 
sector (see e.g. McGuire and Mayhew, 1989). One reason is that health 
care is different from other essential goods and services: the health care 
sector consists of more than a dozen markets – for different types of 
health care and medical treatment; health insurance; pharmaceuticals, 
medical equipment; labour market for medical personnel; etc. In most 
of these markets, serious market failures occur, including adverse se-
lection, asymmetry of information, increasing returns and moral hazard 
(see below). 
Another, perhaps more fundamental reason why markets alone 
cannot be relied upon to allocate health care is that good health broadly 
shared is intrinsically valued in all societies (Hsiao, 2000:6). Inequities 
in health and access to health care offend our innate sense of justice and 
fairness. The notion that, at the minimum, every individual should have 
access to basic medical services and medicines to relieve pain and suf-
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fering and to avoid untimely death is universally shared (ibid:6). As the 
cost of modern medicine is not affordable to most lower-income house-
holds, they need either medical insurance or access to subsidised health 
services in case of serious illness. Even for the better-off households, 
the costs of treating a major illness can lead to financial ruin. Some 
form of health insurance and government involvement in the provision 
of affordable health care is thus unavoidable from an ethical point of 
view.
But health insurance also has a strong economic rationale. In 
both rich and poor countries, about 25-30% of health care expenditure 
is spent on 1% of the population, and about 60% is spent on 5% of the 
population (Hsiao, 2000:11). For 20-25% of the population, there is no 
spending on health care in a given year (Table 1). However, it is dif-
ficult to predict which individuals will be in those 1% or 5% catego-
ries that absorb the bulk of healthcare spending. This provides a funda-
mental rationale for health insurance, as shown in the seminal paper by 
Arrow (1963). 
In Croatia, as in most former socialist countries, discussions 
about healthcare policy and reform usually start from the opposite end 
of the spectrum – the general assumption that access to health care is 
universal, equal and basically free to every individual. Universal right 
to health protection is constitutionally guaranteed in Croatia (“Every-
one is to be guaranteed the right to health care, in conformity with the 
law”, Article 58). However, many policymakers and members of the 
public seem to confuse the ethical norms noted above with basic eco-
nomic laws, which operate even in the health care sector, despite the 
fact that health is a special good.
Table 1  Healthcare expenditure by percentage of population for all age 
groups1
Percent of total population Percent of total health expenditure
1
5
10
50
80
29
60
74
98
100
1 Data for the United States, 1998.
Source: Hsiao (2000:12).
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For instance, the basic law of demand states that, if one reduces 
the price of a good or service, then people consume more of that good 
or service. In the case of health care, the price that people pay for serv-
ices such as routine doctor visits, vision care, or low-cost treatment of 
minor illnesses and injuries is being reduced by comprehensive health 
care coverage. The law of demand states that this will increase the use 
of such care – people will visit doctors more often because routine vis-
its are covered by health insurance.i This will result in excess demand: 
providers will not have an incentive to increase supply because the 
price is fixed below equilibrium level. Excess demand will be resolved 
through rationing – those willing to get cheap routine care will have to 
queue for such services. To avoid the waste resulting from over-con-
sumption of routine care, the price of such services needs to be raised. 
One way to do this is through deductibles and co-payments, but with 
appropriate solutions for low-income families.ii
In contrast to routine health care, for major illnesses and hospi-
tal stays, it makes good economic sense – and is ethically correct – to 
cover most of the cost by insurance. This is consistent with the princi-
ple that insurance should protect people against disproportionate finan-
cial loss due to illness – in particular, against catastrophic loss – but it 
should not insulate them from the cost of all health care.
Economists and healthcare experts in countries such as Croatia 
thus have to explain to policymakers and the public why governments 
alone cannot and should not finance all the costs of health care.iii One 
consequence of this starting position is that political economy consid-
erations are of paramount importance for the success of healthcare re-
forms (see concluding section). 
Market and government failures  
and the situation in Croatia 
Market failure is a situation in which markets do not organise 
production or allocate goods and services efficiently. Economists nor-
mally apply this term to situations where the market is failing to create 
maximum efficiency. It does not mean that the market has collapsed or 
ceased to exist; it suggests that non-market institutions such as govern-
ment regulation might improve the market outcome. In the healthcare 
sector, market failures occur in most of the markets making up the sec-
tor.iv 
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Informational asymmetries are present both in the supply of 
medical services and health insurance, where they are known as “ad-
verse selection” and “moral hazard” problems (see below). On the sup-
ply side, the complexity of the technical data on medical treatment, the 
multiplicity of choices and the distressed state of mind of many who 
discover that they are ill make it difficult for the patient to obtain and 
process all information relevant to his or her illness. The patient must 
therefore rely on the supplier (physicians, other medical professionals) 
for the provision of information on the potential choices available and 
the gains associated with the treatment. In an unregulated market envi-
ronment, this creates the possibility of severe exploitation of patients 
by doctors, who are in a more or less monopolistic position with regard 
to information on medical treatment.v 
One solution to the problem of informational asymmetries is the 
development of a contractual or “agency” relationship between the doc-
tor and the patient, for instance, through legislation on patients’ rights 
enforceable in courts of law. A complementary solution is the develop-
ment of self-regulated standards of professional conduct by the medi-
cal profession – e.g. self-regulation of entry to the profession and the 
imposition of ethical standards after entry. These solutions do not guar-
antee perfect outcomes. For instance, entry barriers into the medical 
profession restrict supply and increase the price of health care; mainte-
nance of ethical standards of doctors’ behaviour may be hard to enforce 
in courts. Nevertheless, these solutions are necessary to overcome the 
worst problems associated with informational asymmetries. One aspect 
of this problem that seems to be particularly pronounced in Croatia and 
will need to be addressed as part of the EU accession process is the lack 
of adequate legislation on patients’ rights and inadequate enforcement 
of existing legislation.vi 
Complexity and uncertainty in health care provision arise be-
cause every case is potentially different from every other and may also 
develop in different ways from previous cases. The market is unable to 
cope efficiently with these problems. This places an even greater im-
portance on ethical behaviour of doctors, who should provide reassur-
ance that they are acting in the patient’s best interest.
Increasing returns arise because, with medical care becom-
ing more complex, there is a growing need for specialist advice and 
specialist medical equipment, both of which are costly and require a 
large number of patients to justify their use economically. In a mar-
ket environment these aspects of production increase the probability of 
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oligopolistic structures emerging. Since oligopolistic prices are higher 
than competitive prices, there is a need for government regulation of 
pricing of medical services.
Adverse selection occurs when higher-risk individuals such as 
smokers do not tell a private insurance company about their health risk. 
As a result, the insurance company calculates a premium that does not 
cover its expected costs for insuring the higher-risk individuals. When 
these costs materialise, the insurance company raises premium for all 
the insured, including the lower risk individuals such as non-smokers. 
The higher premium may then cause some lower-risk individuals to 
switch to another insurance company, which offers a lower premium. If 
no action is taken, this will lead to a vicious cycle and the ultimate col-
lapse of the insurance scheme. 
Adverse selection can be reduced by letting insurers set more ac-
curate premia; e.g. by giving them more information or lifting restric-
tions on how premiums are set. However, this may discriminate against 
chronically-ill and high-risk people, who may to be unable to get health 
insurance at fair prices. To avoid this situation, the authorities regulat-
ing private insurance companies typically define a list of pre-existing 
health conditions which cannot be excluded from insurance plans.
There is no information on the extent to which the problem of 
adverse selection in private insurance plans is present in Croatia. As 
noted above, the role of private health insurance plans is minimal at the 
moment. But as these plans become more important in the future the 
authorities will need to take the problem of adverse selection into ac-
count in regulatory solutions. 
As for the problem of adverse selection in the state-run health 
insurance plan, the high proportion of lifestyle diseases related to obes-
ity, lack of physical activity, smoking and alcohol and drug abuse, and 
the fact that everyone pays the same insurance contributions, suggest 
that the cost of treating such diseases is essentially being subsidised by 
people who do not expose themselves to such health risks. This raises 
financial, equity and fairness issues which have yet to become the sub-
ject of public debate in Croatia.
The term moral hazard refers to the increased risk of careless 
behaviour and thus a negative outcome (“hazard”) because the person 
who caused the problem does not suffer the full (or any) consequences 
of his or her behaviour, or may actually benefit at the expense of others. 
In health insurance this problem would arise if individuals were tak-
ing less care of their health – e.g. exercising less, smoking and drink-
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ing more, taking fewer check-ups than would otherwise be the case – 
just because they knew they were insured. The most important way to 
mitigate moral hazard is through special provisions (“riders”) in insur-
ance contracts. For instance, many health insurance companies include 
a provision that requires the insured to obtain regular check-ups, dental 
cleanings, etc. or offer discounts for non-smokers and people who ex-
ercise regularly. 
It is not clear how far the problem of moral hazard is present 
under Croatia’s comprehensive health insurance. In 2004 and 2005 the 
two top-selling drugs were cholesterol-reduction medicines.vii Wide-
spread smoking and alcohol abuse and the fact that smokers and heavy 
drinkers do not pay higher health contributions further indicate that 
there is considerable scope for the moral hazard problem. In a more 
fundamental health care reform the authorities would therefore need to 
take determined action against different forms of irresponsible behav-
iour of insured persons.viii 
Government failure is the public sector analogy to market fail-
ure and occurs when a government does not efficiently allocate goods 
and/or resources to consumers of government services. Just as a market 
failure is a problem that prevents the market from operating efficiently, 
a government failure is not a failure of the government to bring about 
a particular solution, but rather a systemic failure that prevents an effi-
cient government solution to a problem. 
An example of government failure in the health care sector 
most relevant to Croatia is the dominance of health practitioners’ inter-
ests over the interests and welfare of patients. According to Transpar-
ency International (2005), 32% of Croatian citizens think that corrup-
tion in the health care sector is “widespread”, and 48% think that it is 
“very widespread”.ix Sometimes the dominance of physicians’ interests 
is more or less officially sanctioned. Physicians employed by the state 
were for many years allowed to pay symbolic rents for state-owned fa-
cilities to use for their private practices after regular working hours.x 
Such a practice is, of course, unimaginable in the EU or even in other 
public-sector professions in Croatia. That it was legal is a testimony to 
the political clout that the medical profession has secured in Croatian 
society.xi It is also prima facie evidence of a systemic failure of govern-
ment bureaucracies to operate the health care system in the interest of 
the citizens.xii 
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HEALTH CARE SECTOR AND  
EUROPEAN UNION ACCESSION
The relationship between European law and health policy is 
complex and often confusing, in part because there is no clear demar-
cation of the competence of the member states and the European insti-
tutions in health matters.xiii Article 129 of the 1993 Maastricht Treaty 
stated that “the Community will contribute to a high level of health 
protection for its citizens” and made provision for community action to 
prevent major diseases. This article provided the basis for a programme 
of action in health promotion, information, education and training in 
public health, including in areas such as the fight against cancer, AIDS 
and other communicable diseases; collection of health data; and occu-
pational health and safety; pollution-related diseases and rare diseases. 
In the Amsterdam Treaty revision of 1997 it is stated that “Com-
munity action shall be directed towards improving public health” 
(Article 152). However, what exactly is meant by public health was not 
defined – the border between public health and policies in many other 
areas, such as the environment and consumer protection, is indistinct. 
Health considerations are also implicit in many other articles of the 
Treaty, such as those on research, agriculture, social policy and mecha-
nisms to promote free movement of people and goods. The Amsterdam 
Treaty also sought to clarify how EU law affects health services, stating 
that “Community action in the field of public health shall fully respect 
the responsibilities of the Member States for the organisation and deliv-
ery of health services and medical care” (Article 152). 
However, this exclusion of health services from the competence 
of the EU and the implicit recognition that such services were the re-
sponsibility of national governments soon proved to be not quite so 
simple. Health services can only operate by using many inputs that are 
covered by the single market. Free movement embraces goods such as 
medical technology and pharmaceuticals; people such as patients and 
health professionals; and services such as pharmaceutical research and 
development. The production and movement of these inputs are subject 
to European law, in particular in that they must be transparent and non-
discriminatory. 
For instance, a single market, guaranteeing freedom of move-
ment of people, can only function if those people can travel without 
fear of losing the protection they enjoy in their own countries in respect 
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of health care. Thus, a series of directives in the early 1970s set out 
mechanisms for various groups of people whose work involved cross-
border travel to receive health care in other member states, with provi-
sions for those abroad temporarily to obtain care in an emergency. In 
addition, mechanisms were put in place to enable those organizations 
paying for health care to send patients abroad for treatment. In the late 
1990s, the European Court of Justice passed several rulings which es-
tablished the right of patients to obtain health care abroad without prior 
authorisation. These rulings have shown that the health care sector of 
the member states was gradually coming within the reach of commu-
nity law. 
Health services were part of a draft EU Directive on Services 
that was rejected by European Parliament in early 2006 after some-
times bitter debates. However, by September 2006 an “orientation dis-
cussion” on harmonisation of certain aspects of health care services 
had started among EU members, indicating that this topic will stay on 
the EU agenda.
As a result of the growing complexity of the relationship be-
tween European law and health policy, almost all chapters of the ac-
quis have some implications for health care. Those of particular rel-
evance are Chapter 13, on social policy and Chapter 23, on consumers 
and health protection. But other chapters also contain important pro-
visions related to health care: Chapters 1-3 on the free movement of 
goods, persons and services; Chapter 12 on food safety; Chapter 27 
on the environment; etc. Details on the position of health care in these 
chapters and on Croatia’s standing with regard to the fulfilment of EU 
requirements are beyond the scope of this paper. In any case, in a pe-
riod of intensive accession negotiations they are a moving target. Ac-
cording to the 2005 European Commission Progress Report, for in-
stance, Croatian legislation only partially covers the acquis in the vari-
ous sectors of consumer and health protection (European Commission, 
2005:102). In the chapter on social policy, the main conclusion is that 
this area appears to have been “rather neglected” (ibid:78), while im-
plementation and enforcement capacity will need to be substantially 
improved if the acquis in the field of health and safety at work are to 
be properly applied (ibid:77). How long this might take in practice re-
mains difficult to say. The Croatian authorities seem to be relatively op-
timistic and believe that it will take about two and a half years (i.e. until 
the end of 2008) to complete adjustment of overall legislation (not just 
that relating to health care) with the acquis.xiv 
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Finally, one should note that the Croatian Ministry of Health is 
not in charge of negotiating any particular chapter of the acquis. These 
responsibilities are split among several ministries, which increases the 
need for coordination of activities among different parts of the govern-
ment. To the extent that cooperation among ministries is hampered by 
lack of resources and skills and by bureaucratic rivalries, the adoption 
of the acquis could be further slowed down.
HEALTH CARE SECTOR IN CROATIAxv 
Health status of the population
The picture on the health status of the Croatian population is 
mixed, with some indicators showing relatively good health outcomes 
and others showing relatively poor outcomes. Life expectancy at birth 
– 72 years for males and 79 years for females in 2004 – compares fa-
vourably with both EU-15 (76 and 82 years, respectively) and EU-10 
averages (71 and 79 years), in particular considering the difference in 
per capita income (about 40% of EU average in PPP terms in 2004) 
(Table A1 in Annex). However, Croatian men and women can expect to 
be sick one more year during their lives than average citizens of the old 
and the new Europe (Table 2).
Table 2 Life expectancy at birth and years of healthy life, 2004
Life expectancy  
at birth (years)
Expected years  
of healthy life
Expected years  
of sickness1
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Croatia 72 79 64 69 8 10
EU-15 76 82 69 73 7 9
EU-10 71 79 64 70 7 9
1  Calculated as the difference between life expectancy at birth and expected 
years of healthy life.
Source: WHO (see Annex Table A1); author’s calculations.
Adult mortality rates in Croatia are lower than in the new mem-
ber states – 160 people per 1,000 die in Croatia between the ages of 15 
and 60, compared with an average of 205 in EU-10 – but significantly 
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higher than in EU-15, where the adult mortality rate is 113 per 1,000 
(Annex Table A1). The infant mortality rate is the same as in EU-10 
(6 deaths per 1,000 live births), but again significantly higher than in 
EU-15 (4 infant deaths per 1,000 live births).
Where health outcomes show a particularly large gap with re-
spect to the old (and to a lesser extent the new) Europe is in terms of 
major causes of death. Croatia has a higher age-standardised mortality 
rate than EU-15 for virtually all non-communicable diseases: cardio-
vascular diseases, cancer, injuries, chronic respiratory diseases, diabe-
tes and other chronic diseases. For instance, in Croatia there were 356 
deaths from cardio-vascular diseases per 100,000 people in 2002, al-
most double the average in EU-15 (185 deaths) (Table A1 in Annex). 
These developments are probably closely related to the spread of an 
unhealthy lifestyle, as can be seen from the following health risk indi-
cators (see Table 3):
•  Croatia has an extremely high proportion of obese people – almost a 
quarter of the adult population is overweight, which is almost double 
the average in EU-15 and 50% higher than in EU-10. 
•  Prevalence of tobacco use is very high, especially for Croatian wom-
en (23% of adult women consume tobacco products regularly) and 
school-age children (19% of boys and girls aged 13 to 15 smoke cig-
arettes). 
•  Alcohol consumption in Croatia is 25% above the EU-15 average 
and almost 50% above the EU-10 average. Croatia is in the 5th place 
in the world in terms of adult per capita wine consumption (after 
Luxembourg, France, Portugal and Italy), and in the 15th place in the 
world in terms of per capita consumption of beer. Not surprisingly, 
mortality rates from alcohol-related diseases are very high.xvi 
•  In addition, prevalence of physical inactivity is very high. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) data (not shown in Table 3) indicate that 
in 2003, 47% of Croatian men and 51% of Croatian women were 
physically inadequately active.xvii
In summary, major preventable health risks are highly present 
in Croatia and the authorities could and should do much more to edu-
cate the population about the seriousness of these risks for health. This 
is important to emphasise because the 2006 health care development 
strategy (MZSS, 2006) fails to stress sufficiently the links between 
health risks and health outcomes, leaving the impression that the state 
of health of the Croatian population is mostly good.xviii
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Table 3 Selected health risk indicators
Adults (≥ 15 years) 
who are obese1
Prevalence of 
current tobacco use1
Alcohol 
consumption  
(per capita per 
year, in litres)2 Males Females Males Females
Croatia 22 23 32 23 16.2
EU-15 13 13 32 20 12.9
EU-10 14 17 40 18 8.3
1 Percent of total population. 
2  Total recorded and unrecorded consumption per adult (15 years and older), 
in litres of pure alcohol.
Source: WHO (see Annex Table A2) and WHO (2004).
Demographic trends
To round off the picture on the demand for health services, one 
needs to consider the main demographic trends. As in most Europe-
an countries, population trends in Croatia have been unfavourable for 
some time. Between 1995 and 2004, total population declined at an 
average annual rate of -0.3% (Table A3 in Annex). Croatian women 
bear fewer children on average (1.35) than women in EU-15 (1.6) and 
about the same as those in the new member states. 
As in the rest of Europe, the population in Croatia is rapidly get-
ting older. According to the 2001 census, 16% of the population was 
65 or older; 67% was of working age (15-64 years); and 17% was be-
low the age of 15 (Table 4). By 2050, according to the latest projections 
of the State Statistical Bureau, the share of elderly in total population 
might rise to 27%, and the share of the working age population might 
decline to 59%. The old-age dependency ratio – population aged 65+ 
as a share of population aged 15-64 – would thus increase from about 
23% in 2001 to 46% in 2050, and the total dependency ratio (the eld-
erly plus children as a percentage of the working-age population) from 
49% to 69% (Table 4). 
But this is only part of the demographic picture with negative 
implications for health insurance. The ratio of population not pay-
ing health insurance contributions to employed persons is already ex-
tremely unfavourable, about 2:1 (Table 4). In other words, for every 
employed person, mandatory health insurance contributions have to be 
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high enough to cover insurance premia for two additional persons who 
do not pay the contributions. This in itself is quite enough to show that 
Croatia’s health insurance system faces major long-term sustainabili-
ty problems. Only one-third of the population is paying for health in-
surance, while the remaining two-thirds – retirees, family members of 
insured persons, the unemployed and other non-active persons – are 
not paying health insurance contributions even though they account for 
well over two-thirds of health care costs. While there was some im-
provement in the ratio of the non-paying population to the employed 
between 2000 and 2005, with population-ageing this ratio will inevita-
bly deteriorate, even if employment rates remain unchanged.
Table 4 Demographic trends and health insurance 
Age  
(years)
Percentage share Ratio of population not paying 
mandatory health insurance 
contributions to employed (%)1
In total In working-
age population
2001 2050 2001 2050 2000 2005
Children 
(0-14)
17 14 26 23
Total not paying/
Employed 
1.98 1.85
Working age 
(15-64)
67 59 100 100
Retirees/  
Employed
0.70 0.66
Elderly  
(65+)
16 27 23 46
Family members/ 
Employed
0.97 0.83
Children  
plus elderly
33 41 49 69
Unemployed/ 
Employed
0.09 0.09
1  Total population not paying contributions also includes other non-active 
categories of persons.
Sources: DZS (2006); HZZO (2002; 2006); author’s calculations.
The high proportion of retirees in Croatia’s population is also 
significant for the health care sector because the distribution of health 
expenditure by age is highly skewed towards older people. In the Unit-
ed States, for which the most comprehensive data are available, 36% 
of total health care expenditure is incurred by those 65 years and older, 
whose share in total population is 12%. For Croatia there are no com-
parable data, but as an approximation one can use HZZO expenditure 
on retirees and their families, which has accounted for about 43% of to-
tal HZZO expenditure since 2000. This proportion can be expected to 
increase faster than the share of elderly in total population (currently at 
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16%), because demand for health care will increase with rising per cap-
ita income, again raising the question of the sustainability of the cur-
rent system.
Health care providers
Viewed from the supply side, the situation in Croatia’s health 
care sector is even less favourable than would be suggested by the above 
comparisons of health outcomes and demographic trends. Croatia has 
significantly fewer physicians, nurses, midwives and pharmacists per 
1,000 inhabitants than either EU-15 or EU-10 on average (Table 5). 
Dentists are the only health professionals whose numbers compare fa-
vourably with European averages. In terms of hospital beds, Croatia 
has less overcapacity than the new member states and is basically at the 
average EU-15 level. Other indicators of hospital capacity compare fa-
vourably with European averages; one exception is the average length 
of stay in hospitals (11 days), which is longer than the EU average 
(9 days).xix
Table 5 Resources in the healthcare sector (per 1,000 inhabitants)
Physicians Nurses Midwives Dentists Pharmacists Hospital 
beds1
Croatia 2.4 5.1 0.3 0.7 0.5 5.5
EU-15 3.3 9.2 0.6 0.7 0.8 5.4
EU-10 3.2 6.8 0.3 0.6 0.7 6.4
1 Per 10,000 inhabitants.
Source: WHO (see Annex Table A3).
When comparing these data with health outcomes one can draw 
two preliminary conclusions. First, in terms of utilisation of human re-
sources, the healthcare sector in Croatia appears to be fairly efficient: 
with 25-50% fewer healthcare professionals it helps “produce” ba-
sic outcomes such as healthy life expectancy that are not significant-
ly lower than EU averages. Second, the one health profession where 
there seems to be adequate supply of services – the dentists – is also the 
one where private practice predominates and most expenses are out-
of-pocket. Few complaints tend to be heard about the quality of serv-
ices and corruption in dental care. What this case demonstrates is that 
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market mechanism can be relied upon to produce efficient outcomes 
for some health services and reduce – perhaps even eliminate – gov-
ernment failure. It would therefore be interesting to investigate why 
Croatian citizens have accepted the notion that they have to pay for 
dental services. 
Croatia’s health service providers are further organised into pri-
mary (general and family practitioners, emergency care etc.), second-
ary (specialised care and hospitals) and tertiary sectors (highly spe-
cialised care, teaching hospitals, medical research facilities) as well as 
health institutes (including public health institutes). How these sectors 
are organised and problems of their operation will not be discussed in 
detail in this paper.xx But some issues that arise in the context of health-
care financing and reform need to be mentioned.
One of the key issues is the imbalance that has developed be-
tween primary and secondary care. In most European countries prima-
ry care facilities treat about three quarters of medical cases. In Croatia, 
they treat less than 50% of all cases. The counterpart has been a rap-
id growth of cases treated by specialists in secondary and tertiary fa-
cilities, which expanded by 30% in five years (MZSS, 2006:27). This 
has resulted in duplication of much diagnostic and laboratory work, un-
necessary highly specialised treatment and rising overall costs, as pro-
vision has shifted towards more sophisticated and expensive forms of 
health care. Moreover, the supply of preventative health services has 
been on the decline in recent years, while expenditure on pharmaceuti-
cals has increased rapidly.xxi
At the same time, hospitals have been confronted by the lack 
of financial resources and reliable mechanisms for quality assurance 
(WHO, 2005). There have also been imbalances in the distribution of 
hospital beds by type of care (acute or short-term vs. chronic or long-
term) and in the regional distribution of hospital resources (World 
Bank, 2004). In particular, decentralisation of governance has brought 
most secondary health care facilities under the ownership of local gov-
ernments, which lack adequate financial, management and oversight 
resources to ensure efficient functioning of hospitals.
FINANCING
Unfavourable trends in the health care sector are usually ex-
plained by the lack of resources devoted to this sector in Croatia. How-
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ever, as noted in the Introduction, Croatia does not lag behind EU-15 
in terms of the share of health care expenditure in GDP, and on aver-
age spends more on health care than the new member states. In this sec-
tion it will be argued that, rather than to the lack of funding, the nega-
tive trends in health care can be traced to some flaws in the design of 
health care financing at the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels. 
In other words, the relatively large resources that the society devotes to 
the health care are partly wasted because of the flaws in the system of 
health care financing.
Microeconomic aspects
Primary health care. As the “gatekeepers” of the healthcare sys-
tem, primary-care physicians play an influential role in determining the 
costs of health care by prescribing drugs and referring patients for spe-
cialist or hospital care. In Croatia, primary-care physicians are paid on 
the basis of “capitation” payments, i.e. flat fees per patient per year. 
This system was introduced in the early 1990s, probably for ease of ad-
ministration and because it prevents over-billing. However, when the 
authorities introduced this system, they apparently did not take into ac-
count that it would provide an incentive to physicians to sign up as 
many patients as possible.xxii As a result, they might end up with too 
many patients for the limited amount of time they have. This would 
lead to rationing of services to free up time to see more patients. Some 
preventative care might be cut back; more patients might be referred 
to specialists than would otherwise be the case (as this would save the 
primary-care doctor time for more detailed check-ups); and medicines 
might be prescribed more liberally. For instance, although the number 
of prescriptions per patient per year is limited to five, the per capita 
number of prescriptions rose steadily from 6.0 in 1998 to 8.1 in 2005 
(HZZO, 2005).xxiii An additional reason for the shifting of healthcare 
provision to secondary and tertiary facilities is that capitation payments 
do not allow most primary care doctors to equip their offices adequate-
ly, so they are more or less forced to send patients to clinics and hos-
pitals.
Hospital financing. Unlike primary care, the hospital payment 
system consists of three separate components: (i) for patient accommo-
dation hospitals are paid a flat fee per bed per day; (ii) physicians’ serv-
ices are mainly paid on a fee-for-service basis, using the WHO point 
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system; (iii) pharmaceuticals and other materials are paid separately, 
depending on the cost of each item. In addition, each hospital budget is 
limited by a “global ceiling”, with hospitals being subject to financial 
penalties if they exceed the ceiling. 
Although more diverse, these hospital financing methods also 
have some serious flaws. Capacity-based payments encourage hospitals 
to keep the beds full and extend the length of stay, since high occupan-
cy results in steady funding based on the per diem reimbursement. Low 
occupancy rates also increase the risk that global ceiling on the hospital 
budget might be lowered the following year. Reimbursing physicians 
on a fee-for-service basis is certainly an improvement compared with 
flat fees in primary care, but this system works properly only if the fees 
are set at levels that provide reasonable compensation to physicians, 
and if bills they submit are properly monitored and audited. There is no 
solid evidence that these conditions are fulfilled in Croatia.
More generally, none of the three hospital payment methods 
provides an incentive for hospitals to increase productivity: the HZZO 
essentially reimburses hospitals for inputs used rather than outcomes 
(World Bank, 2004:25). Hospital management therefore has no incen-
tive to try to economise on inputs and realise higher net income for dis-
tribution to owners (central and local governments) or hospital employ-
ees. On the other hand, when hospitals are faced with an unexpected 
rise in costs that might break the overall budget limit, the management 
cannot adjust staffing levels and often has to implement ad hoc cost-
saving measures such as restricting the use of medications or proce-
dures (World Bank, 2004).
In 2002, the government introduced a case-based payment sys-
tem (so-called payment per therapeutic treatment) under which HZZO 
negotiates volume contracts with all hospitals for selected interven-
tions. This method was intended to reduce the waiting lists while im-
proving control over the total costs, as hospitals no longer charged for 
each service but instead for entire therapeutic treatments. The introduc-
tion of this method has helped reduce the average length of stay for 
most of the interventions. However, hospitals were given the flexibility 
to choose whether to bill HZZO under the point-based or the treatment-
based system on a case-by-case basis. This has apparently led to a form 
of “gaming”, whereby the hospital was implicitly guaranteed the high-
est payment (World Bank, 2004:29). As a result, the overall hospital 
costs did not decline significantly.
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Co-payments. Health care services in Croatia are not entirely 
free: under the basic health insurance system, patients are required to 
pay to access health services through a system of co-payments rang-
ing from 15% to 75% for different types of treatment and up to 100% 
for medicines.xxiv Moreover, there is no reimbursement for most types 
of treatment from private providers such as dentists and various spe-
cialists. The authorities have emphasised the role of co-payments as a 
means of increasing the share of private health care financing. How-
ever, the contribution of co-payments to the overall health budget has 
been limited, as large segments of the population are exempt from mak-
ing the payments.xxv 
Health expenditure generally represents a small proportion of 
total household spending, about 2.3% on average during 2003-05.xxvi 
But there is evidence that out-of-pocket expenditure represents a heavy 
burden for some financially more vulnerable groups.xxvii Another ineq-
uity in the current system is that those with chronic diseases face par-
ticularly large out-of-pocket expenses. Finally, the rationale for impos-
ing relatively high co-payments for preventative care is unclear. Al-
though the burden of co-payments can be reduced by subscribing to 
supplementary health insurance (which is also run by HZZO), the in-
troduction of this insurance scheme has not reduced the financing bur-
den for the HZZO.
Sick leave, maternity leave and disability allowances account 
for 12-14% of total HZZO expenditure. These costs are in other coun-
tries financed and administered separately from health insurance funds, 
often as part of unemployment insurance programmes, but were appar-
ently imposed on HZZO for purely administrative reasons. In the eval-
uation of the World Bank (2004:38), Croatia provides one of the most 
generous sick leave and maternity leave compensation schemes by in-
ternational standards, with the state taking on almost the entire risk of 
added labour costs due to illness or maternity. There is little incentive 
on the part of the employers and employees to be judicious in the use of 
sick benefits. Given their size, a more rational use of these allowances 
is likely to have a far greater impact on reducing health care expendi-
ture than, for instance, the announced cost-saving measures for phar-
maceuticals (see below). 
On the other hand, there are indications that disability and some 
other allowances (e.g. for war veterans) are insufficient to guarantee 
minimum socially acceptable living standard to many users of these 
allowances.xxviii This situation has not been conducive to social dia-
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logue and tolerance because it has created the impression that the state 
is wasting public resources on some groups in the population (given the 
widespread abuse of sick leave allowances among the employed) while 
at the same time it has been overly frugal with those who indeed need 
the help (given that most disabled persons and many recipients of vet-
erans’ allowances do not have other sources of income). However, this 
issue would probably have to be addressed outside the narrow scope of 
health reform (see concluding section).
Macroeconomic aspects
About 80% of health care costs in Croatia are financed through 
health insurance contributions (payroll tax) assessed on employees’ sal-
aries.xxix The remaining 20% are financed through transfers from cen-
tral and local government budgets (i.e. from other tax revenues); sup-
plementary and private health insurance; borrowing by HZZO; and oth-
er sources. The basic contribution rate for mandatory health insurance 
is 15%. Since 2003, the contributions are paid only by employers, i.e. 
there is no sharing of the burden with employees, as was the case be-
tween 2000 and 2002, when employers contributed 7% and employees 
9% of employees’ salaries.xxx 
In other words, 80% of all health insurance costs in Croatia 
are paid by employers – they finance health insurance not only for the 
workers they employ, but also most of the costs for insuring retirees, 
members of families of insured persons, the unemployed and other in-
active groups in the population. Although this simple fact has major im-
plications not just for the health care financing but also for the labour 
market, it seems to have escaped the attention of different stakeholders 
in health care reform, including international organisations such as the 
World Bank and the IMF that support reform efforts in Croatia’s health 
care sector.
The link between the burden of health care financing for em-
ployers and the labour market needs to be explained in some detail. 
Mandatory health insurance contributions automatically increase la-
bour costs for employers by 15%. This encourages employers to hire 
workers on temporary contracts, to hire workers without registering 
them, or to substitute capital for labour. Such practices affect in particu-
lar the young, female workers and those who are not satisfied with their 
current jobs but do not actively seek other jobs (in which they could be 
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more productive) because of fear of unemployment. If health insurance 
costs for employers were partly reduced (several possibilities are dis-
cussed below), labour costs would be reduced proportionately without 
reducing net wages, which would most likely encourage employers to 
create new jobs. Health insurance reform is thus closely related to is-
sues of labour market flexibility and opportunities for increased em-
ployment.
Another important macroeconomic aspect of health care financ-
ing is the unfavourable mix between public and private financing. In 
both EU-15 and EU-10, expenditure of the public sector accounts for 
about 75% of total health care spending, and private expenditure for 
the remaining 25% (Annex Table A4). In Croatia, private expenditure 
accounts for about 16% of health care spending. However, patients 
pay virtually this entire amount (about 1.3% of GDP) out of their own 
pockets, as private health insurance is for all practical purposes non- 
existent. In EU-15 countries, out-of-pocket payments account for a 
slightly higher percentage of total health expenditure (about 17.5%), 
but private health insurance accounts for a significantly higher portion 
of expenditure (about 7.5%).xxxi In other words, Croatian citizens al-
ready pay for health care almost as much out of their pockets as EU 
citizens. The reform of health care financing should thus primarily cre-
ate conditions for redirecting one part of health insurance from HZZO 
to private insurance companies, while payments of citizens on average 
would not need to increase significantly. 
The HZZO, which accounts for 95% of total health care spend-
ing, has generally operated close to balance or with a small deficit 
(Graph 1). Expenditure growth was particularly strong during 1997-
2000, when it exceeded nominal GDP growth and nominal wage 
growth by a large margin (Graph 1). Strong expenditure growth (ex-
ceeding nominal wage growth) took place again in 2004, when the larg-
est HZZO deficit so far was recorded, exceeding 1 billion kuna (0.5% 
of GDP). One could conclude from these trends that the financial po-
sition of HZZO has so far been basically sustainable: revenues have 
tracked expenditures fairly closely, and when a deficit occurred it was 
reversed quickly. In addition, since 2001 HZZO revenue and spending 
have been growing more slowly than either nominal GDP or nominal 
wages, with the exception of 2004.
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Graph 1  HZZO revenues and expenditures (annual percentage changes,  
left-hand scale) and balance (million kuna, right-hand scale) 
Sources: HZZO (2006); DZS (2006); author’s calculations.
However, there are some important caveats to this conclusion. 
The first is that HZZO finances only a small portion of capital spend-
ing in the health care sector (less than 0.3% of total spending in 2005). 
The bulk of finance for capital spending is provided by the Ministry 
of Health, local governments and through foreign aid. Moreover, de-
preciation of fixed capital and equipment is apparently not counted as 
cost, thus understating total operating costs and raising serious ques-
tions about the capacity of the system for future investment. The 2002 
health care development strategy estimated that the real value of capital 
equipment in many health care institutions was reduced to 20% of book 
value (Office for the Strategy of Development of Croatia, 2002:9). 
The second caveat is that, from 1996 to 2003, HZZO accumu-
lated debt (as measured by outstanding bills) of over 2 billion kuna (1% 
of GDP). Complete data for 2004 and 2005 are not available, but add-
ing deficits in 2004 and 2005 to this figure yields an estimate of debt 
of about 3.7 billion kuna or 1.6% of GDP. Information about the serv-
icing of this debt is very patchy. According to the Ministry of Health 
(2006:21), during 2004 more than 3 billion kuna of outstanding HZZO 
debt (arising from bank loans and unpaid bills to wholesale drug suppli-
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ers) from 2000, 2002 and 2003 was repaid. But despite this settlement, 
by 2005 HZZO had been forced to take a loan of over 800 million from 
Zagrebačka banka to reduce its maturing debt (HZZO, 2006:2). Al-
though this loan represents a significant amount for HZZO (about 15% 
of total revenue), its accounts consistently show debt servicing costs 
of only about 0.3% of total expenditure. One can easily conclude from 
this piecemeal information that much greater transparency is needed in 
the financial reporting of HZZO and Ministry of Health before the fi-
nancial sustainability of the state-run health insurance system can be 
properly assessed.
REFORM PROPOSALS
The Croatian health care sector has been in a state of more or 
less permanent change since the early 1990s. While initial reforms fo-
cused on the transformation of the system inherited from the period of 
self-managed socialism, reforms in recent years have for the most part 
focused on various aspects of health care financing. The main goals of 
the 2000-02 round of reforms were thus to contain spending from the 
public sources; reduce the payroll contribution rate by limiting bene-
fits and increasing the share of private costs; and improve efficiency 
through reorganisation of the delivery system and devolution of greater 
responsibilities in primary and secondary care to the local authorities.
The latest round of reforms, launched in 2006, similarly focuses 
on cost containment. As shown in Graph 2, the fastest rising compo-
nents of health care expenditure between 2002 and 2005 were spending 
on specialised care, which expanded by 67% (i.e. at an average annual 
rate of 19%) and pharmaceuticals, which increased by 57% (i.e. at an 
annual rate of 16%). The costs in primary and hospital care were more 
or less contained, while expenditure on sick leave, maternity leave and 
disability allowances declined 2.5%. 
The key measures aimed at containing the rise in spending on 
pharmaceuticals is the introduction of a more restricted list of medi-
cines (so-called basic list) that can be obtained without co-payment, 
and the inclusion of a larger number of generic drugs on this list. Ac-
cording to official estimates, this measure will result in annual savings 
of some 300 million kuna.xxxii
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Graph 2  Main components of HZZO expenditure (billion kuna, left-hand scale) 
and cumulative growth of expenditure from 2002 to 2005 (%, right-
hand scale)
Sources: HZZO; author’s calculations.
In the primary care sector, possible measures listed by the 2006 
health care development strategy include reducing the number of pa-
tients to be covered by a team of physicians; encouraging group medi-
cal practice so as to reduce administrative costs; introducing the so-
called found-holding system of payments to general practitioners;xxxiii 
and certain measures to encourage preventative care (see HZSS, 2006: 
43-45). In the hospital sector, one proposal is to introduce payments 
based on so-called diagnosis-related groups.xxxiv However, details of 
these proposals have yet to be elaborated.
The macroeconomic aspects of health care financing have not 
been addressed by the latest reform, nor has much thought been given 
to eliminating other microeconomic distortions in health care financ-
ing (with the partial exception of primary care) and addressing vari-
ous market and government failures identified in this paper. Moreover, 
the mere announcement of key measures related to pharmaceuticals has 
met with stiff public opposition. One can therefore doubt that the lat-
est reform will provide more than temporary restraint on the growth of 
overall health care costs. 
A more fundamental shortcoming of the strategy is that it does 
not raise the issue of the healthcare costs of the ageing population. Re-
search for other European countries indicates that demands on health 
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insurance resources in order to finance expenditure related to ageing 
population and long-term care for the elderly will increase massively. 
OECD projections suggest that, in the absence of policy action, public 
spending on health and long-term care in the major industrial countries 
could surge from an average 7% of GDP in 2005 to 13% in 2050.xxxv 
The current “fire-fighting” problems of the authorities pale in compari-
son with the challenges that these long-term developments will pose.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: WHERE  
WE STAND AND HOW TO PROCEED
There are three main models of health care financing in devel-
oped market economies. Many continental European countries, includ-
ing Croatia, use so-called social insurance model, in which funding for 
health care – but also pensions, unemployment and other social risks 
– comes mainly from compulsory contributions (payroll taxes) paid by 
workers and their employers.xxxvi In the second, national health insur-
ance model, used in the United Kingdom, Sweden and Canada, among 
others, the principal source of funding is general tax revenue rather than 
specific contributions earmarked for health insurance. As a result, the 
health authorities have to compete for government funding with other 
users of public funds (education, transportation, etc.) much more in-
tensively. The third main model is used only in the United States. It is 
unusual in that most workers and their families are insured privately 
through their employers, so that private funding accounts for a much 
larger share of total health spending. But even the United States has 
two major public health insurance programmes: Medicare (for the eld-
erly) and Medicaid (for the poor), both financed through a mixture of 
general taxes and payroll contributions.
The three models have been slowly converging. The European 
and American models are assimilating elements of national health in-
surance: in France, social security contributions are now supplemented 
by revenues from personal and corporate income taxes; in the United 
States a big expansion of government spending on older people to help 
pay for their medicines will be financed from income tax revenues; and 
in the United Kingdom social security contributions were raised sig-
nificantly in 2002 to collect additional funding for the National Health 
Service.
These trends suggest that it is unrealistic for the Croatian au-
thorities and the public to expect that the current model of health care 
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financing can be retained. As noted above, about 80% of funding in this 
model comes from mandatory contributions that are paid almost entire-
ly by employers and are assessed on a relatively narrow tax base – sal-
aries of employees. Employed persons, in turn, account for only one-
third of the population and their share in total population will shrink as 
the process of ageing accelerates over the coming decades. Continued 
reliance on payroll tax will thus place an increasingly heavy burden on 
the productive labour force and on the economy.xxxvii 
This means that a significantly greater portion of HZZO fund-
ing should come from general tax revenues in the future. At the mo-
ment, it is not clear which part of health expenditure for the two-thirds 
of the population who are not paying payroll contributions is covered 
by transfers from the budget. The fact that the government often resorts 
to deficit financing to settle unpaid bills in the health care sector indi-
cates that these transfers are insufficient.xxxviii Since many citizens who 
do not pay contributions – in particular the elderly – are heavy users of 
health care services, it is appropriate that they contribute to the health 
budget. However, many old people do not have sufficient income to 
make meaningful contribution to health care financing. On the other 
hand, they contribute to general taxes through the value-added tax and 
excises (and, in some cases, personal income taxes), so from an equity 
perspective it makes sense to use more of this revenue to finance health 
care. Moreover, this approach is feasible because the authorities will 
anyway have to reduce spending on items such as economic subsidies 
as part of the EU accession process. 
The first major recommendation for health care reform is thus 
to change the HZZO financing mix in favour of general tax revenues 
transferred from the central and local budgets. As shown in Graph 3, 
Croatia stands apart from the old and new members of the EU in that the 
share of state health insurance funding is disproportionately high (80% 
of total health care funding) and the share of government budget dis-
proportionately low (only 3%). Another clear imbalance is the negligi-
ble share of private health insurance in health care financing.xxxix These 
imbalances have to change in the direction of the EU average. The first 
imbalance could be redressed as part of the annual budget process and 
need not even be called a reform. The main requirement would be to 
determine the proportion of health care costs for the two-thirds of the 
population who do not pay contributions that will be covered from gen-
eral taxes. The basic health insurance contribution rate and the employ-
er/employee split of that rate would not have to be changed at first, al-
though over time the contribution rate would have to be reduced in or-
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der to create conditions for stronger employment growth. In addition, 
much greater transparency would be needed with respect to the out-
standing debt of the health care system and its servicing. A related issue 
that would need to be addressed as part of a comprehensive reform is 
financing of capital expenditure in the health care system.
Graph 3  Structure of health care ﬁnancing in Croatia and European Union,
2003 (as a percentage of total health care expenditure) 
Sources: HZZO (2004); HANFA (2006); WHO (2006); author’s calculations.
The second major recommendation in terms of potential impact 
on HZZO finances would be to re-examine the social benefits and costs 
of the current system of sick leave and maternity leave allowances. 
As discussed in Section 5, Croatia has, internationally, one of the most 
generous systems of sick leave and maternity leave allowances, which 
together account for almost 1% of GDP. The sick-leave allowances 
in particular are open to abuse and there is really no reason why the 
state should bear the entire risk of workers’ absence from jobs due to 
illness. 
The long maternity leave – usually one year in Croatia, com-
pared with 16 weeks on average in most industrial countriesxl – is 
often defended as necessary to help increase the low birth rate. Howev-
er, it is probably not the most effective instrument to achieve this goal. 
As elsewhere in the world, the demographic trends observed in Croatia 
are of a secular nature and the low birth rate cannot be reversed by a 
single policy measure such as long maternity leave. Recent research in-
dicates that in OECD countries the greatest impact on the fertility rate 
comes from the female employment rate and availability of affordable 
�� ��
�
�� ��
��
��
��
��
�
��
��
��
��
��
�
��
�
�
��
��
��
���
������� ����� �����
�������
�����������
������������
���������
����������
������
���������������
�������������
��������������
���������
�������
�������
�����������
305
child-care facilities, which allows mothers to return to work relatively 
quickly after giving birth.xli Against this background, it might be per-
haps more beneficial for women and the society as a whole to reduce 
the length of maternity leave to, say, six months – which would still be 
generous by developed country standards – and to invest the funds thus 
saved in an expansion of subsidised child care facilities and simplified 
administrative procedures for part-time work of mothers. This would 
allow mothers to return to work earlier; new jobs would be created in 
this segment of the economy; and the funds the society has invested in 
education of women would perhaps be used more productively than is 
currently the case.
Finally, the issue of insufficient disability and veterans’ allow-
ances could be addressed by introducing so-called “zero pillar” of 
pension insurance. The aim of this pillar would be to prevent poverty 
among the disabled, veterans, the elderly and other persons with insuf-
ficient means to secure a minimum socially acceptable standard of liv-
ing for themselves. 
Regarding microeconomic aspects of health care financing, the 
government’s proposals to help control expenditure on pharmaceuticals 
are necessary and welcome. However, these measures deal more with 
the symptoms than the causes of the rapid growth of expenditure on 
medicines and can therefore be regarded as a temporary stop-gap meas-
ure. As discussed above, the escalation of costs of pharmaceuticals and 
specialised care can be traced to inappropriate incentives provided to 
the primary health care under the system of flat fees per patient. While 
this system is easy to administer and prevents over-billing of HZZO by 
primary care providers, any savings from these features of the system 
are now probably outweighed by the costs of prescription medicines 
and increased referrals of patients to specialised institutions. 
What is needed is a system of payments under which primary-
care providers would have an incentive to act as true “gatekeepers” of 
the health care system. One possibility could be fee-for-service pay-
ments based on the points system, with appropriate monitoring and 
auditing of bills submitted by primary care providers. This system is 
widely used in continental European countries and would probably 
be more effective in checking the rise in expenditure on pharmaceuti-
cals and specialised care than the series of piecemeal cost containment 
measures introduced over the years. 
Similarly, the direction in which the authorities are moving with 
regard to hospital and specialised care – implementing more wide-
ly the system of prospective payments based on therapeutic treatment 
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groups, and introducing a system of payments based on diagnosis- 
related groups – is necessary and welcome. However, the loophole in 
this system that allows hospitals to choose the billing options that are 
most advantageous to them (and, hence, more costly to HZZO) would 
need to be closed. 
Another widely recognised weakness of the Croatian hospital 
system that would need to be addressed over the medium term is lack 
of appropriate management skills.xlii Virtually the entire secondary and 
tertiary health care sectors are managed by physicians, who often lack 
the adequate training in strategic management, financial planning and 
other skills necessary for hospital management in a competitive mar-
ket environment. Moreover, physicians in the role of hospital manag-
ers face an inherent conflict of interest: as hospital managers, they de-
cide how to allocate the funds within the hospital, so they can direct the 
funds to the department where they spend these funds as physicians.xliii 
If these two functions are merged in one decision maker, impartial fi-
nancial control at the hospital level becomes very difficult. 
In addition, the functions of monitoring and auditing financial 
operations of health care institutions are apparently neglected and 
would need to be significantly strengthened. The authorities worldwide 
are working harder at getting better value for the money they provide to 
hospitals and specialised care institutions.xliv Health-care expenditure 
is rising not just because of new technologies and rising demand, but 
also because the health care sector is dominated by powerful providers 
– pharmaceutical and medical technology companies, hospitals and in-
fluential doctors – who find it fairly easy to pass on the costs from new 
medical technologies to the state.xlv 
The overriding goal of recent health care reforms in developed 
market economies is therefore to ensure more effective use of pub-
lic funds. One approach to this goal is to introduce more competition 
into healthcare markets, for instance, by allowing hospitals to keep fi-
nancial surpluses and reinvest them in services. A complementary ap-
proach is to turn to the private sector to provide more healthcare servic-
es. In particular, it is important to recognise that public financing does 
not have to mean public provision of health care. In most European 
countries, the health care sector functions as a mixture of public and 
private providers. In Croatia, aside from dental and partly primary care, 
the role of the private sector as a provider remains limited.xlvi One rea-
son for this state of affairs is that HZZO does not seem to have the ad-
ministrative capacity to process and monitor reimbursement of medi-
cal bills submitted by individuals and private providers for treatment in 
private medical facilities. 
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A more fundamental reason is that the authorities in Croatia 
have still not elaborated a consistent framework for private sector in-
volvement in the health care sector. What measures were taken in the 
past were taken randomly – for instance, the leasing of publicly-owned 
facilities for use as doctors’ private offices or the recent proposal to lease 
unused hospital capacity to private health insurance companies.xlvii Such 
partial measures have not made the system more efficient nor have they 
provided much benefit to health care users (although individual physi-
cians have realised significant benefits for themselves). 
The same conclusion applies to the development of private 
health insurance: a consistent institutional, regulatory and market 
framework in which private health insurance companies are expected 
to function and incentives for their development have yet to be elabo-
rated. As shown in Graph 3, private health insurance covers only 0.6% 
of total health care costs in Croatia, compared with 7% on average in 
EU-15 and 4% in EU-10. It is unrealistic, for instance, to expect that 
private health insurers will find much interest in the newly created mar-
ket for pharmaceuticals if the supplementary health insurance scheme 
operated by the HZZO will cover some of the costs of medicines not 
included in the basic list.xlviii In addition, there are indications that pri-
vate health insurance companies in Croatia are regulated perhaps too 
loosely, so that it is not clear they operate in the best interest of insured 
persons.xlix
This brings us to the next major area that has seen little progress 
over the years: reform of the co-payments system. Co-payments con-
tribute little to the overall health budget; they are difficult to administer 
because of many exemptions; and are disliked by the public. Yet having 
people participate in bearing the costs of health care is the first step to-
ward a true health care reform. Health is not a free resource and cannot 
be maintained without costs being incurred. The society does not benefit 
from unused medicines and unnecessary visits to the doctor. If people 
understand that each time they visit a doctor someone – including them-
selves – has to pay to cover the costs, such waste can be reduced.l Co-
payments should thus be understood as user fees – the cost of accessing 
the system of health care, similar to road tolls as the cost of accessing 
the system of highways. The current state of affairs is in that respect 
untenable: as shown in Figure 3, only 16% of health care spending in 
Croatia is covered from private sources, compared with the average of 
26% for EU members. Within the private sources of funding, there is in 
particular an imbalance between out-of-pocket expenditure, which is 
close to the EU average, and costs covered by private health insurance 
companies, which are way below the EU average.
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The experience of Slovakia shows that people are willing to ac-
cept the notion that good health is primarily their own responsibility 
and that every individual has to participate in health care financing.li 
Moreover, the Slovak experience shows that the introduction of a well 
designed co-payment system does not hurt access to health care.lii For 
their part, the authorities should contribute to this understanding by 
making much more serious, frequent and visible efforts targeted at the 
prevention of major health risks related to unhealthy lifestyles.
In summary, problems facing the healthcare sector in Croatia are 
not new or unique. Solid economic analysis and judicious use of other 
countries’ experiences lead to many well-tried solutions and allow us to 
avoid many mistakes. A key factor for the success of healthcare reform 
is the authorities’ ability to manage political economy aspects of the re-
form. The effects of health care reform are felt immediately by the en-
tire population. By contrast, the effects of pension reform are delayed 
and are felt by only one segment of the population at a time. The au-
thorities therefore need to manage expectations of different stakehold-
ers in health care reform much more carefully and actively. For a re-
form to succeed, the public needs in particular to see the forest for the 
trees: the authorities need to elaborate a clear vision of healthcare re-
form in whose centre stands good health for all Croatian citizens. The 
authorities would also be well advised to avoid the illusion that expe-
rience and possible success in implementation of pension reform also 
guarantee the success of health care reform.
Finally, one should emphasise that technical complexity of 
healthcare policy and reform should not be underestimated. Economists 
and healthcare experts in Croatia should therefore make a much more 
substantive contribution to health care reform than has been the case 
so far. This paper has indicated that more detailed research is needed in 
several areas. These include macroeconomic aspects of health care (fi-
nancial sustainability of the health care sector in the medium and long 
term; public and private sources of funds; the mix of taxes and con-
tributions among public sources of funds; impact of different financ-
ing models on the labour market; fiscal effects of decentralisation of 
health care); microeconomic aspects of health care (impact of differ-
ent financing arrangements on incentives, operations and efficiency of 
health care institutions; management of health care institutions; organi-
sation and regulation of markets for health care services, pharmaceuti-
cals and health insurance); and the political economy of health care re-
form.
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i  There is some empirical evidence on this effect. In the late 1970s, the RAND 
Corporation did an extensive study randomly assigning families to health plans 
with co-payment levels at 0%, 25%, 50%, or 95%, up to a maximum amount of 
6,000 US dollars. As expected, the less that people were asked to pay for their 
health care, the more often they visited the doctor (see Phelps, 1993).
ii  Here one should distinguish between routine visits to the doctor (for minor 
illnesses such as colds, light injuries, etc.) and preventative health care (e.g. 
annual medical, dental and vision check-ups). In addition to clear medical 
rationale, preventative care is also in the economic interest of health insurance 
companies, whether publicly or privately-owned. This is reﬂected in the fact that
insurance often covers the cost of check-ups up to a certain limit. Many health care 
commentators fail to notice the difference between routine visits and preventative 
care; see e.g. Gladwell (2005) in an otherwise highly stimulating article on moral 
hazard in US health insurance.
iii  This statement can also be applied to many western European countries at the 
moment. 
iv  For a comprehensive review, see McGuire and Mayhew (1989).
v  This information monopoly can be reduced through better education and greater 
availability of medical information through media, in particular the internet.
vi  There is no empirical research to support this claim, but there is widespread 
anecdotal evidence that patients in Croatia often experience situations in which 
doctors prescribe treatment without discussing in detail the pros and cons of the 
treatment with the patient and his or her family (see: www.pravapacijenata.hr and 
Vjesnik, 21 August 2006). Another indication of inadequate information provided 
to patients in Croatia is the practice of writing diagnoses in Latin, which sets 
doctors in Croatia apart from their colleagues in other European countries (see 
Vjesnik, 12 and 13 August 2006).
vii  Based on HZZO data published in Vjesnik, 10 October 2005.
viii  Instead, one often gets the impression that the authorities have adopted a cavalier 
attitude vis-à-vis some health risks, in particular smoking; see, e.g. complaints 
about smoking in ofﬁces and public rooms in the Ministry of Environmental
Protection and the Ministry of Culture (“Smoking is forbidden and they smoke 
‘like Turks’”, Vjesnik, 16 August 2006, Readers’ mail). Another case in point is the 
public reprimand of an assistant minister of health who announced in May 2006 
that the government was preparing a stricter law on smoking in public places 
that would be aligned with EU legislation. That statement was denied by the 
government the same day with an explanation that the existing law already deﬁned
clearly where one could and where one could not smoke (Vjesnik, 1 June 2006).
ix  The bribery case against the head of heart surgery in clinical hospital in Rijeka 
(see Večernji list, 17 August 2006) has highlighted a situation long denied by the 
healthcare profession. For instance, the Croatian Physicians’ Association has 
processed only four cases of bribery since 1995 (Vjesnik, 19 August 2006).
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x  A typical case is that of a patient who comes for a check-up in a state health facility 
in the morning and is told by the doctor that she needs certain diagnostic tests. 
The tests are free but the waiting list is so long that, for non-urgent cases it could 
take months to get an appointment. However, if the patient is willing to pay out of 
her pocket, she could take the tests that same afternoon in the same facility from 
the same doctor, as it becomes doctor’s own private ofﬁce after regular working
hours.
xi  Physicians were subject to income tax for this type of work but did not have to pay 
the value-added tax. This practice was ended in mid-2006. However, physicians 
will still be allowed to work outside their full-time job (at most one-third of working 
hours) and in service of private insurance companies, which will be allowed to 
rent excess hospital beds and rooms (Poslovni dnevnik, 24 March 2006). To their 
credit, the authorities at least admitted that private work of physicians in health 
institutions in which they held full-time jobs was unethical (ibid.).
xii  Indeed, without referring to government failure, the 2002 health care development 
strategy concludes that “Croatia needs a health care system that will be serve 
the health of the population, not its own survival” (Ofﬁce for the Strategy of
Development of Croatia, 2002:12).
xiii  The main references for this section are McKee, MacLehose and Nolte (2004); 
McKee [et al.] (2004); and Božičević and Orešković (2004).
xiv  See Poslovni dnevnik, 21 July 2006 (www.poslovni.hr).
xv  Useful and concise sources of information on the health care sector in Croatia are 
WHO (2005), Stevenson and Stubbs (2003) and Mastilica and Kušec (2006).
xvi  The standardised mortality rate for all alcohol related diseases (including liver 
cirrhosis, ishaemic heart disease, mouth and oropharynx cancer, trafﬁc casualties,
falls and intentional injuries) in Croatia is 195 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, 
compared with 155 deaths in Austria; 97 in France, Greece and Italy; and 89 in 
Portugal (WHO, 2004a:57). 
xvii  This deﬁnition includes physically inactive and minimally active population. For
details see Country proﬁles on WHO’s Global InfoBase Online (http://www.who.
int/ncd_surveillance/infobase/web/ InfoBaseCommon/).
xviii  See for instance MZSS (2006:16, 17, 30), where smoking and alcohol consumption, 
mentioned more or less incidentally, are the only health risks discussed, partly 
in the context of increased immigration into Croatia in the second half of the 
1990s. Obesity and physical inactivity are nowhere mentioned in this strategic 
document.
xix  See MZSS (2006:17).
xx  For details, see World Bank (2004) and two recent strategies for the health care 
sector: Ofﬁce for the Strategy of Development of Croatia (2002) and MZSS
(2006).
xxi  Trend decline in the provision of preventative services was noted already several 
years ago: in 2000 there were 79% fewer check-ups of adults, 41% fewer check-
ups at patients’ homes and 89% fewer home visits than in 1990 (Ofﬁce for the
Strategy of Development of Croatia, 2002:11).
xxii  Each primary care doctor is expected to carry at least about 1,700 patients per year 
on a roster. This is relatively low compared with EU average (2,000-2,500 patients 
per primary care doctor) and indicates that a considerable potential for “piling-
up” of patients does exist. The lower ﬁgure was apparently chosen deliberately in
order to encourage physicians to work in under-served areas, where they could 
earn more under the system of capitation payments. 
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xxiii  There are some solid indications that patients in Croatia have a tendency towards 
excessive use of medicines; see Vjesnik, 10 October 2005. A particular problem is 
excessive use of antibiotics, which can lead to the development of resistant forms 
of bacteria and thus put in danger not only the health of the patients but also that 
of all other people.
xxiv  See Article 17 of the Health Insurance Law (www.hzzo-net.hr).
xxv  These include children and students, retirees, the unemployed, people receiving 
minimum income, recruits in mandatory military service and war veterans.
xxvi  See DZS (2006).
xxvii  For instance, the 2001 Household Budget Survey shows that for about 7% of retiree 
households, health costs represented more than 10% of total spending (World 
Bank, 2004:41). A survey by Mastilica and Božikov (1999) found that total out-of-
pocket health care expenditure represented over 17% of income for individuals in 
the lowest 25% income group, compared with less than 3% for the top 25% income 
group.
xxviii  See for instance Večernji list, 17 July 2006 and 2 August 2006.
xxix  This includes employees in private and public sectors, the self-employed and 
farmers.
xxx  Who exactly bears the burden of health contributions (and what part of it) – 
whether the employer at the expense of proﬁts or workers at the expense of wages
– cannot be determined because there has been no research on the incidence of 
payroll taxes, nor on elasticity of labour demand and supply in Croatia (I am 
indebted for this insight to Sandra Švaljek). However, one can assume that health 
care contributions increase the cost of labour regardless of who pays them.
xxxi  The share of private expenditure on health care in EU is 25%. Out of this, 70% 
is ﬁnanced by the households and 30% by private insurance companies. Out-of-
pocket payments are thus 17.5% on average (=0.25x0.70), which is somewhat 
higher than in Croatia (16.4% in 2003).
xxxii  See Poslovni dnevnik, 12 April 2006.
xxxiii  Under the system of found-holding, ﬁnancial resources for health care are allocated
on a per capita basis and are held in a fund, with the general practitioner usually 
deciding on the allocation of resources in the fund. The ﬁnancial incentives offered
by this scheme are in the form of control over budgets to be spent on patient care 
and not in the form of personal ﬁnancial incentives. A disadvantage of this system
(noted in the United Kingdom) is that it might introduce some inequities in the 
provision of health care.
xxxiv  Under payment system based on diagnostic groups, patients are categorised on the 
basis of diagnoses and resources needed for their hospital treatment. This system 
can help reduce costs to the health insurance compared with the fee-for-service 
scheme, but introduces other incentives that might give rise to high costs, such 
as categorising patients into more complex and therefore expensive diagnostic 
groups (so-called “code creep”).
xxxv  See OECD (2006) and European Commission (2006). 
xxxvi  This model is often referred to as Bismarckian, named after the greatest German 
statesman of the 19th century Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898). One should note 
that at the time Bismarck introduced Europe’s ﬁrst social security system (which
comprised health, old-age retirement and disability insurance) his main concerns 
were to appease the working class (and thereby reduce socialism’s appeal to 
the public) and prevent poverty among the old. The social security system was 
ﬁnancially viable because average life expectancy at the time was around 55 years 
(see Oeppen and Vaupel, 2002).
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xxxvii  The authorities have made some progress in this regard by gradually reducing the 
contribution rate from 18% in 1998 to 15% in 2004. Despite the reduction in rates, 
more revenue was collected from contributions, suggesting that a combination of 
improved collection and reduced exemptions had a positive effect.
xxxviii  For instance, in 2002 the central budget transfer to HZZO dropped to 9% of HZZO 
revenues, down from 16% in 2001. At the same time, the government borrowed 820 
million kuna (6% of HZZO revenues) to pay back the old arrears vis-à-vis health 
care suppliers (World Bank, 2004:40). 
xxxix  The share of private health insurance companies is calculated from gross health 
insurance premia paid (amounting to 105 million kuna in 2003, based on HANFA 
(2006)), and total health expenditure based on WHO (2006).
xl  See Clearinghouse on International Developments in Child, Youth and 
Family Policies at Columbia University (www.childpolicyintl.org/issuebrief/
issuebrief5table1.pdf).
xli  See D’Addio and D’Ercole (2005). Among countries with the highest fertility rates 
in OECD are the Scandinavian countries, France and the United States, which 
at the same time have some of the highest female employment rates. On the other 
hand, even though in Italy and Spain only every third woman works, the birth rate 
is just 1.3 children per woman.
xlii  See Poslovni dnevnik, 1 June 2006 and 31 July 2006.
xliii  This insight comes from Vlado Puljiz; see Poslovni dnevnik, 1 June 2006.
xliv  See the leading article in The Economist, 18 August 2005.
xlv  One enduring myth in health care economics is that costs of health care are rising 
because of the rapid advance and increasing availability of expensive medical 
technologies. However, despite the widespread use of new medical technology, 
health care costs have followed very different paths in different countries, indicating 
that much of the increase in costs has been supply-induced (Hsiao, 2000). Jones 
(2005) highlights the importance of increasing demand for health care services as 
a determinant of rising health care costs.
xlvi  In 2003, only 3 special hospitals and 4 health resorts out of 73 hospitals and 
health resorts were privately owned. Out of a total of 6,660 registered medical 
practices, about 2,800 were privately-owned, of which as many as 2,400 were 
dentists’ ofﬁces. More than half of some 1,100 pharmacies were privately owned
(WHO, 2005a).
xlvii  See Poslovni dnevnik, 24 March 2006.
xlviii  See Lider, 17 March 2006; Poslovni dnevnik, 19 May 2006; and Vjesnik, 17 August 
2006. On the development of private health insurance companies see a very useful 
study by OECD (2004).
xlix  See World Bank (2004:19-21).
l  Statements by some politicians that Croatian citizens are not ready to accept the 
shift of a part of health care to the market clearly do not help the cause of health 
care reform (see e.g. Poslovni tjednik, 16 June 2006). If Croatian citizens are not 
ready to accept more market-based health care, how can the Croatian state be in 
a position to accept it? It is interesting to note in this context that Croatians spend 
on average more on mobile phone bills (about 360 euros per year) than on health 
care (about 350 euros per year). One should not question consumer rationality, 
however, faced with undistorted price of health care, consumers would be certainly 
be able to choose between spending on health and mobile phones. 
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li  See Pažitny, Zajac and Marcinčin (2005). For a comprehensive overview of 
experiences with health care reform in OECD countries see Docteur and Oxley 
(2004).
lii  The basic principles for an efﬁcient and equitable system of co-payments are
well-established in the health economics literature and include: high co-payments 
for small, frequent, cheap and everyday diseases; low or no co-payments for 
rare, severe and costly diseases, for patients suffering from chronic diseases 
or disabilities, and for preventative health care (annual check-ups); lower co-
payments for the poor and the elderly; and an upper limit on health care costs as 
a percentage of annual income (see Osterkamp, 2003a; 2003b).
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ABSTRACT
One of the most demanding European Union policy areas, the 
environment has become important in the accession negotiations pro-
cess. Transposition of the acquis, ensuring its adequate implementation 
and absorbing the pre-accession funds constitute an enormous task for 
any, particularly a small, candidate country. Croatia is, in this respect, 
facing a great challenge and this article shows that there is still a long 
way to go. The lack of financing strategies and carefully planned time-
tables for implementation of the obligations sends a clear message that 
decisions should be made and actions taken immediately.
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INTRODUCTION
The environment is considered a serious social and economic 
issue that needs to be addressed comprehensively if we are to accom-
plish and preserve the quality of life for ourselves and the generations 
to come. Environmental policy began in response to local problems, 
but later spread across national borders, for environmental degradation 
caused general concern and induced thorough scientific research. 
Over the years, the EU has shown a great interest in environ-
mental protection and most probably became a global frontrunner in 
this issue. It was realised as early as the 1970s and 1980s that the inter-
governmental organisation or supranational body, as it was, would have 
a great impact on its members. Since that time, the EU has created an 
impressive number of legislative documents and policy papers related 
to the environment. Some of these have been more effective than oth-
ers, which have been ineffective due to the lack of stringent penalties or 
to reluctance on the part of governments in EU member states. 
Nevertheless, quite a lot has been achieved. For the environ-
ment, the accession process is a great opportunity and impetus for ac-
tion. As a candidate for EU membership, Croatia is facing great chal-
lenges. From institutional to administrative and financial demands, 
Croatia has to fulfil a great number of goals in a very limited time – the 
currently available EU funds and programmes might be a useful tool to 
meet the requirements posed by the EU.
The aim of this article is to present the background and con-
text of the environmental policy in the EU, with the emphasis on the 
process in Croatia, mainly based on the use of the pre-accession pro-
grammes – to present what is yet to come and what needs to be ad-
dressed, based on both the current state of affairs as well as the authors’ 
personal knowledge and experience in dealing with both environmental 
issues and EU affairs. 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
One might argue that it all started in the late 1960s in Sweden 
when a decrease of the wood stock was detected, which resulted in a 
serious analysis of the correlation between industrial activities and for-
est degradation. The polluting countries thought they had “solved” their 
problems by building tall chimneys to ensure that pollutants would be 
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taken into the atmosphere and transported hundreds of kilometres away. 
It was only when the economic consequences of environmental degra-
dation were extensive enough that a substantial and holistic analysis of 
the problems and possible solutions was performed. Scientific research 
proved that the soil acidification present in Sweden, a country the econ-
omy of which relies on the wood stock, was a result of the high indus-
trialisation of the countries in the West – pollutants in the air were car-
ried by air currents across borders (McCormick, 1999). 
The protection of the environment is an ideal example of how 
certain policies need to be addressed on the international level, al-
though specific problems are raised locally (Connelly and Smith, 
1999). The outcome of the growing concern and interest in the environ-
ment was the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
held in Stockholm in 1972. This was the starting point of the global en-
vironmental protection policy: the international community recognised 
the importance of the problem of the depletion of natural resources as 
well the significance in relation to the future development of the world. 
They stressed the need for a common approach in solving global prob-
lems, such as climate change or water pollution, as well as, and most 
importantly, consciousness of the co-dependency of the living world on 
this planet. 
One of the most important dates in environmental history is 
surely 1992, when the UN conference in Rio was held. At that mo-
ment, the whole world was involved in the discussion on the mutual 
dependence of economic development and environmental protection. 
Not only did government representatives, academia and scientists par-
ticipate, but the non-governmental organisation (NGO) community as 
well. It was a truly global conference. The conclusion was that environ-
mental protection should not be a limiting factor for economic devel-
opment but its integral part and impetus and that the balance between 
them was necessary and also possible. The result of those discussions 
was a new principle, so embraced and exploited by many later, named 
“sustainable development”.i This concept was unique in the sense that 
it focused on the long-term goals and interlinked the economic, social 
and environmental aspects of life. 
Consequently, the environment has become an increasingly pop-
ular topic not only for academia and professionals, but for the public as 
well – today being environmentally conscious is practically even syn-
onymous with being trendy. At the same time, the movement has out-
grown the borders of states and even continents, and the idea of protect-
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ing the planet against reckless and thoughtless destruction has become 
part of our everyday lives. The optimism and idealism of the 1990s 
has been overshadowed by concerns about globalisation. For that rea-
son the 2002 UN conference in Johannesburg dedicated to the achieve-
ments in creating and maintaining sustainable development was a great 
disappointment (IEEP, 2005). Not only were the targets set in 1992 in 
Rio not met, but also the level of interest and involvement of the coun-
tries that have an important global impact was extremely low. Never-
theless, the EU remained a positive example – although many issues 
have not been resolved, quite a number of actions have been undertak-
en with the ultimate goal of achieving sustainable development (Euro-
pean Commission, 2005b). 
THE EUROPEAN UNION  
AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The European Communities, later the European Union, were 
originally created as an economic trading block. Through time, eco-
nomic interests were outgrown and it evolved into a community that 
places the environment and sustainable development among its core 
principles, even in its treaties. European environment policy has be-
come increasingly ambitious over the course of time and has resulted 
in significant environmental improvements (Connelly and Smith, 1999; 
Mintas-Hodak, 2004). At the same time, competitiveness, as well as 
economic growth and jobs, are vitally important, sometimes leaving 
environmental and sustainability principles aside rather then being in-
tegral to them. 
Recently, due to other issues emerging on the EU level, espe-
cially political matters such as the European Constitution or social re-
forms in its members, the environment is no longer high on the agen-
da. On top of that, the recent enlargement has induced higher costs and 
necessitated reforms in the functioning of the EU institutions, result-
ing in a reluctance for further enlargement. Also, periodically, the EU 
is rethinking its existence, which is obviously happening right now; 
therefore other issues are put aside, while national interests are in fo-
cus. Certainly, an impact on the environmental sector exists and time 
will show to what extent. 
It has become evident that environmental protection is a de-
manding and very costly segment in all EU activities. Environmental 
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policy does not have a sectoral character like other EU policies. On the 
contrary, it is a significant part of all the segments of human life – from 
health and human rights to social welfare and economic growth, and 
therefore environmental aspects have to be addressed in all of them. 
Year by year the size and complexity of regulation is expanding and de-
mands strong commitment from and the understanding of all the stake-
holders. 
In the past, in certain cases enlargement resulted in improve-
ments in the EU environment policy (European Commission, 2006). 
Those members who had had a significant experience in the environ-
mental sector influenced EU policy making in a positive manner, pro-
moting their national policies when joining the EU. One must not forget 
that the member states have a variety of attitudes towards the protection 
of the environment – some are more enthusiastic than the others, some 
have a stronger public awareness of the importance of the problem and 
some lack both the public and governmental decisiveness to make a 
change (EEA, 2005b). On the other hand, if the latest enlargement with 
ten new countries in its best sense becomes as efficient as predicted, the 
EU will continue to be a role model in the environmental sector. The 
intergovernmental and supranational character of the EU enables it to 
impose binding laws on its members, which is significant for the envi-
ronmental sector, since their implementation is sometimes extremely 
demanding. 
Today, many problems are rooted in the way Europeans use 
land, the economic conditions and the ways of life. Recent reports have 
shown that the trends in caring for the environment are not encourag-
ing (EEA, 2005b). Individual awareness of the impacts of certain activ-
ities on the environment and their link to health would definitely make 
a difference. Public polls have shown that there is a great support from 
the EU citizens for preservation and improvement of the state of envi-
ronment, as a result of a growing public awareness of the gains over 
the past decades, ever since environmental action has been recorded 
(Eurobarometer, 215/2004). The main reason is that Europeans value 
the quality of life. Reports from EU institutions (both the Commission 
and European Environment Agency) have proven that there is need for 
joint action from governments and citizens to shape economic devel-
opment in line with “the Earth’s carrying capacity”. Consequently, the 
more Europe uses the opportunity to achieve an environmentally sound 
development the greater is the chance that it will affect global trends. 
Another issue should not be forgotten – many argue that EU environ-
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mental policy is not focused or efficient enough, that it is not adequate-
ly strong to induce radical changes in the society (EEB, 2006). Most 
likely, greater attention should be given to the political willingness to 
implement the acquis at the national level. Otherwise, the state of af-
fairs and the outlook will be worse than if no action had been under-
taken. 
Politically, the EU considers environmental protection a bright 
example of its international leadership. The Union tends to present the 
decisiveness of its twenty five members that in jointly deciding on their 
goals and the means to achieve them, for the purpose of securing social 
justice, economic prosperity and a sound environment for its citizens, 
as a model for the rest of the world. 
ENVIRONMENTAL  ACTION  PROGRAMMES
As the EU is a supranational authority, its policy-making institu-
tion, the Commission, has an important role for all its members and, of 
course, future members. In line with EU international activities related 
to the environment, through the decades the Commission has created a 
line of environmental action programmes (EAPs) that were supposed 
to be used as a framework for future actions. Six of those programmes 
have been prepared and presented – through time they developed from 
those in the seventies that were strictly focused on strong regulation 
and control mechanisms, via those in the eighties that introduced mar-
ket instruments, to the very latest measure, which is focused on the cre-
ation of thematic strategies for each sector identified as resulting in ma-
jor environmental damage (EEA, 2005a). 
The first and second EAP were adopted for the period 1973-
1981. They were both based on the UN Conference on the Human En-
vironment held in Stockholm in 1972 and were to some extent ideal-
istic in approach. This was the beginning of Community environment 
policy, therefore both action plans were focused on the prevention, re-
duction and containment of environmental damage, the conservation of 
an ecological balance and the rational use of natural resources. It was 
the first time that an environment policy document was created for its 
own purpose without being subordinated to internal market objectives. 
The approach in those two plans was top-bottom.
The third EAP, 1982-86, and the fourth EAP, 1987-1992, were 
more related to the completion of the internal market. The third was 
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concentrated on the risks and benefits of environmental policies to the 
internal market. The fourth was adopted in the same year the environ-
ment gained its own chapter in the Treaty. It was focused on the econ-
omy of the environment: environmental aspects were a part of the pro-
duction process in order to reduce energy or material inputs in the pro-
duction cycles, resulting not only in the improvement of the state of the 
environment, but in production costs reduction, and hence in more fa-
vourable outcomes for each side. Finally, both small and large compa-
nies had to be involved, with the realisation that the investments in pro-
duction would be significant, while the benefits would be achieved in 
the medium-term perspective. Furthermore a set of new economic in-
struments was introduced – taxes, subsidies and tradable emission per-
mits. 
In 1990s the fifth EAP was in place with some innovations, 
based on external factors that influenced and changed the approach to 
the environment:
• sustainable development approach,
• integration of the environmental dimension into the sectoral policies,
• new market-oriented instruments,
• role and involvement of the public, NGOs and local authorities,
• defining medium and long-term objectives.
At the same time, there was a certain resistance from some mem-
ber states. Now that measures had become specific, they called for ap-
plication of the subsidiarity principle so that environmental policy was 
brought down to the national instead of the EU level. As a response to 
that, a number of less stringent measures were introduced – softer and 
more voluntary. It should be concluded that the Commission overesti-
mated the willingness of its members to adopt the legislation and prin-
ciples and the economic problems cast a shadow over the promotion of 
the new incentives. 
In recent times, especially with the fifth EAP, it has become evi-
dent that certain sectors need to be specially addressed in the environ-
mental context – those that were identified as the main sources of envi-
ronmental deteriorationii. The integration of environmental aspects into 
sectoral policies would be used to induce changes. Precisely for that 
reason, the last, sixth EAP, is crucial for imposing the need to create 
thematic strategies for the environment, in order to create strong sec-
toral guidance, with a clear timetable for the necessary action. The in-
tegration of the environment into sectoral policies is a continuous pro-
cess and its successfulness depends on a mixture of political commit-
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ment, appropriate structures in place, processes and even individual ef-
forts. Only if public and business jointly participate with government 
will it be possible to create new objectives and revalue the presently 
available instruments. The sixth EAP takes the inadequacies of the pre-
vious EAPs and underlines them as new strategic goals, pointing out 
and introducing cooperative approaches with industry. The aim is to in-
fluence key environmental areas – climate change, nature protection, 
health and the environment, sustainable use of natural resources and 
waste management (European Commission, 2001).
It can be assumed that the shift from the top-bottom approach 
and insistence on the transposition of the acquis to the concept of hav-
ing different thematic strategies, which requires careful strategic plan-
ning and assessment, will be highly beneficial for the EU candidates. 
Instead of having independent legislation to adopt and implement, the-
matic strategies would introduce a clearer context and timeframe. 
ACCESSION PROCESS
The EU accession process related to environment is the chal-
lenging one – to become a member, the candidate has to make efforts to 
fulfil the requirements set by the EU by regulating the adoption of the 
environmental acquis, composed of more than three hundred different 
regulations related to the air and water pollution, chemical, waste man-
agement, biotechnology, protection from the radioactive radiation and 
preservation of natural resources. The environmental chapter is consid-
ered to be one of the most complex ones. The combination of build-
ing or rebuilding the economy in transition while fulfilling the environ-
mental standards is characterised as a challenging process, if not close 
to impossible. It is of the utmost importance that the standards are ad-
opted by future members, not only for the benefit of the general state of 
the environment in Europe, but also to prevent “environmental dump-
ing” in countries that have less rigorous legislative frameworks. Priori-
ties in transposing the acquis include:
• framework legislation,
•  measures initiated from the international conventions signed by the 
EU,
• reduction of global and transboundary pollution, 
• nature protection to preserve natural resources, and
• measures that ensure the functioning of the internal market. 
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The costs of compliance are relatively higher for countries with 
a low population, Croatia being a case in point. Therefore, the Com-
mission has proposed the creation of financial strategies to evaluate the 
real costs of compliance. Those strategies need to be in line with the 
national strategy for the adoption of the acquis and must have a clear 
timetable of concrete investments, especially for the key areas – water 
and air quality and waste management. This is essential for the appro-
priate and efficient use of the pre-accession instruments, which will be 
referred to later. 
Obviously, all these would also present a long-term benefit for 
the candidates. Not only would they be able to function on the common 
market, they would be able to improve the quality of life, reduce the 
costs of health protection as well as those costs resulting from the dete-
rioration of forest, agricultural land or fish stock. A study financed by 
the Commission concluded that over the period 1999-2020, the over-
all benefits of compliance with the environmental acquis for candi-
date countries (excluding Croatia) would amount to between 134 and 
681 billion euros, assuming full implementation is achieved in 2010 
(ECOTEC, 2001). 
CROATIA’S PATH
In October 2005 the European Council decided that the negotia-
tions with Croatia should begin. Only six months later, Croatia started 
the first part of the negotiations related to the environment. The screen-
ing phase for Chapter 27 Environment of the negotiation process, it 
was claimed, was likely to last longer than that for other chapters. The 
explanatory phase of the screening was used to prepare the national re-
view and evaluation of what had already been done, and which actions 
were crucial for the further transposition. Of course, that is a serious 
and not an easy task. Not only does it require a revision of the legisla-
tion that is in force in Croatia at the moment, but also entails a serious 
and profound evaluation of what can possibly be achieved in a realistic 
timeframe, in which way and with which financial sources. In this re-
spect, it is essential to use the pre-accession funds in the most efficient 
way, at the same time consulting other possible sources of financing, 
especially bilateral. 
It is to be expected that certain areas will be identified for which 
Croatia might request transitional periods. Based on the experience of 
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other candidates, it would not be possible to expect approval in some 
issues such as:
• transposition of directives into the national legislation,
•  framework legislation (air, waste, water, environmental impact as-
sessment, access to information),
• nature protection (habitat and birds),
• legislation related to product regulation, and
• introduction of new technologies. 
Transitional periods can be expected in areas where there is a 
need for substantial investment in the infrastructure, which is then pro-
longed through a longer period of time, without jeopardising the eco-
nomic development.iii If the procedures are not changed in the Com-
mission, for each and every sub-sector of the environment, Croatia 
would have to prepare a detailed plan of transposition and implemen-
tation, which would include a specific and detailed timeframe and re-
quired administrative capacity for successful implementation of the ad-
opted regulationiv. Part of this process is the complexity of using the 
financial assistance from the EU in the most effective way. As was the 
case with other candidates, Croatia has to acknowledge its comparative 
advantages and promote investment in the environment sector in order 
to create and develop its competitive areas. 
Through the last six years, the relationship between the EU and 
its members on one side and Croatia on the other has been defined 
through different documents. It was the aim of these papers to define 
the economic relationship and in addition to address other issues, such 
as the environment. It will become clear through this short review to 
what extent these documents affect national policy making, especially 
in the context of the pre-accession funding. 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement, signed by Croatia in 
2001, was the beginning of the contractual relationship between the EU 
and Croatia and was, in some aspects, utilized more extensively than 
had been foreseen (NN – Treaties, 14/02). Its aim was to prepare and 
induce reforms that would eventually lead to the EU membership. Spe-
cifically, in Title VIII Cooperation Policies, in Article 103, the Agree-
ment stipulates the areas of environmental protection that need to be 
especially addressed, with the aim of  “combating environmental deg-
radation, with the view to promoting environmental sustainability”.v 
Along with this new type of European Agreement, the Commission 
has introduced a new CARDS programme in order to streamline its as-
sistance (Council Regulation, 2666/2000). The representatives of the 
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Commission paid a visit to Zagreb in 2001 for the very first program-
ming mission to Croatia.vi During consultations, Croatian representa-
tives managed to secure a small, but relevant amount of funds for the 
environment. Through the CARDS programme 4.85 billion euros are 
planned to be provided to this region from 2000 to 2006 for investment, 
institution building, and other measures. Although these funds were not 
sufficient for all that is necessary, this framework was a starting point 
in identifying possibilities for other donors and partners as well. 
After presentation of Croatia’s application for EU membership 
in April 2003, the Commission prepared the Opinion on Croatia’s Ap-
plication for Membership (Avis). Interestingly enough, six months after 
Croatia had handed in the answers to the questionnaire, in the conclu-
sions of the Opinion, the environment was identified as a separate is-
sue. It was emphasised that “very significant efforts would be need-
ed, including substantial investment and strengthening of administra-
tive capacity for the enforcement of legislation” and that “full compli-
ance with the acquis could be achieved only in the long term and would 
necessitate increased levels of investment” (European Commission, 
2004b). However, the Commission recommended that the negotiation 
process should be initiated. 
In order to identify priorities that needed to be addressed in the 
stage of accession preparations, the Council adopted the Decision on 
Principles, Priorities and Requirements contained in the Accession 
Partnership with Croatia in November 2005 (European Commission, 
2004c; European Commission, 2005a). The Accession Partnership 
highlights short-term (1-2 year period), medium-term (3-4 year peri-
od) and long-term priorities. These concern further development of the 
legislative framework as well as its effective implementation. Taking 
into account the substantial costs required for implementation and en-
forcement of the environmental acquis as well as the complexity of it, 
the time-driven division of priorities and planning is of the utmost im-
portance. 
Annually, in line with the Accession Partnership, Croatia has to 
prepare a National Programme for the Integration into the EU with the 
clear timetable of both specific legislative and non-legislative measures 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, 2006). The 
progress in implementing the priorities is regularly monitored by the 
Commission through the annual Progress Report.vii The 2005 Report 
examined whether planned reforms referred to in the 2004 report had 
been carried out, investigated new initiatives, and assessed the overall 
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level of alignment in each of the areas under consideration. In the envi-
ronment sector, the Commission recognized that most of the problems 
highlighted in the Avis remain present and continue to pose a threat to 
successful implementation of the acquis. The Opinion’s conclusion that 
Croatia needs to make considerable and sustained efforts in the envi-
ronmental sector does not appear to have led to any significant change 
in the overall importance attached to environmental protection by the 
government. One of the resultant tasks is the creation of the coordina-
tion structures and logical coordinating mechanism. They have to be in 
place horizontally, between the national competent authority and other 
relevant line ministries and state administration bodies to overcome the 
high fragmentation of responsibilities, and vertically, between the na-
tional and local environment authorities. 
The National Environmental Strategy, adopted by parliament in 
2002, is based on the principles of sustainable development and deals 
with the state of the environment, international obligations, key objec-
tives and priorities and also includes the state of affairs and trends as 
well as actions to be undertaken in priority areas (NN 46/02).viii The 
National Environmental Action Plan attached to the Strategy comprises 
detailed action plans for individual thematic environmental protection 
areas and economic sectors. The plan includes objectives, measures to 
achieve objectives, the level of actions, authorized implementing bod-
ies, time schedules and possible sources of finance. The document sets 
out preliminary implementation assessments of the targeted measures 
indicating the need for significant investment increases in these sectors, 
as pointed out in the Avis and the previously indicated strategic docu-
ments. Even so, we can argue that neither the strategy nor the plan has 
been an implementable document, lacking specific steps to the fulfil-
ment of what has been envisaged, without efficient monitoring in place 
and guidance on the management of the possible financial sources.
FINANCIAL CHALLENGES OF  
THE ENVIRONMENTAL ACQUIS
As already stated above, legal transposition is the first step of 
the accession process, but the implementation and enforcement of the 
legal acts are crucial matters that require careful financial planning. 
At the moment, Croatia is faced with this costly task of achieving full 
compliance with the environmental acquis. Transition periods or post-
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ponement of implementation of certain directives due to their high cost 
implications will only be granted on the basis of sound justification 
within the implementation plans for the directives contained in Chap-
ter 27 Environment of the acquis. The crucial component of the imple-
mentation plan is an investment or financial strategy for the implemen-
tation of the concrete requirements prescribed by the specific directive. 
Those investment strategies should be reflected in the overall national 
financial strategy for all the requirements in the environment sector. It 
should be used as a tool for the government to forecast the scale and 
timing of funds that are essential to fulfil the EU requirements (admin-
istration, staffing, monitoring equipment and infrastructure). That doc-
ument is a precondition for efficient utilisation of the Structural and 
Cohesion funds available once Croatia is a member of the EU. 
Since no thorough calculations connected with the fulfilment of 
obligations arising from harmonization of legislation have been made, 
the financial strategy is going to be the immediate priority in this sector. 
According to some rough estimates the total environmental investments 
aimed at reaching the average EU standards for water, air and waste sec-
tors will amount to at least 1.5 to 2 thousand euros per capita, totalling 
6.6 to 8.8 billion euros. To this amount, annual operating costs have to 
be added, which makes these expenditures extremely high. Most of the 
costs will be related to water protection and waste disposal.ix
Obviously, the EU financial assistance in the pre-accession pe-
riod will only cover a minor part of all the resources required in the en-
vironment sector. However, it will significantly contribute to the de-
velopment of administrative structures and capacities for future signif-
icantly larger financial allocations under the Structural and Cohesion 
funds. The uniqueness of the Croatian case is the number of available 
EU financial instruments in their different implementation and prepa-
ration stages. We are speaking about the CARDS programme 2001-04, 
Pre-accession programmes PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD 2005-06 and 
Instrument for Pre-accession assistance (IPA) from 2007 until member-
ship. This situation makes the complex functioning of EU funds even 
more challenging.
CARDS Programme
Within the CARDS 2001-04 cooperation policies framework, 
the environment and environmental integration into other policy areas 
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have been clearly acknowledged. Environment, as cooperation policy, 
was reflected in two main documents – Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 
and Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP). CARDS support iden-
tified in MIP aims at improving the implementation and enforcement of 
existing national legislation, further alignment with environmental ac-
quis, building capacity in the public administration and environmental 
NGOs, raising awareness of consumers and the private sector. The ex-
pectations of the accomplished actions are formulated in three straight-
forward results within MIP: an agreed strategy for EU approximation 
in the field of the environment, the systematic use of environmental im-
pact assessment for investment proposals, and an improved system of 
environmental monitoring. 
The financial agreements signed under the CARDS programme 
2001-04 are worth 262 million euros. The financial allocations for the 
environment and natural resources are rather small compared to the 
overall annual allocation (Table 1). Co-financing is not required for 
projects within CARDS programme – in other words, they are in the 
form of grants.
CARDS 2001, 2002 and 2003 annual programmes in environ-
ment have been completely contracted, while the environment com-
ponent of the budget year 2004 is currently in the process of tender 
preparation. This fact actually shows that planning, preparation and im-
plementation of the programmes are time-consuming tasks to be per-
formed according to stringent, sometimes rigid EU procedures, which 
primarily require a well-trained and experienced administration. 
Pre-accession funds 
The strategic document of the Commission on progress in the 
enlargement process has elements of pre-accession strategy for Croa-
tia and presents the basis for utilization of the EU pre-accession funds 
PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD (European Commission, 2004d). For the 
implementation of those programmes 105 million euros were allocated 
in 2005 and 140 million euros in 2006.x 
The particularity of pre-accession programmes, in comparison 
to CARDS, are the substantially larger allocations, focused on finan-
cially larger projects with obligatory co-financing from the national 
budget as a tangible sign of commitment and ownership of the pro-
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grammes. The co-financing rate varies in accordance with the rules of 
each programme.
Graph 1 European Union allocations to Croatia (million euros)
To contribute to the achievement of full compliance with the EU 
requirements in the negotiation of Chapter 27 Environment, the 2005 
PHARE contribution of 4.5 million euros (5% of 2005 total) has been 
allocated to interventions in the enhancement of environmental inspec-
tion and designation of NATURA 2000 sites in Croatia.xi The latter will 
be extremely important in future structural fund investments since all 
interventions in these areas will be systematically assessed. In 2006, an 
additional 80 million euros are available but only around 5 million will 
be allocated for two projects in environment sector. 
These figures demonstrate the tendency of the Commission 
to have focused and financially substantial projects to secure signifi-
cant impact rather than the diffused actions that were found in CARDS 
programme. The PHARE assistance is clearly acquis-driven, in other 
words, it is focused on projects aimed at the transposition and imple-
mentation of acquis requirements. 
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In order to prepare Croatia for the accession, ISPA provides fi-
nancial support to economic and social cohesion, in particular to the 
environment and transport (European Commission, 2004a). Financial 
assistance is provided only to the environmental projects identified as 
a priority in the national Environment ISPA Strategy. These projects 
should enable Croatia to comply with the requirements of the environ-
mental acquis and Accession Partnership priorities, mainly in the ar-
eas of water supply, wastewater treatment and solid waste management 
(See Table 2). 
Table 2 Key Investment-Heavy Directives xii 
Water Supply/Wastewater Treatment
Urban Wastewater Treatment 
Directive
Drinking Water Directive
Dangerous Substances into Water 
Directive
Nitrates Directive
Waste Management
Landﬁll directive
Municipal Incineration Directives
Hazardous Waste Directive
Packaging Waste Directive
Air Pollution Control
Large Combustion Plants Directive
Fuel Quality Directives
Air Quality Directives
Industrial Pollution  
Prevention Control
Industrial Pollution Prevention 
Control (IPPC) Directive
Volatile Organic Compounds 
(VOC) Solvents Directive
The allocation of ISPA funds to each country is calculated on 
the basis of the criteria of population, GDP per capita and surface area. 
Croatia has programmed the whole 2005-06 allocation for the envi-
ronment sector – Karlovac Water and Waste Water Programme (ISPA 
funding 22.5 out of total 36 million euros) and the construction of the 
Bikarac regional waste management centre in Šibenik and Knin Coun-
ty (ISPA funding 6 out of the total of 8.8 million euros). Although all 
the available funds are programmed, at this stage the importance lies in 
project implementation, which has to be undertaken according to previ-
ously agreed stringent conditions. Apart from its primary focus on the 
“heavy” investments, ISPA has also contributed to building know-how 
and administrative capacity which has been supported by technical as-
sistance in training on procurement procedures, financial management, 
project preparation of technical documentation and cost-benefit anal-
ysis. Solid project preparation is a basis for successful financing not 
solely for EU programmes, but also for any other available funding. 
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SAPARD, worth 25 million euros, aims at supporting sustain-
able agricultural and rural development. It is designed to solve prob-
lems affecting the long-term adjustments of the agricultural sector and 
rural areas and to help implement the acquis in matters of the common 
agricultural and related policies. The programming basis is the Nation-
al Rural Development Plan in which measures for financing are identi-
fied. The Plan gives priority to the improvement of market efficiency, 
quality and health standards, retaining existing jobs and the creation of 
new employment opportunities in rural areas. In implementing these, 
due attention has to be given to provisions of environmental protec-
tion. In that sense, SAPARD will, by favouring projects with an en-
vironmental dimension, directly influence the integration of environ-
mental considerations in Croatian agricultural and regional policy. The 
National Rural Development Plan with the identified priority measures 
was prepared in April 2006, but due to the demanding programme im-
plementation procedures, the selection of projects will only take place 
by the end of 2006.
Future Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance
Building on the experience from the recent accession process, 
the EU wants to rationalise the pre-accession aid it provides to the can-
didate countries and potential candidates of the EU. The Commission is 
currently in the process of proposing a regulation aimed at streamlining 
pre-accession assistance by enhancing coordination between the dif-
ferent components to incorporate the CARDS, PHARE, ISPA and SA-
PARD instruments into one – the Instrument for Pre-accession Assis-
tance. The beneficiary countries will use its five components: I Transi-
tional assistance and institutional building, II Cross-border and regional 
cooperation, III Regional development, IV Human resources develop-
ment and V Rural development. Concerning the environment, the funds 
will be available under regional development component for ISPA-like 
investment projectsxiii with emphasise on its bridging function to the 
Structural Funds available upon accession. Currently, for component 
III and IV national authorities in consultation with the Commission are 
preparing Strategic Coherence Framework document. They are also 
starting a discussion on Operational Programmes which identify pri-
ority measures to be financed by EU in the next three years. Although 
faced with uncertainty about what IPA will entail in the future, Croatia 
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has to define its priorities and objectives to be able to utilise it to the 
full. In this respect know-how gained through project prioritisation and 
preparation to date will be a valuable experience in the future.
In the Table 3 a short overview of priorities under various EU 
programmes is presented, expanding from technical assistance to sub-
stantial infrastructural investments.
It must be stressed that Croatia has also been benefiting from a 
Community programme as third country in the sector of environment 
– LIFE-Third countries (2001-06). The objective was to complement 
other mentioned programmes in the establishment of capacities and ad-
ministrative structures, the development of environmental policy and 
various action programmes. Croatia has shown high performance in 
proposing good quality projects and attained 5.7 million euros in a five-
year period. Unfortunately, within the next EU financial perspective 
2007-13, LIFE programme funds will be limited to the member states.
From the general overview of the available programmes and fi-
nancial allocations, a substantial rise of funds in the environment sec-
tor is evident. From a yearly average of around 3 million euros, being 
the least funded sector through the CARDS programme, the allocation 
for the environment sector increased to 19 million euros per year un-
der ISPA and PHARE in 2005 and 2006. The allocation from 2007 on-
wards is still under discussion. The figures presented so far confirm 
the importance of environmental protection in EU policy as well as the 
existing investment gaps in Croatia. The further increase of allocated 
funds would present a great advantage for the financially demanding 
sector of the environment but could only be successfully utilized if the 
required responsibility, ownership and capacity are in place. 
Management of the assistance 
In the previous years, the assistance was implemented in the so-
called centralised manner, which means that the Commission was re-
sponsible for the implementation of the programmes. Since October 
2004 when Croatia became a candidate, it has initiated preparations 
for assuming full responsibility and ownership of CARDS and the pre- 
accession assistance programmes. This process, known as decentrali-
sation of financial assistance lasted for about a year.
In the second half of 2005 the Commission accredited the Cen-
tral Financing and Contracting Unit within the Ministry of Finance as 
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the implementing agency. From February 2006 the Commission con-
ferred the management of CARDS, PHARE and ISPA on the Croatian 
authorities, allowing them to take full ownership of programming, ten-
dering and implementation of those programmes. The Commission will 
only keep some functions of tendering and contracting ex-ante control. 
Conferral of management of SAPARD is expected to present a special 
challenge to Croatia, as it did to other candidate countries. The man-
agement of SAPARD goes one step further in terms of national respon-
sibility to the so-called extended decentralised implementation system, 
which requires structures and implementing rules identical to those in 
member states. 
Decentralisation of financial assistance is a sign of the Commis-
sion’s confidence in national institutions to manage funds efficiently 
and according to the highest standards of sound financial management. 
It is also a part of the obligations that Croatia has to fulfil in the frame-
work of Chapter 32 Financial Control of the acquis in the course of ne-
gotiations. 
The importance of EU funds utilisation should be seen as an in-
tegral part of the negotiations process for all the chapters of the acquis. 
Projects should be seen as a tool for achieving the accession goals and 
their outputs and activities should be seen as part of the overall na-
tional EU integration planning process. Croatian absorption capacity 
will be closely monitored by the Commission and, based on those as-
sessments, the future allocations will be calculated. The overall admin-
istrative capacity in the environment sector at national, regional and 
local level will determine the level of the absorption of available EU 
funds. Accordingly, an appropriate staffing policy is a key to successful 
institutional capacity strengthening, which requires a careful develop-
ment of long-term plans to recruit and train staff. In order to streamline 
the allocated EU funds according to Croatia’s particular needs to fulfil 
the stringent environmental standards imposed by the EU, additional 
efforts need to be dedicated both to the decision-making level in the ad-
ministration to set the priorities in the environmental sector, as well as 
to the operational level, to successfully manage the programmes. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The EU has taken the opportunity to embrace environmental 
protection as its own separate policy after the realisation that economic 
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prosperity is highly environment-dependent and affected by the deple-
tion and deterioration of the natural resources. From non-existence in 
terms of policy, the environment has become one of the most important 
and demanding concerns, resulting in a substantial body of legislation 
and strategic policy documents. Those documents served as a frame-
work for action, which led to the improved state of the environment 
in Europe. Consequently, during the fifth wave of enlargement, each 
candidate faced major challenges in alignment with the EU standards, 
primarily related to insufficient administrative capacities and scarce fi-
nancial resources. The same, naturally, applies to Croatia, and therefore 
problems and tasks should be evaluated realistically time-wise as well 
as bearing in mind the available capacities at local, regional and nation-
al levels. 
It is evident that one of the aspects of fulfilling the accession 
requirements would be an efficient usage of the pre-accession funds, 
bearing in mind the specific conditions Croatia is facing at the moment, 
handling a number of diverse programmes in their different phases of 
existence. Clearly, there needs to be logical sequence of operational 
phases – strategic planning and defining priorities, transposition, im-
plementation plans and corresponding financial strategies, horizontal 
and vertical coordination in the administrative structure, strengthening 
institutional capacity – all essential preconditions for EU funds absorp-
tion.
The available EU funds are insufficient. Therefore there is a 
need for a detailed plan for attaining other sources in the coming years. 
In addition to the fact that EU and bilateral assistance needs to be used 
as efficiently as possible, extra sources should be foreseen and other 
economic incentives for environment protection should be promoted. 
Croatia has a unique opportunity to assess the present situation in the 
EU members concerning the environment and adopt the most efficient 
practices.
Transposition and implementation of the complex environmen-
tal acquis should not be considered a burden but an instrument to im-
prove the environmental conditions and to endorse specific economic 
activities that could be considered a comparative advantage for Croatia. 
Finally, the efforts to comply with EU environmental standards are not 
limited to the government administrative structures. The mere aware-
ness of the social and economic consequences if Croatia fails to pre-
serve the environment should lend additional support to progress in this 
demanding area of change. 
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*  The authors’ positions in this article do not reﬂect the ofﬁcial standpoints of the
respective institutions. The authors would also like to thank Katarina Ott and the 
anonymous referees on their valuable comments.
i  “Sustainable development is a development that meets the needs of the present with-
out compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World 
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987).
ii  The most important sectors identiﬁed as those that have the strongest inﬂuence on
environment are agriculture, tourism, industry, transport and energy. 
iii  Substantial investment is required for sewage system, wastewater treatment, munici-
pal waste management and drinking water supply.
iv  Sub-sectors are Nuclear safety, Water protection and management, Monitoring of 
atmospheric pollution, Prevention of noise pollution, Chemicals, Industrial Risk and 
Biotechnology, Space and natural resources, wild fauna and ﬂora, Waste manage-
ment and clean technology.
v  Cooperation priorities are numerous: water quality and wastewater treatment, pre-
vention of air and water trans-boundary pollution, effective monitoring, climate is-
sues, safe handling of chemicals, safety of industrial plants, waste management, soil 
erosion due to agricultural activities, protection of ﬂora and fauna, effective plan-
ning, use of economic and ﬁscal instruments, implementation of environmental im-
pact assessment and strategic impact assessment, approximation of laws, interna-
tional conventions, regional and international cooperation, education and informa-
tion. The Article also included the protection against natural disasters.
vi  Programming mission is a process of consultation between the representatives of the 
Commission and Croatian delegation in order to identify priority areas for funding.
vii  The Progress Report contains an analysis of the situation with respect to the politi-
cal criteria for membership, an assessment of Croatia’s situation and prospects with 
respect to the economic criteria for membership, review of Croatia’s capacity to as-
sume the obligations of membership, that is the acquis, and brieﬂy examines the ex-
tent to which Croatia has addressed the Accession Partnership priorities.
viii  In the Strategy the following general priorities in environmental protection have 
been established: enforcement of environmental regulation; raising public aware-
ness of the need to protect the environment; integrated approach to pollution abate-
ment (especially as regards air, the sea, water and soil) and actions targeted at the 
prevention of waste generation (waste management system); sustainable manage-
ment of natural heritage and natural resources: soil, waters, the sea, landscape, 
the Adriatic coast and islands; reduction in the consumption of energy coming from 
non-renewable sources; enhancement of environmental quality in urban areas and 
improvement of health and safety, especially through industrial risk management.
ix  A rough break-down of costs related to meeting the requirements that arise from leg-
islative harmonization: water protection 40-45% of the total costs, waste disposal 
35-40%, air quality protection 8-10%, nature protection 4-5%, industrial pollution 
control and risk minimization 2%, horizontal legislation harmonization 0.3-0.4% 
and the rest 0.1% (World Bank, 2003). 
x  In 2005 PHARE amounted to 80 million and ISPA to 25 millions euros. In 2006 
PHARE amounted to 80 million, ISPA 35 million and SAPARD 25 million euros. 
xi  NATURA 2000 is the European ecological network of special areas of conservation 
aimed at protecting biodiversity.
344
xii  Investment-heavy directives are those requiring substantial ﬁnancial resources for
their implementation.
xiii  ISPA-like investment projects are costly infrastructure projects in water supply and 
treatment of wastewater and solid waste.
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Chapter 13
PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE SEA 
AREAS: THE NEED FOR REGIONAL 
COOPERATION IN THE ADRIATIC SEA
Davor Vidas∗
The Fridtjof Nansen Institute
Oslo, Norway
ABSTRACT
The paper discusses the need for the designation by the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization, of the Adriatic Sea as a Particularly Sen-
sitive Sea Area (PSSA). The rationale for this inheres in the special fe-
atures of the Adriatic Sea area, while the policy context has been set by 
the trend of European Union countries to advocate the proclamation of 
PSSA in marine areas surrounding Europe. Firstly, the PSSA concept 
is briefly reviewed and the current status of designations assessed. Se-
condly, the emerging policy of the EU towards PSSA proclamations is 
focused on and pressing reasons such as tanker accidents are highlig-
hted; some background factors, such as the restructuring of oil tran-
sportation flows in Eurasia are commented upon. Thirdly, key featu-
res of the Adriatic Sea as corresponding to the criteria for the designa-
tion of PSSA are explained, including the basic characteristics of the 
area, status and trends of international navigation here, and present and 
potential associated protective measures to address the risks. Also, the 
Croatian initiative towards regional cooperation on an Adriatic PSSA is 
briefly presented. And finally, some conclusions on prospects for regio-
nal cooperation towards a PSSA in the Adriatic Sea are made, conside-
ring contrasts and commonality in that area. 
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the EU has expressed its strong commitment to 
the prevention of environmental catastrophes resulting from shipping 
accidents along, in particular, the Atlantic coast of Europe, in the Baltic 
Sea, and in the Mediterranean Sea. As one of the key means to this ef-
fect, the identification of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas has been ar-
gued for by the EU countries within the International Maritime Orga-
nization (IMO).
The PSSA concept was not widely used as an instrument of ma-
rine environmental protection until recent years. This trend, as far as 
seas off the European coasts are concerned, was partially prompted by 
the Prestige disaster.i A broader reason is the on-going changes in oil 
transport through Eurasia, and the resultant increased intensity of oil 
tanker traffic on the existing routes, as well as the introduction of new 
traffic directions in the seas surrounding Europe. This trend will conti-
nue, primarily as a result of several current and planned oil pipeline in-
tegration and construction projects in the region. 
While the proposals of the European countries for a PSSA in the 
Atlantic waters off their coasts, as well as in the Baltic Sea, have recen-
tly been adopted by the IMO, this has not been the case with the remai-
ning sea singled out, the Mediterranean Sea. Given the heterogeneity of 
the Mediterranean situation, a joint proposal of all those states for the 
entire Mediterranean does not look like a realistic option. 
Within the Mediterranean Sea, however, there are several sea 
areas which may benefit from a PSSA status, and where a joint propo-
sal of the states concerned may significantly enhance management of 
the risk posed by international shipping. The Adriatic Sea is a clear and 
pressing example. Recently, Croatia expressed its interest in playing a 
key role in a joint regional proposal for a PSSA in the Adriatic Sea.
This paper discusses the need for the designation by the IMO of 
the Adriatic Sea as a PSSA. The rationale for this inheres in the speci-
al features of the Adriatic Sea area, while the policy context was set by 
the trend of the EU countries to advocate the proclamation of PSSAs 
in marine areas surrounding Europe, as well as by other broad proces-
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ses such as the evolving EU Marine Strategy. These considerations of 
the trends in the IMO and EU, as reflected in the special situation of 
the Adriatic Sea, have determined the structure of the paper. Firstly, the 
PSSA concept is briefly reviewed, and the current status of IMO desi-
gnations assessed. Secondly, comments on the emerging policy of the 
EU towards PSSA proclamations are provided; apparent reasons such 
as tanker accidents are highlighted, while some background factors, 
such as the restructuring of oil transportation flows in Eurasia, are com-
mented upon. Thirdly, key features of the Adriatic Sea as corresponding 
to the IMO criteria for the designation of PSSA are explained: (i) basic 
characteristics of the area; (ii) status and trends of international naviga-
tion here; and (iii) present and potential associated protective measures 
to address the risks. Following from this, the recent Croatian initiative 
for regional cooperation on an Adriatic PSSA is briefly presented. And 
finally, some conclusions on prospects for regional cooperation tow-
ards a PSSA in the Adriatic Sea are made, considering contrasts and 
commonality in that area; but also comments on the Adriatic Sea as a 
region in the context of the EU Marine Strategy, and on the need for the 
establishment of all-Adriatic cooperation on marine environmental pro-
tection are added. An Adriatic PSSA would be an important first step in 
that direction. Institutionalization of all-Adriatic regional cooperation, 
perhaps through a body such as an Adriatic commission for marine en-
vironmental protection, involving all six Adriatic states – Albania, Bo-
snia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Italy, Montenegro and Slovenia – could 
be the next step worth considering.
WHAT IS A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE  
SEA AREA? 
The Particularly Sensitive Sea Area concept 
in a nutshell
A PSSA is a marine area that needs special protection through 
action by the IMO because of its significance for recognized ecological 
or socio-economic or scientific reasons, and because it may be vulnera-
ble to damage by international shipping activities. 
Designation of a PSSA through the IMO is currently based on 
the revised Guidelines adopted by the IMO Assembly in December 
2005.ii The Guidelines define three sets of criteria: 
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•  ecological criteria, such as the naturalness, integrity or fragility of an 
ecosystem, 
•  social, economic and cultural criteria, including significance of a sea 
area for tourism, fishing and other socio-economic dependency, as 
well as the cultural heritage, and
•  scientific and educational criteria, meaning that the sea area has high 
importance for research and exceptional educational possibilities.
Not all of the criteria listed in the Guidelines need to be satisfi-
ed in every particular case; it suffices that some, and at least one, of the 
criteria are met throughout the area. In conjunction with that, however, 
it is crucial that the area is at risk, whether actual or foreseeable, of da-
mage from international shipping activities (not other maritime activi-
ties alone). Related to the risk so posed, associated protective measures 
within the competence of the IMO should be available.
Thus, identification of any PSSA requires consideration of three 
integral components: (i) the particular conditions of the sea area to be 
identified; (ii) the vulnerability of that area to damage by internatio-
nal shipping activities; and (iii) the availability of associated protective 
measures within the competence of the IMO to address risks from these 
shipping activities.
When an area is approved by the IMO as a PSSA, and so desi-
gnated, specific measures can be used, subject to approval by the IMO, 
to reduce the risk created by the shipping activities in that area. Those 
measures can comprise ships’ routeing such as traffic separation sche-
mes and areas to be avoided, mandatory vessel reporting systems, ap-
plication of discharge restrictions, prohibited activities or compulso-
ry pilotage schemes. While many of those measures can be adopted 
through separate procedures, and based on IMO conventions such as 
MARPOL, SOLAS and some others, an IMO-designated PSSA pro-
vides today a well-established political and legal framework within 
which measures for a certain sea area can be adopted in a more syste-
matic but also innovative manner.iii This aspect can be especially im-
portant in seas surrounded by several coastal states, such as enclosed or 
semi-enclosed seas, where states need to be more oriented towards re-
gional cooperation.
In addition, the designation of a sea area as a PSSA highlights 
the need for special caution to be exercised here by shipping activity, 
and thus contributes to an enhancement of the awareness of the sensi-
tivity of the area. The intention is not to restrict shipping activity, rat-
her to ensure adequate risk management regulation in areas where in-
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ternational shipping poses a particular threat. The IMO Guidelines aim 
at a thorough consideration – based on relevant scientific, technical, 
economic and environmental information – of all interests involved re-
garding the sea area concerned: those of the coastal state, flag state, as 
well as the environmental and shipping communities.
Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas to date:  
the European Union taking over
Ten sea areas have been designated by the IMO as PSSAs: 
•  the Great Barrier Reef (proposed by Australia, adopted by the IMO 
in 1990; and extended in 2005, on a proposal by Australia jointly 
with Papua New Guinea, to include Torres Strait), 
• the Sabana-Camagüey Archipelago (Cuba, 1997), 
• Malpelo Island (Columbia, 2002), 
• the marine area around the Florida Keys (United States, 2002), 
•  the Wadden Sea (jointly proposed by Denmark, Germany and the 
Netherlands and adopted by IMO in 2002), 
• Paracas National Reserve (Peru, 2003), 
•  the Western European Atlantic waters (Belgium, France, Ireland, Por-
tugal, Spain and the United Kingdom; 2004), 
•  the Baltic Sea area, except Russian waters (Denmark, Estonia, Fin-
land, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden; 2005), 
• the Galapagos archipelago (Ecuador, 2005), and 
• the waters of the Canary Isles archipelago (Spain, 2005).
As can be seen at the first glance, most of the PSSAs were pro-
posed and adopted only in the past few years; and out of the total of 
six marine areas adopted as PSSA in the past four years (from Octo-
ber 2002 to October 2006), four were proposed by EU countries. Even 
more striking, among the total of 22 countries to have submitted propo-
sals to the IMO, most – 15 altogether – were EU countries, acting eit-
her individually or, more often, jointly. Several of the PSSAs were ado-
pted to protect an archipelago, islands or a reef. What can not be seen 
from the list is that the PSSA concept – initially seldom used and, per-
haps more important to note, rather politically neutral – has in the past 
few years become heavily politicized.iv
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THE EUROPEAN UNION AND PARTICULARLY 
SENSITIVE SEA AREAS: RESPONSES TO 
CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES
Responses to marine pollution incidents 
Prompted by a row of major tanker accidents off European co-
asts in the 1990s, the EU adopted several regulatory packages, known 
as “Erika” (after the name of the last ship in the 1990s accidents line).v 
The catastrophe of the single-hull, 26 year old tanker Prestige off the 
Atlantic coast of Spain in November 2002, however, had a triggering 
effect for a major EU “offensive” also on the global, IMO level.vi One 
key string of that was the request to the IMO for accelerated phasing-
out of single-hull tankers carrying heavy-grade oil.vii The other was an 
EU countries campaign aimed at IMO proclamation of several Europe-
an sea areas as PSSAs. The two were not unrelated, as soon confirmed 
by the measures proposed within the application for the Western Euro-
pean Atlantic PSSA (discussed below).
In addition, as of July 2003 the EU strengthened regulations to 
accelerate various restrictions on single-hull tankers using ports of the 
EU countries – starting with heavy-grade oil prohibition (a type that, 
incidentally, amounts to only a fraction of the oil imported into EU 
ports).viii 
During its EU presidency, Ireland announced its strong com-
mitment to securing greater protection against environmental catastro-
phes resulting from shipping accidents in the Baltic Sea, waters off the 
Atlantic coast of Europe, and in the Mediterranean Sea.ix The propo-
sals for PSSA designation of the first two sea areas mentioned were 
soon made, and eventually adopted at the IMO. However, for the third 
sea singled out, the Mediterranean as a whole, no PSSA proposal has 
ever been made, nor does it look very likely to follow. The Mediterra-
nean, bordered by over twenty coastal states, is characterized by both 
political heterogeneity and division into several more compact ecologi-
cal sub-regions. As a whole – and even under the unlikely hypothesis 
that its numerous and divided group of coastal states agreed on a joint 
PSSA proposal – the Mediterranean would hardly satisfy the criteria set 
by the IMO for a PSSA. Quite to the contrary, however, certain parts of 
the Mediterranean can be seen as clear PSSA candidates.
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European proposals in the  
International Maritime Organization
Following the Prestige disaster, by the end of 2002 and in early 
2003 a plethora of EU bodies considered the PSSA a policy option to 
be used at the international level. Formally, however, the proposals can 
only be attributed to the states concerned.
In April 2003, six EU countries submitted to the IMO a joint 
proposal for the designation of a PSSA in a vast marine area called 
“West European Atlantic Waters”.x Measures proposed related to sin-
gle-hull tankers carrying heavy-grade oil, and included the requirement 
on restrictions of transit through the area (withdrawn after various in-
terventions from other states, including Japan), and a reporting obliga-
tion within a 48-hour notice period. The latter measure persisted, tho-
ugh doubts have been expressed whether a PSSA was actually needed 
for that purpose. Some commentators have coined this PSSA a “politi-
cally sensitive sea area”.xi
Soon after, in December 2003, the Baltic states, excluding Rus-
sia, proposed to the IMO the designation of the Baltic Sea – excluding 
Russian waters – as a PSSA.xii There was no new measure appended 
to that proposal, though. At the same time, the discussion over accele-
rated phasing out of single-hull tankers returned to other IMO agenda 
(MARPOL amendments), while talks with Russia on that matter regar-
ding the practice in the Baltic have been entered into.
Formally, neither the West Atlantic nor the Baltic PSSA propo-
sal is an “EU proposal”. In the real world, while supporting both pro-
posals, the EU acted in the IMO as a voting block and, together with 
other votes attracted, gained a majority in favor for both proposals. The 
West Atlantic PSSA was adopted at the IMO in 2004, and the Baltic 
Sea PSSA in 2005. 
Both proposals, and especially the Baltic, attracted strong criti-
cism from Russia, as well as from several countries where a high ton-
nage of the world fleet is registered, such as Panama and Liberia. In 
addition, stakeholders such as shipping industry associations (INTER-
TANKO and others) added their voices. While Russia, seconded by 
“flags of convenience” states and shipping industry associations, was 
the main opponent of the European proposals for PSSA proclamations 
in the Atlantic waters and the Baltic Sea, in the latter case, as of 2005, 
it was joined by firm support given in the IMO deliberations by states 
such as China and India.
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The wider context: oil pipelines  
in Eurasia and maritime transport
There is also a wider context for the marine environmental pro-
tection initiatives advocated by the EU in the recent years. The key re-
ason behind them is conveniently summarized in the 2003 Energy Poli-
cy Communication from the European Commission, stating:
“The accidents of the Erika and the Prestige, and the significant 
environmental damage caused by the resulting oil spills, has highlig-
hted the necessity for concerted action between the European Union 
and neighbouring countries to ensure the highest possible safety stan-
dards for the maritime transportation of oil. Given the increasing den-
sity of the maritime traffic in the waters around the EU, it is of utmost 
importance to give a higher priority to considering, where economical-
ly and technically feasible, the alternative of transporting oil by pipe-
lines. This is considerably safer and more environmentally friendly. A 
number of pipelines already link the European Union with Russia and 
it is important to ensure that not only are these fully utilised, but also 
that new pipeline infrastructure are considered instead of new mariti-
me-based projects” [emphasis added].xiii
These considerations, while highlighting environmental con-
cerns, are also of a strategic nature, and are related to energy security. 
The Eurasian space has witnessed major changes since the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, which led to the creation of a number of indepen-
dent states in the oil-rich Caspian region. And in the late 1990s, Rus-
sia itself re-emerged as the second (after Saudi Arabia) most important 
global oil exporter, due to increased production and stagnating dome-
stic consumption. Change in the infrastructure for oil transport from 
producers to consumers, however, has not followed the speed of these 
geopolitical changes; that infrastructure is still to a large extent based 
on organizations and relationships of the Soviet era. That system, thro-
ugh the interconnection of oil pipelines and tankers, is currently able to 
transport Russian crude (Urals) through the Transneft network leading 
in three main directions.xiv One is to Central Europe via the Druzhba 
system (facing serious bottlenecks); the other leads overseas through 
the Baltic Sea ports (none of which is a deep-sea port accommodating 
Very Large Crude Carriers);xv and the third, also overseas, is through 
the Black Sea ports, limited already due to the Bosporus Strait “absor-
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ption capacity”. Moreover, Caspian region states’ oil exports will be 
adding to the load on the already heavily congested Bosporus.
For the EU, and especially the large industrial countries of con-
tinental Europe, the prime concern in oil import is not the increased vo-
lume (such as for e.g. China), but rather the diversification of sources 
of import. While the annual increase in oil consumption in those coun-
tries is relatively small, and far below major overseas consumer mar-
kets, the US and big Asian countries, the key concern for continental 
European countries is their proportionally high dependence on Russi-
an and OPEC oil imports. The increased import of Caspian region oil, 
however, can in future be facilitated by the integration and completion 
of regional pipeline networks, thus directly connecting Black Sea ports 
(such as Constanta in Romania, or Odessa in Ukraine) to the Europe-
an mainland, avoiding transit through the Bosporus; but also competing 
with Russian oil in the Baltic and Black Seas. 
If one were to summarize this broad trend by selected key-
words, those include “diversification”, “pipelines” (land routes) and 
“Caspian oil”. There is, of course, much fine-tuning to be performed. 
On this type of oil issue, the EU is far from being a compact unit; there 
are many differences between the individual countries, the key one be-
ing in the entirely different situation between the big countries of con-
tinental and island Europe. Moreover, there are differences in the rela-
tions of certain large European countries with Russia. Along with that, 
the issue of investments needed for new major projects is always pre-
sent. 
The Mediterranean: a sea where one  
quarter of world oil is transported
Focusing on the Mediterranean, there is one striking feature of 
the maritime uses of that enclosed basin, connected to the rest of the 
ocean space only by the narrow straits of Gibraltar and the Bosporus, 
and the Suez Canal. An estimated 30 percent of international sea-bor-
ne trade, including around one-fourth of global oil maritime transport, 
transits the Mediterranean Sea, the surface of which represents less 
than 1 percent of the world marine area! 
While a large volume of oil is transported here, a major share is 
however in transit for destinations beyond the Mediterranean: to conti-
nental Europe, northern European ports, as well as overseas. In additi-
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on to OPEC oil from the Middle East and North African ports, around 
one third of annual Russian oil exports (around 62 million tons) is lo-
aded on tankers in the Black Sea ports and transits the Bosporus Strait 
every year. With high traffic congestion, as well as measures introdu-
ced by the Turkish authorities, the Bosporus Strait is one of the serious 
bottlenecks for global oil transport; the waiting time for tankers in win-
ter to transit the Strait can be several weeks, resulting in huge costs for 
delays. Moreover, the Black Sea will increasingly face additional pres-
sure, as the Caspian region oil exports grow.
Oil pipelines and projects directly related to Croatia or the Adriatic 
Sea
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Political chart of the Adriatic Sea: coastal states and main ports
Due to this situation, but also due to geostrategic considerations, 
a number of “Bosporus bypass” projects, i.e. oil pipeline projects to 
connect Black Sea ports directly with the Mediterranean, or mainland 
Europe, have been initiated. The interests and visions of the key state 
players in those – the United States, EU countries, and Russia – interact 
in many, sometimes conflicting ways; and are also inevitably intertw-
ined with the priorities and interests of big investors, producers, tran-
sporters and markets. Projects thus emerge without mutual coordinati-
on, and often compete or collide. The first such Bosporus bypass pro-
ject, after a multi-billion investment and strong US political backing, 
was completed in 2005 and officially opened in July 2006: the large 
capacity Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. The BTC may over 
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time contribute to a substantial increase in the volume of oil transpor-
ted by tankers through the Mediterranean.
One of the important oil transport routes in the Mediterranean 
leads through the Adriatic Sea, all the way to the north Adriatic ports 
(Trieste, Venice, Omišalj and Koper). Around 57-58 million tons of oil 
are transported yearly on that exclusively import route, and a major 
share of that (currently around 37 million tons yearly) is further im-
ported through the Trans-Alpine pipeline into Central Europe. There 
are, however, several projects and plans (some of which are in collisi-
on) on how to introduce export directions from the deep-sea Adriatic 
ports. One such project, the Albania-Macedonia-Bulgaria oil pipeline 
(AMBO), would connect the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgas with 
the Albanian Adriatic port of Vlorë, and enable overseas export of pri-
marily Caspian oil. Another project, known as Druzhba-Adria, aims at 
integrating the southern Druzhba and the Adriatic pipeline, adjusting 
the flow direction in the latter, with the purpose of enabling Russian 
(Urals) crude export through the Croatian port of Omišalj. At times, 
there were also considerations for a third possible line – the connection 
of the Ukrainian Black Sea port of Odessa, via Brody, to Omišalj, for 
the purpose of Caspian oil export – yet that one would compete with 
Druzhba-Adria on a part of the same, capacity-deficient line on the so-
uthern Druzhba. The priorities of countries such as the US and Russia 
collided on those lines. 
And finally, there is a project known as Pan European oil pipe-
line (PEOP). This is a major undertaking, planned in the next decade 
to connect directly the Romanian port of Constanta at the Black Sea, 
through Serbia, Croatia, and (possibly) Slovenia, all the way to Trieste 
in Italy, to be here integrated with the Trans-Alpine pipeline, thus secu-
ring to Italy and Central European countries a direct, land route access 
to the Caspian oil traded in the Black Sea.
While facing these and several other projects, the Mediterranean 
is a region characterized by heterogeneous features, both in natural and 
political sense. A PSSA proposal for the entire Mediterranean is not a 
likely option, and it may be difficult to see what would be the practical 
effect of it. For several parts of the Mediterranean, however, a PSSA 
can be a feasible and useful measure. 
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THE ADRIATIC SEA AS A PARTICULARLY 
SENSITIVE SEA AREA?
The Adriatic Sea: basic notes
The Adriatic Sea is a narrow, shallow and temperate warm semi-
enclosed sea, forming a distinct sub-region within the Mediterranean 
Sea region. The sea is nowadays bordered by six countries: Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Italy, Montenegro and Slovenia. 
With its only entrance through the Strait of Otranto, the Adriatic 
Sea appears as an indented gulf, deeply incised into the European ma-
inland. Due to this strategic position, the Adriatic Sea has been a trade 
and transport route since antiquity; and there is no need for a “crystal 
ball” to predict that this function will persist in future, though with pat-
terns adjusted to the era.
While it is clear that the southern border of the Adriatic Sea is 
in the Strait of Otranto area, there are some differences as to where ex-
actly to set the line between the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. According to 
the limits proposed in 1953 by the International Hydrographic Organi-
zation, this border follows the line running from the mouth of Buttrinto 
River (latitude 39º44’ N) in Albania and on to Cape Santa Maria di Le-
uca in Italy (39º45’ N).xvi For the practical purposes of determining the 
area for the Adriatic Sea PSSA, however, a slightly more narrow deli-
mitation is relevant: also situated in the Strait of Otranto, but at latitu-
de 40º25’ N. The entire sea area north from that line corresponds to the 
area of application of the existing IMO-associated protective measures, 
including the mandatory ship reporting system (see further below). 
One might indeed enter into discussion on how to understand 
the politically relevant framework for “regional” cooperation on mari-
ne environmental protection in the Adriatic Sea. Is it the broader Adri-
atic-Ionian initiative, as developed over the past few years? Or a more 
narrow, trilateral cooperation between Croatia, Italy and Slovenia in the 
North Adriatic? In the context of international cooperation on marine 
environmental protection, “region” is, of course, a functional catego-
ry.xvii Neither of those mentioned, however, respond to the purpose at 
hand – the regional protection of the Adriatic Sea, due to its special at-
tributes, as a PSSA.
The understanding of the region that fully corresponds to that 
particular need is, however, found in the newly proposed European 
Commission Directive establishing the EU Marine Strategy.xviii The 
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Strategy divides European marine waters into three main regions, the 
Mediterranean Sea being one of those; and further divides regions into 
sub-regions, to account for the peculiarities of particular areas. The Me-
diterranean is thus sub-divided into four areas, the Adriatic Sea being 
a clearly distinct sub-region, bordered by two EU countries: Italy and 
Slovenia (Article 3). Member states within each marine region or sub-
region are required to make every effort to coordinate their actions with 
third countries (Article 5); in the Adriatic Sea, this includes Croatia, as 
a candidate for EU membership, and Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and Montenegro. For marine environmental protection through mecha-
nisms such as PSSA, the EU Marine Strategy thus confirms the Adria-
tic Sea as a whole as a policy-relevant framework.
The Adriatic Sea and criteria for  
a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area
The main features of the Adriatic Sea not only set it aside as an 
integrated marine unit, but also largely correspond to the three sets of 
criteria for PSSA designation, as detailed by the IMO Guidelines: eco-
logical, socio-economic and scientific criteria.
The Adriatic Sea area is a unique and sensitive marine ecosy-
stem, and an outstanding example of a semi-enclosed sea.xix Its envi-
ronmental conditions are extraordinary, predominantly caused by a spe-
cific system of exchange of waters with the Ionian Sea, the thresholds 
of Otranto separating the Adriatic Sea from the Ionian Sea, and of Pa-
lagruža separating the deeper south Adriatic from the shallower north 
Adriatic. Moreover, freshwater input from the mountain regions of the 
Adriatic eastern coast and north Italian rivers substantially contribute 
to the uniqueness and rarity of a variety of specific ecosystems.
Along the eastern Adriatic coast there are over 1,200 islands, 
islets and rocks. This large archipelago is unique in the Mediterranean 
Sea by reason of its geographical and geomorphologic karstic structure, 
and still retains a well preserved ecosystem. The western Adriatic co-
ast represents the largest sandy and muddy coastal habitat in the whole 
northern Mediterranean area.
Adriatic ichthyofauna is highly diversified, with numerous spe-
cies but low abundance. With regard to its uniqueness and richness in 
biodiversity and living communities, this region represents an outstan-
ding value not only in European, but in global proportions too.
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The large-scale human-induced threats to the special attributes 
of this area come from land-based sources (especially in the north Adri-
atic, though locally also in other zones at the coast with the increase 
of human population), from demersal (benthic) over-fishing, and from 
possible impacts of shipping. There is, though, one distinction worth 
noting. Along most of the eastern Adriatic coast, and especially offsho-
re islands of the middle and south Adriatic, even a moderate stress re-
sulting from international shipping activity (both oil spill and ballast 
water impacts) could be devastating to the fragile environment, which 
has at many places still maintained a high degree of naturalness. Fur-
ther stress in the north Adriatic and along part of the western coast, 
where eutrophication is of particular concern, would contribute to the 
deterioration of its present status.
Regarding the social, cultural and economic attributes of the 
area, the environmental quality and the use of living marine resources 
are of particular socio-economic importance, especially for tourism, re-
creation, and fisheries. There is, in addition, a high degree of human 
dependency on the sea and coastal area, particularly on many Adriatic 
islands. Finally, the cultural heritage of this area is of particular impor-
tance due to the presence of significant historical and archaeological 
sites. Since ancient times, the Adriatic Sea has been an important tran-
sportation route; hundreds of ancient ship wrecks recorded in the Adri-
atic Sea and numerous other remains bear witness to an exceptional ar-
chaeological value.
The Adriatic Sea and international navigation: 
status and trends 
International shipping activity in the Adriatic Sea is becoming 
increasingly dense. This is due to the location of important industri-
al centres, especially along the western Adriatic coast, but also due to 
ports serving for transit to other countries in Central Europe, such as 
particularly in the north of the Adriatic coast (the ports of Trieste, Ve-
nice, Koper, Rijeka basin). Moreover, new transit ports are expected 
to gain significance in the south of the eastern Adriatic coast, such as 
Ploče in Croatia, Bar in Montenegro, and Vlorë in Albania from whe-
re a major new transportation route for Caspian oil export may be ex-
pected.xx Trends in the development of international shipping activities 
will lead to an increased density of traffic (also due to projects such as 
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“Motorways on the Sea”), with special emphasis on several parts of the 
Adriatic Sea, as well as partly to the change in the nature of traffic. A 
significant increase in the volume of transport of oil and other harmful 
substances, including liquefied natural gas (LNG), can be expected.
Key features of hazardous cargo shipping  
in the Adriatic Sea
A spill could have disastrous effects on the vulnerable nature 
and natural resources of the Adriatic Sea, as well as on its important 
uses such as for tourism and local fisheries. In this respect, the introdu-
ction of invasive alien species via ballast water and hull-fouling is also 
a great concern. Let us therefore take a closer look at some key features 
of the current and projected shipping activity in the Adriatic, and pos-
sible impacts. 
The vast majority of ships carrying potentially harmful substan-
ces are found in three categories: oil tankers, chemical tankers, and gas 
carriers, including LNG and liquefied petroleum gas. Currently, there is 
no LNG tanker traffic in the Adriatic Sea, while various other types of 
substances are carried by tankers. When summing up those three ves-
sel types, around 4,500 to 5,000 estimated port calls by ships carrying 
harmful substances as cargo are performed each year in the Adriatic 
Sea navigation. 
It is especially oil transportation that, in the last decade, is in-
creasing in the Adriatic Sea. Currently, the most important direction for 
oil transport in the Adriatic Sea is the import route, arriving through the 
Strait of Otranto and transiting the entire sea to the north Adriatic oil 
terminals: Trieste (importing annually around 38 million tons), Veni-
ce (slightly under 11 million tons), Omišalj (around 7 million tons) and 
Koper (around 2 million tons). There are also several other important 
Italian oil ports in the Adriatic Sea (especially Ancona and Ravenna), 
as well as various coastal routes, mainly for product oil, summing up 
the current annual volume of oil (crude and product) transported in the 
Adriatic Sea in the range of 70 million tons. In the next five to seven 
years, changes are expected in the Adriatic oil transport, related to three 
main parameters: (i) the introduction of one entirely new route for oil 
transportation in the Adriatic Sea; (ii) the introduction of export directi-
ons to be added to the currently almost exclusive import directions; and 
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(iii) volume of oil transported, which is likely to increase significantly, 
possibly even by around 50%.
Transport, i.e. import of LNG, while not present for the time 
being, can be expected to become a significant element in the Adriatic 
international ship transport by the end of this decade/beginning of the 
next. That is primarily due to several Adriatic LNG import terminals 
under construction, such as the import terminal Brindisi (earliest finali-
zation planned for 2008) and the offshore import terminal Isola di Por-
to Levante off Venice (also earliest planned for 2008). In addition, the-
re is a recent revival of plans for the construction of a larger LNG im-
port terminal on the eastern Adriatic coast, also for gas import to seve-
ral Central European countries; as well as plans for an offshore import 
LNG terminal in the Bay of Trieste, while an on-shore LNG terminal 
there is under consideration as well.
Accident exposure in the Adriatic maritime trafﬁc
Maritime traffic in the Adriatic Sea (largely including internati-
onal shipping activity) is characterized by the interaction of four main 
patterns. First, the traffic along the Adriatic Sea, between the Strait of 
Otranto in the south and north to the Bay of Trieste, in which many lar-
ge commercial vessels are involved. Second, the crossing traffic be-
tween the ports on the western and eastern Adriatic Sea coasts. Third, 
the traffic between the ports along the same coast of the Adriatic Sea, 
which in case of the western coast is domestic (Italian) traffic only, 
while along the eastern Adriatic coast can involve ports in several sta-
tes (Slovenia, Croatia, Italy, Montenegro, Albania). And fourth, various 
“irregular” navigation forms, involving large cruise vessels, numerous 
yachts, fishing vessels, as well as various other small boats.xxi
The shape of the Adriatic Sea (long and rather narrow), together 
with demographic characteristics (large commercial ports in the nor-
thernmost part of the Sea), makes the traffic patterns, which interact in 
several ways within the Adriatic Sea, complex and challenging to con-
trol. A relatively high number of large oil tankers travel up to the north 
Adriatic ports loaded with crude or product oil. These oil tankers are 
exposed to dense crossing traffic (especially Italy-Croatia/Croatia-Italy) 
along the journey. What in particular makes this risk high is the rather 
long distance of approximately 420 nautical miles from the Strait of 
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Otranto to the busy north Adriatic import ports. The long distance im-
plies a long travel in a dense traffic area. 
A brief assessment of the overall accident exposure in the Adria-
tic Sea has recently been undertaken by Det norske Veritas (DNV).xxii By 
comparing the accident rate in the Adriatic Sea to other areas around 
the world, the conclusion reached was that the Adriatic Sea belongs to 
the highest accident frequency category. According to that study, the 
Adriatic Sea has an accident frequency more than five times as high as 
the world average. The accident occurrence as related to the commer-
cial traffic load was evaluated to be higher for the Adriatic Sea than for 
other highly dense shipping areas like the Mexican Gulf and the Ba-
rents Sea. 
Regarding the number of ship accidents in the Adriatic Sea over 
the past 15-years period, a total of 174 accidents have occurred.xxiii Ho-
wever, actual pollution caused by accidents so far has not been as se-
rious as the frequency of accidents could suggest.xxiv There have been 
no incidents causing a major spill in the Adriatic Sea, and a relative-
ly small number of accidents actually caused any significant pollution. 
Nonetheless, several cases where consequences could have been gra-
ve can be pointed to. In 1984, the chemical tanker Brigitta Montanari 
sank near the Kornati National Park. Another serious accident occur-
red in 1974 in the Strait of Otranto, when the dry cargo carrier Cavtat, 
after colliding with a bulk carrier, sank to the depth of almost 100 me-
ters. Cavtat carried some 150 tons of tetramethyl lead and 120 tons of 
tetraethyl lead; substances potentially hazardous for human health. In 
cases like these, the environmental consequences might have been di-
sastrous.
Beyond accidents: operational pollution  
by vessels and environmental impact 
While larger ship accidents are rare and regularly attract media at-
tention, the major share of vessel-source marine pollution on a cumulati-
ve basis is, however, not to be attributed to accidents, but primarily to re-
gular, routine daily ship operations, resulting in chronic pollution.xxv This 
may be especially serious in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas.
As to vessel-source pollution of the sea by oil, operational disc-
harges emanating from large ships are – while illegal – frequent in many 
parts of the Mediterranean, including the Adriatic Sea.xxvi The continuo-
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us analysis of images obtained through special satellite technology and 
performed in the past several years has demonstrated that enhanced spill 
concentrations appear along major maritime routes, including the one 
crossing the Ionian Sea and leading through the Adriatic Sea.xxvii Here, 
however, spills occur in a shallow and narrow semi-enclosed sea with a 
sensitive marine environment. The first, overall Mediterranean recon-
naissance study estimated the cumulative annual size of the area of oil 
spills in the Adriatic Sea to be around 1,228 square km (which is appro-
ximately three times the size of the largest Adriatic island, Cres).xxviii 
A specific study made for the Adriatic Sea (including the entire sea area 
north of latitude 39° N) detected 257 oil spills from ships in 1999; 263 
spills in 2000; 184 in 2001; and 244 spills in 2002.xxix These studies 
provide the first accurate statistical maps of oil discharges in the Adri-
atic Sea. The studies also prove that this activity is on-going on a large 
scale here, despite the Special Area status for the entire Mediterranean 
Sea under MARPOL Annex I, prohibiting the discharge of oil and oily 
waste.
A matter of increasingly serious concern in the Adriatic Sea is 
the introduction of harmful aquatic organisms and pathogens through 
ships’ ballast water and sediments. The quantity of ballast water relea-
sed in the Adriatic ports of Italy, Croatia and Slovenia estimated for the 
year 2003 was around 8 million tons, of which around 80% was disc-
harged in Italian Adriatic ports, while the remaining volume was sha-
red between the Slovenian port of Koper and all the Croatian ports to-
gether. However, most of that ballast water arrives from locations wit-
hin the Mediterranean (58%), and due to inter-Adriatic traffic (34%), 
while only 8% of ballast water volume released in the Adriatic ports 
is currently originating from ports located outside the Mediterranean 
Sea.xxx With expected changes in import and export flows, and especi-
ally if a major new oil export route is introduced from a deep-sea port 
in the Adriatic, those proportions would change considerably, so that a 
far larger ballast water volume discharged in the Adriatic Sea would be 
from vessels arriving from ports outside the Adriatic and Mediterrane-
an Seas. Risk of introduction of harmful aquatic organisms and patho-
gens could in that case become significantly increased.
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International Maritime Organization and 
protection measures for the Adriatic Sea
The third element of the PSSA concept, building on the previous 
two – the identified attributes of the sea area, and vulnerability of these 
to impacts of international shipping – consists of measures within the 
competence of the IMO. These, under the terminology of the IMO Gu-
idelines “Associated Protective Measures”, should be specifically tailo-
red to address risks from the shipping activities in the area. Some of the 
measures may already be existing and applied in the area, while others 
can be proposed in the application for the PSSA. Some previous PSSAs 
were approved by the IMO on the basis of existing Associated Protecti-
ve Measures only. Though still possible on paper, after the recent revi-
sion of the IMO Guidelines (and indeed their expected implementation 
in the IMO practice), this will in most cases no longer suffice for a con-
vincing argument on the need for the PSSA. In the case of the Adriatic 
Sea, both the already existing and possible newly proposed Associated 
Protective Measures can be considered in the PSSA context.
Existing associated protective measures in the Adriatic Sea 
There are several sets of Associated Protective Measures ado-
pted so far under the ambit of the IMO, either specifically for, or ap-
plicable to the Adriatic Sea. These include: (i) mandatory ship repor-
ting system; (ii) routeing systems; and (iii) Special Area status under 
the Annexes to MARPOL. The first two sets of measures were adopted 
by the IMO in recent years, upon joint proposals submitted by several 
Adriatic Sea countries.xxxi
The mandatory ship reporting system in the Adriatic Sea (ADRI-
REP) was adopted by the IMO in December 2002, with entry into force 
on 1 July 2003. As of that date, all oil tankers of 150 gross tonnage and 
above, and all ships of 300 gross tonnage and above, carrying dangero-
us or polluting goods as cargo, need to report to the designated Adriatic 
coastal authorities their entry into the Adriatic Sea (at the latitude 40º 
25’ N), their position at several check-points (sectors), and their depar-
ture from the Adriatic. The primary objective of the system is to sup-
port safe navigation and protection of the marine environment through 
the exchange of information.
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Moreover, there are several routeing measures in implementa-
tion in the Adriatic Sea as of 1 December 2004. This routeing system 
consists of traffic separation schemes in the North Adriatic Sea, as well 
as in the Gulf of Trieste, Gulf of Venice, for approaches to/from Koper 
and Monfalcone. Also, there are two precautionary areas (in the North 
Adriatic and in the Gulf of Trieste), and an area to be avoided in the 
North Adriatic. In addition to those mandatory measures, there are re-
commended directions of traffic flow in the Strait of Otranto, South 
and Middle Adriatic Sea. 
Finally, the entire Mediterranean Sea area, the Adriatic Sea in-
cluded, was declared a Special Area under MARPOL, Annexes I and V, 
in order to protect these sensitive sea areas against the discharge of oil 
or oily mixtures, and garbage.xxxii Subject to the provisions of Annex I, 
i.a. any discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixtures from any oil tan-
ker, and any other ship of 400 gross tonnage and above, is prohibited 
in the special area. As discussed above, recent evidence indicates that 
this prohibition is frequently violated by ships involved in international 
traffic in the Adriatic Sea.
Possible proposed associated protective  
measures for the Adriatic Sea
A PSSA application, in proposing new measures, should identi-
fy the legal basis for each measure. In the case of the Adriatic Sea, two 
types of situations can emerge in this respect.
Firstly, measures with a legal basis already available under an 
existing IMO instrument in force can be proposed. These are primarily 
routeing measures, since the current routeing system in the Adriatic Sea 
would evidently need to be strengthened, at least in three segments in 
the Middle and South Adriatic: around the islands of Palagruža, Jabu-
ka, and in the Strait of Otranto. Also, part of the existing routeing mea-
sures in the North Adriatic will need some adjustment due to the plan-
ned expansion of gas exploitation activities from the Adriatic continen-
tal shelf. For this type of measures to be proposed to, and adopted by, 
the IMO, no PSSA is essentially needed – though such measures would 
indeed strengthen the application for a PSSA. Equally so, they can be 
adopted through a special procedure at competent IMO bodies, and re-
ferred to in the PSSA application.
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Secondly, some other measures possibly to be proposed for the 
Adriatic Sea in the PSSA context, do have – under the terms of the 
IMO Guidelines – the “legal basis available” in an IMO instrument, al-
beit that instrument is not yet in force. The case in point is the Ballast 
Water Convention,xxxiii and the “additional” or “more stringent” measu-
res as envisaged in this Convention. If a proposal for certain measures 
in that category proves to be successful, that would be, in terms of As-
sociated Protective Measures, the real and significant practical effect of 
establishing the PSSA in the Adriatic Sea.
A key consideration of whether such measures may be propo-
sed is of a legal nature; and it is a matter of policy whether the proposed 
measures will thereupon be adopted at IMO. As to the legal conditions: 
according to the IMO Guidelines, any proposed Associated Protective 
Measures must have a legal basis. That condition is, by the letter of Gu-
idelines, satisfied by the adoption of an IMO convention or other legal 
instrument.xxxiv The Ballast Water Convention was adopted at the IMO 
in February 2004. The Convention is, however, not yet in force, and will 
not, due to rather stringent requirements, enter into force for some ye-
ars to come. The requirement for this is the ratification (or equivalent) of 
30 states, the combined merchant fleet of which constitutes not less than 
35% of the gross tonnage of the world’s merchant shipping.xxxv By way 
of illustration: to date, over two years after the Convention was ado-
pted, only six states have ratified it, representing altogether – a mere 
0.6% of world tonnage.xxxvi
The objective of that Convention is to ultimately eliminate the 
transfer of harmful aquatic organisms via ships’ ballast water and sedi-
ments. This goal is to be met through gradual introduction of technolo-
gy for on-board ballast water treatment. Ballast water exchange, as cur-
rently used, is accepted as an interim measure only. However, until en-
tirely phased out – and, under the Convention, that must happen by the 
year 2016 – there are still ten years to go for seas such as semi-enclosed 
Adriatic, where ballast water exchange poses very difficult and specific 
questions, often different from areas facing the open ocean.
According to the Convention, ballast water exchange must be 
conducted, whenever possible, at least 200 nautical miles from the ne-
arest land and in water at least 200 meters in depth. Yet, in cases where 
the ship is unable to conduct ballast water exchange in a location so de-
termined, exchange must be done as far from the nearest land as possi-
ble, and in all cases at least 50 nautical miles from the nearest land and 
in water at least 200 meters in depth. Considering the complex proce-
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dure for ballast water exchange, there are no areas in the Adriatic Sea 
that can satisfy those conditions. 
These provisions are of particular importance for shallow and 
narrow sea-areas, where ship-lanes are relatively close to the shores. Eu-
ropean waters as a whole are largely characterised by the latter; and the 
Adriatic Sea is a prominent example. Where a particular sea or sea-area 
does not satisfy such basic requirements, coastal or port states can con-
sider invoking procedures for additional, more stringent measures.xxxvii
For the Adriatic Sea, two different Associated Protective Mea-
sures related to ballast water may optimally be considered within the 
proposal to the IMO for a PSSA designation. First, designation of the 
Adriatic Sea as a No-Ballast-Water-Exchange Area for ballast water ar-
riving in the Adriatic in ships from other seas. And second, mandatory 
ship reporting on ballast water entering the Adriatic Sea. Both measu-
res should apply in the entire Adriatic Sea; and both should be conside-
red as temporary – through 2016, or any later time, depending on whet-
her the Ballast Water Convention enters into force, and indeed on-bo-
ard treatment becomes globally applied by the shipping industry. 
Croatian initiative for regional cooperation  
for the Adriatic Sea
The idea of proclaiming the Adriatic Sea a PSSA is not entirely 
new; it was first mentioned in expert literature,xxxviii advocated by en-
vironmental NGOs, recently also by some politicians and media alike, 
and eventually stated in several regional policy documents. Notably, 
within the framework of the Mediterranean Action Plan, a sub-regional 
contingency plan for major marine pollution incidents in the Adriatic 
Sea was adopted by Croatia, Italy and Slovenia in November 2005. In 
that contingency plan, the three countries envisaged to “collaborate in 
designating PSSAs in the area covered by the Plan” and jointly propose 
these to the IMO, along with Associated Protective Measures.xxxix
Indeed, in addition to adopting specific protective measures, de-
signation of a PSSA in the Adriatic Sea can provide a significant regi-
onal cooperative framework, in line with the EU policy, and also hig-
hlight the awareness of the vulnerability of the Adriatic Sea environ-
ment. It can moreover have an echo in domestic political scenes, due to 
increased public awareness of the need for marine environmental pro-
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tection. There are therefore many valid reasons for pointing out the de-
sirability of a PSSA status for the Adriatic Sea.
There was, however, one “missing link” between the ideas gi-
ven on PSSA, and a concrete proposal for a PSSA elaborated. The IMO 
Guidelines prescribe strict requirements on how a PSSA proposal sho-
uld be structured and what elements it needs to contain. Extensive, mul-
tidisciplinary expertise and access to data on virtually all aspects of the 
marine area (natural, navigational, socio-economic, legal) need to be 
employed in the forming of the PSSA proposal, and presented as infor-
mation in a policy-relevant manner.
Croatia has, in addition to favoring the idea on the PSSA in the 
Adriatic Sea, recently undertaken also that preparatory part of the job 
missing so far on the Adriatic scale. In spring 2004, the Fridtjof Nan-
sen Institute proposed the initiation of a cooperative project within the 
framework of the bilateral development assistance programme between 
Norway and Croatia, which would result in an expert study on the Adri-
atic Sea as PSSA. The project proposal was supported by the Croatian 
Ministry of the Sea, Tourism, Transport and Development, and a coo-
perative group involving the Institute of Oceanography and Fisheries 
in Split and Dubrovnik, the Croatian Hydrographic Institute, the Ruđer 
Bošković Institute in Zagreb, Det norske Veritas, and the Fridtjof Nan-
sen Institute as project coordinator, was assembled in autumn 2004. 
The actual work on drafting the expert study proposal for the Adriatic 
PSSA started in April 2005, and was completed in March 2006, when 
the draft study was, through the Croatian Ministry of the Sea, distri-
buted to the competent authorities of all the other Adriatic countries: 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Italy, (the then) Serbia and Monte-
negro and Slovenia. At the same time, the Croatian Ministry of the Sea 
initiated the forming of a Joint Expert Group of the Adriatic countries 
on PSSA.
With the participation from all the six Adriatic states, and under 
Croatian chairmanship, the Joint Expert Group on PSSA met in Opa-
tija, Croatia, on 20 April 2006, and discussed the text which resulted 
from the study made in the above-mentioned project.xl In Conclusions 
adopted at the meeting, the Joint Expert Group established a Corre-
spondence Group, under the joint chairmanship of all the Adriatic co-
untries, and with the technical support of the Croatian Maritime Aut-
hority.xli A timetable for the finalization of a joint proposal on Adriatic 
PSSA by end-2006 has been agreed upon, with the view of proposal 
submission to the IMO. It was agreed that the Joint Expert Group wo-
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uld have its final meeting in January 2007, immediately followed by a 
ministerial conference of the Adriatic states, to be hosted by the Gover-
nment of Croatia. If successful, this would then enable the joint Adria-
tic PSSA proposal to be submitted to the IMO. 
ADRIATIC CONTRASTS AND COMMONALITY: 
PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION
Beyond the requirements to satisfy formal criteria contained in 
the IMO Guidelines and provide an expert basis for this, a PSSA pro-
posal in the semi-enclosed Adriatic Sea with several littoral states is a 
more complex affair, if compared to those PSSAs proposed by a sin-
gle country only. As an instrument of regional Adriatic cooperation on 
marine environmental protection from impacts caused by internatio-
nal shipping, a PSSA initiative here needs successfully to pass two key 
steps, and not only one. First, such an initiative, where two or more co-
untries have a common interest in a particular area, should be formu-
lated in coordination. An outcome based on consensus of the Adriatic 
States is an optimal, though not strictly legally required avenue, as evi-
dent in recent IMO practice.xlii 
And second, such a regional cooperation towards PSSA, to have 
a real bearing on international navigation – which is an inherently glo-
bal activity – needs to be approved at the global, IMO level. At that le-
vel, the Adriatic states can indeed, for all the reasons explained above, 
be in a position to make a strong case for a PSSA to be designated in 
the Adriatic Sea.
But will they cooperate regionally towards a joint proposal; and 
if so, why? A glance at the Adriatic Sea shows that the situation here is 
rather specific. The Adriatic Sea is a semi-enclosed sea, formed as a de-
eply indented gulf. Total length of the Adriatic Sea coastline (mainland 
and islands) extends over some 8,300 km. However, more than half of 
this length is due to the numerous islands forming an archipelago along 
part of the eastern Adriatic coast, in particular along the coast of Croa-
tia, extending its coastline to well over 6,200 km, which is around 75% 
of the entire Adriatic coastline. For Croatia, this lengthy coast with its 
preserved marine environment is an important resource in itself, and 
a key generator of its economic development, especially due to gro-
wing tourism. Italy’s Adriatic coastline, situated along the entire we-
stern coast, is significantly less indented, with a total length of close to 
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1,300 km (or around 15% of the Adriatic coastline). The remaining part 
of the entire Adriatic coastline extends along the opposite, eastern side 
and is shared between three countries, all still with a distant possibility 
of an EU membership: Albania, around 400 km of coastline; Montene-
gro, 290 km; and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 21 km. The only other EU 
member state on the Adriatic Sea coast, Slovenia, has 45 km of coastli-
ne, thus adding up the remaining 0.5% of the total length of the Adria-
tic coastline.
When it comes to maritime traffic and trade volume, however, 
the situation in many respects may look reversed, especially as to the 
proportions attributed to the eastern and western Adriatic coasts. By far 
the largest share of the maritime traffic and trade relates to Italian ports, 
which annually receive around 75% of the total commercial ship traffic 
and 80% of the total cargo transported. Croatia currently makes up aro-
und 10% of the total Adriatic traffic, both in terms of number of vessels 
and amount of cargo; though with an obvious tendency of growth. The 
remaining countries – Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (through the 
Croatian port of Ploče), Montenegro and Albania – all together make 
up the remaining 15% of the traffic and 10% of the cargo. Among the-
ir ports, however, the single Slovenian international commercial port of 
Koper is distinguished as the most important one, with an annual thro-
ughput (in 2005) of around 2,000 vessels and over 13 million tons car-
go, thus larger than any other single port on the eastern Adriatic coast 
(excluding the Italian port of Trieste).
The significance of this difference from the perspective of mari-
ne environmental protection and resource management can be illustra-
ted in the context of ballast water issues. Already if looking only at the 
three Adriatic countries – two EU members (Italy and Slovenia) and 
one candidate (Croatia) – they all show profoundly different circum-
stances. Italy is, due to maritime export, the biggest generator of bal-
last water introduction into the Adriatic Sea ports, accounting for over 
three quarters of the annual total. Slovenia’s coastline is indeed a short 
one, yet this country is not a negligible contributor of ballast water in 
the Adriatic Sea, due to the maritime export volume from its single in-
ternational port, Koper. Finally, Croatia has by far the longest coastli-
ne in the Adriatic Sea, yet it is currently contributing less ballast water 
import, due to its relatively low (yet increasing) volume of maritime 
export. 
At the same time, however, Italy is by far the biggest Adriatic fi-
shing nation, with its marine capture fisheries exceeding that of Croatia’s 
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fleet by some eight to ten times, and that of Slovenia by around 100 
times. Harmful effects of invasive alien species introduction through 
ships’ ballast water (and other vectors) may result in devastating effects 
to fisheries, which is an important consideration for Italy. For Croatia, 
fisheries as well as aquaculture are significant not only in economic po-
tential but also in employment, and thus demographic, terms – with a 
large number of Croatia’s islands deteriorating in both population age 
and number. The social implications of fisheries, including even mariti-
me country profile, are important considerations in some other Adriatic 
countries. Likewise, tourism, with all its economic, cultural, social and 
other effects, is an important consideration shared by the Adriatic coun-
tries, though to varying extents.
The shared feature of those different country cases is, however, 
the Adriatic Sea itself – a relatively narrow and shallow, semi-enclo-
sed sea, deeply incised into the European mainland. This situation has, 
through history and in future projections alike, led to the Adriatic Sea 
serving as a traditional maritime transport and trade route – where, ho-
wever, possible impacts by the growing international shipping in one 
area may easily be reflected in any other area, thus potentially in the 
entire region. All the Adriatic countries indeed share one important, la-
sting feature: they are all coastal states here, with a multitude of impor-
tant activities, international shipping by both coastal and other countri-
es being only one among these. 
The Adriatic Sea is thus a region that inevitably needs to be ori-
ented towards cooperation in approaching issues of joint concern, in-
cluding marine environmental protection – yet where all the partici-
pants retain certain profoundly different features as their dominant. In 
that situation, to strike the right balance between the national regulation 
sphere, which can take into account each country’s peculiarities, on the 
one hand, and regional cooperation based on commonality, on the ot-
her, will likely remain the key challenge for the Adriatic countries. Ho-
wever, in relation to third parties, i.e. to non-Adriatic flag states, a joint 
platform with uniform requirements will be preferable.
This is why the PSSA option as a concept balancing the appa-
rently local and regional environmental protection interests, on the one 
hand, with the interests of international shipping and industry, on the 
other – also beyond the formal requirements of satisfying the given 
IMO criteria – may prove to be a feasible and useful avenue for the 
Adriatic Sea.
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When seen in relation to the recently emerging context of regi-
onalisation of the “European Seas”, which is an obvious trend and an 
important underlying element for the development of the newly pro-
posed EU Marine Strategy Directive, the relevance of an Adriatic Sea 
PSSA is further enhanced. The EU Marine Strategy aims at the creation 
of marine regions and sub-regions as policy-relevant clusters – with the 
Adriatic Sea identified as one of several clearly designated sub-regions 
within the wider, less compact Mediterranean region. While the Stra-
tegy is directly applicable only to the EU member states and marine 
waters covered by their sovereignty or jurisdiction, member states are 
required within each marine region or sub-region to make every effort 
to coordinate their actions with third countries. An ability to coopera-
te on a PSSA may prove a key test-case for the Adriatic countries – EU 
members, candidates, or aspirants alike – towards a meaningful imple-
mentation of an otherwise broad EU Marine Strategy, on a specific and 
needed goal of Adriatic marine environment protection and sustaina-
ble development. An Adriatic PSSA would be an important first step in 
that direction. Institutionalization of all-Adriatic regional cooperation, 
perhaps through a body such as an Adriatic commission for marine en-
vironmental protection, involving all six Adriatic states – Albania, Bo-
snia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Italy, Montenegro and Slovenia – could 
be the next step worth considering.
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Ships, 1973, as modiﬁed by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto; for the Convention
with Annexes, including uniﬁed interpretations and amendments, see: MARPOL
73/78 (2002). SOLAS is the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 
1974; for the Convention, with its Protocol of 1988, annexes and amendments, see: 
SOLAS (2004). 
iv  On the origins of the PSSA concept and considerations related to early 
proclamations, see: Gjerde and Freestone (1994).
v  The major oil tanker accidents of the 1990s included those of Aegean Sea in 1992, 
Braer in 1993, Sea Empress in 1996, and Erika in 1999. All of these resulted in 
huge costs for clean-up operations, and to ﬁsheries and tourism and other losses.
vi  See a review by Frank (2005).
vii  MARPOL deﬁnes types of tankers and types of oils in detail. Heavy-grade oil, if
spilled into the sea, may cause a particularly serious marine pollution event. 
viii  See: Regulation (EC) No 1726/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
of 22 July 2003, amending Regulation (EC) No 417/2002 on the accelerated 
phasing-in of double-hull or equivalent design requirements for single-hull oil 
tankers. For an interesting commentary, see Boyle (2006).
ix  See a review by Tracey (2004).
x  See the document: Designation of a Western European Particularly Sensitive Sea 
Area (2003).
xi  Roberts [et al.], 2005. For yet another approach see Detjen (2006).
xii  See document: Designation of the Baltic Sea as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area 
(2003). 
xiii  See: Commission of the European Communities (2003:26-27), para. 7.4. 
xiv  The Urals grade is a blend of light sweet crude oil from the oil ﬁelds in Western
Siberia (“Siberian Light”) and heavy sour crude oil from the ﬁelds in the Ural and
Volga regions. Urals emerged in the international oil market in the 1970s, and is 
still used in the Transneft’s oil pipeline network.
xv  Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) is a tanker with a capacity to carry 200,000-
320,000 tons of oil as cargo; and thus more commercially attractive for long, 
overseas journeys.
xvi  See: IHO (1953:17). As stated in the Preface to that edition: “These limits have no 
political signiﬁcance whatsoever”.
xvii  For a discussion on how to understand “region” and “regional” in the context of 
marine environmental protection, see Boyle (2000).
xviii  See: Commission of the European Communities (2005).
xix  Notes on the key natural features of the Adriatic Sea, as summarized in this section, 
draw on the material prepared for the project “Expert study on a Particularly 
Sensitive Sea Area for the Adriatic Sea” by Ivona Marasović, Adam Benović and 
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Nedo Vrgoč of the Institute of Oceanography and Fisheries in Split and Dubrovnik, 
as well as by Nenad Leder of the Hydrographic Institute of the Republic of 
Croatia.
xx  Recent developments introduced a measure of uncertainty on the prospects for 
Vlorë becoming a major oil export port, since the Albanian government – under 
public pressure due to environmental concerns, but also due to geopolitical 
considerations – informed that the terminal for the AMBO project would not be in 
Vlorë, but in the region of Porto Romano (Durres); see Bulgarian Standart and 
Macedonian Utrinski Vesnik of 7 October 2006. 
xxi  For instance, visits of large cruiser ships to Croatian ports in 2003 increased by 
around 190%; from 307 in 2002 to 582 ships in 2003. Most of those, i.e. 575, were 
concentrated in the larger Dubrovnik area. In the tourist season, the area around 
Dubrovnik is often daily visited by up to 10 such large cruisers.
xxii  Source: Summary of ﬁndings by DNV as presented in “Designation of the Adriatic
Sea as a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area – First draft prepared for the Meeting of 
the Joint Expert Group on PSSA, 20 April 2006”, internal document, on ﬁle with
the author.
xxiii  See: Lloyd’s Register Fairplay accident database, 1990-2004.
xxiv  See: IMO/UNEP (2004). In REMPEC data-base, “oil” is recorded for the period 
August 1977 to December 2003 (List A); and “HNS” for the period January 1988 
to December 2003 (List B).
xxv  See, e.g. REMPEC (2004:13-18) and European Commission/Joint Research 
Centre (2002).
xxvi  For an excellent recent study on the subject of vessel-source pollution, see Khee-
Jin Tan (2006).
xxvii  The analysis consisted of images from satellites equipped with Synthetic Aperture 
Radar (SAR), as performed from 1999 on by the Sensors, Radar Technologies and 
Cybersecurity (SERAC) Unit of the Institute for the Protection and Security of the 
Citizen at the European Commission DG Joint Research Centre (JRC) at Ispra in 
Italy.
xxviii  See: European Commission/Joint Research Centre (2001:10).
xxix  See: European Commission/Joint Research Centre (2005:10).
xxx  Based on the ﬁndings in the project “Ballast Water Issues for Croatia”, implemented
by DNV and the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 2004-2005.
xxxi  See the document: Establishment… (2003). 
xxxii  MARPOL Annex I (Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil; Regulation 
10) and Annex V (Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Garbage; 
Regulation 5).
xxxiii  The International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast 
Water and Sediments, 2004. The Ballast Water Convention was adopted at the 
IMO on 16 February 2004.
xxxiv  See para. 7.5.2(3) of the IMO Guidelines. In particular, para. 7.5.2(3.ii) of the 
Guidelines is unambiguous on that requirement, and its interpretation is a rather 
straightforward matter. That is further conﬁrmed by the statement that:“This
option obviously makes the legal basis very clear; the basis would have to be in an 
IMO-adopted instrument”; in: Identiﬁcation and Protection… (2005:5).
xxxv  Article 18(1) of the Ballast Water Convention.
xxxvi  See: ”Summary of Conventions as at 30 April 2006”, at IMO web-site: www.imo.org. 
Contracting states so far are: Maldives, Nigeria, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Spain, 
Syria and Tuvalu.
377
xxxvii  Ballast Water Convention, Regulation C-1 (Additional Measures), in conjunction 
with Article 2(3) of the Convention (More stringent measures).
xxxviii  See, e.g. Zec and Komadina (1996).
xxxix  The Plan was adopted by the Agreement between Croatia, Italy and Slovenia, in 
Portorož, November 2005. On PSSA, see especially para. 2.5.2 of the Plan.
xl  The study is contained in the document: “Designation of the Adriatic Sea as 
a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area – First draft prepared for the Meeting of the 
Joint Expert Group on PSSA, 20 April 2006”, internal document, on ﬁle with the
author.
xli  In accordance with the document titled: “Adriatic PSSA Joint Expert Group (JEG) 
– Conclusions of the First Meeting and Plan of Activities”, of 20 April 2006, 
internal document, on ﬁle with the author.
xlii  PSSA in the Baltic Sea has been approved by the IMO in spite of strong opposition 
by one of the Baltic states, Russia, whose waters were exempted from the proposed 
area. The Baltic Sea has indeed experienced a signiﬁcant growth in the volume of
Russian oil export in recent years.
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*  Glossaries from the European Union (http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/index_
en.htm) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic 
of Croatia (http://www.mvpei.hr/ei/download/2005/06/15/Mali_leksikon.pdf).
GLOSSARY* 
ACCEDING COUNTRY – a country that has fulfilled the criteria for 
EU membership, signed the accession agreements and is waiting to be-
come a full member of the EU. Currently, such status is enjoyed by 
Bulgaria and Romania. 
ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS – the negotiations conducted by a can-
didate country with the EU member states on the conditions to be met 
for full membership of the EU. The negotiations sponsored by the Eu-
ropean Commission are conducted on all chapters of the acquis. The re-
sults of the negotiations are included in an Accession Treaty governing 
all the conditions for EU membership.
ACCESSION PARTNERSHIP – the main instrument for the pre-acces-
sion strategies of the applicant countries and the EU. Its purpose is to 
determine the priorities and the necessary financial assistance for each 
area during the harmonisation of it to the legislation of the Union. Each 
country has to work out a detailed programme for the application of the 
acquis, determine the timetable for assignments, and the human and fi-
nancial resources necessary. 
ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE or COMMUNITY ACQUIS – the 
body of rights and obligations that binds and links all the member sta-
tes in the EU. It does not cover only laws in the narrow sense, but also 
the common objectives laid down in given founding treaties. Each co-
untry that wishes to become a member of the EU has to accept the deci-
sions in the foundation treaties and adjust its legislation with the com-
munity acquis.
AGENDA 2000 – a document of the European Commission containing 
a programme of activities related to the development of the EU and the 
financial framework for enlargement with the new member states in the 
period 2000-2006.
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ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS, EUROPE AGREEMENTS – a spe-
cial form of association agreement between the EU and separate coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries. The basic 
objective of an agreement was the preparation of the associated coun-
tries for EU accession. It was based on the principles of respect for hu-
man rights, democracy, the rule of law and the market economy. Euro-
pe Agreements were signed with ten countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slova-
kia and Slovenia. 
CANDIDATE COUNTRY– a country that has applied for the full 
membership of the EU and that has been given the status of a candidate 
country by the European Council based on a positive opinion of the Eu-
ropean Commission. Such status is currently enjoyed by Turkey, Croa-
tia and Macedonia.
CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and 
Stabilisation) – a programme of EU technical and financial assistance 
for South East Europe (beneficiary countries: Albania, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro and FYR Macedonia), me-
ant for the implementation of the stabilisation and association process. 
CARDS priorities are: reconstruction, the return of refugees and displa-
ced persons, the stabilisation of the region, the establishment of the ap-
propriate institutional and legislative framework (democracy, human 
rights, rights of minorities, reconciliation, civil society, media indepen-
dence, the fight against organised crime), sustainable economic deve-
lopment and economic reform oriented towards a market economy, so-
cial development, cross-border, trans-national and regional collaborati-
on. Since 2005, Croatia has been using only the regional component of 
the CARDS programme, because, having gained the status of a candi-
date country, it has been given the opportunity to utilize the pre-acces-
sion programmes PHARE, ISPA AND SAPARD. → PRE-ACCESSI-
ON PROGRAMMS
CENTRAL EUROPE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, CEFTA – the ba-
sic objectives of CEFTA are the harmonisation of the development of 
economic relations among the states signatories, the raising of the stan-
dards of living and securing of better employment opportunities, an in-
crease in productivity, a rise in financial stability and the removal of 
trade barriers among the signatories. CEFTA created one of the pre-
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paratory activities on the way to full membership in the EU. In De-
cember 1992 the Agreement was signed by the then Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland, in 1996 by Slovenia, in 1997 by Romania, and 
in 1999 Bulgaria. Croatia signed a CEFTA Accession Treaty on 12 De-
cember 2002, and became a full member on 1 March 2003. Since 1 
May 2004, besides Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania have been members 
of CEFTA.
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY, CAP – its objective is to pro-
vide reasonable prices of agricultural products for European consu-
mers, appropriate incomes for farmers and the application of the prin-
ciple of single prices, financial fairness and a preferential approach to 
EU agricultural products. It is one of the most important common poli-
cies of the EU, and about 45% of the EU budget is spent on its imple-
mentation.
CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY – on 29 October 2004 the prime mini-
sters and foreign ministers of the 25 member states of the EU signed 
the European Constitution, the fundamental law of the Union, while re-
presentatives of the candidate countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Tur-
key, signed only the final part of the Constitution. The process of ratifi-
cation of the European Constitution has to be completed in a period of 
two years. As the Treaty has so far been ratified by as few as 15 mem-
ber states and two countries (France and the Netherlands) rejected it by 
referendum, the EU has introduced a period of deliberation to explore 
the options to resolve the current constitutional crisis. It is intended to 
replace all existing EU Treaties with a single consolidated document.
CONVENTION ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE – an organised de-
bate on the future of the EU started by the EU member sates on the ba-
sis of the Laeken Declaration. According to the Declaration, the goal 
of the Convention was to initiate a broad debate on the key issues re-
lating to the future of the EU and to prepare a Draft EU Constitution. 
The Convention started on 28 February 2002, and was concluded by 
presenting a proposal for a Draft Constitutional Treaty to the Europe-
an Council in Salonica on 19 and 20 June 2003. The participants in the 
Convention, chaired by Valery Giscard d’Estaing, were the represent-
atives of the governments and parliaments of the EU member states 
and candidate countries, the representatives of the EU institutions and 
the representatives of social partners, non-governmental organizations, 
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youth and other stakeholders. The Convention on the Future of Europe 
was an innovation in the history of the EU, as previous intergovern-
mental conferences aimed at signing treaties had not been preceded by 
public debates open to all stakeholders. → LAEKEN DECLARATION
COPENHAGEN CRITERIA – principles and criteria for membership 
laid down at a meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993. 
The heads of member states of the EU agreed that it would accept the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe as members if they met these 
political and economic criteria: (1) stability of institutions to ensure de-
mocracy, the rule of law, the respect for human rights and the rights of 
minorities, (2) respect for an effective market economy, and (3) ability 
to assume the obligations that derive from the acquis, including the im-
plementation of the political, economic and monetary objectives. The 
EU retains the right to decide when it will receive new members.
COREPER → PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE – an intergovernmental organisation based in 
Strasbourg that encourages in the member countries the development of 
democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law and promotes the 
European cultural heritage. The Council of Europe was set up in 1949 
by 10 European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, UK and Sweden) and has today 46 
members. All members of the EU are also members of the Council of 
Europe. → EUROPEAN COUNCIL, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPE-
AN UNION
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (often cited as the Coun-
cil or the Council of Ministers) – the most important legislative body 
of the EU. Since it is composed of the ministers of the national govern-
ments of the member states, national interests are represented in this in-
stitution at the European level. Today, the Council of Members shares 
its legislative role in many areas with the European Parliament. This 
is the result of the democratisation process of European integration, 
in which the role of the European Parliament, the only democratical-
ly elected body at the European level, is becoming constantly stronger. 
Although in many areas it no longer makes independent decisions, in 
the Union, no decision of a legislative nature can be made without the 
involvement of the Council of Ministers. The composition of the Coun-
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cil varies according to the area in which the decisions are being made. 
When this is, for example, the Common Agricultural Policy, the agri-
culture ministers of the member states sit in the Council, when it is to 
do with the arrangement of the trans-European railway networks, the 
ministers of transport or other appropriate departments of the nation-
al government will take their seats. Within the institutional triangle of 
the Union (EC, EU and European Parliament), the Council of the Euro-
pean Union represents the member states. → EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE
DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT – a term used to describe the fact that, ow-
ing to the complexity of its structure and decision-making process, the 
EU suffers from a lack of democracy and seems inaccessible and hard 
to understand to the ordinary citizen. In the professional literature this 
term also stands for the institutional set-up of the EU which is domi-
nated by the Council of the European Union and the European Com-
mission, the institutions combining legislative and executive powers. 
The role of the European Parliament, the only institution whose mem-
bers are elected by direct vote, is relatively minor. However, owing to 
the growth in importance of the European Parliament over the years 
and numerous initiatives to simplify the organization of and decision- 
making process in the EU, as well as to ensure more transparency in its 
operation, the democratic deficit has been gradually reduced.
ECOFIN – Council of Ministers of the EU for economic and financial 
affairs.
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, EMU – the process by 
which member states of the EU harmonise their economic and mon-
etary policies with the ultimate aim of adopting the single currency, 
the euro. The Maastricht Treaty completely developed the objective of 
monetary union, the method and timetable for its creation. The proc-
ess of creating the EMU unfolded in three phases, the last of which was 
the foundation of the European Central Bank, the determination of ex-
change rates and the introduction of the single currency. The single cur-
rency was not adopted by three member states: Denmark, Sweden and 
the UK. The ten member states who joined the Union on 1 May 2004 
must adopt the euro as soon as they meet the convergence criteria. They 
were not granted opt-out clauses during the accession negotiations.
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EURO, the – single currency that on 1 January 1999 was accepted by 
11 members of the EU (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, It-
aly, Luxembourg, Holland, Germany, Portugal and Spain), the ultimate 
aim being the total abolition of national currencies. Denmark and the 
UK used the right to remain outside the “euro zone” (according to the 
Maastricht Treaty), while Greece and Sweden did not formally satis-
fy the convergence criteria by the time mentioned. Greece, having met 
these criteria, entered the euro zone in 2001. The introduction of the 
euro as the single currency in the EU is the third phase of Econom-
ic and Monetary Union. The total replacement of national legal tender 
in the euro zone with euro bills and coins was carried out at the end of 
February 2002.
EUROBAROMETER – the name of a survey performed by the Euro-
pean Commission in the member states, aimed at monitoring the public 
opinion of EU citizens concerning the EU enlargement, social circum-
stances, health, culture, environmental protection, the euro, defence is-
sues, etc.  
EUROPE AGREEMENTS → ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS 
EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOP-
MENT, EBRD – was founded in 1991, the aim being to help the former 
communist countries in their transformation into market economies. 
In 27 countries, through investment into mostly private firms, either 
on its own or with partners, the Bank promotes structural and secto-
ral reforms, market competition, privatisation and entrepreneurship, the 
strengthening of financial institutions and legal systems, the necessary 
development of infrastructure for private sector development and the 
adoption of good corporate governance, including awareness of envi-
ronmental protection. Croatia became a member of the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development on 15 April 1993. The bank’s 
headquarters is in London.
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, ECB – administers the European 
central bank system, its task being to determine cash flows, manage 
foreign currency transactions, manage the official foreign currency re-
serves of the member states and look after orderly payments clearing. It 
was founded on 30 June 1998, when it took over the responsibility for 
implementing European monetary policy.
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EC – a political body that represents 
the interests of the EU as a whole. It proposes laws, policies and pro-
grammes, and is responsible for the implementation of the decisions of 
Parliament and the Council. Until the accession of the new members, 
it was composed of 20 members (two each from France, Germany, It-
aly, Spain and the UK, and one each from the other countries). Mem-
bers of the Commission are agreed on together by the member states, 
and they are confirmed by the European Parliament, to which the Com-
mission is answerable. In the new mandate, 2004-2009, the Commis-
sion is composed of 25 members. The period of office of Commission 
members lasts for five years. Within the context of the institutional tri-
angle of the Union (the European Commission, the Council of the EU 
and the European Parliament), the Commission represents the Europe-
an Community.
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY – an expression that used to be used un-
officially (until the negotiations concerning the EU) as a common term 
for all three communities: the European Coal and Steel Community, 
laid down by the 1951 Treaty of Paris, the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), 
founded in Rome in 1957. In unofficial EU communications all these 
three communities are referred to for short as the Community.
EUROPEAN COUNCIL – refers to the meeting of heads of state or 
heads of governments of EU member states with the President of the 
EC. Meetings are held four times a year, in order to discuss important 
EU issues. → COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COUNCIL OF THE EURO-
PEAN UNION.
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA, EEA – created in 1992 by an agree-
ment signed by the then 12 member states of the European Commis-
sion and 6 members of EFTA for the sake of the creation of a single 
market in which the freedom of the movement of people, goods, serv-
ices and capital would be respected. Today the EEA consists of the 25 
EU and 3 EFTA member states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway). In 
the EEA area, about 80% of the regulations of the single EU market are 
applied.
EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY, EES – one of the pillars 
of the Lisbon Strategy based on three objectives: (1) full employment, 
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(2) higher productivity and quality at work, and (3) social and territori-
al cohesion. → LISBON STRATEGY
EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION, EFTA – an internation-
al organisation uniting the markets of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway 
and Switzerland into a free trade zone that is at the same time a plat-
form for the participation of its three members (not including Switzer-
land) in the European Economic Area together with the 25 states of the 
EU. EFTA was founded by the Stockholm Convention of 1960 as an al-
ternative to the EEC as it then was.
EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK, EIB – is a financial institution of 
the EU that was organised in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome. The objec-
tive of this institution is to contribute to the integration process and in 
general to the objectives of the EU, through the provision of long-term 
financial resources for certain capital projects in the Union and other 
countries worldwide.
EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM, EMS – an agreement by which 
the member states of the EU linked their currencies so as to avoid great 
fluctuations in exchange rates and inflation. This monetary system, 
founded in 1979, was the forerunner of the Economic and Monetary 
Union.
EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY – a new policy calling on 
neighbours to the east and south of the EU to take part in the process of 
ensuring peace, stability and prosperity, its objective being to create a 
ring of friends around the borders of the new, enlarged EU.
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT – the representative body of the inhab-
itants of the EU. Members of this Parliament have been chosen by di-
rect ballot since 1979; the number of members chosen in a given Mem-
ber State is in proportion to the population of the country as a share of 
the total population of the EU. The new Constitutional Treaty says that 
no matter how small a country is, it has the right to a minimum of six 
members in Parliament. National quotas for each new member are laid 
down in the Accession Treaties. The maximum number of members in 
the Parliament is also laid down by the Founding Treaty. The European 
Parliament currently has 732 members, and its remit includes: consid-
eration of the proposals of the European Commission, participation in 
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the adoption of regulations, appointing and discharging members of the 
European Commission, the right to queries related to the work of the 
European Commission and the Council of the EU, division of authority 
in the adoption of the annual budget and supervision (with the Council) 
of the execution of the budget. In the institutional triangle of the Union 
(the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament), 
the Parliament represents the citizens of the Union.
EUROPEAN UNION, EU – a supranational community created as a 
result of collaboration and integration that was started in 1951 by six 
countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Neth-
erlands). After more than five waves of enlargement (1973, Denmark, 
Ireland and the UK; 1981, Greece; 1986, Portugal and Spain; 1995, 
Austria, Finland and Sweden; and the ten new members in 2004), the 
EU today has 25 members. The title of European Union was introduced 
in the European Union Treaty of Maastricht (1992). The first pillar of 
the EU consists of the three communities: the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom); the second pillar 
is its common foreign and security policy; and the third is collaboration 
in matters of justice and home affairs.
EUROSTAT – the statistical office of the EU collecting and processing 
comparable statistical data from the EU member states. 
EVOLUTIONARY CLAUSE – a formulation from the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement. In it, a state that starts the association proc-
ess expresses its intention to join the EU, and the EU accepts this.
EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE – member states are obligated 
to avoid excessive budgetary deficits, i.e. they must maintain budget-
ary discipline, respecting two criteria: the budgetary deficit must not 
amount to a sum that is more than 3% of GDP, and the public debt must 
not exceed a sum equivalent to 60% of GDP. If these values are exceed-
ed in some country, what is called an excessive deficit procedure is ac-
tivated at the level of the Union. The procedure establishes the level of 
the deficit, measures to cope with it, and possible financial penalties. 
The Stability and Growth Pact stipulates the procedure if this is an ex-
cessive deficit.
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EXCHANGE RATE MECHANISM, ERM – the germ of the Economic 
and Monetary Union. This was a system of adjustable exchange rates 
in which the exchange rates of the member states fluctuated within set 
limits. It was expected that this system would stabilise exchange rates, 
control inflation and be a spur to trade. Also developed was the ERM 
II system, as aid to countries that do not have the euro so that, respe-
cting common economic criteria, they can prepare for membership in 
the Union. → ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION
FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE – the basic objective of this is to lay 
down seven-year political priorities and to curb overall growth in bu-
dgetary expenditure in the EU. It is the fruit of agreements between the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and determines 
the maximum amount and structure of expenditures anticipated. So far 
four such agreements have been made: the 1988-1992 Financial Per-
spective (the first Delors package), the 1993-1999 Financial Perspecti-
ve (the second Delors package), the 2000-2006 Financial Perspective, 
which is the foundation for the Agenda 2000 financial package and the 
Financial Perspective 2007-2013. → AGENDA 2000
INSTRUMENT FOR STRUCTURAL POLICIES FOR PRE-ACCES-
SION, ISPA – was officially launched on 1 April 2000, the aim be-
ing to provide help to the EU candidate states in their preparations in 
the area of transport and environmental protection. The main priorities 
of the programme are: education concerning EU policies and procedu-
res, assistance in reaching EU environmental protection standards, and 
expansion and linkage with trans-European transport networks. → PRE- 
ACCESSION PROGRAMMES
INTERREG III – an initiative of the Community, the aim of it being 
to enhance economic and social cohesion in the EU through the enco-
uragement of the balanced development of the European continent via 
cross-border, trans-border and inter-regional collaboration. The initial 
idea of the Interreg initiative, adopted in 1990, was to prepare the bor-
der areas of member states for a community with no internal borders. 
Member states of the EU that take part in Interreg III can use the reso-
urces of the European Regional Development Fund for this purpose. 
States that are not EU members must finance their own participation in 
this initiative from their own resources and/or if the EC approves, from 
the EU assistance programme. At the EU level, within the context of 
the European Commission, the Regional Policy Directorate-General is 
charged with Interreg III affairs.
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LAEKEN DECLARATION → CONVENTION ON THE FUTURE 
OF EUROPE
LISBON STRATEGY – a set of joint strategic objectives adopted at 
the European Council meeting in Lisbon in March 2000, according to 
which the EU is to become the world’s most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy by 2010, capable of sustainable economic 
growth, with the highest level of employment and strong economic and 
social cohesion.
MAASTRICHT CRITERIA, COVERGENCE CRITERIA – principles 
laid down in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, when the member states set 
up the EU and agreed on these criteria for the establishment of econo-
mic and monetary union and a single currency: (1) the rate of inflati-
on can be at most 1.5% greater than the average rate of inflation of the 
three EU countries with the lowest inflation, (2) long-term interest ra-
tes must not be 2% higher than the average of the three EU countries 
with the lowest inflation, (3) the deficit of the national budget must not 
be greater than 3% of GDP, (4) the public debt must not be more than 
60% of GDP, (5) the national currency must be in the normal ERM 
range (→ EXCHANGE RATE MECHANISM) during the two previo-
us years. 
NEW MEMBER STATES – Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hunga-
ry, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia completed 
their negotiations and from being candidate countries became member 
states of the EU on 1 May 2004.
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE (Comité des re-
présentants permanents, COREPER) – a body consisting of the mem-
ber states’ permanent representatives (ambassadors) to the EU in Brus-
sels. The Committee provides assistance to the Council of Ministers at 
a stage of preliminary negotiations and consultations about the propo-
sals and drafts of instruments put forward by the European Commissi-
on. The COREPER’s task is to prepare the decisions and discuss other 
issues of political importance for the meetings of the Council of Mini-
sters. 
PHARE PROGRAMME – an assistance programme set up in 1989 
after the fall of communism in the countries of Central and Eastern Eu-
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rope, the objective of it being the reconstruction of these countries. At 
first it covered only Poland and Hungary and was called Pologne-Hon-
grie: Assistance à la restructuration économique (hence the acronym 
of today). In time it spread to the countries of CEE. Apart from giving 
help to the reconstruction of the economies of these countries, PHARE 
was the main financial instrument of the pre-accession strategy of the 
ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe that submitted applications 
for EU membership. The objectives of PHARE are mainly directed to 
building up institutions and the financing of investments in candidate 
countries. → PRE-ACCESSION PROGRAMMES
PRE-ACCESSION PROGRAMMES – As a form of aid for prepara-
tion of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe for membership 
in the EU, the EU founded three programmes for the 2000-2006 peri-
od: PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD. The PHARE programme concentra-
tes on the building up of institutions, participation in Community pro-
grammes, economic and social cohesion and industrial restructuring. 
The SAPARD programme deals with the modernisation of agriculture 
and rural development, while ISPA supports infrastructure projects in 
the area of transport and environmental protection.
PRE-ACCESSION STRATEGY – a form of assistance that was suppo-
sed to facilitate the economic and political transition in the countries of 
CEE. The European Council adopted it in 1994, and it was based on a 
deepening of the associated countries and EU institutions, development 
of the association agreements, financial aid via PHARE and preparati-
ons for integration into the single market.
SAPARD (The Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Ru-
ral Development) – a special EU accession programme for agricultural 
and rural development meant for candidate countries. The objective of 
the programme is to assist candidate countries to overcome problems 
of structural adjustments in their farm sectors and rural areas and to 
afford assistance in the implementation of the acquis in the area of the 
Common Agricultural Policy, and the whole of the relevant legislation. 
The programme was launched at the beginning of 2000, and the candi-
date states have the right to make use of it until they join the Union. → 
PRE-ACCESSION PROGRAMMES
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SCREENING – the first stage of negotiations for EU membership. It 
consists of determining the areas of a candidate country’s legislation 
that must be adjusted with the EU acquis and evaluating the current le-
vel of compatibility of the country’s legislation with the EU rules and 
the need for further adjustments. The screening serves as a basis for bi-
lateral negotiations between the EU member states and each of the can-
didate countries.
SINGLE MARKET, INTERNAL MARKET – the conceptual framew-
ork for the unification of the economic area in the EU through the re-
alisation of the four freedoms, as they are called – freedom of move-
ment of people, goods, services and capital without any internal bor-
ders. Today the concept “internal market” is used more, and this is how 
the same meaning is defined in the European Union Treaty, i.e. the abo-
lition of all internal barriers to the functioning of the four freedoms. 
The Single European Act of 1986 was the first to make essential amen-
dments to the Treaty of Rome (which paved the way for the creation of 
a common market) necessary for the establishment of a single market, 
and at the beginning of 1993 the internal market of the EU started fun-
ctioning.
SOCIAL POLICY PROTOCOL – adopted in 1991 in Maastricht, and 
signed by 11 EU countries (the UK did not sign it). It was subsequen-
tly signed by Austria, Finland and Sweden. In it, the signatory countries 
express their intention of increasing employment, improving living and 
working conditions and so on. This area was later included within the 
purview of the Amsterdam Treaty, and the Social Policy Protocol cea-
sed to exist as a separate entity.
STABILISATION AND ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT, SAA – a new 
generation of Europe agreements offered to the countries of SEE as part 
of the stabilisation and association process. The Agreement governs the 
general principles, political dialogue, regional collaboration, the free 
movement of goods, the movement of labour, the foundation of legal 
entities, the provision of services and capital, harmonisation of laws, 
implementation of laws and rules of market competition, justice and 
internal relations, political and financial collaboration. The Agreement 
gives a signatory country the status of potential applicant for mem-
bership in the EU. Croatia signed such an agreement with the EU on 
29 October 2001 and it entered into force on 1 February 2005.
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STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT – the foundation for the third de-
gree of the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union, which 
started on 1 January 1999. Its objective is to ensure budgetary discipli-
ne in the member countries after the introduction of the single curren-
cy. According to the provisions of the Pact, the European Council can 
penalise a Member State that does not undertake measures to reduce an 
excessive budgetary deficit.
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE – a political 
document agreed on 10 June 1999 in Cologne, with the strategic obje-
ctive of the convergence of the countries of SEE on the Euro-Atlantic 
structures and the strengthening of mutual collaboration. The pact sets 
up a framework for the collaboration of the states of SEE, the member 
states of EU, the USA, the Russian Federation, international organisati-
ons (including international financial institutions) and various regional 
initiatives. In Croatia, it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European 
Integration that is charged with the coordination of all activities rela-
ted to the Pact.
STRUCTURAL FUNDS, COHESION FUND – these constitute a part 
of the structural policy of the Union, the objective of which is to redu-
ce the gap in development between the rich and the poor regions and 
member states of the EU and to promote economic and social equali-
ty. The four structural funds are the European Regional Development 
Fund, ERDF; the European Social Fund, ESF; the European Agricul-
tural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, EAGGF and the Financial In-
strument for Fisheries Guidance, FIFG. The Cohesion Fund was set 
up in 1993 in order additionally to reinforce structural policy. It is me-
ant for cohesion countries the per capita GDP of which is less than 90% 
of the Union average, and its aim is to finance environmental protecti-
on and transport infrastructure. They make about one third of the EU 
budget.
EUROPEAN INNOVATION SCOREBOARD – contains a number of 
standardised indicators of innovation activities. The EC adopted the 
first such document in 2001.
TRANSITION INDICATORS – a system of qualitative indicators for 
the transition countries that are published by the EBRD. In accordan-
ce with them, in values of from 1 to 4+, grades are given to the restru-
cturing and privatisation of the corporate sector, the liberalisation of the 
market and the condition of financial institutions.
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TREATIES OF ROME – these were signed in 1957 in Rome during the 
foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Eu-
ropean Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). They also set up a cu-
stoms union among the countries of the ECSC (European Coal and Ste-
el Community, founded in 1951 by the Benelux countries, Germany, 
France and Italy) and defined the objectives for the creation of a com-
mon market to ensure the free movement of people, goods, services 
and capital. When the Maastricht Treaty (the European Union Treaty) 
came into force, the European Economic Community was renamed the 
European Community.
TREATY OF NICE – entered into force on 1 February 2003. It is the 
result of an intergovernmental conference that started in February 2000 
and ended in December of the same year. The Conference dealt with 
the composition and work of the EU institutions after the following wa-
ves of enlargement. By the entry into force of this Treaty and the EU 
enlargement with the accession of new countries, changes were intro-
duced in the composition and the manner of functioning of the Euro-
pean Parliament, Council of the European Union, European Commis-
sion, Court of First Instance of the European Communities, European 
Court of Auditors, Economic and Social Committee and the Commit-
tee of the Regions.
TREATY ON THE EUROPEAN UNION, EU TREATY – a treaty that 
set up the European Union and defined the objectives of the EMU, the 
single currency, common foreign and security policy, a common defen-
ce policy, the introduction of Union citizenship and close cooperation 
in justice and internal affairs. The member states signed it in 1992, and 
ratified it in 1993.
URUGUAY ROUND – trade talks that started in 1986 in Uruguay. It 
was only in 1994 that an agreement was signed by the ministers of 125 
countries meeting in Morocco. Although the negotiations lasted many 
years, they are considered to have been successful because they covered 
a number of trade matters and heralded the foundation of the WTO.
WHITE PAPER – an EU document with proposals for future activities 
in a given area. In some cases it follows a Green Paper published to la-
unch a consultation process at European level.
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